PREFACE

The theme of the 2000 issue of Animus is the Hegelian philosophy. Few philosophers since Plato or Aristotle have exerted such a profound, pervasive and palpable influence on later thinking as has G.W.F. Hegel; and as few have seen their central ideas and arguments so thoroughly muddied, compromised and controverted over two centuries of ideological cooption and hostile or thoughtless interpretation, mostly from points of view alien to Hegel's own.

In line with the general mandate of Animus, the editors have selected from many proffered submissions nine articles whose common merit is that they seek to recover the original letter and spirit of the Hegelian argument on its own terms. They may be grouped in three categories: (a) reflections on Hegel's relation to philosophical history, (b) essays of exposition, (c) assessments of later uses/abuses of the Hegelian text. We are especially pleased to include in this issue two pieces by James A. Doull, known to many as perhaps the most exacting interpreter of the Hegelian mind in this century.

a) In this first group, Doull's Hegel's Phenomenology and Postmodern Thought meets a long-standing need for a study, faithful to Hegel's intention, of the significance for cultural history of the argument of this much-misunderstood work, showing how, by its own account, it makes the transition from a modern to a post-modern philosophical standpoint. Then in Hegel's Presentation of the Cartesian Philosophy Floy E. Andrews examines Hegel's reading of the Cartesian philosophy and his appreciation of the historical importance of its key principle, the unity of thought and being in the idea of God. James Doull's second contribution questions a common prejudice regarding Hegel's alleged 'anti-liberalism' for which the latter's popular essay on the English Reform Bill is often cited as evidence. In Death on the Grand Scale, Graeme Nicholson artfully traces the theme of 'death' throughout the course of Hegel's system, in terms of its logical meaning, in its natural sense as a principle of organic genesis and mortality and again in the historical context of the birth and decline of civilizations.

b) The next two papers are chiefly expository. F. L. Jackson's Hegel's Psychology of Freedom, explicates the core argument of Hegel's psychology of mental life, a neglected work in which the all-important concept of 'spirit' finds its initial definition and justification. David Peddle's Hegel's Political Ideal takes up the theme of the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, or political spirit, clarifying Hegel's actual account of civil society and its relation to the state in counter-distinction to later interpretations of the same on the part of Marx, Taylor and Rawls.

c) The final three essays deal with how Hegel has been understood and misunderstood in later times. In Hegel's Lutheranism and Contemporary Theology, Gary Badcock examines how Hegel's account of the Trinity has been appropriated in the service of a later Christ-of-faith theological humanism, a
view that fails to appreciate Hegel's own adherence to a strict Lutheran emphasis on the priority of divinity. In Taylor on Phenomenological Method, Keith Hewitt takes Charles Taylor's well-known re-interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* decisively to task on the basis of the original text. Finally, in *The Discursivity of the Negative*, Daniel J. Selcer documents the emergence of one major school of later 'Hegelianism' in Alexandre Kojève's 'thirties lectures on Hegel which made a profound impact on a whole generation of French-existentialist thinkers.
Hegel's *Phenomenology And Postmodern Thought*¹

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Introduction

{MS-4} The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is an introduction to the *Science of Logic* and the other parts of the system one calls the Hegelian philosophy. It is introductory in that it [brings to light]² the subjective principle of the older modern philosophy, wherein what is other than self-consciousness is related to it, through a reflective logic, as forms of consciousness. This [reflective] relation [constitutes] the 'appearance' of spirit: a creative thinking which, through the rational creature, knows its creation as itself. When all forms of this relation - subjective, objective or historical, the conjunction of the two in religion - are considered in their development and succession, this apparent spirit is found to rest on spirit explicated in its own logical [or philosophical] form as spirit, not [simply] as for a subject. But the *Phenomenology* does not lead to the [philosophical] form of spirit as though it were not yet itself philosophy. [Rather], it is 'introductory' as comprehensive of, and pointing beyond, what is called 'modern' in distinction from 'ancient' philosophy. In ancient philosophy, though the concept of spirit occurs in its final systematic form as

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¹ *Editorial note:* In the months preceding his death in March, 2001, James Doull had been working on an article, intended for *Animus*, on the lesson of Hegelian phenomenology for an understanding of postmodern philosophical and political culture. The material is of a very preliminary, incomplete quality; rough drafts clearly not having had the benefit of editing, second review or rewriting on the part of the author. These have been numbered MS-1, MS-2, MS-3 and MS-4, but as there is considerable overlapping and repetition as to content, the ordering is arbitrary. I have therefore been forced to be inventive in meshing the four drafts as in order to form a continuous argument, such as seems to me best to reflect what I already know of his mind on these matters through earlier conversation. Thus various segments and fragmentary paragraphs have been melded as seemed fitting, the source in each case being appropriately prefixed. Where arguments are repeated, an alternative reading is footnoted in quotation marks. Instances of sheer repetition or fragmentary remarks which break off have been purged. With those exceptions, virtually all the extant script is included and nothing of my own interjected, although a degree of editorial tinkering was unavoidable in order to render certain sentences complete or their meaning more obvious. I have to this end added punctuation and inserted occasional words or phrases in square brackets. Where I had doubts, JD's unadulterated script is footnoted. All other footnoted comments are my own, as are the section titles -- *F. L. Jackson* ...

² MS: "shows"
Neoplatonism, there is only the beginning of spirit at the point where all things are returned to their [original unity].

Philosophy has its origin temporally in art and religion, so far as these are the forms of a people's knowledge of a concrete ethical freedom. In its three forms, philosophy unites art and [religion], showing both to be necessary. Within philosophy itself, the difference [between] the immediate unity of image and thought in art, and their reflected relation in the Vorstellung of [religious] thought, assumes the form of a [self-differentiation] of logical stages by which [thinking] comes to know its object as itself. The first [or ancient] philosophy which took its beginning in art presupposed a universal principle and came to know what that was through [a thinking through of] nature. The second, [modern] or phenomenological philosophy, presupposed nature, this presupposition mediated with the universal through the [thinking] subject. In the third the mediation is in God or the universal [itself]. This last philosophy gives adequate form to what is believed in the Christian religion and is the true intellectus fidei; [a thinking] neither extraneous [to its content] nor mediated [only] through the subject, as in the Augustinianism become modern philosophy.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is a comprehension of modern philosophy in its development of the subject as certain of itself to the truth of that certainty, and the concomitant development of a 'free society'. Following the method given in the introduction of the work, a reader thus oriented can discover the unity and [deliberate] movement of the work according to Hegel's intention, though [it is a standpoint] hard to attain for those nurtured in the presuppositions of a later age. That philosophy is a form

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3 MS: "their origin".  
4 JD's argument wholly assumes Hegel's account of the consummation of modern philosophy in his time, with its consequent radical shift in thinking, the emergence of a 'third', 'post-modern' phase of philosophical history.  
5 MS: "difference".  
6 That philosophy generally shares in and arises out of the absolute perspective of art and religion is of course the central doctrine of 'absolute spirit', which describes the universal interest embodied in those speculative enterprises through which finite, self-consciousness human beings seek to appropriate, express and embody the infinity of freedom as their own essential actuality, their truth in and as "spirit". The systematic (i.e. logical) relation of art, religion and philosophy is given in Encyc. Part III, Section Three (and elsewhere), but the same triune relation is reflected, not only in philosophy itself in its constituent idea, but also in the historical 'appearances' of philosophy as described in Encyc. Ss. 574-577. There the 'syllogisms' which describe the essential thrust of the ancient (ss.575) and the modern (ss.576) philosophies culminate in a third syllogism which defines the standpoint of a new philosophical thinking aborning in Hegel's time -- a thinking which freely and explicitly commences from none other than the principle of spirit as such, as the 'idea' implicit in and informing all philosophy. The Hegelian system gives the broad logical outline of this third phase of philosophical history.  
7 The role of the Phenomenology is central since it was explicitly intended by Hegel as the logical recapitulation of the standpoint of the finite or subjective spirit and the whole Christian and later modern-philosophical culture resting on it; as comprehended from the point of view of its perceived consummation in Hegel's time. It thus at once forms the appropriate 'introduction' to a new and distinctively post-modern standpoint. JD's interest herein is not directed so much to the internal argument of the Phenomenology itself, as to the overall view of history it presupposes on the one hand, and on the other, what the transition to a 'third' post-modern, post-Christian culture of which Hegel writes has subsequently come to mean. For further, see James Doull, "What is the Augustinian 'Sapientia'?", Dionysius 12 (1988) 61-67.  
8 MS: "unfailing".
of 'absolute spirit', what 'spirit' as absolute or finite is, what philosophy has to do with art and religion - all this is long forgotten.

Though words may differ, to say that philosophy is a form of 'absolute spirit' is in no way an eccentric opinion but that of all philosophers before Hegel, though they might stumble like men drunk and only after a certain development come to know explicitly what they were about. What distinguishes philosophy since the post-Hegelian revolution is the conviction that [the new] humanized philosophy and culture generally have not lost but taken [wholly up into] themselves, as their own, everything that had before been ascribed to religion and metaphysics, to the [alleged] detriment of human freedom. 'Post-Christian' is not said merely of ways of thought antagonistic to Christianity - animism, enlightenment [or] whatever - but to [the general belief that] humanity, as having absorbed Christianity, [is] able on its own to realize a freedom to which religion had come to be only an impediment and a delusion. The formation of this attitude is not to be explained as an 'overthrow' of philosophy as formerly understood. Those who first spoke of these changes and their successors rather found themselves [already] on the other side of a wall, and of former philosophy saw only what made sense from that position.

Hegel had not long departed this life when one learned from those who had heard him or were closely associated with his thought that religion was myth or that its proper theme was humanity; that philosophy was the guide to a wholly secular liberation, [a liberation] not least from religion and metaphysics [themselves]. If not many at first gave in explicitly to this radical humanization of philosophy, what was called philosophy in the nineteenth century culture after the 'thirties was [nonetheless] hardly less remote from the Hegelian concept of philosophy as a form of absolute spirit. Philosophers wavered between more naturalistic and more idealistic versions, losing hold of the dialectic that might have combined these opposed directions and [failing] to uncover a unity of the two without [obscuring] the difference.

The logic of this [post-Hegelian] transition to a humanized philosophy, the history of this philosophy as it sought to unify its divisions, and of the incipient return from it to older philosophies as of other than historical interest, has yet to be [fully] given. It may be thought that we are for now at a certain lull in the storm where post-Hegelian schools have lost their attraction and the passions which animated their discovery have subsided; where philosophy in any of the three forms Hegel knew only begins to return from a long oblivion.

Phenomenology And Philosophical History

{MS-1} The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [as] an introduction to the *Science of Logic* and the other parts of the Hegelian system, does not lead everyone to the system, whatever presuppositions one may hold as to how, if at all, 'spirit' can be known.

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9 The simile is Aristotle's. Anaxagoras in bringing presocratic metaphysics to completion in the idea of *nous*, is spoken of as "a sober man among drunkards."
philosophically. What 'spirit' means is taken to be known through the Christian religion: the triune God in himself, the creation of irrational nature and of the rational creature, implicitly spiritual, the division or 'fall' of the rational creature, the revelation of what God is in the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Son, the conversion thereby of the division into a moment of concrete spiritual form unifying God and the human individual. That this belief -- expressed in a thinking which used natural relations for what was beyond them -- could be known as true also for thought, had long been the interest of philosophical Christians; a necessary interest since, for other than philosophical thought, the *Vorstellung* was incredible.

Philosophy is for Hegel a form of 'absolute spirit' and the highest. It is only to be treated after art and religion, being in a manner a unity of the two. That is a hard saying and differs from what since his time one has commonly taken philosophy to be - as the most general of the sciences, perhaps, [having] something more to say of the embodied self-consciousness which is man than psychology and the life sciences or something further than the social sciences about human communal relations; [or which perhaps], as logic, can speak of the common form of all inquiries. The unity of mind and body, which man is, is not grasped as 'free spirit', nor history as the common realization of that freedom. Absolute spirit, as that in which historical reality and subjective freedom are united, which the individual comes to as the knowledge of his freedom, "has its reality in spirit", and not in the recurrent evils and precarious goods of historical existence - 'absolute spirit' [in that sense] appears [to a later time] as a vain notion, an escape, perhaps an opiate.

But all peoples have their arts in which they realize beauty - the ugly as well, if the world is for them ugly -- and some religion in which they have relations to divine beings potent to realize or frustrate human ends. [But if] all peoples have arts and religions, few peoples have discovered philosophy in Hegel's sense. Philosophy as separate from art and religion, unmixed with myth and image, came into being first among the ancient Greeks. The ground was prepared for that philosophy by the political freedom of the *polis* - not an abstract subjective freedom, but an ethical freedom in which individuals knew themselves free in realizing the concrete objective ends of family and state. To this freedom poets and other artists gave a universal foundation -- a religion in the medium of art, nature and freedom harmonized, the harmony not broken by the emergence of the rational individual or person from the domestic and the political community.

It is the emergence of subjective freedom from the collision of natural and political institutions, the formation of an actual relation of individual and universal within which falls [also] their difference, that permits the appearance of philosophy. In the aesthetic

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11 Here and in what follows, reference to 'the *Vorstellung* ' is JD's (as Hegel's) shorthand for the specifically Christian representational schema, forming the unique content of its general belief as articulated in the doctrines mentioned. 'Spirit' might also be said somewhat to belong to the class of quasi-natural representations (Holy Spirit, the Comforter etc.); the corresponding philosophical concept addressed more in terms of the idea of an unconditionally actual freedom.
mode both tragic and comic poetry verge on this unified thought, but one on the side of the universal, the other on that of the individual. Philosophy is from the first a free universal thinking which would know all else through forms of itself - concepts or - and these forms as leading to the highest which is "the thinking of thinking itself". Not that philosophy knew from the first [what] it was, as though it could [directly] appropriate the result of the self-knowledge attained in the aesthetic medium. Though in the order of experience philosophy was dependent on that aesthetic knowledge, once discovered, it had its independent growth, at first antagonistic to the anthropomorphizing images of the artists, then recognizing a common end more adequately known in the medium of thought.

After Aristotle, with whom this universal thought discovered what it was, interest turned to the relation of free individuals or persons to that objective end. This relation was sought first in the humanized world of Hellenistic-Roman culture which drew to it the peoples who did not know the individual freed == or repelled the Jewish people who in their religion knew the root of that freedom [only] in its pure universality. The free individuals of that culture, finding their independence to dissolve into sceptical instability, turned inward to discover that absolute principle in the several forms of Neoplatonism in which ancient philosophy reached its limit.

The limit of that philosophy was that in Neoplatonism the movement to the absolute principle was from the side of the free individual and not also from the principle, though that it should be this as well was contained in the Aristotelian idea of a self-creative thought. The [Neoplatonic] philosophy knew as the assumed end of its search the intuition of a unity before all division and difference. That philosophy might move from the negativity of this result and [come to] know [that] what was other than the principle [also pertains] to it, and to the free individual, required a new beginning. That beginning, if it would become the end and interest of all, could not exist first as philosophy. Nor could one revert to the aesthetic religion which was the birthplace of the ancient philosophy, since here the need was of the free individual, which had broken with the world to find a world in which its freedom had reality. The condition of such a further philosophy was the Christian religion in which God, knowing division as his own - God as trinitarian -- revealed what he was in the incarnation, death and resurrection of his Son; where[in] individuals were not only implicitly free through submission to their creator, as in Judaism, but as divided and in relation to the creation given over to their passions and finite interests and turned against the creator, were [yet] drawn by the Son from that division to the concrete freedom revealed in him. In this religion the Aristotelian principle, purged of the presupposed finitude through which philosophical thought had access to it by the negativity of the free individual and its self-knowledge in Neoplatonism, was known as realized in the spiritual relation of God and man in the medium of a thought expressed in language, available to those drawn in faith to the revelation as absolute truth without need of the hard intellectual formation requisite for philosophy.

[This] intellectus fidei had for its medium before the modern age ancient philosophy, especially in the final systematic form called Neoplatonism. [Whether] thought through
more Aristotelian or more Platonic versions of this philosophy, the concrete spirit of the religious belief neither appeared nor was known [in a thinking] equally concrete. [The Neoplatonic] philosophy led [only] to 'the One' before the division of thinking and thought - implicitly 'spirit', as the source of all things, but not to be spoken of unless in images. For a new philosophy to emerge from this religion it was necessary that the human world, receptive of it and informed by it, should attain the form of a concrete ethical order, where the interest of individuals was to realize objective institutional ends, unitive of nature and subjective freedom. This occurred historically in the reformation of the medieval church by which subjective freedom [came to be] known as a necessary moment in the reception of religious truth. The reflection of this reform on human institutions was to overthrow the medieval order in all its principal aspects: instead of a celibate ideal to give priority to family life; to set work for one's living above poverty [as] an abstract freedom from the temptations of economic life; to put in place of obedience a free acceptance of political power.

But in these transformed relations to the world, which rested on the relation of the individual in the religious community to his reconciliation as accomplished in Christ, there was not yet the free self-consciousness which would be the moving force in the modern age, alike in philosophy and in human life generally. The ancient philosophy, in the aesthetic Sittlichkeit in which it originated, did not have in it the free rational individual or person. In this second beginning there was only implicitly the free subject, certain of its being and, in that certainty, of its capacity to know the divided or finite and to relate it to the human good. The course of philosophy in the modern age would develop the relation of that subject to the absolute substance, the God of religious faith, and to the radically externalized nature (implicitly the same as that self-conscious certainty), [and to develop these relations in] the concrete form they had in the religious Vorstellung. The principal interest of this philosophy Kant knew to be "God, freedom and immortality" -- that the subject was free also in its immediate embodied existence. Even [so], for the sceptical among the [modern] philosophers -- and scepticism is part of philosophy -- what philosophy could not know were these objects-in-general. The general history of that age was disturbed by revolutions which had the same direction as philosophy -- to develop subjective freedom. The popular will, which [initially] saw itself as constitutive of the state [and] as appropriating it, in the end found its true freedom in returning to the ethical order with which modernity began, only now as having subjective freedom in it.

The [aim of] Phenomenology is to introduce the philosophy of the concrete spirit, of which it can be said it differs from the religious Vorstellung, not in content, but only in giving [that content a] conceptual form [appropriate] to a reader [who is] already in the philosophy of the modern age. This [modern] philosophy begins where the [ancient] philosophy ended - with the subject certain of itself, as beyond division and the

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12 I.e., the Reformation.
13 In Hegel's reasoning, a 'return' always directly entails a new beginning, and one more concrete than the original since comprehensive of all that has intervened. The 'return' to the original Christian-modern principle is thus at once the emergence of a new Sittlichkeit, the post-modern culture in which Hegel already found himself and which is subsequently presupposed.
possibility of being deceived as to itself, a subject which finds as its principal idea an absolute substance [as] cause of its own existence. For this new beginning in philosophy the way to God or the absolute substance is not [as for the ancient] through nature and its reflection into an ideal world. [Having grasped] nature as unified, this [new] thinking radically distinguishes it from itself, and knows it as radically externalized. [In] this structure, the movement of thought [now] is, in the light of the divine substance, to find itself by going into the world, which, [though] separated from [the independence of thinking], is implicitly one with it. The objects of primary interest in this reconstitution of the former order are: the freedom of the subject; the laws or necessary connections through which the endless otherness of extended matter is intelligible; the relation of the free subject to itself as a living individual in nature; and God as comprehensive of nature and freedom.

The way to knowledge and the amelioration of human life in this context was by experience. The interest of philosophy was to discover the method of experience, how one might not end in doubting all things but, [as a] free subject, to distinguish true from false. Philosophy not only discovered a method -- having which and adapting it to particular subject matters the sciences and technical arts might go their way oblivious to their foundations -- but [knew] itself, in relation to its universal interests, as a knowledge by experience. What was sought before by turning from the world to a divine truth was to be discovered now by turning to nature, not as a distant image of an intelligible world, but as the work of a divine creator, creative alike of the spatio-temporal conditions of nature [as] of its several orders constituted according to categories of necessity and causality.

[Whether] taken as constitutive of things or subjectively as 'categories' of the understanding, the free subject knew truly through these forms. But in the [subsequent] development of this philosophy of the freedom of the subject and the necessity of the understanding, the experience of 'spirit', which is the subject of the Phenomenology, was of the problems the free subject encountered in its knowledge of itself, of nature, and of God in the relation of self-consciousness to what was other than but also belonged to it. As against the older intellectus fidei there was here [the actual] experience -- or what is equivalent -- the appearance of spirit. The intuition of unity before division had given way to a mediated knowledge comprehensive of division. But in this relation the moment of division and difference is unequal to [that of their unity], the mediation [being only] through the free subject. The movement of the subject is to overcome this inequality and expose the 'spirit' underlying its appearance.

14 In Hegel's account, the whole of modern thought from Descartes to Kant is properly to be described as a reflection on God, the world and the self explicitly from the standpoint of the self-certain thinking subject (in Hegel's terms, the finitely existing, 'appearing' or phenomenal spirit). The ordinary term for this relation of a self-conscious being to all that appears to it as given, is simply 'experience'. Modern philosophy is thus uniquely 'philosophy of experience', which is why Hegel's titles his summary of it 'phenomenology' -- "the science of the experience of consciousness" (see Phenomenology of Spirit, concluding remarks of Introduction).

15 Neoplatonic?
This mediation is first in the subject, its development to a concrete unity of individual and universal, in which the opposition in all its forms of self-consciousness and consciousness is comprehended. The unified individual has then to know the [realization] in objective or historical form of its freedom. Then the unity of these two developments is known through religion as the free relation of human and divine implicit in this unity [which is], through a succession of religions, attained in Christianity. The philosophy as such of phenomenological spirit is finally a reflection on the unfreedom remaining in the religious Vorstellung, which draws on the subjective and objective experience, the destruction and restoration of the religious relation in these forms, and through the concept of religion thus attained knows that unfreedom to belong to the form and not to the true content of the Christian religion. In this translation of Vorstellung to the form of thought the subjective mediation gives way to a mediation inherent in the divine idea, which is the standpoint of the Hegelian system.16

The third philosophy, to which Hegel first gave expression, has like the second the Christian religion as that in which it exists in the general consciousness. But the relation of the religious to the philosophical form of 'absolute spirit' is not the same. The second, in disciplining an abstract subjective spirit -- [otherwise] destructive of the Christian religion -- to the concrete content of the Vorstellung, gave to it a philosophical form. The third philosophy founds its relation to nature, and to finite spirit in [both] its subjective and objective aspects, [directly] on the Christian trinitarian idea, this as the [explicit] object of a thinking which, through the first and second philosophies, knows itself and its objects as concrete - as the division and return [to itself] of an original unity. The movement of this thought, as in the Vorstellung, is to a relation of equal 'persons' within which are contained all subjective and objective concepts.18 On this foundation rests a Sittlichkeit in which 'life' or the immediate existence of spirit, and the relations of individuals in their particularity, are comprehended in a self-governing community wherein the unity of freedom and nature in family, society and state is equally the unfolding of an objective end, and, from the side of individuals, the realizing of that end as their concrete good.

16 This short paragraph gives the briefest possible summary of the stages in the argument of Phenomenology, the upshot of which is the standpoint of the 'third' philosophy of the system.
17 The MS has 'drawing back'.
18 MS-4 has: "The third philosophy which began with Hegel had again its finite condition in an ethical order in which subjective and institutional freedom coincided. The mediation is through the religious Vorstellung -- the subjective assent to the objective operation of grace. Secularly the result is acquiescence in a divinely appointed political order. That this unity be for the subject and through its activity was, [in the practical sphere], the work of the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The interest of these revolutions is to bring a subjective freedom into an institutional order [that is itself] implicitly free. This new order had its foundation neither in the 'religion of beauty' [of the ancients] nor in the Christian freedom of the Reformation, but in the Christian Trinitarian idea [as such] as the object of philosophical thought - the Hegelian idea. In this relation the war of Enlightenment with the Christian religion was ended. [True], the formation of individuals generally to a knowledge of their freedom was through that religion in its Protestant form, the meaning of the Vorstellung being allowed therein to prevail over its form. [But] in [the new] ethical order the inflexible religious basis of the family was no longer seen as in conflict with subjective freedom but as [the latter] objective end; [while] civil society no longer tended to replace the state, giving primacy to competing particular interests; [rather] sovereignty and the popular will were reconciled in the state."
{MS-4} What tribes and peoples take for their gods -- as beings capable of sustaining their communities and interests and imparting to individuals some sense of an independence from, or at least a coincidence with, the recurrent course of nature - to such beings mythopoeic fancy [has given] countless forms, personalized more or less superficially. [But] that the religion of a people and the expression of itself aesthetically should also take the form of philosophy supposes that its institutions are animated by a subjective freedom -- that individuals know the realization of their common ends as a realization also of [that] freedom. One can say with Aristotle that the tendency to philosophy is present in all men; [however], that this tendency develop into philosophy as such -- a thinking that [knows its] determinations as its own and not a thought mixed with myth and image -- this thinking must exist virtually in the relation of free individuals to their institutions. From the laborious freedom of political life philosophy could emerge as the science of the free man who knew the principle of that freedom.

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**Genesis Of Post-Modern Culture**

{MS-2} *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is comprehensive of the subjective standpoint of modern philosophy. Its treatment of that philosophy is different from that of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as not looking back to that history from the new concept of philosophy which emerged from its argument, but, so to speak, from within it, following the development of the subjective principle itself. The infinite substance, existent from its intrinsic necessity, which the Cartesian subject found in itself as its primary idea, was for the [Hegelian] subject -- which not only found [a principle] of concrete freedom in itself but knew the objective development of that freedom -- no longer simply substance but also subject. The relation of human freedom to that infinite subjectivity was not that of Augustinian predestination, as in the Protestant Christianity with which the period began, but of a freedom realized also on the human side.

The new [or third] philosophy which this argument discovered had no longer the form of a subjective freedom reconciled with the world [only] in principle, by methodical exploration and ordering of the world finding itself in it but also divided from it. [It was no longer] the appearance or experience of spirit but spirit itself: nature as a moment of divine freedom; human freedom as a divided subjective and objective relation to that freedom; that division overcome where human and divine meet in the forms of absolute spirit.

The difference of this new philosophical standpoint from that of phenomenal spirit appears in all aspects of human life. In the primary human institutions there is no longer a contest between objective end and individual freedom. The relation of man and woman is no [longer] a medieval separation of ideal unity and abstract legality; nor is it a unity [that is] inward and implicit only, not extending to differences; [nor again a] relation realized in particular interests without inner unity. [In the new relation] inclination and reason meet, and its realization is through the [conforming]\(^\text{19}\) of nature to the *Sittlichkeit* of the

\(^{19}\) MS: “formation”.
family in children. [Moreover], the sphere of private interests is no longer a contest of 'estates' with one another and with a state in course of attaining an effective unity. The revolutions are past in which one sought to centre political sovereignty in 'society'. [If] 'society' [used to be] taken to be within the state, as states became more and more democratized, the rights of individuals and of national communities were assumed to be prior to all institutional relations. [Thus] in both family and in the interrelation of society and state there was at first a deepened spiritual unity, then a falling away from this unity to a priority of individuals in their diverse interests and natural particularity. [But] neither tendency can be grasped without the other and neither through the antecedent modern philosophy. The rights assumed to belong to individuals and national communities reflect an institutional order in which individuals, as capable of concrete freedom, are the primary end and interest.

In religion the new philosophy worked a like revolution. One is not to suppose that someone of perverse, aberrant genius invented the Hegelian philosophy in the face of common sense and national experience. Rather, as is the office of the philosopher, Hegel discerned and defined logically a universal shift in the self-understanding of peoples, touching all the principal objects of their interest. In religion the shift pertained to the relation [of peoples] to the primary doctrines of the Christian religion. The belief of the church had been given stable universal form in antiquity, accommodated to the Greco-Roman culture within which it had [its] historical existence. With peoples who had been converted to the Christian religion, not from that developed culture but from an undeveloped barbarous condition, the need was to form in them that ordered, rational relation to their religion which otherwise must be a mixture of piety and destructive savagery in [their] relation to the world. Religious belief was both beyond this developing order and mediated by it, expressed through fasts, pilgrimages and other austerities, reverence to saints in whom faith was actual, [and] communicated [both] symbolically and through the discipline of works by a sacred clergy. [In this era] the philosophical understanding of the concrete spirituality of Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection and the relation of the faithful to this belief was through the analogies of a finite reason [as applied to] a unity before [all] division and discourse. There was no place for the subjective principle of the modern age which radically combined intuition and discourse.

The modern age was founded on a spiritual relation to the spiritual content of the Christian religion; a relation in which substantial unity, division and subjective return to the origin are not dissipated, as in Neoplatonism, into a primal unity. [But], though the relation is now 'spiritual', it is only as the 'appearance' of spirit: subjectivity, while taken philosophically as the beginning, is extraneously mediated, relating itself to the substantial unity [of spirit itself] only through a dialectical reflection on the finite, in the course of which reflection it unifies its own divided moments and discloses the objective foundation of this reflection itself.

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20 JD has in mind the Christianized Germanic peoples, the original European 'nations'.
21 I have considerably rearranged the wording of this last sentence defining the essential 'phenomenality' of the modern spirit. The original MS has: "The relation is spiritual, but as apparent spirit, in that the subjective moment is either extraneously mediated or, taken philosophically as the beginning, has relation..."
This 'phenomenal' spirituality brought with it a radical shift in the understanding and practice of the Christian religion and its relation to a secular order.\(^{22}\) In its religious form it took for its object the *Vorstellung* itself of the principal doctrines, not [its] translation into the concepts of the Neoplatonic synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic thought. The intent [lay now], not in a virtuous reform of the will against the background of eternal damnation and purgatorial correction, but in the relation of individuals directly to their absolute restoration. Against the [purely inward] reconciliation in this relation, the subjective moment subordinated in it would on its own make that reconciliation explicit and real by [returning to]\(^{23}\) the world and in that relation maintaining a rational self-conscious unity. The phenomenal spirit of the modern age was [to become] occupied with the relation of religion, as so taken, and enlightened reason; the new beginning which Hegel discerned and delineated at a certain point in its development comprehended the terms of that division.

With that change the phenomenal spirit gave way to concrete spirit: the [mere] apprehension of the *Vorstellung* passed into agreement with its content. The result is still with us, but as externalized: the subject of the religious relation appears as the existing individual, or as a humanity capable of realizing beyond limit the finite freedom of all its members. When one speaks of a post-Christian or post-modern world what is meant is [just] this externalized spirit. The consequences for religion, as they have unfolded, are wonderful to consider. Where for Hegel, who had thought through [the whole career of the] phenomenal spirit the result was a knowledge of the constant belief of Christians in the unique truth of their religion -- as adequate to what [is assumed] in all religion, other religions as containing a partial truth, *a praeparatio evangeli* --, for the externalized standpoint, first, all religions are equal; second, the most primitive is preferable as abstracting least from human existence; third, the Christian religion is of all the most intolerable as most radically founded in thought. The result is a Christianity factualized, resting on a fundamentalism either of image and symbol or of scriptural text.

The confirmation of the Christian religion was for Hegel 'in spirit and in truth'; the historical contingencies of its first appearance, [its] later tradition and [subsequent] division of Christendom into complementary forms [having] had their truth in that [spiritual] relation. What separates Hegel from the forms which the new philosophical beginning he articulated assumed after his time, [is that] there has occurred a conflation of the historical development of Christian peoples in which the original meaning of the modern age has [itself] been lost from sight. In that conflation, Descartes and his successors appear to have conceived a dualism of mind and body, thought and nature. That their intent was rather to discover a unity such as was not before known is largely forgotten, as alien to a mentality which assumes that unity immediately. [The] history of

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\(^{22}\) The reference, one presumes, is to Protestantism.

\(^{23}\) MS: "by giving into the world". Reference is to the Renaissance renewal of interest in nature and the human condition on the part of an individualism fully disciplined in the 'otherworldliness' of Christian spiritual inwardness. Having gained the confidence and certainty of their inner freedom thereby, it became possible to re-engage the finite world, without, as was the case with Roman individualism, succumbing to mysticism or scepticism.
this post-Christian, post-modern world has [since] run its course to the point of a scepticism which no longer knows whether philosophical thought is possible at all; whether there [could be] a free self-consciousness where mind is assimilated to body and their relation a mystery. In the practical realm, universal rights are ascribed to individuals as prior to all institutional relations; [but] what the universality [of right] and its articulation as a plurality [could mean] from this standpoint of the externalized spirit, is not intelligible. The meaning of rights and their application becomes in this context a matter of arbitrary and shifting judgment. Institutions as predicated on indeterminate rights lose their cohesion and capacity to unify divided opinions, the exercise of power tending therefore to be arbitrary and tyrannical.

The source of this dissolution and loss of coherent thought is perhaps most easily evident when one considers the origin and meaning of universal rights. The thoughtful historian knows that the 'universality' of the individual -- the rational individual or person capable of universal determination in relation to such others -- is a concept unknown before the Hellenistic-Roman age. The historian knows also that the more concrete 'rights of man and the citizen' in their various formulations are the product of the rational spirit of Enlightenment. The further extension of rights in modern democracies, including the rights of communities, draw their universality from the concrete spirit expressed in the Hegelian philosophy. Taken in abstraction from that history and the philosophies animating it, rights have the contradictory quality of equalizing all differences [while] at the same time requiring they be saved; or they appear as a leveling equality and also the immediate reaction to this [from the standpoint of] a being in nature.

Considered from the side of the Hegelian philosophy, 'post-modernity' is the concrete unity of nature and thought [as it appears] in the Sittlichkeit of family, society and state set forth in the Philosophy of Right. The [philosophical science]24 which [would] grasp the logical structure of post-modernity assumes the system, but in its practical aspect at that first stage of its development -- that unification of spirit in ethical institutions as completed in what Hegel calls the 'immediate state'. That [immediate] state is distinguished in the argument of the Philosophy of Right from the state as externalized, [i.e., 'civil society'], as a state in which the natural particularity of a people has been united concretely with their common rational universality, [existing thus] as a particular individual in relation to other such individual states.

24 JD is tempted to call this inquiry 'phenomenology' in another, post-Hegelian sense. As I find this distinction obscures the main flow of the argument I have excluded it. The MS reads: "The philosophical science whose object is this appearance is a 'phenomenology of spirit', but in an altered sense from that of the work so named. That [latter] phenomenology is introductory to the new philosophy of the Hegelian system. The phenomenology which can grasp the logical structure of 'post-modernity' assumes the system, but in its practical aspect ... etc".

25 See PhR 157B and 183.

26 JD here is here describing, phenomenologically, the principle of the modern nation-state, in particular the European-Christian monarchies. The limit of the 'immediate' state lies in its existence as a distinct community, based as much on some naturalistic distinction of boundary, blood, language, lineage etc. as on a universal political principle. The universal grounds of political right in the Christian principle of freedom thus tend to be conflated with and degenerate into claims to nationhood on the part of particular self-identified peoples or Volker. It is this intrinsic inconsistency which makes inevitable the eventual mutual
That this state does not rest in its ideality (as Plato wished that the polis of his Laws remain as isolated as possible from the corrupting relation to other states) is to be understood through the logic of spirit which variously determines the development also of states which have not, [as it has], attained a concrete ethical unity. Spiritual unity is not [something] immediate, but a [self-subsistence] through division and externality and the negation of it. The externality of the 'immediate' state [consists in] its natural particularity, and its movement is to unite [this its givenness] with its inner ideality. But the state as thus unified does not [then] have a spiritual form. The subjectivity attained in this unification -- which is the active or executive power in its constitution -- only becomes actual as the unity of the whole people when they forget this ideality and are given over to the multiple [internal] interests of partial communities -- e.g., economic and other corporations.

{MS-4} In the political system of the nineteenth century, whose dominant form is the nation state, the inner universality of the state is lost from sight in the [welter of] relations of one to another as particular wills. The instability and contradiction brought to light in these relations is the point of transition to absolute spirit as that on which they depend. This transition is found in some form or other in all human communities, however rudimentary the structure of their domestic, economic and political institutions. The structures through which individuals have common binding ends -- are 'communities' -- both liberate and confine or even enslave. So far as members of a community are awakened to a sense of their individual freedom, and [of] its confinement, they are impelled to 'liberate' themselves from their institutions, whether to remake them and find room for their awakened freedom or only to relapse into the same unfreedom.

{MS-2} In post-modernity, as springing from the completed inner development of the European state, the division [into particular and ideal elements] also is complete, and appears able to stand on its own [independent of] the state [itself] and its religious foundations. If, however, one follow attentively the logical development of post-modernity [one witnesses] a dissolution of this confidence in its independence of earlier forms. Thus at first only a radical minority went fully over to this division and [its] utopian confidence in an ultimate human liberation, whether in a Marxist or Nietzchean form or some variation of these. People generally held to the sovereignty of their states, adhering to the abstract [or] moral aspect of that division or [else to its] natural extreme, or to some conflation of the two. Power in the states passed to a middle class and formally to a more and more inclusive democracy. The [European] states found an objective realization of their sovereignty in empires, subjecting peoples of less liberated cultures and providing for the enrichment of the middle class.

destruction of the European Volksgeister, as also the emergence of a universal Weltgeist, an historical dialectic which JD will point out below is the whole upshot and inspiration of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

27 One takes 'natural particularity' here to refer to those differences of locale, lineage, language etc wherein peoples distinguish themselves as 'nations'.
28 For Hegel on this general point, see Encyc. ss. 482.
29 The elements whose unification wholly on the side of finite humanity is the basis of the 'immediate state' as defined in the antepenultimate paragraph.
The contradiction of this nineteenth century system -- of sovereignties assumed absolute and at the same time particular, and pursuing particular ends of competing economic interests -- was brutally exposed in the First World War. Hegel in his time saw in such a collision "the [manifest] dialectic of the finitude of these spiritual communities (PhR. 340)\textsuperscript{30} and the coming into being of a world community whose moving end [would be] to realize universally that concrete freedom which the particular states attained inwardly in the completion of their historical development. The attempt, following its ruin, to grasp what that inner structure of the nineteenth century European system was, to grasp what this inner [basis of] sovereignty might be if purged of its particular embodiments, only resulted in a confused and impotent attempt to form a common world government.\textsuperscript{31}

For the logic of the relation of particular sovereignties which had come to the telos of a long Christian formation to the recognition of a universal or providential reason working in history to [become fully manifest], the states still had to suffer a long and difficult history. The first stage was a separation of their divided externality from a deceptive political sovereignty and of the terms of the division from each.\textsuperscript{32} The radical positions of the so-called [right and] left Hegelians (anti-Hegelians they would better be called) took on a new life in the opposition of an existential nationalism to a universal Marxist will.\textsuperscript{33} Contrary fascist and Marxist parties -- the two positions are abstractions from the concrete unity of individuals and their institutions -- divided European states in more and less virulent forms, seizing power when they could, until the opposition took a general form and collided in the Second World War.

In this conflict of the opposed elements of post-modernism neither appeared in its purity. To attain the dominance it sought, each had to appropriate the spiritual resources of the state, [though] in a forced [amalgamation],\textsuperscript{34} not in that which could come into

\textsuperscript{30} The MS translates Erscheinende as 'appearing -- that is phenomenological -- '. The passage referenced is a celebrated one wherein Hegel describes the dialectical logic according to which, out of the historical conflict of the European nation-states, a post-national or world-historical spirit is to emerge motivated directly by the demand for a universal human freedom. JD views the cataclysmic wars of the twentieth century in this context, as the final, self-inflicted death-throes of European nationalism. The question then becomes what one is to make, politically and philosophically, of the aftermath; of the emergent post-nationalist, post-Christian and post-modern world. JD is concerned to show that while 'post-modernism' reflects an awareness of a vast spiritual sea-change, it expresses it only as a positive fait accompli, negatively counterposed to a spiritual world-history which it either abandons entirely or reduces sceptically or linguistically to rubble.

\textsuperscript{31} I have attempted again to overcome certain parsing uncertainties. The MS has "A knowledge of the structure of that nineteenth century European system and thus of it as the way to a grasp of what this inner sovereignty was, purged of its particular embodiment, only followed its ruin in a confused and impotent attempt to form a common world government."

\textsuperscript{32} The penultimate paragraph argues that before the Great War the idea of a humanist order in opposition to the state was embraced only by a radical few; traditional sovereignties, however 'deceptive', being otherwise generally maintained. JD now argues that in the era between the Wars humanist ideology would successfully usurp and corrupt the states themselves, its own inner contradictions being forced to the fore thereby.

\textsuperscript{33} The MS refers to 'left Hegelians' only. But of course the later nationalism to which JD refers and its more radical form as fascism, has roots in right-Hegelianism (e.g. Gentile).

\textsuperscript{34} MS: 'unity'.
view through their stronger separation. The voluntary union of by now nearly all the European states in the framework of a common state has required a further development in the relation of the elements. The existential aspect, notably in the writings of Martin Heidegger, disowned the violent Nietzschean subjectivity [which animated] Nazism and became more passive in nature, more receptive of an older spirituality temporalized, defining its opponent more generally as a universal economic-technical will. 'Technocracy' [on the other hand], is pluralistic, a segment of the 'global economy' without its own political centre, as in Leninized Marxism.

{MS-3} The competition of these forms had [thus] been blunted in Europe by their inclusion within the bureaucratic framework of a common state. Linguistic, cultural communities coexist with the equalizing force of the global economy. In [this] structure both [aspects] are democratized: the universal rights of individuals [are] given primacy over constitutional arrangements, as over legislative and judicial powers. In this relation, while one knows in general what the underlying rights of individuals are, how they are to apply to them in their endless particularity is ever provisional and uncertain. In the same way, as the philosophical confidence of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger in his phenomenological stage, and [the other] recent schools generally has been broken, [so now] it is uncertain whether there can be philosophy at all, [as in the practical sphere] government, in the relation of public opinion to legislation and its judicial interpretation, has become a contingent reflection of these elements one on the other.35

[In this context] a recognition of the unity of the divided elements may take the form of an admiration of the primitive, for in all human communities there is something of objective, institutional form - of family, economic relations, governance - in relation to which individuals are in some manner unified. Within primitive institutions the least of subjective freedom. But into such forms an existential subjectivity can read its own freedom and make of primitives guardians of nature against technological destruction. Individuals in flight from a Christian religion, [considered] oppressive of anarchic

35 MS-3 summarizes the same matters: "[The] nineteenth century world was already virtually post-modern and post-Christian. Modernity and Christianity [had become] centred in national cultures [as] competing parts of a humanity ever more sufficient to itself through scientific and technical progress. The contradiction between the particularity of these national states and their unqualified sovereignty was played out in competition for world empire and [finally] in the collision of the First World War, in which was expressed, with brutal clarity, the limit of the system. [Thereafter] the break with the former realm of faith and philosophy became more complete. Radical positions of earlier origin took hold, which [either] assimilated state to society - the equality of individuals in the whole range of their interests and passions - or else [would] rest it on race and culture or as residing the particularity of language. [The tendency either way] was to confer unmediated despotic political power on 'leaders' whose intuitive genius was to discern the way to [popular] desired ends. As fascism and Marxism these opposed forms contended for world domination until they destroyed each other in the Second World War. The contradiction [between the appeal to] a spurious universality [on the one hand] and to linguistic communities [one the other, saw] universal rights at once recognized and oppressed. The limit of the sovereign nation state, the necessity that its particularity be situated within the universality to which subjectivity it gave primacy in the form of rights, had been exposed by the first general conflict of the nations. [An] imposed and violent recognition became by the subsequent argument voluntary, in the sense that the fragmented freedom of existential and equalized individuals, in which [any sense of] the unity of existential [individuality and] universality in self-consciousness is lost, had evidently, without that unity, nothing more to stand on and could only peter out."
freedom, can more easily recognize the religious interest common to humanity in
religions that have not much of reason in them. Thus, according to an opinion now
current, Canada is an association of aboriginal peoples and English and French linguistic-
cultural communities - of those at the first beginnings of a rational freedom and those
who would be liberated from reason.36

{MS-2} But one knows that humans, as rational, are unable for long to live within
finite ends. That is true even if, as in Enlightenment and post-modernism, there is present
also a universal end -- happiness, the realized good of individuals, or however named.
The scepticism of indefinite difference does not suffice. There is need to go beyond
[ever-receding] limits. The less and more adequate forms in which an infinite end is
discovered by post-moderns deserves the closest attention. The process leads in the end to
a recovery as actual of the whole historical mediation which led to a knowledge of a
concrete spirituality, [a mediation] lost in the externalization or temporalization of that
standpoint in its initial realization.

{MS-3} [For as by] successive stages the post-modern, post-Christian world has lost
intrinsic stability and begins to look beyond itself, a new relation opens to former
philosophies. It was not [as if] the giants of that world had [actually] overthrown religion
and philosophy. The relation is analogous to that of the subjective culture of the
Hellenistic-Roman age where individuals, against the ethical order of the polis and the
hard objectivity of the res publica Romana, thought to have freedom and the enjoyment
of their right as persons in a human world - only to experience the disintegration of that
world in a scepticism which could not find a universal inclusive of particularity. In that
age one turned inward from the chaos of temporal life to an intelligible world and a unity
before division, of which nature and the sensible world could then be known as a well-
ordered image.

That contemplative reconciliation already appeared superficial to Augustine as not
concretely unitive of the two worlds, [nor] subjectively of the human individual. [In] the
post-modern, post-Christian world the awakening to a need [to] know what [its own
standpoint] is [satisfied only] in the [recognition] of a concrete spirituality, a 'third
philosophy', which it supposes itself already to [possess]. But [as] awakening in the
contemporary division between a desired existential concreteness and the equalizing
freedom of the technical-economic society, philosophical thinking more readily gives
weight to one or the other pole of this division. Thus some find their way from the later

36 MS-4 (much edited) has: "[The appeal to a naturalistic political culture] which has become a force in
the historicized world of post-moderns [is] problematical in that [the coincident philosophical conviction
that] institutional order depends on rights and freedoms of individuals -- claimed as inherent and immediate
in individuals and centred in life and nature -- is simply not intelligible on this standpoint. When applied,
for example, to the Canadian federation whose institutions are derivative from modernity, the effect is to
undermine them, to put on one level European peoples formed in a rational, mostly Christian, tradition and
aboriginal tribes having from their own culture only the rudiments of an order in which individuals as
rational subjects can be thought to be endowed with universal political and human rights."
Heidegger to medieval Christianity, mediated to the world through some form of Christianized Neoplatonism. For them our loss of religion and philosophy has its source in the subjectivity of the modern age, the mistaken turn philosophy took with Descartes, reaching its extreme in Hegel. For others a benevolent development of the global economy grounded in Protestantism and morality is the way to the spiritual as well as economic liberation of humanity. Both have in them a certain unification of the divided terms of post-modernity, but extraneously from the standpoint of the old[er] and [of] the modern philosophy.

The first of these two forms finds relations to the existential aspect of post-modernity, holds to nature and would limit the exploitation of it by the subjective thought of the modern age. The other has confidence that democracy and a technical-economic culture globalized, if guided by a morality roots in Protestant faith, can advance the well-being of humanity indefinitely. Neither form has place for the Hegelian argument that the ancient philosophy, reaching its limit, gave way to the modern, and this in turn to the third philosophy of whose historical existence post-modernity is a certain form.

More generally, to attempt in the 'post-modern' world to separate what is 'pre-modern' from what is 'modern' - Protestantism, Enlightenment - would be to use in vain a Procrustean sword. The philosopher, whose office is to understand the world in which he is, cannot stay with the common division of post-modernity into an existential side and a technological having its roots in modernity. People do not in reality live in one or the other but in both. To rediscover the historical mediation forgotten in post-modernity is not to [retreat or] divide but to attend to the whole mediation, [ancient,] medieval and modern. If one would know what [the] universal human rights presupposed in post-modernity mean, and in what institutional order they could be given definite and stable interpretation, one must look impartially at both aspects of post-modernity, [including also the recovery] of the spirit of modernity and on what basis its excesses, unbound in post-modernity, can be converted to the good of free individuality as their proper end.

This recovery is attractive especially to that part of the Christian world which has maintained its medieval order and a knowledge of its doctrine through forms of ancient philosophy. The new Neoplatonisms ... seem able to join hands with post-modernism as against an earlier retreat from modernity and post-modernity which, with absolute Papal authority, would maintain the pre-modern church against the world ... The relation of 'post-modernism' in its completed existential development to Neoplatonism has difficulties, [however], which, being well considered, compel the conclusion that it is at best a partial recovery of the intelligible basis of the post-modern. The first and crucial difficulty is that, while the original Neoplatonism knew from its Stoic and Sceptic antecedents a unity beyond the finitude of both an objective or noetic world and a comprehensive noesis or subjective world, the new Neoplatonism finds its beginning in a Presocratic logic which had not thus appropriated finitude to self-conscious thought... If Heidegger in a way, by drawing an older poetic language into the circle of his thought, surmounts the difficulty, it recurs explicitly in Derrida's différence and is generally an obstacle for post-moderns... They must find themselves in the difficulty of Anaxagoras, who brought into philosophy an undivided nous but as confronting all else as divided or 'mixed'. This difference from the original Neoplatonism, while it may appear to give to the new a more positive quality, cannot but make [its] structure uncertain.
Conclusion

{MS-3} The dissolution of the post-modern society as a contradictory relation of existential particularity and equality of differences is for Hegel the disclosure of the ethical order of the state in its third form - as world history. The concrete freedom in which European nations reached the term of their historical development, as giving to their institutions and their freedom in them the form adequate to that of their Christian belief, is no longer borne primarily by peoples of a particular national temperament, language and culture, but, as universal, draws all peoples to it. The historical scene has radically changed from the age of the nation states and their empires. There is now a common technical-economic culture equalizing individuals and 'liberating' them to an anarchic freedom, eroding the authority of traditional cultures and religions.

In this awakening to a universal world order, a post-modern freedom [in a] global economy can appear as the primary reality and controlling force. [But] there is present also in this society the need to reflect on itself and discover anew what it is; to grasp its own historical development and antecedents in earlier cultures and religions. The reason moving in that history -- the conflict of substantial unity and subjective freedom, the unification of the two and the transition of this unity into ethical institutions -- has, [however], an objectivity unattainable from the standpoint of the post-modern society as such. For those of a Christian tradition in its post-Christian form, this transition [might] appear as to an immediate unity of divided economic and communal moments -- a [return to] the primitive as healing the division. But the authority of the primitive, as having in it the least either of intrinsic stability or of subjective freedom, [tends to] give way to the attraction of cultures [that are] strongly stabilized [but] repressive of individuality.

{MS-1} Where the condition of peace among nations has been for some time the fear of mutual destruction, a fear that does not depart but has become more unregulated with the end of the 'cold war', the need is more urgent than in Hegel's time to discover on what this finite actuality of competing states rests, what the historical spirit taken universally is and what its relation to absolute spirit. Hegel's response to these questions must remind the reader of the Civitas dei of Augustine [where] the principal opposition is found to be between the human subjectivity awakening in relation to the absolute creative God of Judaism, and the subjective freedom mediated by the Greek and come fully into its own in the Roman world. The Christian religion, which had its historical preparation in these peoples, Augustine could only treat as guided by Scripture and a Pauline expression of its essential content. This representation or Vorstellung imposed on him [the requirement of] an absolute separation of the 'two cities' and prevented the recognition of truth in the religions and institutions of other than the Jewish people, unless in the Roman Empire and the philosophical grasp of its culture in Neoplatonism.

The Hegelian philosophy, containing the content of the Christian religion in conceptual form, could remove that radical division, enter into relation to other peoples [and cultures] from the most primitive to the original Paradise, [finding] in the Greeks and Romans the logic of the preparatio evangelii. Hegel can then find in history the immediate relation of individuals to an absolute end, and the conversion of a falling away
from that end into a free subjective relation to it. Christian history mediates between Augustine's *civitas dei* -- as possessing the absolute truth in separation -- and historical existence. [There] takes shape a world more and more conformed in its institutions, and [in] the spirit moving in them, to the unchanging belief of [all] peoples. And philosophy, in responding to the reason of the world that has broken from the *Vorstellung*, gives to [its] religious content the form of thought. At first in this work one drew on the ancient philosophy. Then, finding that this could not contain the concreteness of the *Vorstellung*, the need of which the structure of medieval institutions made felt, a new philosophy emerged founded on the religious belief itself and able to relate [that] belief [to] a secularity apparently radically opposed to it. And from that modern world in turn [has emerged] a more deeply Christianized secularity and a new philosophy.\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) It being uncertainly punctuated in the MS, I have altered this concluding paragraph somewhat to bring out what I think is JD's meaning. The unadulterated script reads: "The Hegelian philosophy containing the content of the Christian religion in conceptual form could remove that radical division, enter into the relation of other peoples from the most primitive to the original Paradise and find in the Greeks and Romans the logic of the *preparatio evangelii*. Hegel can thus find in history the immediate relation of individuals to an absolute end and the conversion of a falling away from that end into a free subjective relation to it. Christian history mediates between Augustine's *civitas dei* possessing the absolute truth in its separation and historical existence. In that relation takes shape a world more and more conformed in its institutions and the spirit moving in them to the unchanging belief of peoples and philosophy in respond to the reason of the world which to exist has broken from the *Vorstellung*, gives to the religious content the form of thought. At first in this work one drew on the ancient philosophy, then finding that this could not contain the concreteness of the *Vorstellung* the need of which the structure of medieval institutions made felt a new philosophy emerged founded on the religious belief itself and able to relate to the belief in a secularity apparently radically opposed to it. And from that modern world in turn a more deeply Christianized secularity and a new philosophy."
Hegel's Presentation Of The Cartesian Philosophy In The
Lectures On The History Of Philosophy

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Although Hegel considers aspects of the Cartesian philosophy in other works, his most extended treatment is in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, a work published posthumously from a disparate collection of materials. His History is not the neutral, dispassionate work of a scholar, a treatment he would despise as "wandering around in mausoleums".¹ It is also not without difficulty to understand what informs Hegel's presentation of the history, what in this case underlies the extraordinary statement of the Cartesian philosophy one reads in the Lectures. In this paper I shall indicate first what versions of the Lectures I use, then give a short commentary on Hegel's treatment of Descartes. Hegel uses Descartes' Principles of Philosophy as his text, which is problematic. In the third section of the paper, I draw out the difficulty of using the Principles; then in the fourth section I consider Hegel's treatment more deeply in its context, which has as consequence an insight into why he might have used that text.

A. Editions Of Hegel's Lectures On The History Of Philosophy.

Hegel lectured on the history of philosophy nine times, in Jena (1805-6) for which he produced a written text, twice at Heidelberg (1816-17, 1817-18) using an outline, then six times in Berlin (summer 1819, 1820-21, 1823-24, 1825-26, 1827-28, 1829-30) supplementing the Jena manuscript and the Heidelberg outline with further notes.² For the two editions of the lectures on the history of philosophy of Karl Ludwig Michelet (in Volumes 13-15 of Hegel's Werke, first edition 1833-36, second edition 1840-44) he had access to the Jena manuscript and notes in Hegel's own hand, documents which are now lost to us, as well as transcripts from students attending lecture series in various years at Berlin.³ He produced a fusion of all these materials, not distinguishing between what was Hegel's own and what came from other sources. It is generally conceded that Michelet's

³ Among the large number of extant auditors' transcripts, Michelet mentions only a few as ones he chiefly drew upon. See Brown, 3.
second edition is inferior to the first. The standard English translation of E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson used Michelet's second edition, which is in general more literary than the first.

There have been efforts in recent years from collaborators in the work of the Hegel-Archiv to reproduce the extant texts of Hegel's lectures. These are appearing under the general title of Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg). What are available of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy are student transcripts from various series. The editors of these lectures did not feel the necessity, as in the new edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to produce each series independently because they did not find the transcripts from year to year differed substantially from one another. Rather, they present the 1825-26 series because of a better stock of materials for reconstructing them five different manuscripts, among them the ample transcript of Captain von Griesham. The new edition of the lectures on the history of philosophy, medieval and modern, has been published in German (eds. Walter Jaeschke and Pierre Garniron) and in English translation. By utilizing only the 1825-26 lectures, the new edition is not as rich in content as Michelet, especially his first edition. There is happily a recent French critical edition of Michelet's first edition, also by Pierre Garniron. Its critical apparatus identifies those elements which come from Griesham (putting them in an italic script within the body of the Michelet text) and reductively then those which most likely come from Hegel's own manuscripts.

For our purposes there are advantages in consulting all three versions: Brown is a presentation of one series of Hegel's lectures on Descartes, where the essence of the matter is there most directly and unadorned; for commentary on passages otherwise unclear in Brown, Michelet I is most useful since it puts the matter sometimes in other words, amplifies and draws into the treatment of the subject additional comments; then Michelet II, the work of an excellent student of Hegel, who himself attended the 1823-24 lectures, presents a comprehensive, fully developed version of the lectures. I shall use Brown as the basic text here, supplementing with Michelet I and Michelet II for clarification and amplification.

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4 Ibid., “The second edition is quite different and less satisfactory; it is considerably abbreviated, is much less useful in its notes and apparatus, and gives a decidedly flat impression because it does not reflect with as much authenticity the spirit of Hegel's lectures.”
5 The English translation, Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, 3 vols., London and New York, 1892, reprinted 1974. Hereafter Michelet II (Vol.3 unless otherwise noted). After Hegel's untimely death in 1831 there was the great desire of his students, among them Michelet, to publish Hegel's hitherto unpublished lectures. They were therefore published in some haste in that first edition.
B. Hegel's Treatment Of Descartes In The 1825-26 Lectures On Modern Philosophy

Hegel's project in his lectures on the history of modern philosophy is to draw together 'subjectivity' and 'substance'. His treatment of Descartes, true to the Cartesian philosophy, situates it in that larger history. What is initially striking in the Hegelian treatment (found in every version Brown, p. 140, Michelet I, pp. 1396-1399, Michelet II, 224 and passim) is the revelation that in Descartes is first found the statement of the unity of thought and being, and the movement from that unity in the cogito to the unity of thought and being in God expressed in the ontological argument -- God as the principle of Cartesian metaphysics. The movement in Descartes' philosophy is therefore a movement from the finite subject to the infinite substance.

In all three versions now generally available, it is noteworthy that Hegel takes the Cartesian philosophy from the Principles of Philosophy, not from Meditations, even though references are also given to relevant pages in Meditations. This becomes a matter of greatest significance in Hegel's presentation of the arguments for God's existence. In the Principles the a priori argument appears first [n.14], and the principle "What is clear and distinct is true" subsequently [n.30]. In the Meditations, however, the a priori proof is a consequent of the principle "What is clear and distinct is true." It might be noted that Hegel follows an outline in his treatment of Descartes given in the opening of Part I of Spinoza's The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy. The outline is skeletal only as Hegel transforms these moments to (a) a beginning with thought alone; (b) the movement to certainty in the cogito argument; (c) the passage from certitude to truth and objectivity in the idea of God; (d) the foundation of human understanding in the Divine veracity. There is no imposition therefore from the side of Spinoza's outline on Hegel's treatment.

8 Metaphysics is that which marks the transition from the subjective merely to the objective (from certainty to truth, the "I" to God): "What comes [next] is thus the transition of this certainty into truth, into the determinate; Descartes again makes this transition in a naive way, and with it we for the first time begin to consider his metaphysics." Michelet II, 233.

9 But these references do not appear to be Hegel's own. They are from Michelet himself. See the reconstruction in the French edition, which is able to distinguish what is from Hegel's own manuscripts, now lost, and what is added by Michelet. Jean-Luc Marion, Questions Cartésiennes II (Presses Universitaires de France, 1996) notes the following (p.10, n.11): "...Hegel ne cite jamais, à notre connaissance, que les textes suivants: la traduction latine (P/ de Courcelles, Specimina, 1644) du Discours de la Méthode, IV, les Principe Philosophiae, I, # 7 et - pris comme un texte de Descartes! Spinoza, Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae; les Meditationes semblent entièrement ignorées fait d'autant plus remarquable que Hegel est sans doute l'un des premiers à se préoccuper de lire effectivement les textes de ses prédécesseurs. C'est dire le poids de l'interprétation canonique." This is not quite accurate, although Marion's point that the Meditations on the face of it seems ignored is well taken. Hegel clearly refers to passages in Rep.II Obj. and Rep. V Obj.

10 Spinoza writes: "In order to proceed with his investigation with the utmost caution Descartes was compelled: (1.) To lay aside all prejudice; (2) To find the fundamental truth on which all knowledge rests; (3.) To discover the cause of error; (4.) To understand everything clearly and distinctly."

11 The fourfold division according to the outline is very explicit in Michelet I and Michelet II, and fades away in Jaeschke and Garniron (hence also in Brown).
The treatment in Brown is the most economical, as one might expect in the notes of very good students. Its very economy is also a great purity. We read this in Griesham's transcript:

We come now for the first time to what is properly the philosophy of the modern world, and we begin with Descartes. Here, we may say, we are at home and, like the sailor after a long-voyage, we can at last shout "Land ho." Descartes made a fresh start in every respect. The thinking or philosophizing, the thought and the formation of reason in modern times, begins with him. The principle in this new era is thinking, the thinking that proceeds from itself. We have exhibited this inwardness above all with respect to Christianity; it is preeminently the Protestant principle. The universal principle now is to hold fast to inwardness as such, to set dead externality and sheer authority aside and to look upon it as something not to be allowed. In accordance with this principle of inwardness it is now thinking, thinking on its own account, that is the purest pinnacle of this inwardness.[Brown, 132]

Descartes is described there as the true beginning of modern philosophy, he "began at the beginning, from the universal, from thinking as such, and this is a new and absolute beginning"[Brown, 137]. It is the "I think" which is the starting point, expressed by Descartes in saying we must doubt everything, not as the skeptic who rests in doubt, but in order to seek what is certain. The first point is therefore that we must renounce all presuppositions, that thinking might proceed not from anything external or foreign to itself, but from itself alone: "The demand which rests at the basis of Descartes' reasonings thus is that what is recognized as true should be able to maintain the position of having the thought therein at home with itself."[Michelet II, 226]

Thus, in seeking what is in itself certain and indubitable, Descartes is inexorably led to thinking: "What is certain is certainty itself, knowing as such, in its pure form as relating to itself this is thinking."[Brown, 139] Then there is the "determination of being", cogito ergo sum, "the determination of being is immediately bound up with the I... in it thinking and being are thus inseparably bound together."[Brown, 141] It is not a syllogism, for there is no mediation between thinking and being, but rather simple identity [Brown, 140]; moreover, "thinking" here is, as Descartes answers to Gassendi, "consciousness", to which Hegel adds: "If I say 'I see, I go for a walk,' the I is in the determination of seeing or of going, but I am in it also as thinking. When I say 'I' that is thinking. It is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking in one particular pocket and sensation, seeing, wishing and the like in another. Thinking is what is wholly universal. Thought represented as what is thinking is the I."[Brown, 140] Thus for Hegel, as also

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12 Brown, 132. It is remarkable that what are essentially a student's notes could be so vivid. It is reported that Hegel lectured slowly.

13 Brown, 140; cf. Rep.II Obj., AT vii, 140-41, where Descartes explicitly rejects the thought that the connection between thinking and existing involves a syllogism. But in Principles, there is a syllogistic argument modus ponens. See n. 21.
implicitly for Descartes, the "I" or "self" which is conscious is the universalizing, unifying activity -- what in Kant is called the "transcendental ego". But, Hegel notes, "Descartes offers no proof of this thesis of the unity of thinking and being."[Brown, 141] This observation is, while true of the Meditations (which does not proceed as will be shown by way of 'proof'), is not on the face of it true respecting the Principles: in that work there is a proof, proceeding from the major premise "whatever thinks, at the time that it is thinking, exists." And Hegel seems to be aware of all the subtleties here:

From the one side we view this proposition as a syllogism: being is deduced from thinking. Against this logical connection Kant objected that being is not contained in thinking, that it is distinct from thinking, and he is quite correct. They are, however, inseparable, that is, they constitute an identity. What is inseparable from another is nonetheless distinct from it, although the identity is not endangered by this difference; the two are a unity. All the same, this is not a syllogism, for a syllogism comprises three terms; needed here is a third term that would mediate between thinking and being. But that is not how it is. It is not "I think, therefore I am" the "therefore" is not here the 'therefore' of the syllogism, for it expresses only the correlation by which being is immediately linked with thinking. In Descartes, therefore, we see expressed the identity of being and thinking.[Brown, 139-40]

Hegel cannot state strongly enough the importance of the Cartesian insight: "This [the unity of thinking and being] is on the whole the most interesting idea of modern philosophy, and Descartes was at any rate the first to formulate it."[Brown, 142] Nevertheless it is here as well that Descartes' philosophy suffers most: its determinate conceptions were not deduced from the understanding, but "taken up empirically"[Michelet II, 224], simply discovered intuitively. It is this inadequacy which Hegel's own Logic will overcome. Nevertheless,

"What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into truth, into the determinate," for the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof for God's existence. Yet the

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14 Hegel describes 'consciousness' as the "self-actualizing Universal"; Descartes, it is true, calls the self, which he otherwise identifies with consciousness, a "thinking thing", clinging therefore to a substantiality, a "thing endowed with a faculty of thought"[Rep.III Obj., AT vii, 174.], which he himself must modify in the Principles of Philosophy where he recognizes that in truth only God is properly substance.[Principles, n. 52]  
15 Principles I, n.7. See also the Conversation with Burman: "Before this inference, 'I think therefore I am', the major 'whatever thinks is' can be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference depends on it. This is why the author says in the Principles that the major premise comes first, namely because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. But it does not follow that I am always expressly and explicitly aware of its priority, or that I know it before my inference..." AT, v, 147; CSMK, 333.  
16 Brown, 142. In Michelet II, 224, he says: "In order to do justice to Descartes' thoughts it is necessary for us to be assured of the necessity for his appearance; the spirit of his philosophy is simple knowledge as the unity of Thought and Being."
transition here is again, in Hegel's words, "[made] in a naive way." Consciousness in seeking to extend its knowledge, casts about and simply finds a fund of ideas -- Hegel calls them fittingly Vorstellungen which have nothing deceptive about them so long as it does not claim there is something objective and external to itself given in them. Hegel reminds us, "I am presenting this in the way Descartes does," for clearly this manner of simply finding and not deriving these ideas is inadequate. It is especially in the convenient appearance of the idea of God, which Descartes finds ready to hand, so to speak, that the inadequacy is most evident. "Hence we see these determinations following upon one another in an empirical and naive manner, one that is therefore not philosophically or metaphysically demonstrative."[Brown, 143] But this one idea, which for Descartes "stands out from all the others..."17 as alone having within itself 'existence', and not merely possible or contingent existence "but utterly necessary and eternal existence" [Princ. N.14, CSM I; AT viiiA, 10] is, as Hegel describes it, "a presupposition. We find within ourselves this idea, one would now say, as the highest, that the One is. That is then presupposed; and if we ask whether this idea exists, that is precisely what the idea is, that with it existence is posited too,"18 Thus Hegel can conclude that in this idea of God no other than the same unity expressed in cogito ergo sum, the unity of being and thinking, is expressed.

Descartes, of course, calls the idea of God which he finds in his thinking an "innate idea", that is, an idea which I can think of at will but which has its own determinate nature which I can neither add to nor subtract from. Hegel's characterization of the idea of God as a "presupposition" in the Cartesian philosophy is an accurate description of the manner in which Descartes happens upon it, especially in the Principles: "The mind next considers the various ideas which it has within itself, and finds that there is one idea the idea of a supremely intelligent, supremely powerful and supremely prefect being which stands out from all the others..." With more attention to the logic of such a find, the Meditations raise the question where do the ideas in his thinking come from, that is, are they all founded in his thinking as derived from the cogito itself or found in it? It is in his search for an idea not of his creation, not merely subjective, that he inevitably will come to the idea of that which cannot come merely from his thinking, pure objectivity, the idea of God which he possesses but cannot be thought to have caused. Here too the idea of God is a "presupposition", as it turns out, "innate in me just as the idea of myself is innate in me", the "mark of the workman imprinted on his work", a mark which is not "something different from the work itself." As one scholar has noted, "...it is on my nature, not in my mind that God has imprinted his mark. That is why reflection on the self of which I am conscious yields not only the idea of what I am, but the idea of God too."19

17 Principles, no.14, CSM I; AT viiiA, 10.
18 "...eine Voraussetzung. Wir finden in uns diese Idee würden man jetzt sagen als die höchste, dass das Eine ist. Dies is also so vorausgestzt, und wenn wir fragen, ob diese Idee auch existiere, so soll gerade dies die Idee sein, dass damit auch die Existenz gesetzt ist." Vorlesungen, Teil 4, 96. Brown's translation was somewhat opaque here.
There is not in the 1825-26 lectures a separation of the *a priori* proof from the other two proofs found in the *Principles of Philosophy*, from the idea of God present in the finite subject. In Descartes these have a definite importance since the *a priori* proof must be supplemented by the second proof of the *Principles*. He recognizes the certainty of the *a priori* proof while we are in the actual state of contemplating the idea of God, but "at times when we are not intent on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, a doubt may easily arise as to whether the idea of God is not one of those which we made up at will, or at least one of those which do not include existence in their essence." In this respect, the *a priori* proof suffers the same defect as mathematics: we cannot deny that two and three added together are five while we are turned to the thing itself, but we lose that certitude as soon as we turn away from it. There is not properly for Descartes a transition to truth, to objectivity in the *Principles*, at least for the finite subject, simply with the *a priori* proof. When one finds in his thinking an idea of God and attends to it, seeing in it necessary and eternal existence, then the mind must conclude that God exists. This is sufficient for certainty, the state of the attentive mind, but not for truth, the assurance that what the attentive mind turns away from does not disappear or change, the confidence that the clear and distinct is constant, objective, true. "Hence at times when we are not intent on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, a doubt may easily arise as to whether the idea of God is not one of those made up at will, or at least one of those which do not include existence in their essence." [Princ., n.16, AT viiiA, 11; CSM I, 198] It is for this reason that the *a priori* proof in the *Principles* must be supplemented by the proofs from "effects". A finite discursive mind turns from one idea to another, cannot hold fast to all its ideas at once. Thus Descartes asks first what is the cause of the idea of God within us, and then as supplement to that question, what is the source of our being, we who have always had the idea of a being more perfect than ourselves.

The causal proofs from the "idea of God" in the finite subject is given in Michelet I and Michelet II after the *a priori* proof, as in the *Principles*. There is thus the separation of the proofs, and consequently an implicit consciousness of their role in completing the movement from certainty to truth as it is found in the Cartesian philosophy. But the importance of the proofs from the idea of God as 'effect' is not drawn out in any of the versions of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* presently available to us. This is remarkable because Descartes shows the logic of the movement from one to the others very plainly in the *Principles*. It is all the more remarkable when one grants that it is to Hegel himself that we owe the explicit statement of the movement from certainty to truth

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20 As in Meditation III: "And whenever my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes to mind, I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which seemed most evident...Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that ...two or three added together are more or less than five, or anything in which I see a manifest contradiction." AT vii, 36; CSM II, 25.

21 It is evident by the *natural light*, he says, that something which recognizes something more perfect than itself is not the cause of its own being. *Principles* I, n.20, AT viiiA, 12; CSM 200.
in the Cartesian philosophy, a matter of the greatest importance in the interpretation of Descartes.  

The fourth division of Hegel's treatment, which will discuss the implication that the divine veracity has for us, begins oddly with this quote, in part paraphrased, from Descartes: "We must believe what is revealed to us by God, although we do not directly conceive it. We must not be surprised that it surpasses our capability." Michelet II adds "It is not to be wondered at, since we are finite, that there is in God's nature as inconceivably infinite, what surpasses our comprehension."[238] These reflections are found in Principles, nn.24-26, and they precede Descartes' discussion there of the divine veracity and its consequence for us that "what is clear and distinct is true." Descartes says there that in order to pass from knowledge of God to knowledge of creatures, we must try to deduce from our knowledge of God an explanation of the things He has created, bearing in mind as a precaution that God, the creator of all things, is infinite while we are altogether finite. On this basis, he will not in his science search for 'final causes', nor will he enter into arguments about the 'real infinite' (God) which he distinguishes from the 'indefinite', things in which we observe no limit. Hegel sets the proof of the fundamental principle of the understanding in its very proper context, for only after Descartes has entered into the metaphysics of the identity of thought and being, having shown that there is for finite thinking this identity and has drawn it into relation to the identity of thought and being in our idea of God, indeed in God himself, does he move to what is other than his thinking.

Although Descartes seems to retreat from metaphysics (at least in the Principles), admonishing us to leave those lofty ideas for the finite subjective cognition of the finite world, this turn to the finite is, as is clear in the structure of the Meditations, in thoroughgoing relation to the idea of God: "What is asserted here then is that through thinking we experience how things are in fact; God's truthfulness is made into the absolute bond between subjective cognition and the actuality of what is thus known."[Brown, 144] Hegel continues:

We have here the antithesis between subjective cognition and actuality. At one moment we are told the two are inseparably linked, that thinking is being. The next moment they are regarded as different, so that the need to mediate them arises, and the proof of their unity rests on the mediating. Set forth here on the one side is our subjective cognition, and on the other side actuality. What mediates them is the truthfulness of God or the truth

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22 A failure to make the distinction is the source of the charges of 'circularity', for example.
23 In Part Two he will deduce, for example, the three primary laws of motion from God's immutability.
24 Brown, 144. This understanding is directly opposed to those who would characterize Descartes' metaphysics as "a drape to cover the goods" [Charles Adams in AT xii, 306], "subterfuge" [Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes, an Intellectual Biography, Oxford, 1995, 12], "double-talk" [Hiram Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity: an Essay on Descartes, New Haven, 1973, chaps. 1 and 4] or "dissimulation" [Louis Loeb's thesis in several articles], that is, as having no relationship to his scientific philosophy.
of God. This truth itself is in its turn none other than the fact that the idea of God immediately contains actuality within itself as well. [Brown, 144]

The veracity of God is precisely the unity of thought and being [Michelet I, 1418], "this unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived, and external reality or existence." [Michelet II, 239] Hegel criticizes Descartes for not deriving 'extension' from 'thought': "Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has not the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness: but simple Being, set forth as the negative of self-consciousness, is extension." [Michelet II, 241] Descartes does however know 'extension' as the 'other' of thought 'thinking' for Descartes is absolutely what 'extension' is not. "Thought, concept, or what is spiritual, thinking and self-conscious, is what returns into itself, what is at home with itself. The opposite to thought is what is not at home with itself, what has being outside itself, what is extended, what is not free... the entire sphere of extended substance (the kingdom of nature), or that of spiritual substance, constitutes a totality within itself. Each of the two, the entirety of each aspect, can be grasped without the other." [Brown, 146] But Descartes knows also the perfect reciprocity of 'thinking' and 'extension', for 'thinking' has faculties of sensation and imagination which are directed wholly to extended substance; and 'extension' has properties, number and measure, which are wholly appropriate to 'thinking'.

What is wanting is the logic of this difference and relation, for without that Cartesianism seems to be caught in the dualism which subsequently is unfairly attributed to Descartes himself.

Hegel observes the manner in which Descartes accounts for the interactions of the spiritual cogito and body: "But the middle term or the link between the abstract universal and the particular external [body] has to be identified. Descartes identifies it by saying that God is the intermediary, the middle term. This is what is called the system of assistance, namely that God is the metaphysical ground of the reciprocal changes..." [Brown, 151] This account is anticipated, moreover, in Descartes' acknowledgement of the divine veracity as guarantee of clear and distinct ideas:

...we saw that Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of the conception: as long as I think rightly and consistently, something real corresponds to my thought, and the connecting link is God. God is hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites, since He is, as Idea, the unity of Notion [Begriff; 'concept'] and reality...Descartes' conclusion is quite correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect. Only the form employed by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the beginning there are two things, thought or soul and body, and that then God appears as a third thing, outside both that He is not the Notion of unity, nor are the two elements themselves Notion. [Michelet II, 251-2]

25 See Meditation 6 for Descartes' appreciation of this absolute difference of 'thinking' and 'extension', and also their complete relation to each other.
To pass from metaphysics to physics, to a world of particular bodies, we must move from matter simply as extension to matter-in-motion. Hegel writes aptly: "One of Descartes' main points is that matter, extension, corporeality, are quite the same thing for thought; according to him the nature of body is fulfilled in its extension, and this should be accepted as the only essential fact respecting the corporeal world."[Michelet II, 245] But Descartes does not himself leave the matter there. To move to a world system he must hypothesize motion externally given to matter, in such a way to be sure that preserves the essential characteristic of body as 'extension', which Hegel acknowledges elsewhere: "Extension and motion are the fundamental conceptions in mechanical physics; they represent the truth of the corporeal world. ... Hence changes in matter are due merely to motion, so that Descartes traces every relationship to rest and movement of particles, and all material diversity such as colour, and taste in short, all bodily qualities and animal phenomena to mechanism."[Michelet II, 247]

C. The Difference Of Presentation Of The Cartesian Philosophy In Meditations And In The Principles.

As has been noted already, Hegel used in his exposition Descartes' Principles of Philosophy rather than the Meditations. On the face of it, this is both puzzling and problematic: puzzling because the Meditations is the work generally regarded as the canonical Cartesian text and problematic because the order of presentation in the Principles cannot be regarded as proceeding with the same indubitability as the Meditations. Descartes makes it clear in his Conversation with Burman that for the order of discovery (hence 'indubitability'), one must look to the Meditations, not to the Principles. But it is Descartes himself who produced his philosophy, if not more geometrico as in Spinoza's Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy, still in 'synthetic' rather than 'analytic' form. We might ask why he did this.

Descartes knew that his Meditations would pose difficulties for some. When the work was first released he wrote to his Jesuit friend: "One problem none the less remains, which is that I cannot ensure that those of every level of intelligence will be capable of understanding the proofs, or even that they will take the trouble to read them attentively.

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26 It is true that some would dispute this appraisal of the Meditations. But its unique place in the Cartesian corpus, engaged as it is in the solution to the problems which plague Descartes' earlier works, and establishing the foundation for the structure and limits of human understanding in such a way that all subsequent work come from it as the tree from its roots, is the subject of my earlier paper in this journal, "God, the Evil Genius and Eternal Truths", Animus, Vol. 3 (1998), [http://www.mun.ca/animus/1998vol3/andrews3.htm].

27 He says this to Burman: "In the Meditations that argument [the a priori proof of God's existence] comes later than the one here [the argument from an effect of God in the Third Meditation]; the fact that it comes later, while the proof in this Meditation comes first, is the result of the order in which the author discovered the two proofs. In the Principles, however, he reverses the order; for the method and order of discovery is one thing, and that of exposition another. In the Principles his purpose is exposition, and his procedure is synthetic."
..."[11 Nov. 1640, AT iii, 237;CSMK III, 158] By the end of the year of publication of the Meditations he was already planning to publish his philosophy in an easier, more available form. The result would be the Principles of Philosophy, published in 1644, in four books. It is a systematic exposition of Descartes' metaphysics and his natural philosophy. He described its contents in the preface to the French edition, and there recommended, for a 'sound understanding' of his metaphysics that it would be appropriate to read first of all the Meditations.

But after the publication of the Principles, Descartes seemed to have recommended it as the preferred entry into his philosophy. Burman records him as expressing such a view:

"A point to note is that one should not devote so much effort to the Meditations and to metaphysical questions, or give them elaborate treatment in commentaries and the like. Still less should one do what some try to do, and dig more deeply into these questions than the author did; he has dealt with them quite deeply enough. It is sufficient to have grasped them once in a general way, and then to remember the conclusion. Otherwise, they draw the mind too far away from physical and observable things, and make it unfit to study them. Yet it is just these physical studies that it is most desirable for people to pursue, since they would yield abundant benefits for life. The author did follow up metaphysical questions fairly thoroughly in the Meditations, and established their certainty against the skeptics, and so on; so everyone does not have to tackle the job for himself, or need to spend time and trouble meditating on these things. It is sufficient to know the first book of the Principles, since this includes those parts of metaphysics which need to be known for physics, and so forth." [CB, 165; CSMK, 346-7].

Moreover, Descartes cautioned Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden and Descartes' intermediary with Queen Christina, not to give his Meditations to the queen: "I will merely observe at this point two or three things which experience has taught me about the Principles. The first is that though the first part is only an abridgement of what I wrote in my Meditations, there is no need to take time off to read my Meditations in order to

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28 To Mersenne, 31 Dec. 1640: "I will not fail to answer immediately anything you send me about my Metaphysics. But otherwise I should be very glad to have as few distractions as possible, for the coming year at least, since I have resolved to spend it in writing my philosophy in an order which will make it easy to teach." AT iii, 276; CSMK 167.

29 He had originally proposed a work in six parts, but omitted the treatment of the human body and of the passions since the work was already quite lengthy. The latter two topics appear in subsequent works, the unfinished La Description du corps humain, written in 1647/8 (a reworking of L'homme, the unpublished manuscript of 1633), and Les Passions de l'âme (1649).

30 "I divided the book into four parts. The first contains the principles of knowledge, i.e. what may be called 'first philosophy' or 'metaphysics'; so in order to gain a sound understanding of this part it is appropriate to read first of all the Meditations which I wrote on the same subject. The other three parts contain all that is most general in physics." AT ixB, 16; CSM I, 187.
understand them; many people find the *Meditations* much more difficult, and I would be afraid that Her Majesty might become bored."[26 Feb. 1649, AT v, 291; CSMK, 369]31

Since Descartes himself encouraged his readers to take his philosophy from the *Principles*, what objection could possibly be raised if Hegel used it as his text for the exposition of the Cartesian philosophy? It is because the order of presentation in the *Meditations* is properly the only compelling order from the subjective beginning, for it proceeds from the most extreme doubt "so that absolutely nothing is accepted unless it has been so clearly and distinctly perceived that we cannot but assent to it."[Rep.II Obj. AT vii, 158; CSM II, 158] A whole literature of Cartesian scholarship, centred on Martial Gueroult's *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons* (1952), demands that the unity of Descartes' thought and the rigorous order of his arguments be paramount in any commentary on him. Descartes made this same demand in the Preface to *Meditations*:

...I do not expect any popular approval, or indeed any wide audience. On the contrary I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived opinions. Such readers, as I well know, are few and far between. *Those who do not bother to grasp the proper order of my arguments and the connection between them, but merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion, will not get much benefit from reading this book.*[AT vii, 9-10; CSM II, 8; italics mine.]

Descartes does not follow what he calls the "order of topics", as so many of his commentators do32, but rather the "order of reasons": "It should be noted that throughout the work I do not follow the order of topics, but the order of reasons, that is to say that I do not attempt to say in a single place everything that pertains to the topic, because it would be impossible for me to properly prove them, there being reasons which must be drawn from sources farther off than others...The order of topics is only suitable for those

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31 To Chanut, 26 February 1649, AT v, 291; CSMK, 369. In the dedication of *Principles* to Princess Elizabeth, he finds an altogether different spirit than he presumed in Christina. To Elizabeth he writes: "I have even greater evidence of your powers and this is special to myself in the fact that you are the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previously published works. Many other people, even those of the utmost acumen and learning, find them very obscure; and it generally happens with almost everyone else that if they are accomplished in Metaphysics they hate Geometry, while if they have mastered Geometry they do not grasp what I have written on First Philosophy. Your intellect is, to my knowledge, unique in finding everything equally clear; and this is why my use of the term 'incomparable' is quite deserved." He adds: "And when I consider that such a varied and complete knowledge of all things is to be found not in some aged pedant who has spent many years in contemplation but in a young princess whose beauty and youth call to mind one of the Graces rather than gray-eyed Minerva or any of the Muses, then I cannot but be lost in admiration."

32 We need only think of the numerous ahistorical commentaries in the analytic tradition, or the more ostensibly sympathetic but nonetheless unCartesian books and articles on God in Descartes, freedom in Descartes, doubt, clearness and distinctness, etc., where the treatment does not situate the topic in the architectonic of the whole but takes it up in isolation from that whole.
whose reasons are all unconnected and who can say as much about one difficulty as another." [To Mersenne, 24 Dec. 1640, AT iii, 266-7; CSMK III, 163]

But these observations are as true for the *Principles* as for the *Meditations*: both works follow the "order of reasons", both claim to put first what must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later, arranging matters "in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before." [Rep. II Obj., AT vii, 155; CSM II, 110] The two works do not, however, proceed in the same way. Descartes distinguishes two sorts of order, the analytic order and the synthetic, and situates elements of his philosophy in different places according to the whether the order of the work is analytic or synthetic. The *Meditations* proceed by way of "analysis", the *Principles* and the treatment *more geometrico* in *Rep. II Obj.* by "synthesis". In the former the *a priori* argument for God's existence is subsequent to the proof from effects and has as its premise "What is clear and distinct is true", whereas in the latter works the *a priori* proof is first and the principle of the understanding, "What is clear and distinct is true" is derived from the subsequent knowledge we have of God known to exist. These two orders coincide in an important way with the distinction drawn in Aristotle and the Scholastics between two ways in which things might be said to be known: *secundum se* and *quoad nos*. In considering whether God's existence is self-evident (*per se nota*), to use a pertinent example, St. Thomas distinguishes what is in itself most knowable from what is most knowable to us.  

\[33\] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 2, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos."

\[34\] *Metaphysics*, 993b10-11. Cf. *Summa Theol.* I, q.1, a.5 ad 1: "...nihil prohibet id quod est certius secundum naturam, esse quod nos minus certum, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, qui se habet ad manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis, sicut dicitur in II Metaphys."
than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict
with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have
got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who
really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal
things, so far as is possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them.[Ibid.]

The synthetic method, even in geometry, depends on the analytic as the 'method of
discovery". Its value lies in presenting things in such a way that one might have a
comprehensive grasp of the whole. But in geometry, and a fortiori in metaphysics, the
synthetic presentation depends on the analytic discovery: "Analysis shows the true way
by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a
priori, so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points,
he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered
it for himself."[Ibid., 155, 110] If in geometry it does not much matter whether the
student give such attention, the primary notions according with our ordinary experience,
in metaphysics this does matter. The Principles of Philosophy therefore are wholly
dependent on the Meditations for the "deep justifications" (in Gueroult's words) of its
arguments, ordered according to the requirements of our certainty, and that is why in the
Preface to the Principles Descartes referred the reader to the Meditations as the proper
preparation and justification for what is given in the Principles.

It is in the Meditations that Descartes gives the proper entry into his philosophy, that
work alone giving authority, the authority of finite thinking, to the whole Cartesian body
of work which precedes and follows it. Gueroult writes: "The Meditations is constantly
invoked by Descartes, now as a breviary, now as the necessary and truly demonstrative
introduction to the whole of his philosophy. It is to it that the first part of the Principles
expressly refers; it is on it that he comments to the end of his life, without ever changing
anything in it." The differences between the two works, not so much in content
(although that too must be noted) as in order and detail, are substantial. We have already
noted that in the one the cogito argument is not syllogistic, in the other it is; the one
places the causal arguments for God's existence first, the other the a priori argument; key
concepts such as "clear and distinct ideas" are simply introduced by way of example or
exemplars in the Meditations, whereas in the Principles there are definitions (of "clear
and distinct", "substance", "mode", "attribute" etc.), premises and proofs stated simply, all
of which follow from its intended use. Finally, we must mention that the Meditations are
written in the first person singular the sure sign of the subjective standpoint from which
it will move to objectivity; the Principles appear in an objective form, written
impersonally at times or from the standpoint point of all of us: "our doubt", "our mind",

"we have within us", even "we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are having such thoughts, are nothing."

Descartes describes the work himself: "... I must tell you that I have resolved to write [the principles of my philosophy] before leaving this country, and to publish them perhaps within a year. My plan is to write a series of theses which will constitute a complete textbook of my philosophy. I will not waste any words, but simply put down all my conclusions together with the true premises from which I derive them. I think I could do this without many words. ..."[AT iii, 233-4; CSMK 156-7] It would differ from the *Meditations* in these ways: "The first part, which I am working on at present, contains almost the same things as the *Meditations* which you have, except that it is in an entirely different style, and what is written at length in one is abbreviated in the other and vice versa ..."[AT iii, 276; CSMK 167] This textbook, intended for use in the schools, would contain his entire scientific philosophy, the first part serving as the basis of the whole but not intended to stand on its own. The *Meditations* were written in the manner in which metaphysical truths are discovered; the same matters treated in the *Principles* are presented as the fruits of that discovery, in tight arguments from premises to conclusions, as a recapitulation and presentation of work thought out beforehand. If we are to think Cartesian metaphysics, to be drawn into it and convinced by it, we must turn to the *Meditations*; if we are interested simply in Cartesian doctrine, the Cartesian position on the matters he treats, whether as foundation for the physics he propounds or simply for itself, then the *Principles* is the appropriate text.

**D. Descartes' Place In The History Of Philosophy**

*i. The double method: logic and the history of philosophy*

In the various 'Introductions' to Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, he makes plain why philosophy is its history, why philosophy which is "the thought which brings itself into consciousness, is preoccupied with itself, makes itself its object, thinks itself, and at that, in its specific steps and stages" is identical with the process of its self-development both logically and temporally.

...the progression of the various stages in the advance of Thought may occur with the consciousness of necessity, in which case each in succession deduces itself, and this form and this determination can alone emerge. Or else it may come about without this consciousness as does a natural and apparently accidental process, so that while inwardly, indeed, the Notion brings about its result consistently, this consistency is not made manifest. ...The one kind of progression which represents the deduction of the forms, the necessity thought out and recognized, of the determinations, is the business of Philosophy; and because it is the pure Idea which is in question and not yet its particularized form as Nature and as Mind, that
representation is, in the main, the business of logical Philosophy. But the
other method, which represents the part played by the history of
Philosophy, shows the different stages and moments in development in
time, in manner of occurrence, in particular places, in particular people or
political circumstances...in short it shows us the empirical form...[Michelet

This self-development of thought, worked out in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, is conceived
by him to have made its appearance temporally, the history of philosophy thus a system
of development also. But this double development is not to be understood as simply
logical on the one hand and historical on the other. It is rather that there could be no
*Logic* had there not been the historical development, and yet the ultimate measure of
what belongs to that history is the *Science of Logic*. 36

Since the history of philosophy is not simply a succession of events, an "aggregation
of facts ordered in some way or other" but a "development of thought, a development
which is absolutely necessary" [Introd., 88], it is therefore a selection of philosophers, a
self-selection as it were: "As a history of nations recognizes only the deeds of its heroes,
so too in the history of philosophy it recognizes only the deeds of thinking reason."
[Introd. 92]37

"...even if the history of philosophy has to relate deeds, nevertheless the
first question is what is a deed in philosophy, i.e. whether something is
philosophical or not, and what place each deed occupies? ... In the history
of the outside world everything is a deed (of course some deeds are
important and others unimportant), but the deed is placed directly before
our minds, it is a *fact*. In philosophy the opposite is the case: What a deed
is and what place is to be ascribed to it, that is the *question*." [Introd. 190]

The principle by which a "philosophical deed" can be recognized is that it takes its place
in the unfolding of philosophy itself. It is for this reason that the system is the measure.
"The series of their deeds is indeed a series, but it is only one work which has been
produced. The history of philosophy deals with only one philosophy, one action, though
one divided into different stages. Consequently, from time immemorial there has been
only one philosophy, the self-knowledge of the spirit." [Introd., 92]

For Descartes, the Cartesian philosophy is a culmination, not an event in the history
of philosophy. He could not know his place in the long history of philosophy except as its

36 "If the *Phenomenology of Spirit* ... can be looked on as Hegel's introduction to his *Logic*, so too can the
*History of Philosophy* be considered a different sort of introduction to the same *Logic* not exhibiting the
development of consciousness to the point where pure speculative thinking can begin but presenting an
historical account of the development of speculative thinking itself." Quentin Lauer, "Hegel as Historian of
37 Introd., 92. The deeds of the history of philosophy are the works of the philosophers themselves. [Introd.
184]
completion. But for Hegel, the Cartesian philosophy is a moment in that history. How it is treated, what is emphasized, what omitted, is determined by that history, and its relation to the present:

"...we do not have to do with the past, but with thinking, with our own proper spirit. There is therefore no proper history or it is a history which at the same time is no history for the thoughts, principles, ideas which we have before us are something present." [p. 133]

It follows that only in so far as the thought of our predecessors remains integral to our thought is it historical. Otherwise it is simply past and dead. Precisely as in the past but continuing to be part of the philosophy of the present, the Cartesian philosophy is a moment in the history of philosophy. What a particular philosopher thought of his own work, its importance and significance for philosophy as he understood it is therefore of secondary importance. Descartes is in the history because he is integral to our own philosophical thinking.

This is not merely, nor primarily, because philosophies contradict one another, subsequent philosophies refuting past philosophy (as Descartes might have thought himself to have refuted the Scholastic philosophy). In truth "no philosophy has been refuted and yet all of them have been." [Introd.95]. What has been refuted is that some particular form of philosophy should count itself as "highest now and for all time" when what is true is that it has been the highest form in its time, but now has ceased to be, given that the activity of spirit is self-developing in that history. If it is no longer regarded as the highest philosophy, still its content has not been lost. "Refutation is only setting aside one determination of it and making it a subordinate one. No philosophical principle has been lost; all such principles are retained in what follows...Refutation of this kind occurs in every development, e.g. the growth of a tree from its seed...The latest, the most modern, philosophy must therefore contain in itself the principles of all the previous philosophies and consequently it is the highest one." [Introd.95] What the Hegelian system makes of the Cartesian philosophy is therefore more significant than what Descartes made of it himself.

ii. Descartes' place historically and logically

In the groanings of the World-spirit to come into full possession of itself in the long course of the history of philosophy, it is the work of modern times, Hegel notes at the end of his history, "to grasp this idea as spirit, as the Idea that knows itself." He situates Descartes at the beginning of this period where "in order to proceed from the conscious Idea to the self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely the fact that the Idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely sundered in twain." [Michelet II,

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38 Hegel observes the same about about all philosophical positions: "It certainly happens that a new philosophy makes its appearance which maintains the others to be valueless; and indeed each one in turn comes forth at first with the pretext that by its means all previous philosophies not only are refuted, but what in them is wanting is supplied, and now at length the right one is discovered." Michelet II, 17.
549] With Descartes, he says, "pure thinking rose above this cleavage that had to become self-conscious, and progressed to the antithesis of the subjective and the objective."[Brown, 272] Descartes cannot fully resolve this antithesis. His place in the history of philosophy is fixed: "Self-consciousness, in the first place, thinks of itself as consciousness; therein is contained all objective reality, and the positive, intuitive reference of its reality to the other side."[Michelet II, 549]

As we read again Hegel's treatment of Descartes, it is clear that the principle of the Cartesian philosophy, thinking, is wholly absorbed with itself, allows of no presupposition or something other than thinking, and this in the name of its freedom: "Thinking is to be the point of departure; it is the interest of freedom that is the foundation."[Brown, 139] Thought thinking itself, Spirit taking possession of itself, becoming what it is, has its proper beginning in this philosophy.

...the spirit achieves this aim and gains freedom in no other element but thought. In perception I have always an other as object, which remains other; there are objects which dominate me. So too in feeling I find myself dominated, I am not free in it; I am just a victim of it, I have not made myself feel. And even if I am conscious of this feeling, I still only know that I am feeling something and am compelled to feel it. Even in willing I am not simply at home with myself; I have specific interest, and these are indeed mine, but they always involve an other over against me, an other which remains other and by which I am determined in a natural way, (e.g. by impulses, inclinations, etc.) In all these, I am never completely at home with myself. Thinking alone is the sphere where everything foreign has vanished and the spirit is absolutely free, at home with itself. [Introd., 80]

Hegel repeatedly observes that Descartes presents his philosophy in an inadequate way. Here too: "In the Cartesian form the stress is not on the principle of freedom as such, but instead on reasons more popular in tone, namely that we must make no presuppositions because it is possible to be mistaken." [Brown, 139]

Thinking, as the wholly universal, absorbs 'being' within itself: "Thinking is movement within self, pure reference to self, pure identity with self. This is being too." [Brown, 141] But, Hegel observes, this identity of Thought and Being, constituting the most interesting idea of modern times, is not worked out by Descartes, as it is in the Encyclopedia Logic, for example.'Preliminary Conception', nos. 20 - 24'. "He has relied on consciousness alone..." [Michelet II, 230]. In asserting that thought is more certain than body, what Descartes says more universally is this: "In this Philosophy has regained its own ground that thought starts from thought as what is certain in itself, and not from something external, not from something given, not from an authority, but directly from the freedom that is contained in the 'I think'." [Michelet II, 232]. Again Hegel notes the inadequacy: "Descartes offered no proof of this thesis of the unity of thinking and being..."[Brown, 141]
In the movement to God, Hegel has said that Descartes "presupposes" the idea of God: "Hence we see these determinations following upon one another in an empirical and naive manner, one that is therefore not philosophically or metaphysically demonstrative." [Brown, 143] It is clear now by what measure these inadequacies are discovered; it is the *Logic*. What Descartes presupposes here, for example, is self-realized in that work, God, the Absolute Idea, as the unity of Subjectivity and Objectivity, "having no other content than the whole system of which we have so far been studying the development." [*Encyclopedia Logic*, n.237] The Absolute Idea has been there from the beginning. "In this perspective, the absolute Idea is to be compared with the old man who utters the same religious statements as the child, but for whom they carry the significance of his whole life." [*Encyclopedia Logic*, n.237 Add.]

One could go on, but it is now sufficiently manifest that Hegel's treatment of Descartes in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* has concretely as its paradigm the self-development of the Idea in the *Logic*. What simply appears in Descartes or is "innate", presupposed, asserted, is inadequate to the full self-determination of the absolute Idea. Yet it is a moment in that life of God in himself "The eternal life of God is to find himself, become aware of himself, coincide with himself. In this ascent there is an alienation, a disunion, but it is the nature of the spirit, of the Idea, to alienate itself in order to find itself again." [Introd., 79-80]

iii. *Hegel's use of Descartes' principles of philosophy*

The whole presentation of the history of philosophy in the *Lectures* is orchestrated, determined and self-actualized by the self-same movement of thought to come into its own as appears in the *Logic*, "the revelation of God as he knows himself to be" [Michelet II, 547]. The determination, we have seen, is entirely self-determination, but it is nonetheless necessary.

I maintain that the succession of philosophical systems in history is the same as their succession in the logical derivation of the categories of the Idea. I maintain that if the fundamental concepts appearing in the history of philosophy are treated purely as what they are in themselves, discarding what affects their external form, their application to particular circumstances etc., then we have before us the different stages in the determination of the Idea itself in their logical order and essence. Conversely, if we take the logical process by itself, then we have in its chief stages the progress of the historical facts; ... [Introd., 22]

The course of the history of philosophy presented in the *Lectures* is therefore *objective*. It is not "the narration of all sorts of opinions", nor of so many philosophical systems in opposition to one another; it is not Hegel's history as over against Cousin's. Hegel could be mistaken in his interpretation of this or that position, and the history of philosophy itself untouched, for it is the disclosure of the self-development of Spirit in time. [Introd., 87-88].
Descartes' philosophy in that history is presented objectively. The elements of his philosophy bring themselves forward: doubt, the *cogito*, the movement to objectivity in the idea of God, God's truthfulness as the absolute bond between subjective cognition and objective truth. If Descartes has presented these elements "naively" this is not a criticism but a clear indication of his place in the history of philosophy. In a letter to V. Cousin who had made a gift to Hegel of his eleven volume edition of Descartes, Hegel writes: "Your complete edition of Descartes, which you have given me, is a beautiful present. The naïveté of his procedure and exposition is admirable. One can regret not being given the power to force men to be introduced to philosophy by studying these treatises, at once so simple and clear." But objectivity demands that Hegel situate them in the inexorable development of the history.

In the matter of the argument for the existence of God from the "idea of God " Hegel treats it as wholly an ontological argument. Descartes required that the *a priori* argument be bolstered by the argument from causality, because we cannot know whether the idea of God and what it implies is trustworthy until we know that what is clear and distinct is true. This is as true of his procedure in *Principles* as in *Meditations*. In presenting the *a priori* argument Hegel says: 'This had already been said by Anselm, that 'God is what is most perfect'. The question then arises 'But does this most perfect being also exist?' This is an illegitimate question." Hegel's correction of Descartes is equally a correction of Kant in this matter. "For what is most perfect is supposed to be that in whose concept existence already lies. That is the definition of 'what is most perfect' existence and representation are bound up together in it." [Brown, 142] It is therefore a "presupposition" at this juncture in philosophy, this idea of God which from the side of logic has not produced itself from itself.

Why should Hegel take his presentation of the Cartesian philosophy from the *Principles* and not from the *Meditations*? In part, one could say it does not matter because the elements of his philosophy are present in both works. What is at stake though is the authority of the philosophy. Descartes proceeds subjectively in the *Meditations*, and moving solely from the certainty of the *cogito* and its ideas, finds his way indubitably to God and truth, and from there to a "science of nature". The procedure in the *Principles* forsakes that subjective movement and presents the objective results of those same *Meditations*. When Hegel situates the Cartesian philosophy in the history of philosophy, his interest is in the elements, and not in their subjective development, a development which in the course of the larger history is superceded. Spinoza also treats the Cartesian philosophy objectively, and he too uses the *Principles* as his text. The objective standpoint of the *Principles* or of Spinoza himself is only brought into view by working through the subjective standpoint of the *Meditations*. If for Descartes the causal argument for God's existence must come first in the "order of reasons", that is, subjectively, Hegel knows that in the logic of the history of philosophy, the "idea of God" is at that moment a presupposition, and in that idea is presupposed also the *a priori* proof.

But in truth the authority of the *Meditations* is not lost on Hegel. His discussions of doubt, of thinking, of the identity of thought and being in the *cogito*, of all the elements of the Cartesian philosophy are among the most profound reflections on the *Meditations* to have been written. Hegel is fully conversant with the philosophy of the *Meditations*, offers the deepest commentary on its elements and its originality, and could not from the *Principles* alone have come to such an appreciation of the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes is the true beginning of modern philosophy, a philosophy which begins with thought alone. That true beginning is found in the subjective reflections of the *Meditations*, not in the presentation of the *Principles*. This is manifestly not lost on Hegel.

Hegel virtually quotes from *Rep. Obj. II*\(^{40}\), and therefore would know Descartes' views on the merits of "analysis". Hegel's speculative method, the dialectical method, he describes as the end of the *Logic*: "The philosophical method is both analytic and synthetic, but not in the sense of a mere juxtaposing or a mere alternation of both these methods of finite cognition; instead, the philosophical method contains them sublated within itself, and therefore it behaves, in every one of its movements, analytically and synthetically at the same time. Philosophical thinking proceeds analytically in that it simply takes up its object, the Idea, and lets it go its own way, while it simply watches the movement and development of it, so to speak. To this extent philosophy is wholly passive. But philosophical thinking is equally synthetic as well, and it proves to be the activity of the Concept itself. But this requires the effort to beware of our own inventions and particular opinions which are forever wanting to push themselves forward."

[Encyclopedia Logic, n. 238, Add.] His description of the "analytic method" is entirely appropriate to the Cartesian philosophy as he presents it in the *Lectures*. The method is the source of the "naiveté" he detects in Descartes and appreciates fully in his letter to Cousin.

NOTES

In accordance with current practice, I use the following abbreviations for the standard editions of Descartes and Hegel:


\(^{40}\) Michelet I, 1411, 1412 and *passim*; Brown, 140; Michelet II, 232, 233.
Hegel On The English Reform Bill

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A man's body, and his mind, with the utmost reverence to both I speak it, are exactly like a jerkin, and a jerkin's lining; -- rumple the one, you rumple the other" ---- Tristram Shandy

I

“Liberalism is the problem with which history is now occupied and which it has to solve in the future,”¹ So wrote Hegel near the end of his life, thinking especially of the July Revolution and the failure of the French to find a stable unity of democracy and state authority. It was then more than forty years since, as a student, he had rejoiced at the coming of the great revolution which would enthrone reason as the controlling power in human affairs. If, as is said, the old Hegel was greatly troubled at revolution renewed in France and threatening even in Britain, what troubled him was not revolution but that it continued when it was no longer necessary. He never ceased to think that a new age had begun in 1789, which needed, however, still to be understood and accepted by peoples and governments².

Liberalism is the inner freedom and equality of the Protestant reform realized in the world. Therewith the division between rulers and ruled becomes secondary, sovereign power belonging to all citizens alike in virtue of the rationality in which all are primarily equal, despite whatever differences of birth, talent or education may also occur. Political equality is, however, as ambiguous as was religious equality at an earlier time. Should it be taken to mean direct democracy? The indirect democracy of representative government? Or is the truer sense of the revolution that now people are at the point where they demand and can endure that their affairs be governed by impartial reason, as far as this can be provided by the fittest and most qualified among them? However impossible

¹ Werke, 2nd ed., vol 8, (Berlin, 1840), 541.
² Rosenkranz's description of a Hegel shattered and despondent at the July Revolution and the possibility of revolution in England does nothing more than colour what is said in Philosophie der Geschichte., ed. cit., vol.8, facts he quotes from the Roman historian Niebuhr, an unphilosophical head who receives harsh censure elsewhere from Hegel. See his Hegel's Leben, Berlin, 1844, 413-19.
direct democracy is in a modern state, it was this Rousseausan ideal that still held the French bourgeoisie fifteen years after the Restoration³.

The reason for instability in France was not danger that the revolution might be undone by the restored monarchy. Rational rights of person and property remained in effect; a state had been organized within which the various levels of society had room to carry on their affairs freely; thanks to this ordered freedom the intelligent were not regarded with suspicion by the people, but were trusted and had influence with them. But liberals were unsatisfied with this real freedom because they demanded that the general will be also empirically general: that individuals as such rule or participate in government. They were unaware that what they sought in this was the opposite of the liberal principle: not government according to reason but the domination of opinion, caprice, interest, hatred of authority as such⁴.

Instability and recurrent revolution were likely to continue in France for a long time. For the causes of an anarchic suspicion and hostility of individuals towards government were deeply fixed in French tradition, political and religious. If the restored monarchy could not abolish liberal democracy, to oppose its principle was a matter of religious conscience, and the attitude of the people to political authority, once it was beyond their direct control, was as towards an alien and external power and not the expression of the general will. Between the Revolution and Catholic France was a gulf that could not be crossed, if it be true that without religious reform liberalism cannot win the common people to the better meaning of its principle.⁵

Liberalism was not an unsolved problem for France alone or for Catholic Europe. Indeed, France apart, Catholic Europe had even a certain immunity to revolution in that it lived either in the decline of a Renaissance culture or, to the east, had hardly entered the modern age. It might be that in Protestant Germany the bourgeoisie did not resent the authority of an able and enlightened bureaucracy -- an aristocracy of talent and education -- with the active resentment of the French bourgeoisie. Centuries of Protestant faith disposed them to feel rather unity than conflict of public and private interests. But the weakness and danger was that this conviction was rather religious than from the experience of political freedom. If it might be thought that the German bourgeoisie were better able to live through and complete the revolution than the French, certainly they had not yet proved that this was the case. The rights which the bourgeoisie had gained by its own efforts in Britain and France had sometimes been granted in Germany by absolute princes or had been introduced by Napoleon. With the industrial revolution and the resulting transformation of social relations it must be expected that the same independent spirit -- the same separation and hostility of civil society in relation to the state -- must grow in Germany as earlier in France and Britain. Revolution in some manner would

³ *Ph. Gesch.*, l.c.
⁴ The logic of liberalism, what there is of human right in its principle, one learns of course chiefly from *Philosophie des Rechts*; e.g. sect.124 ff.
⁵ To *Ph. Gesch.*, l.c., *Ph.R.*, sect. 270, for the relation of church to state generally and why Hegel finds successful revolution, as against indefinite recurrence of the same revolutionary situation, only conceivable in Protestant countries. It has of course nothing to do with the extreme importance of the French Revolution for humanity that the French people fail to draw the right conclusions from it.
have to be experienced as revolution, even if the end might be voluntary obedience to a wise government as the true agent of the general will.  

If Hegel saw this happy unity of reason and authority with revolutionary freedom as possible for Germany and grounded in the special character and tradition of the people, he knew also how difficult its achievement must be. The unsolved problem of liberalism was, more generally stated, the problem of the relation of civil society to the state. Is the state properly the servant of individuals and their private or corporate interests? Or is it rather that these interests, however much deserving to be protected and encouraged by the state, are not so much ends as means to a fuller liberation of individuals which is the end of the state? Nowhere did Hegel see the conflict of particular and common interest so harsh as in Germany, whether he looked at the older history of his people or at the newest tendencies. The reason for this was the wholeness of the German temper, as little capable of English common sense and compromise as of a French division of religious and secular conscience. But in learning from the success, such as it has been, of the English and the French in uniting society and state, the Germans could find the way to a resolution of the conflict satisfactory to themselves. The way was certainly not to abandon reason and enlightenment for nature, history, old Germanic forms of association, pagan or medieval.

Among the growing bourgeoisie of Hegel's Prussia those forces were already strong which broke forth explosively in 1848 against government from above, then were contained by the stronger force of German nationalism. Bismarck's Empire was no doubt a certain solution to the problem of liberalism, but altogether other than the ideal solution that seemed not impossible in Hegel's time. The Prussian constitution, a work of the Enlightenment, could by a natural growth permit the freest development of civil society without that weakening of state power which had taken place variously in Britain and France. In Prussia the monarchy had been revolutionized first. Society, to reach the same point, must absorb and build on the rationality already attained in Britain and France.

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6 Ph.Gesch., pp. 541-42, 545-46. Modern freedom in its more developed forms was the work of the French and Germans. The French brought it to reality without any clear conception of it; the Germans attained the concept, but its reality with them was not from an inner development but taken from, or imposed by the French. See., e.g., Geschichte der Philosophie (1941), 3rd part, 478 ff., 485.

7 Hegel's attitude to the Prussian state is for us deeply buried under the awareness of its subsequent history. For him Prussia was more than any other European state the creation of the Enlightenment. Because it was freer than the French state, or the English, of merely existent, traditional rights, the true achievements of the Revolution -- rational human rights, a rational system of law, etc. -- could be incorporated into the Prussian state more successfully than in other cases. And it was just this work that a bureaucracy formed by the Revolution and the new German philosophy was in course of accomplishing. On the historical situation, Staat und Gesellschaft im deutschen Vormärz 1815-1848, ed. W.Conze, Stuttgart, 1962, 79 ff; 243 ff. Hegel was also fully aware that relapse into a worse than medieval barbarism was encouraged by some aspects of revolutionary thought. The Ph. R. was primarily directed against an irrational, nationalistic liberalism, of which Nazism was the distant result: "Vorrede" (Hoffmeister), 6 ff.
Instead, as in the other cases, the fatality of nature prevailed: the strife of a ready and total obedience with an equally ready and total opposition of society to state.\(^8\)

The most desirable course of events for his people, it must have seemed to Hegel in his last years, would be that, first, a strong capitalist economy have time to grow, therewith an independent society as in Britain; that liberal democracy be discouraged until it had this basis and might thus rather seem to establish its principle of equality and human right within society than turn to revolutionary politics. For liberalism need only be a problem and a danger if it became, as in France, the fanatical effort to realize abstract equality through direct democracy. The true defence against this empty demand for power was the attraction of an ordered class society, as in 18th century Britain.\(^9\)

The recurrence of revolution in France, whence it must spread at once to Germany endangered this rational growth of civil society. No less disturbing was the prospect of liberal revolution in Britain, which alone of modern states had remained indifferent to radical freedom throughout the revolutionary wars. For Britain, if no longer as in the previous century a model of freedom generally to others, remained a model in the sense indicated. The ruin of the British constitution would be a loss to Europe.

From such considerations, and not from a senile retreat and fear of revolution, Hegel could reasonably be moved in the last year of his life to resume the role of publicist and set in useful perspective for the Prussian bourgeoisie the causes and prospects of the Reform Bill in Britain. Where society or particular interest has taken control of the state, is the state any longer capable of fundamental reform without revolution? Yes, but with much difficulty; and provided there is little disposition to listen to intellectuals in place of statesmen.\(^10\)

II.

The English constitution was an anachronism, resting "entirely on particular rights, freedoms, privileges conferred, sold, presented by or extorted from kings and Parliament on special occasions. Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, which concern the most

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\(^8\) Ph. Gesch., 529. On the particular form the relation of society to state took in Germany after 1848, viz. a socialist (Marxist) opposition to a state for which liberalism was no longer a problem, the author's comments in "Hegel and Contemporary Liberalism: A Defense of the Rechtsphilosophie Against Marx and His Contemporary Followers," in The Legacy of Hegel, ed. J.J O'Malley (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973)

\(^9\) e.g., "France's misfortune must be sought entirely in the complete disintegration of the feudal system ... As a result of the decline of the States General, the higher and lower nobility no longer appeared in the character of representative ... On the other hand., their personality was intensified in the highest degree .... At the same time, effect is no longer given to the representation of the Third Estate ..." "The German Constitution" in Hegel's Political Writings, trans. Knox, Oxford, 1964, 205.

\(^10\) The article on the Reform Bill was written of course for the use of Germans, Prussians in particular. Hegel is concerned to show at once the strength of the British constitution and that British freedom is insufficient to German needs. Though unlikely to please an English reader,for which reason its publication was delayed by the King of Prussia after two-thirds had appeared in the official Preussische Staatszeitung (v. Hegel's Political Writings, 22), it is most superficial to find in it, with Rosenkranz (op. cit. p-419), a denigration of England -- let alone a "krankhafte Verstimmung"! Hegel sees alike what a Bentham and what a Burke sees in the 18th century constitution.
important foundations of the English constitution ... are concessions wrung (from the Crown) by force, or else acts of grace, agreements, etc., and constitutional rights have stuck by the form of private rights, which they had at their origin, and therefore by the accident of their content." \(^1\) "But at no time more than the present has the general intelligence been led to distinguish between whether rights are purely positive in their material content or whether they are also inherently right and rational." \(^2\)

The interest and importance of the Reform Bill is that in the matter of the franchise it attacks the principle of positivity on which the constitution depends. However moderate the content of the Bill, in its principle it is liberal and revolutionary. The franchise is no longer to be regarded as the property of a few in certain localities, which they take it to be their private right to sell to candidates approved by the local aristocracy. Instead it is seen as a universal right of popular participation in the election of Parliament, even if the universality will at first only take the form of a fairer distribution locally and among classes. What therefore in effect is attacked in the Bill is the aristocracy, its long established right to rule for the people. "What rouses the greatest interest is the fear in some quarters, the hope in others, that the reform of the franchise will bring in its train other reforms of substance. The English principle of positivity on which ... the whole of English law rests, does through the Bill actually suffer a shock which in England is entirely new and unheard of, and one instinctively suspects that more far-reaching changes will issue from this subversion of the formal basis of the existing order." \(^3\)

"In England a broad field for reform is open comprising the most important aims of civil and political society. The necessity for reform begins to be felt." There are, apart from the constitution, the "extensive jumble of English private law, which even Englishmen master their pride in their freedom sufficiently to call an Augean stable;" obsolete forms of ecclesiastical organization and property; "manorial and other bizarre rights and property restrictions derived from feudalism;" "the contrast between prodigious wealth and utterly embarrassed poverty;" the Irish question etc. Together these evils might move public opinion to demand universal rights and to transfer its allegiance from the aristocracy to the radical party as supporting such a reform and rationalization of society. For the "reason why England is so remarkably far behind the other civilized states of Europe in institutions derived from true rights is simply that there the governing power lies in the hands of those possessed of so many privileges which contradict a rational constitutional law and true legislation." \(^4\)

In these circumstances it might seem probable that England was on the eve of a liberal revolution. One estimate was "that, under the Bill in question, the greater part of the electors would consist of shopkeepers, and thus the interests of trade would seem to gain advantage." It would serve the ambition of the 'novi homines' whom this electorate would put in Parliament to make themselves the advocates of liberalism and universal right. And since principles so opposed to their privileges could hardly be acceptable to an

\(^1\) "The English Reform Bill" in Hegel's Political Writings, 299.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid. 295; 300-01.
\(^4\) Ibid. 301 ff; 300.
aristocratic government, the new politicians "would inevitably come on the scene only as an opposition to the government and the existing order of things; and the principles themselves would have to appear not in their practical truth and application, as in Germany, but in the dangerous form of French abstractions." "The new class may all the more easily get a footing, since the principles as such are simple in nature and so can be quickly grasped by the ignorant. Since in addition, on the strength of their universality, these principles have a claim to adequacy for everything, they suffice in a man of a certain slenderness of talent, and a certain energy of character and ambitions for the requisite all-attacking rhetoric, and they exercise a blinding effect on the reason of the masses who are just as inexperienced in these matters."15

Should such a struggle develop between the ruling aristocracy and the demagogic leaders of the middle section of the bourgeoisie, "which in England is of course extremely numerous and which in general is most open to those abstractions" the battle would be the more dangerous in that there was no power in the constitution able to mediate between the two sides. "In England the monarchical element in the constitution lacks the power which in other states has earned gratitude to the Crown for the transition from a legal system based purely an positive rights to one based on the principles of real freedom, a transition wholly exempt from earthquake, violence, and robbery."16

And is not a battle of principles inevitable? The contrast between England and "the civilized states of the continent" is too extreme to continue long. On the one side government by a privileged class and positive rights; on the other the sovereignty of the general will and national institutions. The principles of the reform "being grounded on universal reason, cannot always remain so foreign even to the English understanding as they have been hitherto."17

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However inevitable it might seem, Hegel judged that revolution was improbable in England. Should it indeed occur, its causes would rather be the accidental incompetence of politicians and the momentary loss of practical sense by the people than because the reforms sought could not be attained within the constitution. Certainly the constitution could not absorb the liberal principle -- atomic individualism with its implication of direct democracy. But, as the history of the following century was to show, it could tolerate the indefinite extension of the franchise. If the principle of positive rights was, and continues to be held to stubbornly, there was shown on the other hand an unlimited capacity to alter the content and distribution of privilege according to the necessity of the times. That the constitution contained this wondrous strength and adaptability, and for what reason, was evident to Hegel as to no British philosopher or political writer. Burke no doubt felt the excellence of the constitution, and could account for it through the constitution itself and by an analogy with the Christian religion. Lacking a general and

15 Ibid. 323; 325; 326.
16 Ibid. 330. For the last, Hegel thinks of course chiefly of the Allgemeines Landrecht of Frederick the Great.
17 Ibid. 325.
philosophical insight into its principles, he is at his limit when confronted with the deeper rationality of French liberalism. In extolling prescriptive above rational right, he was obliged to defend, or ignore, indefensible abuses. It escapes him alike that the excellence of the constitution has its source in its rationality and that the corruptions characteristic of it are primarily there because this rationality is immediate and abstract.\textsuperscript{18}

The obstacle to the radicals and their abstract ideas is the "political sense" of the English people. Not the same as this is the "so-called practical sense of the British people, its concentration on gain, subsistence, wealth." For shopkeepers do not as such tend to acquire "political sense" but to be fixed in a narrower unpolitical view of their interest. But the "so well-reputed sound common sense of the English people" has also the quality that "it makes individuals feel the insignificance of the influence they exercise on public affairs by their single votes. Moreover this same common sense gives them a proper sense of their general ignorance and their slender capacity for judging the talents, acquaintance with business, skill, and education required in high offices of state." What then is this "political sense" and how did the English come to have it in a special degree?\textsuperscript{19}

It in not certainly the virtue which Montesquieu thought necessary to the survival of democracies. Indeed it would be hard to find anywhere so complete a corruption of political life as in England, where the rights of electors are regarded to a great extent simply as a "matter of cash". But this corruption may also be thought the sign of a just perception and political maturity. For to take "badges, roasts, beer, and a few guineas" for their votes is preferable, surely, to the practices of the more inexperienced French voters who, to be conscious of their political importance, must have "insurrections, clubs, associations, etc.". One need not agree with "the almost unanimous view of the pragmatic historians that if in any nation private interest and a dirty monetary advantage becomes the preponderating ingredient in the election of Ministers of state, then the situation is to be regarded as the forerunner of the inevitable loss of that nations political freedom".\textsuperscript{20}

One may instead ask how it would ever be possible for the members of civil society to acquire "political sense" except by carrying to absurdity their appropriation of the

\textsuperscript{18} Burke, speaking of a concrete reason in Hegel's sense, calls it stoically "a conformity to nature in our artificial institutions" (Reflections on the Revolution in France, Everyman's Library, 32). But such a conformity in no way explains how "the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but is secures what it acquires" (31). "... we are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy": but no more does this medieval language explain the consciousness that the "principle of conservation" and "the principle of improvement" are radically one and the same -- from which comes Burke's confidence in the sufficiency of the constitution to all occasions. The bond is the Humean, sceptical principle of concrete individuality, the presupposition of Burke's thought about which he cannot speak clearly. Leo Strauss, recognizing and deploiring this concession to modernity in Burke, remarks that "Burke himself was still too deeply imbued with the spirit of 'sound antiquity' to allow the concern with individuality to overpower the concern with virtue" (Natural Right and History, Chicago, 1953, 323). On which Hegel would have commented that modern individuality does not exclude ancient virtue but contains it and restores it to the concreteness it had lost in Stoic and medieval forms.

\textsuperscript{19} "English Reform Bill", 312; 315; 320.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. 296; 297.
state. Once the franchise has been placed "in the same category with strict property rights" the contradiction between its meaning within society and its political meaning can hardly be overlooked. Upon this insight would follow logically the subordination of society to the state. The Reform Bill aids to this conclusion as containing "an internal contradiction between positive rights and an abstract and theoretical principle. Therefore the illogicality of what is derived from the basis of the old feudal law is shown up in a cruder light than if all entitlements to voting had been put on one and the same footing of positive rights". The recognition of this contradiction need not precipitate a liberal revolution. It may instead, by permitting a Burkean insight into the inner and ideal nature of the constitution, lead to a conservative reaction.\textsuperscript{21}

It could not be the intention of a popular essay to show the logical structure of the English constitution -- how it worked and whence its stability and long duration. For it would be necessary to bring into the argument philosophical concepts of the greatest difficulty and quite unfamiliar in their strict conceptual form to the ordinary educated reader. Hegel proposes only to indicate historically and empirically the form of the struggle taking place in England. The pieces are all there in his description but not their logical connection. He can assume that the English character is well known in its general lines to his readers: the popular idea of a national character in a mixture of conflicting qualities, such as to support whatever friendly or hostile attitudes one may have in varying circumstances. Hegel's intention is to counter one-sided conclusions Germans might draw from events in England according as they favoured one side or the other or sought support therefrom for their political attitudes at home.

If the argument be translated into more philosophical form one could say that while the principle of the English constitution is positive or prescriptive right there is present also a rational principle whereby nothing given (precedent, custom, etc.) is binding to the point of destroying the constitution. The "political sense" both of the ruling part of the nation and of the ruled has its foundation in this principle. It is in no way an abstract moral principle -- virtue as opposed to vice -- but rather such as to permit and comprehend a vigorous, even ruthless, pursuit of private interest or stubborn adherence to privilege. The consciousness of this underlying unity of the body politic, and attachment to it, were maintained by no formal education (though a classical formation predisposed to the reception of it) but by the conflicts of society and their resolution.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. 315, "... it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers ... as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right" (Burke, 31). The aristocracy, who administer the inheritance, readily treat it as their property. But the constitution in its operation constrains its would-be owners to recognize the mutual dependence of classes and their common subordination to the principle of sovereignty expressed by the monarchy. The effect of the constitution is to awaken, beyond the conflict of class interests, the sense of unity and mutual obligation. For this to come about the proprietary attitude has to be negated by a conflicting claim to the property. The resolution is the ideal unity of classes in a common self-consciousness.

\textsuperscript{22} England is a Protestant state. What lies in this formula equally evades liberal and socialist writers and conservative or theological (such as L.Strauss). For, as Burke already noticed, such a state contains both a conservative and a reforming principle. For the concept - of this unity, \textit{Ph.R.}, sections 105-114, on which the writer has commented somewhat in an article already referred to. There is in Protestant societies an
The English was not a medieval aristocracy attached, like the Polish, to the destruction of the state. It was to able to govern also contrary to its interests so far as it not only contained the solid ignorance of country squires and those who had no other claims to rule than blood but was in some measure the universal or political class. From the settlement of 1688 the English state could be governed neither by the absolute authority of kings nor by republicans but by those who know the unity of both principles. For the independent Protestant temper of the commercial class was indeed antagonistic to monarchy, if the two confronted each other immediately. There lay, however, in the ascetic pursuit of wealth a contradiction which had its resolution in the total movement and conflict of society. Implicitly the Puritan knows in his devotion to business also an ideal end -- that work and the acquisition of wealth was means to a free life he could not venture to enjoy in this world. It evaded his direct awareness that the interaction of classes in society had no other result than to produce the desired unity of work and enjoyment already secularly. The actual experience of society resolved concretely for him the contradiction that the love of money, or whatever his particular interest and passion might be, was both vanity and his very self. For the capitalism which was the expression of his moral or rational attitude to work made the contingency of productive labour more immediately and harshly present than need be so in a more static economy. If this experience drove the employed either to ruin or to the independent spirit of the employer, the social sphere of capital and labour alike was defined by their relation to the aristocracy -- the relation to an unconfined individuality of an individuality formed through a particular occupation. If the effect of capitalism was to level and equalize, to reduce the natural to abstract universality, the opposition of bourgeois to aristocrat had the tendency to restore the broken unity -- no longer, however, as that of craftsmen, technicians, specialists to their work as such, but as of concrete persons to one another in society.  

Those for whom this knowledge did not have the form of submission to the inevitable forces of social life but rather of insight that the unity of classes in the state proceeded from nothing else than this negation of particular interests were capable of "political sense". They were the universal class who, knowing what it is to govern and be governed, could rule for the rest according to the constitution. Their authority with the others had its source in this, that in them was best realized what the other classes sought.

The tendency of the English state was at once to encourage strenuous and intelligent economic activity on the part of the bourgeoisie and out of that class to recruit or refresh an aristocracy able to rule a strongly independent people. In these conditions effective power passed from the King to Parliament; and in place of a pervasive central administration, as under the French kings, local and particular aspects of government, by the same aristocratic principle, were widely diffused among the political or ruling class.

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23 In view is especially Ph.R., "Die Bürgerliche Gesellschaft: (a) Die Art des Bedürfnisses und der Befriedigung". Fragments of Hegel's logic of civil society and its relation to Protestantism were taken up by Marx and by Max Weber. Hegel writes from a view in which the socialism of the one and the liberalism of the other have both their place.

24 e.g. Ph. Gesch., 544-48.
For these reasons, and not merely their maritime situation, the British were peculiarly fitted both to carry their trade to the remotest parts of the globe and to conquer and rule what they exploited. If the English pursued their economic interest with as little scruple as any, the ideal aspect of empire was at least practical -- not, as with the Spanish empire, dissociated from the real and exploitative.\textsuperscript{25}

Hegel saw perfectly the strength of a system which could both give a real political freedom and participation in government to those capable of it and contain and satisfy those whose talent and interest was particular. Out of the divisive forces of a modern society devoted to the application of science and technique to the production of wealth the English constitution produced a people strongly attached to its traditional institutions. The source of this conservative spirit was, as said above, that the independence and seeming sufficiency of society was negated and thereby the old institutions were no longer felt to be alien but as that in which all were one. To this stable consciousness of freedom in their ancient traditions a civil society as independent as possible and the negation of its independence are to be seen as equally necessary.\textsuperscript{26}

No less clear to Hegel was the peculiar weakness of the constitution. Indefinitely capable of admitting partial reform, the constitution need succumb only when the content of the reform demanded could no longer be separated from the liberal principle. But when would this point ever be reached? For the political problem in which all others would seem to be contained is that of revolution or the unity of state and civil society. Of this problem there are no approximate or partial solutions: society finds in principle a unity prior to its particular interests or there is no state. The constitution then being a solution to this problem, how can it be insufficient to another? But freedom was taken to lie chiefly in the right of individuals to follow their particular interest with the least impediment. Equality, though strongly present in the underlying Protestant belief, was rather the removal of such impediment than positively the common rationality which should, by the nature of that belief, have precedence over natural differences. And the community of classes which appears as the term of the social process is only the term, and not, as in the religious belief, also what is primary and comprehensive of economic and legal relations. This disparity between the religious and the secular form might take a moral or practical form. Not in this, however, would Hegel see the beginning of a change in the constitution itself, but rather in the intrinsic development of civil society. It would come of itself with a clearer consciousness of the principle of the constitution that the unity of society and state would be felt rather as a deeper disunity.

The cause of a new separation could seem to be merely a more developed science and technology, a scientific culture which had no longer any place for an aristocratic humanism. However plausible, arguments of this kind in fact say nothing to the point. Developed technology by itself only makes conspicuous what it once took a Burke to discern -- why the Englishman was happy to be ruled by aristocrats. It was exactly

\textsuperscript{25} "English Reform Bill", 330; \textit{Ph.Gesch.}, I.c.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ph.R.}, sect.182 ff. for an incomparably succinct and precise statement of the logic of civil society. Civil society as it achieved independence in Britain is to be considered primarily under the first or immediate form treated in sect.190 fully.
because he was conscious that society was a system of mutual dependence where specialists blindly pursued their speciality.

The constitution has in fact withstood far more dangerous attacks than from developed technology. It has admitted liberalism to the extent of the universal franchise. Yet the liberal principle once admitted must have subverted the constitution. Socialism from its communal, collective view of human relations would seem to be still more destructive of British freedom. In fact, socialist governments have moved easily enough within the constitution. That these more radical forms could be absorbed without revolution has no other explanation than that both were already implicit in the constitution and belonged to its logic. For, as indicated above, the ideas of equality and social solidarity occur essentially in the transition from society to state -- already in its immediate form. The liberalism and socialism that grow on this foundation, even when they seem to dominate the constitution remain British, however, and hostile alike to Jacobins and Marxists.27

The English constitution, however admirable and an education for others, was not for Hegel as for Burke immutable and divine. Divine it might be called if the rational is divine. But the rationality was founded on a jumble of positive rights; it was a freedom from the letter of tradition and from the positive as such, the endless capacity to bind the new to the old. But it was this freedom only in particular cases, not universally. As such it might long satisfy a people peculiarly occupied with the particular and whose ideal was a personal independence rising out of this empirical attitude, the completion of it. If as Hegel expected, the constitution survived the Reform Bill, the unity it expressed of empirical and ideal was felt less easily in the following period than their conflict. Unless in an abstract, moralistic optimism, science and technology and humane interests tended to become sharply divided.28

The strength of the British constitution was for Hegel that in an objective secular form it gave satisfaction to the conflicting real and ideal interests of a Protestant people.

27 Burke already recognized that in a sense both liberal and socialist rights could properly be demanded by Englishmen under the constitution: "If civil society is made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it was made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by that rule ...They have a right to the fruits of their industry ... he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour. In this partnership all men have equal rights ... " (Burke, 56) But the special form in which he sees these rights imparted is shown in such as "Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself ..." (Ibid).

28 "Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parties wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporations of the human race, the whole, at one time', is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy," etc.(Burke, 31-2). Hegel can give exact philosophical form to the concept of a concrete reason expressed in this. Because Burke has not hold of his thought except through natural and theological analogies, he cannot know that his concept of society and state is not related, e.g. to Rousseau's as empirical to metaphysical, but rather as two different but closely related metaphysical concepts.
It tolerated evils such as would move other peoples to revolution, but had also the
capacity to correct them in a manner agreeable to the empirical temper of the English
people. In this was a lesson for Germans as to the outcome of the revolutionary period: a
state in which civil society had maximum independence, where individual and collective
interests could have the freest possible development. A free and enlightened Prussian
state -- German it might come to be -- would have its special character, as the English and
French had given their special character to modern freedom. In a German state free
individuals would recognize and accept, after a hard conflict, a pervasive and
undiminished state as realizing their true interests. A still half-feudal state would of
necessity reform itself once it had to rule free citizens for whom blood and aristocratic
privilege conferred of themselves no authority.

Hegel's estimate was that the constitutional state, as the outgrowth and completion of
a national history, was able to contain revolution in a Protestant country. In France
revolutionary movements might indeed continue, but not so that they could either destroy
or extend greatly the freedom possible in a modern state. Less developed peoples might
be expected to imitate this pattern, not very successfully.

Hegel considered the advanced European states at a point where the English and
French, through revolution, had attained a unity stronger than class divisions. The
Germans, to his mind, had hardly more to do than recognize that they had reached the
same point. Certainly, in Prussia at least, revolution was unnecessary, for the reason that
rational institutions already existed. There was needed only political experience among
the bourgeoisie, so that they might come to know that their hostility to the state was no
more than an attachment to attractive abstractions. The most striking confirmation of his
analysis is no doubt 1848, when triumphant revolution dissolved feebly into German
nationalism.

Once the European states had come to a concrete internal unity, Hegel knew that
political life inwardly must degenerate for want of ideal and universal problems to solve.
Higher political satisfaction from that point was only to be found either in war with other
states, in which ideal interests could be quickened, or else in wider, world-historical
relations. This long familiar outcome is in one way the historical refutation of Hegel's
belief that the age of revolution was over. It may also be read as the strongest
confirmation of his political philosophy. His question was what primarily holds a modern
political society together. Hegel may seem to have been right, in denying that the answer
could be found either in nationalism or in the further liberation of 'civil society'.

29 e.g. "Das Nächste ist nun, was eintritt, wenn der Geist hat, was er will. Seine Tätigkeit ist nicht mehr
erregt, seine substanzielle Seele nicht mehr in Tätigkeit. Sein Tun steht nur mehr in entfernterem
Zusammenhange mit seinen höchsten Interessen" Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. Hoffmeister,
Hamburg, 1955, 67; to which add 69 ff.
Death On The Grand Scale

Graeme Nicholson

There are some philosophers who see their task as guarding us from myth, superstition and error, who suppose that we are all inclined to credulity, and that we need the discipline of criticism and analysis which they will supply. But there are others who make a different appraisal of our everyday life, and who take a different view of the task of philosophy. According to them, we are always being tempted by narrowness and smallness, and by what is near at hand. So what we need above all is to have our minds raised to the things that are the highest and greatest of all. I surely place in the latter group such authors as Plato and Heidegger. And I should like to see Hegel in that group too, even though he hated being pigeon-holed, and even though he insisted that nobody was ever as critical and as analytical as he, nobody more vigilant against superstition and error. I need not quarrel with Hegel's own self-estimation, however, because it is clear that he did campaign against the narrowing of Ideas into mere Concepts -- on this point, he is like other philosophers who have pointed us beyond restrictiveness. When we turn our minds to topics such as Right, Actuality, Spirit and Life, according to Hegel, we must never restrict their application, or domesticate them to just one particular role. On the matter of life, Hegel is like many other philosophers -- seeing its universal character. For him, and for most philosophers, it is an error to suppose that life is manifested especially in living creatures, animal, plant or human, beings endowed with organs, an error to suppose that observation and experiment with such creatures would provide us with a concept of life. In fact, the idea of life is only partly realized in the organic domain. Life is expressed even more fully in spiritual activity, in art, in political action, and in history. Here Hegel is at one not only with Plato and Heidegger, but with almost all authors in the great philosophical tradition.

One thing that may be distinctive of Hegel, however, in view of his dialectical prowess, is to treat this universal scope of life in connection with an equivalent universal scope of death. There is no reason to suppose that death is, primarily, an organic phenomenon studied by biologists, and that we could grasp it through an empirical concept. Since life is a topic to be treated by general Logic, as well as by the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of Spirit, the Philosophy of Right, and the Philosophy of History, it is no surprise that death too re-appears in all these domains. So I want to examine the phenomenon of death in Hegel, not only in the limited experience of a single organism, but on the greatest possible scale, in the life of nature as a whole and history as a whole.

First, then, what about the place of death in Hegel's logic?
The Logic of Life and Death

In the *Science of Logic*¹ we follow the dialectic of the concept through the subjective concept and the objective concept to their unity, the Idea, and the first glimpse we get of this Idea is life. Life is the first immediacy of the Idea. That means, among other things, that the Idea of life is the immediate predecessor of the Idea of knowledge and the immediate substratum of it: only a living subject can be a cognitive subject; knowing is one kind of living; knowing is never to be attributed to the inert or to the lifeless. This is a modern echo of the ancient teaching of philosophy that cognitive *nous* belongs to the living *psyche* as one of its powers, but in Hegel it has the further meaning that, while knowledge always mediates the objective with the subjective, it depends upon the prior and more immediate unity of the two, the immediate unity accomplished in life. The living, organic, moving, growing and self-organizing body bears in itself the primary imprint of the concept, the *Begriff*. Being imprinted in this immediate way with the concept, the living being will be in a position to entertain a cognitive representation of the concept. So this is the logical Idea of life, though Hegel makes it clear at once (*WL*, Vol. II, p. 415; *SL*, pp. 762 - 763) that life will also appear as a theme in the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

In the purely logical treatment of life, there is only one differentiation that is at work: that between the universal genus and the living individual. It is introduced at the point where the scrutiny of life begins (*WL*, Vol. II, pp. 412 - 413; *SL*, p. 760). The genus plays the principal role in the logic of life, with the living individual being relatively inessential, vanishing, expendable. That is to say that life realizes itself as the genus perpetuating itself through reproduction, on the one hand, and the death of individuals, on the other hand (*WL*, Vol. II, p.417; *SL*, p. 764). Let me add here that the *Science of Logic* does not differentiate genus from species -- either of these can serve as the universal factor over against the individual -- although the *Philosophy of Nature*, Sections 367 - 368, will show in detail how the genus particularizes itself into a number of species. Our present point is that the Idea of life includes the Idea of death. An eternal life of the individual is ruled out by Hegel on logical grounds. No mere accident of nature, death belongs to the constitutive dichotomy of genus and individual.

In the genus process, the separated individualities of individual life perish; the negative identity in which the genus returns into itself, while it is on the one hand the process of generating individuality, is on the other hand the sublating of it, and is thus the genus coming together with itself, the universality of the Idea in process of becoming for itself. In copulation the immediacy of the living individuality perishes; the death of this life is the procession of spirit (*WL*, Vol II, pp. 428 - 429; *SL*, p. 774).

The individual's death has a necessary ground, because the individual stands over against the universal genus, and simply cannot claim to be the true subject of life. The truth of

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the Idea is not confined to the living individual, but is found in what is universal. We can see here a certain echo of "The Doctrine of Essence" from the *Science of Logic*, Book Two, but also a difference. The genus stands over against the living individual in a manner that can recall the differentiation that belongs to Essence, in which the universal essence or form stands over against the manifold of singular things that are its instantiations. But we see that in the structure of life we are dealing with something more than that. Living individuals are not composed of mere parts, as beds are, for example, but are articulated into living members that are teleologically organized. Such individuals will not merely exemplify the universal -- they have the positive drive to perpetuate it through reproduction. The living genus is the kind of universal that must reside within the mutual relations of the living individuals, e. g., in their sexuality.

The death of the individual is the point at which the Idea of life passes over into the Idea of knowledge, i. e., the point at which spirit arises out of death (*WL*, Vol. II, p. 429; *SL*, p. 774). This transition will be replicated at the very end of the *Philosophy of Nature*, Sec. 376: here too, the death of the natural individual is the point of the emergence of spirit.

Life And Death In Nature

The living genus is the kind of universal that can never have an adequate realization in one individual. In this, it is unlike the angelic order as conceived by the scholastics, every one of whose individual members was in itself a genus. Moreover, the living genus is the kind of universal that is in need of successive generations through time. When we introduce time, we are moving out of Logic onto the terrain of Nature.

The *Philosophy of Nature*, in Sections 374 - 376,\(^2\) shows that the death of the individual is doubly fore-ordained. Death is, first of all, the outcome of the inborn germ of death, an inherent and logical necessity. As was established in the *Science of Logic*, the individual is inadequate, by comparison to the genus, to be the primary subject of life. But secondly, there is external necessity added to that: the finite individual occupies a world filled with other individuals, so that there are many outer powers that impose upon it death by violence or death by disease. The living individual is inherently vulnerable.

The philosophical meditation on nature not only seeks to comprehend and explain the death of the individual, but to show its justification. And I should like to argue on Hegel's behalf on this point. Within the domain of nature, individuals ought to pass away, just as they ought to come into being. It is the genus, not the individual, that has the primary claim to embody the Idea of Life. The individual wears out, and must do so. The singular animal can be a living singularity only through being united with the universal, the genus (Sec. 367). But this is never a mere co-inciding of the two, an immediate

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\(^2\) My references will be to sections or paragraphs (not pages) of the text as they appear in Part Two of the *Encyclopedia* of 1830, and in the *Philosophy of Nature*, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
oneness. It is a mediated unity. Just as birth precipitated a singular animal of such-and-such a species, so death must "sublate" this union, demonstrate that the oneness of universal and singular is not immediate. The Idea of life appears in an impressive form in the case of those animals who die at the moment of copulation (Sec. 370 of the 1830 Encyclopedia).

That the genus, not the individual, expresses and represents life is also the teaching of the Bible. In both accounts of creation, in Genesis 1 and in Genesis 2-3, it is clear that God is creating species or genera, not merely individuals, though in Hegel's view (unlike the view of Philo Judaeus and Origen) there is no creation of genera in advance of the creation of individuals. When the genus is created it is by way of, and together with, the creation of individual prototypes.

The living individual is the subject of death in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. I do not believe he refers, at least not directly, to the death of genera and species themselves, i.e., their becoming extinct. And yet we know today that species and genera are disappearing from the earth at an alarming rate. Hegel is equally silent, I believe, on the mirror-question of the creation or evolution of new species, and seems to regard that hypothesis as unphilosophical (See Sections 248 - 251). Both these points suggest a need to revise Hegel, to show that, even if we confine ourselves to the terrain of nature, death and birth take place on a grander scale than he had mentioned in his book. From a logical point of view, this is the issue of the birth and the death of something universal, the genus or species itself. There is surely no need to attribute to Hegel the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of species, or the Platonic doctrine of the imperishability of the forms. We shall be looking at a parallel case in the Philosophy of Spirit, where we shall see that Hegel is fully aware, both of the death of the individual, the singular self, treated in the account of Subjective Spirit, and of the death of states and civilizations, formations of the Objective Spirit. These formations are universal relative to the singular individual, but they too are capable of death.

The Death Of The Subject

Since we too belong to nature, our death is necessary for the sake of our genus, humanity, and has the same justification as that of other creatures. Yet, as spirit, we also transcend our natural destiny, and so the death of the spiritual individual has a meaning that goes beyond that of natural death, and is in need of further comprehension, and further justification, going beyond the study of death in the animal kingdom. Yet the theme of death is surprisingly muted in the Encyclopedia studies of subjective spirit (or subjective mind, Geist). The only clear reference to it that I have found is in the subsection "Self-Consciousness", Sections 430 - 433, where Hegel treats the problem of mutual recognition. He marginalizes the issue of death here by comparison to his earlier

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3 As with the Philosophy of Nature, my references will be to paragraphs of the text, drawn this time from Part Three of the 1830 Encyclopedia; and from Philosophy of Mind, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
work. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the famous pages on "Self-consciousness" had argued that mutual recognition would never have arisen if there had not been, at a more primordial stage of history, and at a more primordial level of spiritual self-consciousness, a battle to the death between two self-conscious subjects. In the *Phenomenology*, that struggle had come to precipitate the estates of lordship and bondage, the first and inadequate form of mutual recognition. But in the 1830 *Philosophy of Mind [Spirit]*, he expressly relegates that old battle-to-the-death to the primitive state of nature, claiming that in modern civil society there is no need to fight those old battles over and over again; mutual recognition can be achieved without them; struggle to the death is not a universal need of self-consciousness.

I would not take issue with this particular political view of the mature Hegel. I am, however, perplexed that he found no other locus in the *Philosophy of Mind [Spirit]* for a treatment of death as a phenomenon central to subjective spirit. In our own times, we have been instructed by Heidegger who showed that our "being-towards-death" is one of the defining elements in human existence. The anticipation of death as our possibility -- indeed, as "the possibility of being impossible" -- can be seen to constitute the very sense of the finitude and the seriousness of human life. Quite apart from the broader implications of this theme in Heidegger, touching on the human awareness of futural time, and on the human "understanding of being", it does appear strange that Hegel took so little notice of it in his *Encyclopedia*.

But there are copious references to the death of the individual subject in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, and it is quite clear that in these passages, Hegel is by no means regarding death as a natural phenomenon or occurrence. Death appears here in its spiritual significance. There are three main contexts in which it is treated: in the criminal law regarding murder (Sections 96 and 119), in the discussion of the death penalty (Sections 99, 100, 101 with Additions), and in the treatment of war, in which the state expects its citizen soldiers to offer up their lives for their country (Sections 323 - 328). Here it is the individual or singular self that is confronting the universal, but it is a self-conscious and spiritual individual, and it is a spiritual universal, the state, not a genus or a natural species, that he confronts. Each state is an individual with its own organs of decision, so that the spiritual death of a human being is the outcome of policy, whether that be the policy of punishment or a policy of war. The individual is, of course, supposed to participate in the government of the state, through whatever organs of representation are available to him. This spiritual universal is not kept in being through mere reproduction of the species, but through free action. This, however, does not mean that the state should be viewed as having originated in a social contract, nor does it imply that the individual has the right to withdraw from its jurisdiction. The state has the absolute right to make its policies, and their impact on the individual can be severe.

The might and the right of the universal, the state, can justify both capital punishment and the recruitment of its citizens for war. Hegel does not himself advocate particular legal measures in this philosophical book, such as the claim that capital

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4 References to *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955) are to sections. English translation by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1942)
punishment is appropriate for this crime or that, or the claim that it is never appropriate. His intent is to rebut those who have argued on one ground or another that capital punishment is absolutely wrong and always wrong. The arguments he considers in Sections 100 and 101 are either utilitarian in character, or based on social-contract theories. His reply is to invoke the state as "the higher entity which even lays claim to this very life and property and demands its sacrifice" (Sec. 100). It is the same fundamental line of argument that grants, for certain occasions, the appropriateness of a policy of war (Sections 323 and 324) and the right of the state to demand the sacrifice of individual life: "Sacrifice of behalf of the individuality of the state is the substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty" (Sec. 325).

The Death of States and Civilizations

Now we turn to the Philosophy of History, where the individuals under discussion are already universals themselves, concrete universals: states, peoples, civilizations. They are not instantiations of a genus-or-species universal, and yet they do die. The Philosophy of History shows how the vast process of world history -- particularly war -- brings death to nations. Where the nation dies, it is survived, not by a genus or a species, but by the process of spirit itself which Hegel also calls world history. Hegel uses the term "death" from time to time for the end of a state or a civilization, but he also uses many other terms for it: corruption, ruin, decay, being smashed, and so on. I bring all these concepts under the concept of death, for the important point in all cases is that the continuity of history is decisively broken. It is a case of something coming to an end and something new beginning, far more comparable to the death of a parent and the birth of a child than to a metamorphosis such as we may observe in nature (caterpillar to butterfly) or in human growth (adolescence to maturity). Terms like "decline" and "collapse" also bring before us this picture of a punctuated world history.

The Philosophy of History presents us with the spectacle of the wreckage of the greatest human projects no less than their rise and their glory. We can infer from our logical starting point that every state and every civilization has died or will die, and this of course includes our own. In the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel gives voice to the melancholy that must accompany that thought.

When we look at this drama of human passions, and observe the consequences of their violence and of the unreason that is linked not only to them but also (and especially) to good intentions and rightful aims; when we see arising from them all the evil, the wickedness, the decline of

5 My page references are, first, to the German text of the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (PG), published as Volume 12 of Hegel's Werke in Zwanzig Bänden, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), and, in the second place, to English translations. The translations are drawn from two sources. Quotations from the Introduction to the Philosophy of History (IPH), were translated by L. Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988). Quotations from the main body of the text are drawn from the edition of Carl J. Friedrich in The Philosophy of Hegel (PH) (New York: Modern Library, 1953).
the most flourishing nations mankind has produced, we can only be filled with grief for all that has come to nothing....As we contemplate history as this slaughter-bench, upon which the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals were sacrificed, the question necessarily comes to mind: What was the ultimate goal for which these monstrous sacrifices were made? \(PG,\ p.\ 34;\ IPH,\ pp.23\ -\ 24\)

Yet for Hegel, while melancholy is one genuine response, one tonality of a spirit that contemplates the world, it cannot be the pre-eminent and governing tone of the spirit, for it shows its special fondness for particular things that have passed away. The alert spirit contains and subdues its own melancholy by the discipline of studying the whole of history. And just as melancholy is contained and sublimated in the totality of the spirit, so too the deaths and sufferings which the melancholy spirit contemplates are contained and ordered within the whole of the progressive march of world history itself.

The insight to which philosophy ought to lead, therefore...is that the real world is as it ought to be, that the truly good, the universal divine Reason is also the power capable of actualizing itself. This good, this Reason -- in its most concrete representation -- is God. God governs the world: the content of His governance, the fulfillment of His plan, is world history. Philosophy seeks to understand this plan. \(PG,\ p.\ 53;\ IPH,\ p.\ 39\)

Hegel will seek to see the immanent wisdom and providence of God in the working out of the spirit's long historical march to freedom; he will also seek to raise our sights to the true transcendent God beyond history: ":...whatever can claim to be noble and grand in the world still has something higher above it" \(PG,\ p.\ 54;\ IPH,\ p.\ 40\). Hegel will justify the death of states and civilizations too.

The main text of the \textit{Philosophy of History} organizes its material in four divisions: the oriental world, then the Greek, the Roman, and the Germanic worlds. I'll focus on the second section, seeking to see in what way Hegel treats the death of Greece. We have in this case both the deaths of the particular Greek states (Athens and Sparta get particular attention), and in addition the death of the entire civilization of Hellas. I shall show that the death of Greece exhibits structural features that are common to all cases of death. First of all, as with natural death and subjective death, the death of Greece involves both an internal cause, the inborn germ of death, and an external cause, violence. Secondly, this death also puts this living individual (Greece, the concrete, individual universal) over against the universal power which steps in here in the role that was held earlier by the universal genus, or by the state. This power is what Hegel calls either World History or the World Spirit. Its onward march after the death of Greece is what shows the death to be not merely necessary but justified.

The Greek civilization was framed by the oriental world on the one side, and by the Roman world on the other. The latter will make its appearance dramatically at the end of Hegel's narrative about Greece. We'll begin by juxtaposing Hellas with the oriental world, where Hegel highlights its contrast with despotism and monotheism. Hegel
recounts the athletic, the sculptural, the military and the poetic celebration of individuality in Greece, a beautiful individuality, as he calls it, manifest not only in the human but in the divine sphere. The Greek genius is manifest in their gods. The beautiful individuality of the gods is that immediate victory of spirit over nature that still remains in continuity with nature.

The divine beings of the Greeks are not yet the absolutely free spirit, but spirit in a particular mode, fettered by the limitations of humanity, still dependent as a determinate individuality on external conditions. The gods of the Greeks are objectively beautiful individualities. (*PG*, p.299; *PH*, p.56)

In such a world, Hegel tells us, the human individual will also feel his or her own freedom with an immediate confidence, certain that it is in accord both with the gods and with the needs of the state.

At the Greek level of freedom the individual will is unfettered in the entire range of its vitality, and embodies the substantial being [the state] according to its particular nature....We may assert that the Greeks, living in the first and genuine form of their freedom, had no conscience....Their end was their living fatherland, this actual Athens, this Sparta, these temples, these altars, this form of social life, this group of fellow citizens, these mores and habits. (*PG*, pp. 306 - 307; *PH*, pp. 61, 63)

But what happens in Greece is that such a freedom is bound to be led from its first immediacy to an inward reflection, led, as Hegel says, into inwardness itself. The purely immediate and natural confidence that we are doing the right thing is suspended; we need to find a way of proving that we are right. It was the Sophists who introduced this inwardness.

Inwardness was akin to the Greek spirit, and it was to reach it soon, but it plunged the Greek world into ruin....It was the Sophists, the teachers of wisdom, who first introduced subjective reflection and the new doctrine that each man should act according to his own conviction. Once reflection comes into play, each man has his own opinion and inquires as to whether the principles of right and law cannot be improved. (*PG*, pp. 309 - 310; *PH*, p. 63)

Thus the leaders of the state are not automatically right, and intellectuals of all descriptions raise their claims in a manner that the youth cannot resist. Hegel comments that this development was noticed by Thucydides, "when he speaks of everyone's thinking that things are going badly when he is not present" (ibid.), but nothing is clearer than the representation of this state of affairs in the writings of Plato too.

In the case of the Greeks, Hegel says that the spirit was not yet sufficiently withdrawn from nature and immediacy to be able to rely upon its own autonomy and
freedom; indeed, only an infinite withdrawal of spirit from nature would prepare the spirit for the task of guiding itself in complete autonomy. In Greece, the spirit had not yet strengthened itself to the point of being able to accommodate the freedom and the inward reflection which the intellectuals proclaimed. It is for that reason that, in Greece, inwardness and freedom now took on the form of crime and debauchery.

Further advance, as well as corruption, started from subjective, inward morality, individual reflection and an inner life generally....The principle of [subjective] morality which was bound to enter became the germ of corruption which, however, showed itself in a different form in Athens from that which it assumed in Sparta. In Athens it was evident levity, in Sparta, private deprivation of morals. In their fall the Athenians showed themselves not only amiable, but great and noble, in a way which makes us lament their passing away. Among the Spartans, on the contrary, the principle of subjectivity progresses into vulgar greed and issues in vulgar ruin. (PG, p.323 - 324; PH, p. 73)

This corruption shows itself in the fault, the rift, where the entire civilization of Hellas was consumed with the war between the two greatest city-states, the external sign of the flaw. It also showed itself in the way in which these two powers conducted themselves during the war (Athens especially earning the severe condemnation of Thucydides), as well as a general corruption of the spirit manifest throughout every sector of life. The corruption has a meaning: it is a certain kind of inwardness.

We may note the principle of that corruption as inwardness becoming free in and by itself. We see this inwardness arising in various ways. Thought, the inward and general, menaces the beautiful Greek religion, while the passions and caprice of individuals menace the political constitution and laws. Subjectivity, comprehending and manifesting itself in everything, threatens the entire, immediate, existing state of things. Thought therefore appears here as the principle of decay, the decay of substantial ethics. (PG, p. 326; PH, p. 74)

These developments constitute some of the inborn germ of death that brought about the end of Greece. Yet, as with nature, Hegel never isolates a single formation of spirit from the world, the totality. And thus as Greece weakens itself, the world has prepared that external force that will administer its violent end, and that, at the same time, will be the successor to Greece in the march of world history.

In deadly juxtaposition to the multiform variety of passion which Greece presents, that distracted condition which mixes good and evil in one common ruin, there stands, like a blind fate, an iron power ready to reveal that degraded condition in all its weakness, and to smash it to pieces in miserable ruin; for cure, amendment and consolation are impossible. This crushing fate is the Romans. (PG, p. 338; PH, p. 79)
In a sort of epitaph on the next page, Hegel observes that the Roman world "was chosen for the very purpose of casting the ethical individual into bonds,...The world sank into sorrow and grief...the heart of the world was broken...yet the supersensuous free spirit of Christianity could arise only from that feeling." (PG, p.339; PH, p. 80)

Greece had to die because, while the beauty of its earlier period was a liberation, it brought an experience of freedom that had to extend itself further and further, but, in the event, this freedom could not govern itself. It fell into self-indulgence, egoism, jealousy and division. This liberty gone rotten had to be completely extinguished by an alien power that put iron discipline in its place. We need not trace Hegel's thought on Rome any further. My point has been to show, first, how the inner principle of the Greek beginning -- beautiful freedom -- showed its weakness as Greece developed, the finitude that led to its corruption; second, how it died by the external violence of a state that utterly lacked beautiful freedom. Rome begins instead with law and personality, and those two, when taken to their limit, will bring death in turn to Rome. The Germans will kill Rome.

North America

I'll conclude by referring to our own state, Canada, and our own civilization, the North American, and ask whether we have any evidence, yet, of their coming death. The view that history should conclude with one finite civilization lasting on forever, an everlasting democratic capitalism, is absurd and un-Hegelian. The end, however, can never be clearly foreseen any more than it can be prevented by action or by thought. We can only work by guesswork in this territory. And in this paper, I'll leave our Canadian state to one side and look at the general civilization of North America.

It is based on freedom as surely as the Greek civilization was, though not the beautiful freedom that was just emerging out of nature. It is a freedom constituted by negativity, in that it rejected the class civilization of old Europe, and the religious establishments of Europe, and embarked on self-discovery in the new land. Also negative was its drive towards the conquest of nature, for, as in all settled states, we encountered this continent after we had been civilized, for we came with European languages, sciences, arts, technologies and religions, and we imposed our will. Our freedom was not expressed in beautiful sculptures and temples, as with the Greeks, but in mechanical contrivances. First of all, we used them to conquer our continent. Ours is the freedom of inventiveness, and an inventor such as Thomas Edison expresses our kind of freedom perfectly -- the Tinkerer, the Fixer. The U. S. Civil War was the most inventive in weaponry. Now we have gone on from machinery to spacecraft, but in addition we have also applied our tinkering freedom to the social systems that our ancestors bequeathed to us, so that education becomes totally transformed with every decade, and new churches are invented in the hundreds. We have revolutionized banking, commerce, production, communications, and transport, again and again, so that now the whole world waits upon our initiatives in this line. Moving from the conquest of the continent to a conquest of
social structures, we then come to understand each individual life as the ongoing process of self-transformation, as we cultivate the best opinions, the best therapy, and, with constant application, the correct bodily appearance. We understand the fine arts such as painting on the analogy of the inventor, for the great artist is the one who can invent something new and great, like Jackson Pollock. The great academic with a great paper or a great book discovers something new and great. Such, I think, is American freedom.

One sign of the coming death of our civilization would be an infinite circulation of inventiveness, and perpetual transformation, with less and less available material to transform: such may be appearing now in the arts, academia and the media. Another sign would be the collapse of every vestige of an older culture, such as the nuclear family, the Christian church, and traditional content in education. Our inventive freedom in its extreme form would be unable to cohabit with anything old at all. At times I seem to see our coming death in the ever-increasing hegemony of the inventor. This underlies Heidegger's vision of the world of technology. And yet we are discussing Hegel here. I think he might have had a less horrifying vision of American freedom, and perhaps he might have held out the hope for another century or two for this civilization. But he would surely agree that we would need to set limits to the inventor.

Another speculation of my own is that the brutal force that will put an end to the life of our tinkering civilization will come some day from a renewed and united Europe.
Hegel's Psychology Of Freedom

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I. Introduction

Since Plato correlated virtues in the state with those in the soul, the idea of a reciprocity between politics and psychology is as old as philosophy. For the possibility of the state as an ethically founded community rests on a concept of the individual as actually free, not some hybrid being who is in some sense free, in another not so. Correspondingly, any psychology which does not know personality to be the truth of human nature, which cannot comprehend human action as prompted by self-generated rather than instinctive ends, stands as a formidable obstacle to the very idea of a free community. To paraphrase Plato, where freedom remains psychologically ambiguous, so too must the ideal of free polity remain in principle unfulfilled.

Every account of ethical life implies a parallel psychology and vice versa. In traditional systems this reciprocity was assumed: Aristotle's psychology of habit and intellect, for example, plays into an ethics of moral and political virtue which supports a definition of man as a political animal who has its proper life in a state. After Kant this linkage was to become more problematical; the moral appears dissociated from the psychological, the practical from the theoretical; even the possibility of a psychological science of freedom is written off as an illusion of reason. Fichte's school would seek to heal the breach by assimilating nature wholly to moral self-consciousness -- I simply am what I do -- thereby providing the speculative model for the radical moral and technological pragmatism which has come to form one main current in later ultra-modernist culture. Schelling provided the converse model of an identification of self-consciousness and nature which was to inspire later existential forms of ethics and psychology. These twin movements now mostly dominate ultra-modernist thinking:¹ on the one side revolutionary humanism with its radically practical account of the human and on the other the existential aestheticism which brings everything into the perspective of the immediate being-for-self of the natural or finite subject.

²⁰th century psychologies chiefly draw their inspiration from these humanistic and counter-humanistic sources. Both represent a certain appeal to human freedom but in such an extreme and one-sided way as to render that concept wholly problematical and

¹ F. L. Jackson, "The Revolutionary Origins of Contemporary Philosophy", Dionysius. ix, 1985
ambiguous. For example, the appeal of evolutionary psychology or its neurological and genetic extensions lies not so much in the plausibility of its actual mechanistic theories as in the faith that 'man' is somehow a work in progress, an unfinished nature capable of modification, cure and improvement through technical, psychological and political intervention. The neo-Pavlovian experimentalist, B.F. Skinner, went so far as to suggest the term 'psychology' be dropped altogether from our vocabulary to be replaced by the more appropriate 'behavioral technology'. The other main stream of 20th century psychology, having its watershed in the pan-psychism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, was to develop various forms of psycho-social analysis which view culture in general as a system of emotional, social and linguistic structures that are 'repressive' of the individual's aboriginal freedom, producing thereby a kind of spiritual sickness whose cure lies in some form of radical 'disinhibition'. Existential, psychoanalytical and phenomenological psychologies from Freud, Lacan, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to popular neo-Adlerian notions of self-estimation and empowerment have accordingly set themselves resolutely against the kind of pragmatic-scientific psychology defended by such as Skinner or Rorty. The presumption on both sides is, however, the same: individuals are not in possession of their freedom; it is rather something to be brought about in them, whether through social or scientific conditioning or through therapeutic catharsis. Freedom is seen as a condition to be externally imposed on an otherwise unfree nature, or else it is a stifled or corrupted subjectivity needing to be emancipated. In neither case is freedom considered actual in human nature as such.

The fundamental ambiguity clinging to most modern psychologies is thus that in the general interest of freedom they appeal to descriptions of the human condition and nature such as are in themselves deterministic, that is, that imply that human beings are in their nature unfree, or if free, only in an essentially conflicted and conditional sense. If in tradition the psyche was an unquestioned and vivid reality and psychology concerned chiefly with its understanding and proper care, in the present time the notion of a free inner life has been thrust in the background as an archaic notion, psychology seeing its proper role to lie in the service of a freedom conceived wholly pragmatically as endless human mastery over the natural, material and social conditions of life, or existentially as the affirmation of a wholly subjective freedom against the bondage of its finite world.

In both forms the intent and the content of psychology are in conflict with one another. This may be seen in the simple paradox which each implies: were their claims true, it would be impossible to make them. Were it literally the case, for example, that human actions are entirely conditioned, then scientific activity itself is only a form of high-level reflex reactivity, thus without any objective authority. Again, if every objective human judgement literally has a non-objective, unconscious source, then a psychology of the unconscious is in principle inaccessible since in it the psychoanalyst would only be rationalizing his own depths. Likewise, were thinking literally brain activity, then the EEG is the measure of this truth too; if 'world' were but the correlate of subjectivity there can be no context in which to communicate this fact; if theory expresses nothing more than the bias of some covert power structure, so is this claim also a prejudice. As much could be said of the standpoint of modern science generally -- it tends to describe reality in ways which exclude the possibility of science itself. But the
contradiction is more obvious in psychology since it is the freedom of human thought and action themselves that are directly compromised in and by its own theories.  

Hegel stands at the crossroads of this ultra-modernist division into psychological extremes wherein freedom is assumed as the primary principle and at once is compromised or denied. In what follows I will seek first to outline the general background and presuppositions of Hegel's psychology of freedom and then to sketch its overall structure.

II. "Human Nature"

(a) The Concept of Spirit

The key to Hegel's thought is the concept of 'spirit'. If the term is found vexatious by many, it can most simply be described as a synonym for 'freedom': where the latter is commonly thought of adjectively as a sort of property or condition, 'spirit' is the substantive which denotes freedom as an actual life. "The essence of spirit" writes Hegel, "is freedom", or conversely, spirit is life so far as it has freedom for principle. Linguistic convention has had a lot to do with obscuring otherwise plain Hegelian distinctions. English translators, for example, have routinely rendered the German 'Geist' as 'mind' or 'the mind' with the intent of avoiding the term 'spirit' as if nothing more than a poetic or religious metaphor, with superstitious overtones, unsuited to strict philosophical usage. The Hegelian spirit, however, is far from a metaphor and certainly not a 'spuk' as in Stirner's jibe; nor does it appeal to a spirit-world in the skies. Not only does the blanket use of the English term 'mind' have a reifying effect that turns a living activity into a thing; not only does it introduce a definite psychological, British-empiricist bias which entirely loses the sense of Hegel's conceptual approach; but when it comes to capitalizing expressions like Mind or 'Absolute Mind' the whole Hegelian argument is cast in a ridiculous and entirely inappropriate metaphysical light.

Hegel himself uses the word Geist in its ordinary everyday German meaning embracing all three of the fore-mentioned connotations: psychological, practical and speculative (EN 385). Spirit as subjective has the simple meaning of a reference to the merely inward or mental life of the individual person. This is distinguished from spirit in its objective sense, the 'ésprit' of the moral, political and historical community (the 'American spirit'). These are presented as partial forms of an 'absolute' or explicitly self-conscious spiritual life, a life bearing direct witness to freedom as its essential constitutive principle, which idea finds specific articulation in the explicitly spiritual

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2 G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (hereinafter abbreviated 'EN'), s.482., tr Miller (Oxford, 1971). I have frequently modified Miller's translations on the basis of Moldenhauer-Michel (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1970) to bring out arguments and nuances he misses and get rid of distracting anglicizations such as capitalization of substantives and spurious terms such as 'notion' for 'concept', 'ming' for 'spirit' etc..

3 Max Stirner, *The Ego and His Own*, (Western world, 1982).
disciplines of fine art, religion and philosophy. The argument of the philosophy of spirit overall thus consists in explicating the distinction and connection between the finite psychological and practical forms of freedom within an infinite perspective in which the idea of freedom itself is explicitly enunciated, developed and comprehended as their common unifying principle.

There is good reason, indeed, to view the Hegelian system as a whole as nothing less than the system of freedom. Considered logically, freedom is simply the principle as such of infinite self-determination, the Begriff or 'concept'. As having the implication of a sublimation of otherness and necessity, freedom is the animating principle of nature, attaining to its highest potentiality in organic life and in the human animal in particular. Finally, in and as human self-conscious thought and action, freedom is an actual, self-realized, self-sustaining life, whose psychological and practical forms are to be seen as dialectically relative moments within spirit in its absolute sense of a self-conscious life in which freedom is explicitly known and willed as its own very nature, substance and aim. Indeed, spirit is 'finite' -- a 'merely' human spirit -- so far as it takes itself to be no more than a subjective or psychological state or no more than a political condition, rather than as an 'infinite' life which is actual in itself. This is because, Hegel argues, freedom as infinite self-determination cannot be reconciled with a view of it as determinate, that is as some existential or circumstantial condition. An actual or absolute freedom demands that subjectivity pass freely over into determinate action, while on the other hand, that only that objective order of life be thought legitimate which has its animation in and through individual freedom.

It is Hegel's persuasion that only in a psychology which considers the human being to be a person or spirit, thus as a being in whom liberation from natural form is constitutive of what individual, self-conscious life is, can it make sense at all to contemplate the possibility of an institutional life founded in freedom. For where necessity and freedom remain conflicted in human being itself, where individuals know themselves as at once free and unfree, a fatal ambiguity is introduced into the pursuit of an objective human freedom and no ethical stability is attainable. It is in this regard that Hegel found most extant ethical philosophies wanting and why he thought the development of a psychology of freedom crucial (EN 379).

Hegel's psychology belongs to a larger philosophy of freedom in all its categorial, metaphysical and psycho-social implications: freedom as concept, freedom prefigured in nature, freedom as human freedom. The summary explication of this freedom-idea is of course the burden of The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part III, on 'spirit', which deals with freedom as the essence and theme of human psychological, ethical and intellectual life. The same argument is further elaborated in The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Philosophy of Right and the published lectures on world history, art, religion and the history of philosophy.4

4 "The essential feature ... or substance of spirit is freedom, i.e., the absence of dependence on an other, relation of self to self. Spirit is the actualized concept which is for itself and has itself for object... Or as Christ said, the truth makes spirit free and freedom makes spirit true (EN 382).
Hegel's philosophy of the subjective spirit -- his psychology -- is one of the least known segments of his system, perhaps in great measure because what is known of Hegel has been largely due to the impact of his political philosophy upon a left-hegelian legacy which chose either to ignore the psychological doctrine or regard it as a bourgeois vestige. Marx insisted it is only necessary to assume that individuals exist and are self-active beings; all else is superfluous. Hegel, however, is everywhere adamant that a psychological 'proof' of freedom is indispensable to any legitimate legal, moral and political philosophy since any presumption of human free agency would otherwise be inherently controvertible. His own Philosophy of Right, accordingly, begins with a recapitulation of the concluding sections (469-482) of the Encyclopedia psychology expounding the concept of free personality in relation to, and indeed as, the consummate principle of human individuality as such.

However commonplace the everyday intuition of personal freedom, the attempt to formulate an actual science of free subjectivity has long suffered from a persisting perplexity as to the proper status of the object of psychological inquiry. The older metaphysical solutions -- psycho-physical dualism, pan-psychism, pan-physicalism, double-aspect monism etc. -- all took the division between the realms of the physis and psyche for granted and saw the question as one of establishing their proper relation. Pan-psychism, for example, the generally prevailing outlook in pre-scientific cultures where a clear spirit/nature distinction remains unarticulated, insists on the priority of the spiritual over the natural and thus on a 'superstitious' understanding of nature itself. The wish to reunite spirit with nature became the theme of modern romanticism, generating various forms of psychological absolutism wherein inwardness or subjectivity is made the unconditioned fact and "world" as Heidegger put it, "is always and only world for the spirit". A certain feeling of freedom finds satisfaction in a speculative poetry of quasi-natural inner energy, of the recovery of an aboriginal life in which the sources of a 'natural' spirituality might be reappropriated through diet, body-cultivation, activism on the part of the 'environment', or ritualistic healing.

Physicalism, on the other hand, draws everything into the category of natural fact, dismissing any notion of supra-physical life as mere superstition. From the atomism of Protagoras to contemporary experimentalism, its tactic has always been to conduct psychological inquiry as an extension of the science of nature, thus to explain psychological events and activities in physical or physiological terms, the latter conceived exclusively in terms of material necessitation. In a sort of parody of Descartes' search for the seat of the soul, neuropsychology still seeks to 'locate' intelligence in the brain. Physiological psychology remains in its very conception a sort of sophisticated phrenology: the cross-categorial identification of one mode of reality in terms of another. In thus eschewing all recognition of the subjective dimension in human experience a

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5 Husserl's phenomenology attempted to lay the ground for such a science, spawning a tradition of phenomenological psychology of which better known popular works include; M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (tr. Smith, 1990); F.J. Buitendijk, The Mind of the Dog, (1973); J-P Sartre, L'imaginére: la psychologie phenomenologique de l'imagination (1970).
7 The complex psychoanalytical theories of Freud, Lacan or Reich and 'new age' popular mysticism differ only in intellectual subtlety. The assumptions are the same.
priori, the experimental reduction of psychological events to biological or physical causes inevitably fails to capture just what is uniquely psychological about them. In principle preemptive of insight into the plain facts of ordinary psychological experience, physicalist explanation is obfuscating to the very degree it is 'scientific', its only real claim to authority lying rather in the practical utility of its various findings.

Psycho-physicalism finally, which attempts to let the distinction between psychic and organic simply stand and merely to correlate them, yields psychological methodologies which endlessly vacillate between 'explaining' events of one class in terms of another. The method of 'correlation' is a two-way street: one alters physical conditions noting any correlative psychological change, or the other way round, and then does the mathematics. The advantage, of course, is that questions of body-mind dualism and causality can appear to be put aside (as in Skinner's 'black box') but only to the extent they are at the same time assumed as essential to the method itself: one assumes a physical range of data, a corresponding psychological one, and their undefined mutual interaction. Mainstream contemporary experimental psychology generally takes this approach.\(^8\) Earlier psychophysics (the James-Lange theory of emotion for example) was content to argue psycho-somatic or somato-psychic correlations indifferently. Later psychologies tended to lean to one extreme or the other: Pavlovian-Skinnerian conditioning sought correlational reduction of mental events to physical terms, the phenomenological experimentalism of Buytendijk or Merleau-Ponty a correlational reduction of bodily behaviour to conscious intentionality. By postponing recognition of the dualism which is nonetheless assumed, it appears possible either way to carry out endless experimental research into feelings, attitudes, behaviour, perception, cognition and so forth, without committing to any actual overall theory of mental life or arriving at any insights and conclusions as to individuality itself and its principle.

In spite of its achieved cultural influence, ubiquity and centrality and its own self-image as a distinctly scientific or at least post-metaphysical inquiry, it is not clear at all that contemporary psychology has rid itself of its metaphysical baggage of a more or less rigid distinction between organic and mental. If one traces the various schools of contemporary psychology to their historical roots what is remarkable is how this distinction remains the common unreasoned point of departure. A distinction between nature and freedom remains the source of the conceptual parameters which determine what psychology itself can be and shall be about, whether one says there is only the natural universe and mental life but a dimension of, or a way of speaking about it; whether being is subjectivity and reality what is constituted in it; or whether the whole question of psychic-organic polarity is pragmatically suspended and the focus kept simply on describing and tabulating correlations across this categorial gulf.

(b) Freedom and Nature

If it is to surmount this ambiguity, a psychology of freedom will first of all require an account of nature different both from the enlightenment view which still predominates in

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\(^8\) Accordingly, experimental-psychology has in recent times turned almost entirely to correlational methods with psychological 'facts' reported in statistical terms
natural science as well as from that of the continuing reaction against it born in romanticism. It will neither assume the exclusion of spirit from nature or their radical identification but seek to comprehend both as expressive of one idea. Such is the simplest statement of the logic behind the Hegelian psychology as of the conception of nature it presupposes.

It is hardly surprising then that, historically, Hegel's account of nature has been judged 'speculative' in the most pejorative sense by critics from both sides of the fence, even by those who might otherwise regard themselves Hegelians. Much misunderstanding is avoided if it is at least clear that for Hegel a philosophical consideration of nature neither does nor should pretend to compete with empirical-scientific knowledge and on the contrary must remain open to and take account of whatever the extant knowledge is. The two inquiries simply have different interests: enlightened empirical science has an essential pragmatic thrust; it no more intends to be a metaphysics of nature than should philosophy pretend, in the manner of romanticism, to substitute a mystified version of nature as against it. The whole interest of philosophy should rather be, in Hegel's view, to comprehend nature from the standpoint of freedom, that is, of thought, and that means getting hold of the concept of nature, employing and applying to this end whatever empirical knowledge is available.

As the philosophy of nature is a conceptual treatment, it has the same universal for object [as does empirical science] but considers it as it is for itself, in its own immanent necessity, that is, consistent with the principle of self-determination ... Not only must philosophy be in agreement with our experience of nature, but the origin and formation of the philosophical science thereof has empirical physics as both presupposition and precondition ... [even though] the latter cannot be thought its foundation ... which ought rather to lie in the necessity of the concept itself (EN 246).

For an age schooled in technocratically oriented modern science -- 'real science with real results' -- the idea of a freely conceptual view of nature is bound to appear alien. The practical relation to nature requires that natural things and events have nothing within, behind or beyond them but be taken simply as they are, given and there for our thoughtful observation, an order of determinate and determinable 'necessary contingencies' (EN 248) as the measure of all mere hypotheses. There could, of course, be no scientific evidence that the experimental view of nature is 'correct' any more than 'empiricism' itself could be validated by appealing to the facts; such a view of things simply belongs to the natural-scientific method as its founding assumption. For natural science to oppose its empirical standard to philosophical science -- as 'scientism' does -- would be to adopt the character of a metaphysics, a role it otherwise adamantly eschews. For Hegel, that the interest and

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9 G.E. Mueller, Encyclopedia of Philosophy (NY, 1959) frequently intervenes parenthetically in the course of his translation to declare this or that statement or argument of Hegel's utterly unintelligible or ridiculous in his view, omitting large segments of the text..

10 There follows an extended criticism of Naturphilosophie, the romanticist mysticism from which, even more than from empiricism, he wished to disassociate his own conceptual physics.

11 EN 246 and Zusatz for Hegel on the relation of theoretical to practical views of nature.
assumptions of empirical and philosophical science of nature differ does not mean they are at all inconsistent. In the one, nature is assumed as outside and before thinking with thinking brought into play after the fact; in the other, thinking resolves directly to engage the concept of nature itself.

For Hegel, the prime point at issue is the so-called 'externality' of nature. The commonplace modern view of the meaning of this is that nature stands external to us, the consequence of an empiricist bias for which thinking deems itself scientific only so far as it views things and events as already there before it, standing over against it, as 'objective', gegen-ständig. But it is really one and the same thinking which withdraws into itself to assume the role of detached observer and in the same act constructs nature as a world objectively independent of our thinking about it. Hegel sees this subjective-objective division as both the essence and limit of the empirical view. It masks the deeper sense of the externality of nature exemplified in the ordinary insight that things and events are not simply external to us, but external to one another. That is to say, the 'otherness', 'outsidedness', 'endlessness' etc. of natural things and events belong to their very being as natural. 'External nature' thus does not describe how the universe exists relative to thinking beings but the essence of the being of nature as such. It is to say that what is characteristic of any entity, structure or occurrence qua natural, is that it has its origin, ground or cause, not from itself, but through something other than itself, this again through another and so on. This endless dependency of finite things and events, not upon themselves, but on another and yet another, in infinitivum, is what one calls 'natural necessity'.

From the point of view of its concept, then, nature is indeed the 'external world', but in a far more compelling sense than simply what is 'out there' for an observing subject 'in here'. The philosophical idea of nature, for Hegel, rather springs from this characteristic of other-determinateness or being-through-another which belongs to the natural as such. 'The external world', Ausserlichkeit, is the commonsense shorthand for the concept of nature as such and as a whole, so constituted, that is, as universal self-externalizing, self-differentiating activity. For Hegel, this insight also provides a unique approach as to how the 'order' of nature is properly to be viewed, in contrast, for example, to the classical representations of it according to principles of emanation or evolution which posit some primal form or event and has everything else flowing serially from it from higher to lower or from lower to higher. Typically such alleged primal events, since never themselves presently evident, are relegated to the past, to an divine act of creation or a 'big bang' at the nether reach of cosmic history. Hegel brands such views as "inept" (249 EN. Remark) for the simple reason they interpret nature as if it were itself a natural phenomenon with its own origin in space and time etc., a view not only contradictory but
which ignores what is equally obvious, namely that nature is as much spontaneous proliferation as it is orderly sequence, as much endless differentiation as homology of form; that nature advances, as the adage has it, by leaps and bounds, not in any tidy series.

Philosophically the order of nature is rather to be found, Hegel argues, in the differing modes in which the principle of external necessity is manifest throughout the whole; how it progresses from the 'pure' externality represented by space and time to more complex relations in which the form of sheer otherness is progressively sublimated and rendered complex. In physico-chemical interactions, for example, events and processes at once produce and react to one another, exist therefore in the explicit form of 'other for another', of relational externality, as reflected in the typically reciprocities in which mechanical laws or chemical formulae are expressed. In organic life this sublimation is yet more nearly complete so far as the organism sustains and reproduces itself, produces another which is at the same time its own, and is thus in principle a self-externalizing being. These 'stages' are not to be seen, however, as springing from or causing each other in any literal or natural sense; they are rather moments or stages which belong to the concept of the natural whole as such:

Nature is to be viewed as a 'system of stages', emerging of necessity one from another as its proximate truth, though by no means such that one stage springs naturally from the other but only within the terms of the idea [logos] which constitutes the basis of 'nature' itself. (EN 249)

The clue to this division of stages in nature lies in the recognition that more is involved in the concept of 'externality' than would appear when considered only in the abstract, namely, as externality as such, 'pure' externality. Properly considered, the possibility that things and events, qua natural, are external to one another lies in they themselves, in the law of their finitude according to which their 'otherness' belongs to them essentially, as their very own, and not as a limit or property imposed on them (paradoxically, surely) from outside. Externality, that is, presupposes self-externality and 'pure' externality is the simple abstraction from the latter. The manifestation of abstract externality in nature is of course space and time, and Hegel shows straight away how these dimensions are constituted, not as a fixed and static otherness of thing to thing or event to event but as self-sublating dynamics wherein what is other is other to another, this again to another, and so on ad infinitum. The 'necessity' ruling in nature, accordingly, is not the inevitability that everything be reducible to space and time, but the converse: the generative process whereby mere abstract differentiation is overcome, elaborated through a manifold of more and more complex and concrete forms to the point where the true principle and telos of nature as self-differentiated existence, being-other-for-self, becomes progressively more explicit.

The emergence of self-externality out of externality or self-differentiation out of difference is thus the deeper significance of the order and necessity of nature. Since externality and difference are modes of determination, what is revealed in and through nature itself is that all determination is self-determination. If in terms of logical principle
determination is necessity and self-determination freedom, then the striking upshot of Hegel's argument is that what is chiefly made manifest in the order of nature is that natural necessity has its ground in freedom, that nature itself is a moment in freedom, that the other-determinateness everywhere characteristic of natural process has self-determinateness as its underlying telos. And this is so, even though freedom as such is nowhere to be witnessed in nature itself, rather only universal contingency, eternal recurrence of the same, endless iteration which never seems to attain completion. Yet in its endless self-differentiating, self-othering activity, nature attains to completeness nonetheless in the generation of a particular natural being, an animal, in and for whom self-determination, self-conscious freedom, a telos otherwise hidden in nature generally, emerges as an explicit actuality.

In this view Hegel steps quite beyond both metaphysical and empirical accounts of nature, bearing explicit witness to nature conceived as an active living whole; a system whose surging cosmic and nuclear energies, gravitational and electro-magnetic dynamics, physico-chemical interactions and self-reproductive organic life, prefigure a freedom finally consummated in the self-conscious, self-active human form. Nature is thus ordered, is a 'system', so far as in and through its manifold forms and processes mere passive otherness is resolved to an active self-othering wherein nature comes to exist for itself. The sub-systems of nature -- cosmic, physical, chemical, organic, human -- evidence the stages through which abstract determination is progressively abated and the principle of self-determination comes more fully to the fore.

Nature is as such a living whole. The movement through its stages is precisely this: that ... out of an immediacy and externality which represents its 'death' the idea [of freedom] reverts into itself, in the first instance as the living being, but then also as overcoming this determinateness in which it is only life, and bringing itself to explicit existence as spirit, which is the truth and final end of nature as also the genuine actuality of the idea (EN 251).

The philosophy of nature thus seeks more than simply to observe and theorize about the detail of nature as natural science does but to comprehend nature as in its very concept a system of external necessity which both has its presupposition in freedom and is the latter's self-generated foundation. This is the meaning of the ancient doctrine of nous as nature's indwelling principle: nature as intelligence self-realized as a progressive liberation from external form, a liberation culminating in the living, animate being whose characteristic activity is precisely the active co-option and assimilation-to-self of what is found external to it. In the living form the whole of nature is comprehended, though it remains a finite natural entity in so far as it reproduces and dies. This limit of this animal species-life is surpassed, in Hegel's account, in human self-conscious life in which nature is both consummated and also sublimated, and an actual freedom comes on the scene as the fully realized end of a nature which nonetheless has no end in itself. In the emergence

14 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, s.708
15 An 'external world' first comes into existence for the living animal, explains Hegel (EN 352), since it as an organic self that it confronts non-organic nature as its own proper otherness.
of self-conscious life there is thus implied both the death of nature itself and the advent of free personality;

(c) A Science of Human Nature

As freedom has its foundation in natural necessity, so natural necessity is only adequately comprehended as the prefiguration of freedom. The two must be thought as one idea. A psychology of human freedom is possible only where nature itself is understood as self-consuming in a being capable of thought and action, in which being the form of natural determination, external necessity, is virtually set aside, subordinated to a principle of self-conscious life emergent in it. This latter life cannot come to birth from a stone, nor inhabit inanimate nature like a ghost in a machine; it is, to employ Aristotle's word, the 'actuality of a possibility' already latent in the human animal as such. Correspondingly, the othering which constitutes nature's general mode acquires in human individuality the explicit status of a self-othering relative to a free being-for-self. For such a being, otherness is not absolute but exists as its very own other-being, and for Hegel such a being is spirit.

The intent of a philosophical psychology is the verification of freedom as the actuality of personal life, the true 'human nature'. "The philosophy of spirit can neither be empirical nor metaphysical but is concerned with the concept of spirit [developed] into the system of its own activity." Hegel's psychology thus makes its beginning where his philosophy of nature concludes, namely with the human animal as unique in having its own species for object; a being who, in the consciousness of death, already knows both the limit of its own and of all nature, but knows also another inward and self-active life in relation to which natural life is set in abeyance. From this starting point it seeks to comprehend systematically the complex of psychological modes constitutive of this inward life, and for Hegel no real progress can be made in psychology without this initial recognition of the 'ideality' of natural form in relation to mental or spiritual life. This ideality of nature is not to be understood as its literal overcoming on the part of a pre-existing, triumphant spiritual being, but as a possibility latent and prefigured in nature itself, become actual in the human animal. It is only in a qualified sense, not absolutely, that one should speak of the life of spirit, soul or mind as 'beyond' nature or as a 'conquest' of it, for the reason that its link with nature is essential to what spirit is.

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16 De Anima 412a, from Book II of which work it is clear Aristotle had quite the same view as did Hegel on the essential inseparability of the soul-body conjunction.

17 From Hegel's script of 1822/25 (M.J. Petry, Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Dordrecht, 1978), v.1, p.102 (my translation). Hegel continues: "The empirical consideration of spirit stays fixed on cognition of its phenomena without reference to its concept, the metaphysical will have only to do with the concept to the exclusion of its phenomena, the concept thereby turned into a mere abstractum whose determinations are still more lifeless concepts. But spirit is essentially this; to be active, and that means to bring itself and its concept phenomenally to light, to reveal it."

18 Feuerbach, Marx, Engels et al were attached to the definition of man as a 'species-being', in which their naturalistic, romanticist leanings are betrayed. Hegel, however, (e.g., EN 376) held that it is in the death of the individual qua species-being that freedom commences, in the free, self-conscious individual who has his 'species' for object-- i.e., is a free spirit.
If from our point of view spirit has nature for presupposition, in absolute terms the former is the latter's 'truth' and prior to it. In this truth nature has vanished and spirit attained to its own sought-after idea, the identity whose object no less than whose subject is just the concept [of freedom] ... If in nature [freedom] has a completely external objectivity, in attaining to the self-identity of spirit this externality is overcome (aufgehoben), and it then is this identity as reversion-into-self-out-of-nature. (EN 381)

The philosophy of nature ... must therefore have as its final result the proof of the concept of spirit, while the science of spirit must in turn verify this concept through its own development and implications. (Ibid., Add.)

'Ideality' is another of those Hegelian terms which exercise translators but crucial since expressing a key principle. What exists as 'ideal' has nothing to do with what lies beyond reality or which ought to be but is not. The term is used in the context of the logic of Aufheben -- , superseding, sublimating, assimilating, incorporating, comprehending -- and specifically designates the activity whereby anything whatever, once appropriated or assimilated into a further context inclusive of it, acquires the altered status and meaning of a mere element, moment or function. It is the surgeon who performs the operation, not his scalpel which plays only an 'ideal' role in his hand. Language functions 'ideally' within communication: one hears, reads or thinks what is meant, not the sounds or squiggles which are only 'moments' in the act of signification. Organic processes have their life 'ideally' within the larger life of the body whose organs they are; hormones have no chemical life of their own nor is a severed hand a hand. Hegel similarly describes economic activity as 'ideal' within the life of the state, not that the former is anything less than compellingly real but in that it can have status and scope only where there is first institutional order.

The 'ideality' of nature in mental life is meant in this specific sense and no other. For self-conscious individuality natural existence is already aufgehoben, a relative, not an unconditional otherness: "there can be no absolute other for spirit". The spatio-temporal material world certainly persists in the eternal, immaterial life of the soul, but as 'ideal', and this is quite simply what any psychological feeling, habit, perception or recollection is: some external determinateness appropriated to become the object and content of a self-relational mental life. This is not at all to diminish the reality of nature or its vaunted 'independence' -- it is physicalism and mentalism which bring that sort of thing into question. With Hegel, 'independently real' is too often exploited as a weak metaphor for nature construed as absolute, while there is nothing conceptually inconsistent with viewing nature both as real and yet subordinate to some other actuality. Blades, brains,

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19 In Hegel literature, confusion caused by gratuitous translations of simple terms is legendary; the use of 'Notion' for the ordinary German word for concept, Begriff, a case in point. Derrida has written whole books 'deconstructing' Hegel's concept of Aufheben as a wilful unification of opposites, a deciding of undecidables, completely missing the dialectical character essential to that unification (see EN 79-82) as well as Hegel's account of difference and opposition themselves (EN 117-120), far more radical than Derrida's and impervious to his criticism.
words, the marketplace are real enough in themselves, but still have their actuality, in Hegel's terms, in contexts extending beyond and incorporating them.

So with the ideality of nature in spirit. However 'real' in themselves, natural determinations do not exist as natural within mental life; rather ideally, as a content given or expressed. Accordingly, the organization of Hegel's philosophical psychology springs from three principal considerations: 1) that natural determination, reference to an empirical world, is an ineradicable feature of all mental life as such; 2) that the essence of mental life is nonetheless freedom, or infinite self-relation; 3) that actual mental life is the activity of unifying just these factors. Psychology is correspondingly not a single inquiry but tripartite. Partly it will be inquiry into the empirical-behavioural or psycho-physical characteristics of the human animal as such, a science of man or 'anthropology' in the sense this term had in Hegel's day. Partly also psychology will be inquiry into the individual qua self or subject in relation to an objective world, a psychology of experience: 'phenomenology' as Hegel calls it. Finally, philosophical psychology proper will be inquiry into the inwardly given mental world of free personality, a world existing in and for a self which explicitly knows and makes it its own: a psychology of the subjective spirit as such.

Hegel's psycho-physics or anthropology corresponds with what one now generally calls experimental psychology, including characterology, developmental and abnormal psychology, physiological psychology, behavioural psychology and so forth -- sciences which have in view the individual as an intelligent organism, a natural but in some sense 'animated' being. The traditional hypostatization of this animation is of course psyche or soul, and no matter how militantly they insist on dealing only in brains and biochemistry, all empirical psychologies presuppose this dimension at least to the extent they assume a distinction between psychological and physiological sciences and evidence. Phenomenological psychology on the other hand has been revived this past century by Husserl and others though in a very different form than Hegel's. Existential psychology, depth psychology, psychoanalysis are other examples of this approach whose chief interest is to discover the ground of the overt, objective relation to one's world and to others as lying in the individual's own non-objective relation to self, to disclose and describe this so-called 'unconscious self', a human underlife perhaps construed physiologically in terms of infantile sexuality or other species-impulse, or by appeal to some other social, linguistic or cultural Urwelt.

Experimental and phenomenological psychologies thus satisfy one or other pre-mental aspects of psychological life, the first the aspect of intelligent organicity, the second the

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20 Descartes way of speaking in Meditations II is of the 'objective reality of the idea'
21 Husserl radicalized consciousness by treating it as an absolute standpoint whose content, seen as also given absolutely, that is, existentially, is disclosed by a methodological epoché, a suspension of judgement which renders possible a 'positive' science (his word) of subjective experience - 'Erlebnis'. The epoché is thus, as it were, the epistemological equivalent of the psychoanalytical method of regression. Hegel knew of earlier forms of this view in Rheinhold's theory of the 'facts of consciousness', a view he roundly rejected
22 Hegel viewed modern philosophy to Kant as essentially theory of consciousness, thus a phenomenology not a philosophy of spirit (EN 37-61 and espec. 415). What phenomenological philosophy is has its formal definition in the second of the three 'syllogisms' of EN 576.
aspect of self-referentiality. Typically in practice they find themselves acutely at odds, resting their case as they do on disparate starting-points; their tendency being to stress those particular psychological modes which most clearly appear to exemplify their case. Experimental psychology emphasizes the obvious impact on sensory-motor reactions of altered organic or other external conditions on human behaviour, tending to reduce other aspects of mental life to this pattern. Phenomenology stresses rather the aspect of subjective intent in human acts, the gestalt effect in perception for example, then proceeds to describe all other psychological modes in terms of such 'intentional experience' in which outward acts are interpreted as expressive of unconscious acts.

In Hegel's accounting, however, it is important to recognize that psycho-physics and phenomenology do not have standing as independent sciences but only as subordinate to the more inclusive psychology of free personality as such. The paradigm here is neither the quasi-natural life of the animated organism nor the experience of the self of its world. Rather these represent abstract fixations which have their proper, interrelated status as moments within the individual's actual or self-conscious mental life which Hegel calls spirit. And this alone is the proper subject matter of a philosophical psychology. It belongs to the autonomy of mental life, so considered as 'subjective spirit', that in it psycho-physical affectivity acquires subjective spontaneity while what is outwardly experienced takes on the character of an inwardly self-determining content.

The paradigm evidences in the psychology of spirit proper will accordingly be those mental activities whose content is 'absolutely' objective in the sense of self-objective, of being given in and for the subject who knows this givenness as its own. And it is precisely a unity in reciprocity of subjective and objective, of self and givenness, that especially characterizes such free mental activities as insight, imagination, symbolic memory, thinking, desiring, willing and so forth.

Psychology [proper] treats of the faculties or universal modes of mental activity as such -- intuition, ideation, memory and so forth -- taken apart from their empirical content ... as also from the forms in which they are given in the soul as physical determinations or in consciousness itself as an object present and given for it. This is no arbitrary abstraction on the part of psychology, since mental life is itself, in its very concept, just this elevation above nature and natural determinateness, as also liberation from entanglement with an external object. What alone is left for it to do is realize this freedom which is its very concept ... that any content that is raised to the status of its own intuitions, which become its 'sensations', be further transmuted into representations, these into thoughts and so forth.(EN 440)

Obviously, a philosophical psychology of this kind will not treat these 'higher' mental activities as if they were given phenomena available for empirical description and

23 I have used 'mental life' or 'mental activity' throughout as synonyms for 'spirit' in its subjective sense, avoiding substantives like 'mind', 'the mind' etc. to emphasize that spirit is no thing or entity but free, self-cognitive activity, and that in a most essential sense.
analysis or explainable by reference to something other than themselves -- brains, language or whatever. That would be again to imply a dogmatic mentalism which would fail to ask the real question, which is what these activities are in themselves, in their concept qua mental; as well as how all the other forms of psychic life -- physiognomy, temperament, sensation, habit, the experience of consciousness etc. -- are prefigured and consummated in them. In short, Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit, like his philosophy of nature, seeks to give every psychic form its own place and due, while bringing all together into one systematic view of personality as a dynamic whole, revealing the actualization of freedom to be the operative principle throughout.

III. Psychology Of The Human Animal

As it appears in Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit, 'anthropology' is neither a survey of the findings of empirical psychology nor a substitute for it. Though covering the same ground as conventional psycho-physics, bio-psychology, characterology or behavioural psychology, as a philosophical anthropology it is concerned only with the key concept of freedom so far as implicit even in those psychological modes which specifically have a physiological component, that is, which of their nature manifest an ambiguous conjunction of mental and physical aspects. More commonly in such cases it is the distinction between these mental and physical aspects that is stressed; the metaphysical psychologies earlier mentioned mainly rest on such an assumption. But Hegel notes that what is really remarkable about psycho-physical states is not the separation, but the inseparability of mental and physical components, and this is what is chiefly of interest for a philosophical psychology. For what is principally true about an inherited trait, a sensation, an emotion, a habit etc. is precisely that neither the physical nor the psychological aspect can be ignored or denied. Fear is felt in the pit of one's stomach: not only does one never feel it apart from some such physical state, but, contrariwise, what it is one feels in one's stomach is not a physiological state (like indigestion) but fear. In feeling the psychic is physical and the physical is psychic, and it is just this ambiguous identity that must be kept in view.

The aim and logic of Hegel's anthropology consists in showing how even psychological states which have the character of psycho-physical conjunctions belong to the concept of spirit, which is to say, express freedom in a certain mode. Psycho-physical identity is how self-determination appears immediately in the animated individual. Were such indeed not the case, one's freedom would be a meaningless fiction, a disembodied autonomy, and so it is important for Hegel that mind-body conjunction be recognized as an essential, not a coincidental or imperfect feature of mental life. In it is reflected the necessity that there is no mental life without a bodily life, that freedom has existence only in and as a living human being. But it is even more important to recognize the converse as equally true: in the human being, soul is the destiny of the organism, organic life having its fulfilment and actuality only in and as mental life. This mutuality and interaction of natural and spiritual is how freedom appears in the individual as a naturally existing being, as an 'empirically' free being.
Correspondingly a philosophical anthropology must show how and why the claim that mental life is the 'product' of physical conditions is no less fallacious than is the converse, and that either position renders the status of both categories enigmatic. The main requirement is that psycho-physical events are taken for what they are -- events in which one element is as much and no less the 'cause' of the other as the other is of it. The emphasis might indeed tend one direction or the other, as in ordinary sensation, for example, where a somato-psychic 'causality' appears primary. Emotional states, on the other hand, seem to have a psycho-somatic origin. The essential point is that there is no question of 'causality' here or of relations between distinct entities, since it is the conjunction which is primary. Accordingly, what is directly manifest in such psychological states is that the physical exists ideally in a psychic life while this psychic life exists self-expressively in the physical state. For Hegel this inseparability of psychic and physical is the evident fact in a whole range of quasi-natural psychological states: in mood and disposition, feeling and emotion, and more subtly in those 'higher' forms of 'body-language' such as bearing and gesture, laughing and weeping etc. "where the note of mentality is diffused throughout the whole, announcing the body itself as the externality of a higher nature" (EN411).

The temptation to explain away or refute the ambiguity of body-mind conjunction in the manner of physicalism or mentalism is therefore to be resisted. It is simply how the matter itself stands and should be understood as such: free personality is at once a living individual, the living individual an animated individuality. The argument of Hegel's anthropology is the working through of what constitutes the form and order of these various modes of psycho-physical identity, beginning with those states in which conjunction appears more or less fixed and contingent and moving on to those in which it appears more as a fluid interactivity of physical and psychic wherein each mediates the other.

In the first group of forms are included those psychological traits in which natural determinations are reflected in a wholly passive way in the individual; where personality seems contingently predetermined by physical or physiological conditions and variations that as such have no particular psychological significance. This is the case with the influence of seasonal, diurnal and environmental conditions on temperament; of geography or gender on general character traits; of individual differences as a function of changes in bodily reactivity (e.g. age); and finally the psycho-physiology of sensory-emotional life. Springing out of the latter is a further group of psycho-physical forms in which a rudimentary 'self-life' arises in the inevitable clash and turmoil of particular ephemeral feelings and emotions. This elemental, preconscious feeling-self which prefigures personality forms the basis of a wide range of human empathetic phenomena such as the capacity to identify with the feelings of others, the sympathetic intuitions of mother-child, friends etc., the 'magnetism' of hypnotic and hysterical influence. But equally, so far it is but a merely felt selfhood, an unconscious identity, it can also come
into conflict with rational personality and, so far as it can, is also the source of all manner of para-normal, neurotic and psychotic states.\footnote{Hegel gives a most provocative account of what would now be called 'unconscious' manifestations. It is unique in the view that empathetic or psychiatric states such as hypnosis and madness can only occur in a being which has at least the \textit{potentiality} for rational life. Insanity, for example, can only be described in relation to sanity.}

A more stable unity emerges through the cultivation of habit which, by limiting and bringing order among the passions in their ambiguous tendency to both impotence and excess, establishes a more fluid mutuality between self and body wherein individuals so disciplined acquire an independence and capacity for self-determination beyond that achievable in the unrestrained life of feeling. In this simple self-mastery is presaged more complete forms of freedom; Hegel's analysis here invokes the Aristotelian 'rational animal' in whom body has become instrument of the soul and soul the actuality of the body.

Hegel's analysis is remarkable in making no appeal at any point to a simplistic causal account of the relation of natural to psychological determinants. That temperament, traits, talents, dispositions, feelings, insanity, habits etc. seem simply to 'turn up' in people, to express directly what they are, does not alter the fact they are psychological modes nonetheless. If they are considered (no doubt rightly) as forming the basis of mental life, it is by no means because their logic and origin is one of \textit{natural} causality. The sun does not 'cause' a sunny disposition, white skin a European habit of mind, a lump in the throat grief. When it is said organic or environmental conditions 'produce' corresponding psychological response, this is only figurative, for what is actually 'produced' is neither a mental nor a physical entity simply but a psycho-physical state, a unity in which natural determinants appear in a distinctly \textit{non}-natural mode. Even the most hard-nosed experimental research assumes this: the 'effects' observed, desired or tested for as a result of, say, psycho-pharmaceutical interventions, are inevitably described, as they must be, in psychological terms (one feels exhilarated, dizzy, painless etc).\footnote{A further example: the now common confidence that schizophrenia is chemically based does nothing to the alter the fact that 'schizophrenia' itself is a \textit{mental} disorder, described in terms of uniquely \textit{mental} symptoms. It would be odd on the basis of merely detecting some gene or chemical in the system to judge anyone schizophrenic on that account alone, just as, notwithstanding the advances in pharmacological treatment of depression, 'being depressed' remains a psychological, not a biochemical condition.}

Everything depends on refusing to let go of the inherent ambiguity of psycho-physical phenomena, not to explain this away but to recognize it as evidence of an \textit{aboriginal} ideality of nature in spirit. Where temperament or traits, sensations or emotions, unconscious feelings or habits are concerned, it is essential they be comprehended as the phenomena they are, not as reducible to one or other of their psycho-physical moments. The point is rather to examine the logic of their role within the larger life of the animated individual as such, so that Hegel can recognize differences of biology, environment, gender, disposition and so forth as certainly psychologically determinative in individuals, but not in any strict cause-and-effect way nor as fixed and isolated psychological functions, but as complementary, contributory elements within the total economy of the intelligent animal. The behaviourist would be right to assert that
human personality has a basis in habit, for example, but wrong to view habit as externally conditioned. For in habit there is also a certain measure of liberation from sheer bodiliness and externality, and 'behaviour' is no less an outward expression of inward autonomy than a structuring from without.

The logic of Hegel's psychology of the intelligent animal traces the development of the principle of self-determination in the immediate mode of an interactivity of psychic and physical. It begins with those conjunctions which appear wholly contingent, such as temperament, following through to those in which a more definite mutuality and interpenetration of moments is evident where simple identity passes into an emergent, but still immediate self-identity confirmed and structured through habit, in which latter, Hegel observes,

the individual human being exists in the mode of a nature-being and is to that extent unfree; but also is free in so far as the natural determinateness of the sensory is reduced through habit to his being simply, thus no longer standing as something different opposed to him, to be occupied with, interested in or dependent upon ... The main point about habit is the liberation the individual gains from the feelings even while being affected by them. (EN 410)

Finally, as an animal so rationalized through habit, individuality acquires the form of a unified personality suffusing bodiliness and making it its own. Hegel calls this full-blown animated individuality 'the actual soul' and describes it thus:

From [this] standpoint body comes into consideration, no longer from the side of its organic processes but only as an externality posited ideally in [the animated individual] which in turn is no longer restricted to the involuntary embodiment of its inner sensations but makes itself manifest in whatever measure of freedom it has achieved in overcoming obstacles to this ideality. (EN 411. Add.)

It has been said of Vermeer's portraits of kitchen maids, exquisitely posed in their very physical but self-absorbed presence, that he captured their human being as 'bodies translucent with soul'.

Hegel's is thus no spiritualistic account of spirit. As anthropos, ensouled being, the animated individual has bodily life as presupposition but no less as its own expressive content. The straightforward evidence for this is simply the existing or 'natural' individual as such for whom nothing is ever mental which is not expressed physically nor anything ever physical which does not have mental import. In the living rational animal, body is always spiritual and spirit always bodily; or put another way, there is no such thing as a psychological structure or event that is 'purely physical', any more than there are such that are mental without any physical reference. Again, what is true in the mind-body conjunction is not their separation or abstract relation but their dynamic of reciprocal liberation-actualization, native to the human being as such and in which a certain limited
freedom -- a 'natural freedom' -- is already manifest. It is this embryonic freedom-in-nature which is and should be, for Hegel, the first and appropriate concern of an anthropology of the animated individual.

This intrinsic ambiguity of human nature is an ancient paradox, ever begging to be dispelled or mystically interpreted. But it is, on deeper consideration, freedom itself as it appears on the scene as the simple fact of human existence as an immediate conjunction of being and selfhood, of physical and mental dimensions. In empirical and experimental psychology the temptation is all but irresistible to attempt to reduce every mental activity to such 'natural' or psycho-physical modes as traits, emotions, habits etc.; then to reduce these in turn to organic terms. But whatever organic 'cause' is elicited has still to be defined with reference to the psychic phenomenon allegedly explained by it, and so the whole exercise is fatally circular. Intelligence, for example, clearly has an organic basis in the brain (it is difficult to think without one) yet no matter what steps may be taken to explain or measure it, 'intelligence' itself is definable only in mental, not in organic terms., In the end, as colour is a sensation, not an eye, and shame a feeling, not a fluctuation in blood pressure, so intelligence is a psychological trait, not a synapse or gene. In the fully animated creature of habit in whom a measure of stability has come to pervade every aspect of sensory-motor life, the forms of a merely abstract psycho-physical identity are dissolved into the more fluid form of total body-mind interactivity. The human being is thus literally, not metaphorically, a 'living-soul', an individuality whose trans-organic or im-mortal life is more than a mere object of conjecture but the simple given fact.

IV. Phenomenology Of Consciousness.

In the overall scheme of Hegel's philosophy of the subjective spirit, this standpoint of the immediately independent individual or 'actual soul' forms both a conclusion and suggests another starting point. For the concept of independent individuality has directly a dual significance: psycho-physical ambiguity transposed in quite another key. On the one hand, the whole of psycho-physical life is brought to unity in individuality, the realm of otherness resolved to an otherness belonging to the existing individual as such whose own psycho-physical life it is. But on the other hand, this unity, this 'existing individual as such', stands no less independent of this psycho-physical world than inextricably related to it. Individuality as such, in short, implies at once self-relativity and relativity to an other, to a given content. This relation of an autonomous selfhood, 'I', to a world of its own which is simply there for but also opposed to it, is what one ordinarily speaks of as 'experience', and the division into a subjective and an objective reference, into consciousness and world, is essential to it.

Consciousness constitutes the reflexive, relational or phenomenal stage of mental life. The 'I' is infinite self-relation as subjective, as self-certainty. The immediate identity of the natural soul is raised to this purely ideal identity with self, its content becoming for this self-existent reflection an
This purely abstract, self-initiated freedom distinguishes from itself its determinateness, the nature-life of the soul, as something autonomous, an independent object, and it is of this object, as external to it, that the 'I' is primarily 'aware', thus is a being-conscious-of, a consciousness. (EN 413)

The 'self-world' relation of experience is of a wholly different order than the quasi-natural relation of psycho-physical conjunction whose terms are in some degree distinguishable. In the relation of experience, consciousness and world have no meaning whatever independent of one another -- pure ego on one side, things-themselves on the other. These are purely reciprocal terms: the very concept of consciousness suggests an infinite reflexivity wherein alone the 'I' and the 'object' have meaning. On the 'real' side, what is otherwise the realm of the psycho-physical in general, has here the status of a content actively posited as existing 'in itself' for subjectivity -- a world 'out there' for a self 'in here'. On the 'ideal' side, individuality which constitutes itself as autonomous, an 'I' or 'subject', is not a soul anymore, a psycho-physical self, but a 'transcendental' self whose whole meaning lies in a world being there for it. Husserl's dictum: 'all consciousness is consciousness-of' is no less superfluous than the Heideggerean converse that 'world is always world for the subject' which is but the same principle ontologically expressed. The gulf between transcendental and empirical, phenomenality and being-itself, is in the end a spurious one since to be 'subject' at all means nothing else but to be the consciousness of something objective while an 'object' in turn has no other meaning than that something is 'there' for consciousness.

For Hegel the focus of phenomenological psychology is upon subjective freedom, which is not native or original as often supposed, but springs from the act, itself an act of freedom, wherein the sense of independence cultivated in the natural individual is affirmed absolutely. In this immediate appropriation of its abstract autonomy, individuality withdraws into itself out of its psycho-physical life, in the same act determining the latter as an 'experienced' world, the object of its observation and reflection and with which it struggles to be reconciled. The paradox of consciousness lies in the fact that it also belongs to this same claim to autonomy that the experienced world stand utterly independent of the subject, be 'already there' for it, to deny which would be compromise the very basis of the subject's self-declared independence, the ground from which it springs. As it is in one and the same act that a detached, transcendental self and an objective world of experience over against it are established, these cannot be confused with each other without corrupting both, and this is the absolute first law of empirical science. It is also the hidden paradox which renders such knowledge from experience in principle finite and incompletatable, for the unconditional otherness of the object which subjectivity demands is inevitably, from an absolute point

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26. But for Hegel, as the 'phenomenological' assumption of modern philosophy, it can come to light only where a certain ordered culture already exists. The self-original nature of subjective freedom -- that it exists simply in the sheer affirmation of it -- is articulated explicitly by Descartes as by Husserl and, in some form, by virtually everyone in between.

of view, only the reflex of the same act in which the latter affirms itself. In short, what is objective is in the end subjective and vice versa.

The standpoint of subjective freedom, of 'experience' and its psychology, thus has in it a latent contradiction belonging to its concept. In its rigid dissociation of self and world there is at the same time the implicit admission of a reflexivity and relativity which renders this dissociation void. The resolution of this contradiction marks Hegel's departure from the standpoint of the philosophy of his day which he explicitly understood to be phenomenological in its assumptions, character and problematic. In his own psychology of experience, Hegel rather seeks to trace and identify the various forms of consciousness-world and discern how, beginning with the simplest affirmation of subjective-objective difference, the point is reached where the equally essential reciprocity of subject and object is brought to the fore. The course followed is the same as in his better-known earlier work, The Phenomenology of Spirit, which, however, had a more extensive and broader historical purpose. In the narrower context of a strict phenomenology of the subjective spirit, Hegel excludes much of what is in the larger argument of that work, confining himself to the logical divisions in a phenomenology of experience, namely, the structures of 'consciousness', 'self-consciousness' and 'reason'.

Notably in contrast with the correlational methods of experimental psychology focussing on psycho-physical conjunctions, the method of phenomenology is intrinsically dialectical, moving entirely within the context of the reflexivity which consciousness-world essentially is, according to a logical progress Hegel summarized clearly in the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit. In contrast with psychophysics again, phenomenology will make its commencement, not from the psycho-physical or empirical individual, but from the simplest form of the subjective act which affirms a world 'then-and-there' for it. It then proceed by means of a dialectic latent even in this simple relation to more complex forms in which the essential relativity of subjective and objective moments progressively reveals itself in the structure of the object itself. Hegel's aim, quite unlike that of contemporary phenomenological psychology, is to bring fully to the fore the limit of the principle of infinite unity-in-reciprocity upon which the concept of conscious experience depends, as well as the limit of the subjective freedom it assumes, namely a freedom from, but also dependence upon, an unreconciled otherness of its own creation. In the course of the argument, the concept of 'experience' itself as viewed philosophically is brought out; namely the relation of self-affirmed free spirits to a world recognized as necessarily finite and endless in that it is not clearly its own: in short, the partial or problematic appropriation of the world in accordance with an abstract and subjective presumption of freedom.

This logical development of phenomenological categories is familiar enough and need only be briefly noted. First is the simple orientation of the presumptively free self, the 'I', to a world directly affirmed as already there for it: what Hegel calls the 'sense-like' consciousness. Implicit in this attitude, however, is a fatal ambiguity concerning the being of this immediately given world: whether it exists in itself or has status only as

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28 In The Phenomenology of Spirit, (tr. Miller, Oxford, 1977) Part A, i, ii and iii; in EN, Sect. 1B, (a) (b) and (c).
subjectively posited. This paradox renders the standpoint of immediate experience unsustainable, leading to a further reconstitution of the world for consciousness as a realm of things possessing properties, in which objective relation the relation of objective to subjective generally might be represented as something already given. But the thing-world is unstable too in another way; it dissolves into the phenomenal play of mutual interactions pointing beyond themselves to an essential world of stable laws and categories. In the formulation of this purely intelligible world, however, consciousness cannot help but recognize the key role it plays in its construction, a recognition destructive of the independence essential to its very standpoint.

Any simple consciousness-world relation being unsustainable, experience demands for its object a being like itself, another self which, like itself, stands on its own, and in relation to which it hopes to find its own freedom recognized. This is only, however, to become embroiled in an endless conflict of selves vying for mutual recognition, each denying to the other their absolute freedom -- "Hell" Sartre observed, "is other people". The war of ego against alter ego reaches its climax in the recognition that the conflict really belongs to the consciousness that would in this way seek to make itself its object; for such a self-consciousness, other-relation and self-relation must remain unreconcilable. The confrontation is really one within subjective freedom itself and is overcome only so far as the conflict within self-consciousness between its abstract freedom and its existential being-in-the-world is resolved; where each can be sacrificed to the other and their latent reciprocity come fully to the fore. This 'absolute' self-consciousness as an essential unity of the objective world as subjective and the subjective as objective Hegel identifies as the standpoint of 'reason'. In it, a merely inward or universal self-consciousness passes freely over to the experience of a world that is posited as one with it, which world in turn assumes for subjectivity the significance of the arena in which its own freedom is realized.

The later phenomenological-existential critique of the principle of reason and 'modernity' as its cultural expression, may be viewed as an extended elaboration of the penultimate paradox just indicated. The individual as a radically autonomous subjectivity, fixed in itself, knows it has no actual freedom in a world that is 'objective' as such. It may seek to conserve the authenticity of its freedom by choosing to exist in this alien world nonetheless, asserting itself in it and against it, a choice admittedly absurd but to which, in Sartre's word, one is 'condemned'. The existential-deconstructionist critique of modernity from Nietzsche to Derrida refuses to follow Hegel beyond this standpoint of a conflicted or finite human freedom, viewing every other conception, including that of a freedom infinite and actual in itself, as enemy to its own. Instead, it finds a certain 'proof' for its radically subjective standpoint through the carrying out of an endless demolition of every other perspective which does not accord with its own radical critique of the concept of a universal reason, an approach which of itself leads to no positive result but only embodies and expresses the final decadence of the modern tradition which clings to the principle of subjective freedom.

Hegel on the other hand rejects the dead-end of subjective freedom by pushing the phenomenological standpoint to its furthest, radical limit. At the point at which the
conflict intrinsic to experience as a finite relation of self to world is made explicit, the essential reciprocity of these terms themselves, and thus what 'subjective' freedom really comes down to, is fully recognized. Hegel intends 'reason' as just this recognition: as freedom is something more than simply the individual as animated organism, it is also something more than an autonomous ego, whether transcendental, existential or otherwise. 'Reason' for Hegel is far from some sort of cosmic logicality brooding over the world, and as far from a merely subjective principle of transcendental unity imposed on the otherwise alien content of experience. That reason is the 'truth' of experience, means, for Hegel that in it the limit of experience itself is exposed, in that the latter rests on the wholly abstract assumption of an autonomous subject somehow detached from a world it nonetheless is supposed to inhabit, know, and act in and upon. Its presumed distinction into subject and object is exposed as at the same time no distinction, a completely fluid, relativity. Freedom in its fuller definition for Hegel is thus rational freedom, in the specific sense of a reciprocity between self and world that is not, as from the standpoint of experience, only finite or existential, but such that in it 'I' and 'object' are infinitely one and the same, and explicitly so. It is this standpoint which Hegel takes up in the third and main argument of the philosophy of subjective spirit, the psychology of the actually free spirit, of mental life as such.

V. Psychology Of Mental Life

(a) ‘Spirit’ As Mental Life

The object specific to philosophical psychology in particular is the subjective spirit as such, and this in its completed form, not as the merely animated individual or the self of experience, but as what one ordinarily knows as the individual's 'inner life' as a thinking, deliberating individual. This 'inwardness' reflects nothing more than the wholly self-positing, self-referential character of mental activity: in short, its spontaneous and to that extent self-determinate character. The ordinary act of recall -- of a name, a past experience, the formula for velocity -- provides a simple case in point. One already possesses a content which is yet only latent; known yet unknown. One 'turns within', seeks it and finds it, brings it to light, re-cognizes and confirms it as the thing sought. At every stage -- latency, recall, recognition, verification -- the content remains already there 'in' oneself, independent of external evocation, needing only to be brought to evidence in the free act of recalling it. Ordinary recall is thus a live demonstration of the mutual mediation of objective and subjective, content and form which is characteristic of all mental acts, a demonstration requiring no philosopher to license it or put it on stage.

Plato in Theaetetus invokes the image of a mine as a metaphor for the latency of content in mental life and Descartes makes a similar observation about the difference between the sun in the sky and the 'objective reality' of the sun-idea in thought. The same holds true of every other mental act: its content is no less spontaneously produced by it than it is also already 'there' in and for it. Such is the case with imagination and its image, thinking and its concept, desire and its object, choice and its options. In each case
subjective and objective components are distinguished, but within an original identity in which they also have no independence of one another. It is only the counsel of abstraction which wants to foist in a Thinker behind thought, a Thing behind objects, a Holy Will behind moral choices, in short, to fossilize the subject-object polarities of mental life when what is unique about them is precisely their fluid mutuality.29

Common to all mental modalities, though expressed differently in each, is just this activity of mutual determination of subjective and objective moments, of outer and inner, being and self. Any mental act is the affirmative sublimation of any separation between self and content; in intuiting, imagining, thinking, desiring, willing etc. what is above all characteristic is that their content is decidedly not given empirically or sensually but from the outset as content that is posited in and by the act itself.

Any mental act is such that its content both exists in itself and, consistent with freedom, is also its own. It possesses this dual determinateness of 'existence' and 'own-ness' aboriginally, on the one hand finding something already existent in it and on the other positing it as its own. (EN 443)

Psychology proper for Hegel thus has to do with the genesis and development of this freely self-determinate inner life which is more than a psycho-physical individuality and more too than the abstract freedom of the conscious 'I'. Although the content of mental life has its origin nowhere else than in bodily life and experience, it belongs to the self-enclosed reflexivity of mental activity itself that the element of externality is subordinated and assimilated in the mental act where it appears in another form, namely, as a content that belongs specifically to, and has the form, of the inner life itself. In and as mental life, individuality thus stands in a wholly free relation to its own world, the various forms of mental activity being species of the active assimilation of determinate to self-determinate form which Hegel designates as Erinnerung: the 'mentalization' in which everything whatever is drawn into relation to freedom.

Mental freedom (der freie Geist) reveals itself ... both as 'soul', the simple mental substance or immediate spirit, and as 'consciousness', the experiencing spirit which is this same substance self-divided... [But] the principle of free mental life is to posit the being of consciousness as soul-like while rendering the soul-like as objective. Like consciousness it stands over on one side against the object and yet, like soul, it is both sides at once, a totality. So whereas as soul the truth of mental life is only that of an immediate, unconscious totality, and whereas as consciousness it also falls short as this same totality construed as an 'I' severed from its external object, it is only as free that the truth of mental life is recognized as knowing itself to be such (EN 440, Add.).

29 For Hegel, it is in being haunted by the very same ghost of metaphysics that it would exorcize, that the phenomenological standpoint of modernity reveals its limit. Even the contemporary pragmatic or deconstructionist demand that every notion of 'subject' be entirely given up accomplishes this only by radically limiting the scope or possibility of philosophy itself.
Freedom has already turned up in Hegel's analysis of the subjective life in two forms, first as the ideality of nature in the psycho-physical individual, and second as the abstract autonomy of the 'I' in relation to the equally independent object of its experience. But these are fettered forms of self-determination. The contingent congruity between bodily and mental states is a kind of independence, but at best an ambiguous freedom since the reflection-expression of one aspect in the other is still a relation between otherwise alien modes and not a true self-determining. As for the autonomous self who transcendentally would determine the given content of its experience, this too is self-determination only in a unilateral or formal sense, in that the content determined still abides in itself outside the unity of self-consciousness. Self-determination is more fully manifest psychologically where the transubstantiation of natural into spiritual form is complete, i.e., where the mere identity of self and other is resolved to a self-identification and the mere difference to a self-differentiation. But this is precisely the universal characteristic of mental activity properly speaking: that in it the content of psycho-physical states is given the form of self-evidence, while the fixed and conflicted relation of ego and world in experience is liberated to the free reflexivity of the thinking life in which subject and object thoroughly mediate one another.

'Soul' is finite in being immediately or naturally determined; 'consciousness' in having its object given it. Mental life, no longer fettered by an object, is limited ... only in that as immediate subjectivity it is free only in principle. (EN 441) ... [But] what this principle of the free spirit is, is just the complete unity of subjective and objective, of form and content; accordingly an unconditional totality, thus an 'infinite' and 'eternal' [self-determining]. (Ibid. Add.)

With Hegel, a psychology of free individuality requires the systematic ordering of the various distinguishable mental acts such as will bring out their common principle. Viewed as a mere manifold, as if each stood enigmatically on its own -- recall something other than imagination, intuition than memory, thinking than willing etc. -- their common essence qua mental is thereby obscured.

To treat mental activities as distinct expressions or as general faculties each somehow useful and adaptable to this or that intellectual or personal interest, is to miss what their end overall might be. But this can be found to lie only in the concept of mental activity itself whose essential end is the sublimation of its own initial subjective form and to reach out and get hold of what it is: to liberate itself to itself. The various so-called mental faculties are in this sense to be regarded as steps in this liberation, and this alone permits of a rational method for the study of mental life and its various activities. (EN 442)

The Hegelian Geist is thus no autonomic Self pre-armed with faculties and categories with which it would commandeer an alien world and enforce its will in it. It is rather the active mental life which appropriates and redeems the merely given world by reconstituting it as a world of its own according to its own self-determining principle.
The intuition of a meaningful world, its recollection and re-presentation through image and symbol, the generation through the mnemonics of language of a world explicitly in and for thought, the consequent self-certainty that purposes self-proposed goals -- in and through all these essentially interconnected activities a world otherwise alien for the self-conscious individual is transformed into one that has freedom, 'the absolute idea', as its substance and principle.

For Hegel mental life is the consummation and resurrection of nature, not some curious evolutionary capacity in the case of a particular natural species. Still, mental life is viewed somewhat on the model of organic life raised to a higher power. As skin, heart, brain or eye have no life of their own beyond the function they serve in the total life of the organism, so particular modes of mental activity -- intuition, imagination, language, deliberation etc. -- have no independence except as moments within the larger dynamic of a free subjective life. 'Reason', infinite reciprocity of subjective and objective and the form pervading all mental activity, provides the ordering principle of a properly philosophical psychology whose end must be to disclose the 'psycho-logical' progression of mental modes in and through which a merely subjective-existential freedom is liberated to the concrete autonomy of an actually free and rational life. The consummation of this logic of inner liberation yields the figure with which the philosophy of the subjective spirit concludes, namely, the thinking-deliberating individual as a being capable of action; whose witness to personal freedom translates directly into a will to realize this freedom as the substance of an objective human order, the legal, moral and institutional life which, in the larger Hegelian system, forms the theme of his ethical and political philosophy.

(b) Human Reason

It is clear the 'reason' of Hegel's psychology is no Kantian regulative super-faculty any more than it is the conjuring of a cosmic intelligence, as Charles Taylor has held.\(^{30}\) Hegel is no 'rationalist' in either sense. Rather the concept of reason here pertinent is the same with which the argument of phenomenology concludes, namely the concept of the thoroughgoing reciprocity of consciousness and world, the infinite unity of subjectivity and objectivity, which concept forms the first, if only formal definition of what spirit is. This reciprocity is not, however, to be thought a mere relativity of subjective and objective nor, as with Schelling, their abstract identity, but both of these dynamically considered. Logically, then, reason is reciprocity in the intense sense: identification through differentiation and at once differentiation through identification. It is on this basis, Hegel thinks, that reason itself has typically been considered as falling into a subjective and an objective form, a theoretical and a practical reason. The former roughly defined is the activity of the subject in bringing to light the essential conformability of the objectively given world to its own rational intuition; the latter is this subjective certainty as the impulse to realize its reason as an objective world. Theoretical reason is the intellectual spirit whose aim is the appropriation of the objective world in freedom; practical reason the volitional spirit whose ultimate end is the constitution of freedom as

the principle of an objective order of life: the 'intellect' and 'will' of the older metaphysical language.

Hegel regarded the presumption of a fixed subjective-objective opposition as the principal problematic of the modern philosophy of experience, the inability to surmount which had been -- and in more subtle ways still remains -- the chief impediment to the development of an authentic psychology of freedom.

Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences profiting least from the ... deeper concept of reason of modern times and finds itself even now in a wholly corrupt condition. The Kantian philosophy laid great emphasis on the claim that psychology, even as empirical, forms the basis of metaphysics itself construed accordingly as the analysis of the 'facts' of human consciousness taken simply as facts. Such confounding of psychology with anthropology and [phenomenology] has done nothing to improve matters, having only had the effect that for metaphysics and philosophy generally, all attempts to know truly, that is conceptually, the necessity of what exists in and for itself, namely the free spirit, have been abandoned. (EN 444)

The prescience of this remark is striking. Contemporary psychology, where not still locked into 18th century mechanistic psycho-physical notions, still appeals to an equally constrictive Kantism which, however much sophisticated in the schools of Husserl, Freud, Heidegger or Foucault has yet to move beyond the basic presumption of a gulf between conscious and preconscious life. What Hegel observed concerning such positions remains true: a psychology of freedom is quite impossible on either ground.

With respect to experimental psychology, its own assumptions prevent it from recognizing familiar activities such as imagining, thinking, desiring, etc. as real, even though for common sense as for Hegel they are not only real but the very substance of one's self-conscious life. It can only reduce them to something else, to biological or behavioural terms, missing thereby just that which of all things is essential to them, namely their free, self-determinate character. The method of existential phenomenology, on the other hand, would 'deconstruct' these same activities by seeking to ground conscious life (which it nonetheless presupposes) in some absolute and inscrutable pre-mental or para-mental condition -- 'life', 'the unconscious', 'being', 'language' etc. -- an analysis which thus sustains itself through the endless negative dialectic of its own primary distinction from which it can never extricate itself. In neither context, accordingly, whether conceived as a cybernetic automaton or as an inwardly conflicted being, can the concept of actually free individuality possibly emerge.

Revisiting the older distinction between theoretical and practical reason, Hegel's takes the key consideration to be, that while negative with respect to any fixed opposition of ego and world, reason does not entail the abolition of this difference but its retention as its own essential moment. This is why 'Reason' has been traditionally understood as both

31 Ref. Note 50.
an objective and a subjective principle: as a principle of objective cognition, \textit{Wissen}, and a principle of subjective self-realization, \textit{Wille}.

The theoretical or intellectual spirit addresses the world as 'objective', not in relation to the mere consciousness of it, but as objective \textit{in itself}. It is motivated by a demand for insight into the \textit{intrinsic} meaningfulness of the world and by the impulse to bring this intuition to light. Observation, representation, hypothetical conjecture, linguistic and conceptual articulation, are the familiar intellectual mediations through which the mere \textit{experience} of a world is raised to a \textit{knowledge} of it.

So determined as having all objectivity as such contained in it, [reason] is a knowing whose object is not anything given externally, and thus inscrutably. Accordingly mental life is the \textit{simple, universal, wholly opposition-less certainty of self} which, being confident it will find in the world only itself and that the world must in principle be reconciled with it, ... knows that to discover the reason of the world it has only to seek its own. \textit{(EN 440 Add.)}

Practical reason moves in the other direction. Reason is just as much the movement to render its own principle of subjective-objective unity objective, to render the inner certainty of its freedom outward. In its immediate form, 'will' is simply this practical sense and orientation generally: the impulse to action, the will to will which Nietzsche took to be the whole of freedom. Its more developed form as free choice (Nietzsche condemns it as a counter-impulsive "will not to will") is the essence of the Kantian morality.\textsuperscript{32} But for Hegel, so far as willing is impulsive or merely moral, it still assumes a content and aim other than freedom itself; it is to this extent a 'free will' only contingently. It is only where freedom itself is its aim and content that one can properly speak of a rational will, that is to say, a will actively to bring about and sustain freedom as an objective world, an ethical-institutional order of human life -- \textit{Sittlichkeit}.

In Hegelian shorthand, theoretical reason is the resolution of being to own-ness, practical reason the resolution of own-ness to being, each movement representing different aspects of the one inner self-determining activity which is subjective freedom. The limit of theoretical and practical reason correspondingly lies just in the fact that each embodies the dynamic of subjective freedom on its one side only: intellectualization as "subjectification of the objective", in Hegel's words, invests intuitively pre-given determinations with the form of self-relation, while willing, as "objectification of the subjective", is the resolution of this abstract self-relativity to particular, determinate form. \textit{(EN 443)} The concept of an actually free spirit -- a being capable of action -- will further require that this residual disjunction be rendered transparent as representing but two sides of the same free life, neither in itself intellectual nor practical only. In this insight, psychology as the reflection on the subjective spirit and its inner freedom, reaches its proper conclusion in the concept of the individual as an actually free being, which concept alone can stand as legitimizing the presumption of a properly philosophical account of the world of 'objective spirit, i.e., the realm of moral and historical action.

\textsuperscript{32} A theme dominant throughout Nietzsche's works, e.g. Beyond Good and Evil, 19, 259 etc.
The intellectual or thinking life ('theoretical reason') has an economy and logic of its own, the accounting for which is inadequate if appeal is made only to experimental or phenomenological models. The very idea of a psycho-physics or phenomenology of mental acts properly speaking is problematical. They are acts of the whole individual in which the organic and the subjective play only a subliminal role. There is no 'organ' of imagination for example; if imagination is impossible without a brain, then who imagines is still more than a head full of cells; and what is imagined is 'a waving palm,' not a burst of neural gymnastics. The contents of mental acts, moreover, are not 'objective' in the ordinary sense, but uniquely self-objective (the waving palm as posited, not given) and so it is more that simply something 'there-for-a-subject'. To propose to 'explain' intuiting, remembering, thinking etc. psycho-physically or describe them phenomenologically is thus already to convert them into something other than what they directly are.

The old idea of minds making copies of non-mental entities and passing them up the line for further processing as images, symbols or concepts is, while metaphysically picturesque, still the basic model of experimental psychology.\(^{33}\) Hegel, however, writes:

> that [intelligence] receives and accepts impressions from outside, that 'ideas' arise through causal operations on the part of external things upon it, etc., belongs to a point of view utterly alien to what mental life is, as to the standpoint of its philosophical study. (EN 445)

The same holds for phenomenological description which rests on the assimilation of all mental acts to one subjective form, as modifications of an original 'protodoxic' intentionality of consciousness, in Husserl's language, as modes of Dasein's being-in-the-world, or as even perhaps a function of one's speaking or writing. Not only is subjective-objective polarity still residual in these views but the simple fact is not faced that intuiting, imagining or thinking are not properly to be described as acts of a subject in any sense, since subjectivity is already one of the terms in the free intellectual reciprocity in which such acts consist. In recalling anything, for example, I am as much in the object recalled as the object recalled is in me; and so for all cases. Thinking is not the act of a detached ego brooding over an alien world but the self-expressive activity in which it is a matter of indifference whether one says thinking immerses itself in being or being presents itself to thinking.\(^{34}\) It is in just this that the freedom of mental life lies.

\(^{33}\) The picturesque ancient model by which Lucretius' in De rerum natura would explain cognition is no different in principle from those still employed by contemporary experimental psychology. His 'atoms' were equipped with hooks and eyes of various shapes and sizes to facilitate their differential linkage to one another. In the 1960's, the popular theories of D.O. Hebb explained creative imagination by the hypothesis of connective extensions growing on cortical neurons. Computer technology has given a renewed boost to such essentially phrenological speculations to help 'locate', as with Pinsky, thinking, sadness etc. in parts of the brain.

\(^{34}\) Again, this unity of thinking and being is absolutely and already presupposed in all theorizing whatsoever, including scientific theorizing about the contribution of the brain, genes etc.
Experimental and phenomenological psychologies succeed only to the extent that, tacitly or explicitly, they treat the actuality of mental life as illusory; and this in stark contrast to the most ordinary and vivid witness, namely, that one does actually imagine, speak, think etc. Through insight, imagination, language and thought, the psycho-physical and experienced world undergo a total metamorphosis, in Aristotle's phrase, into a whole other genus, a world 'in accordance with reason', inwardly self-constituting and self-determining. The spontaneity of intellectual activity is thus irreducibly what it is, not some superficial embellishment grafted upon bodily life and experience. Nor do these latter constitute the 'real world', as commonly said. The psycho-physical animal does not, properly speaking, have a 'world' at all but lives interactively in and with nature. The world for 'experience', on the other hand, is not self-existent but an indeterminate phenomenality brought to totality in and for an abstract self. It is only the world of intellectual insight that exists in itself, that is, is not merely 'real' or 'objective' but is considered sub specie aeternitates as animated by its own inner principle. The world as thoughtfully addressed is one in which thinking itself plays a role, thus a world known as in principle actual.

For Hegel intellectual life generally consists in the complex of activities whose overall thrust is the 'subjectification of the objective', the 'mentalization' of the non-mental or, in another vein, the liberation of every content from its mere givenness and its comprehension under the form of freedom (intelligere as discriminating-gathering-interiorizing). His aim in the analysis of the theoretical reason is accordingly to bring out the role that various specific cognitive activities play in this overall process of Erinnerung, inwardization, through which a free mental life establishes and sustains itself.

In everyday terms, the ordinary word for the intellectualizing activity Hegel has in mind is just 'thinking'; not 'abstract thinking', but in the comprehensive Cartesian sense as covering the whole range of free mental activities wherein a given content is progressively appropriated to a spiritual form, that is, endowed with a self-determining character. The autonomy accomplished in the course of such intellectualization is marked on the objective side by the transformation of the content from evident to self-evident, and on the subjective side by the advance from cognition as wholly given over and absorbed in its content, to a cognition which explicitly recognizes its content as its own. For Hegel, 'thinking' is at one extreme spontaneous and immediate -- 'intuition' (Anschauung) -- and at the other, self-conscious comprehension -- (Begreifen). Mediating these is a range of other determinations of thinking -- as recollection, imagination, symbolization and signification, mnemonic retention -- which, as reflexive or representational, are partly intuitive, partly comprehensive. Through their mediation, an immediately intuited world attains to explicit self-determinate form as comprehension, while in turn this self-conscious thinking finds its freedom manifested and confirmed in the concrete detail of its intuitive and imaginative life. Thinking is thus for Hegel no less intuitive than reflective, no less reflective than comprehensive; it is not a simple activity but a complex dynamic in which many component acts -- observing, attending, imagining, remembering, conceiving etc. -- are unified according to the logic of thinking itself, rooted in the principle of reason as 'subjectification of the objective'.
Thinking is this self-conscious activity in which individuals actualize an autonomy already theirs in principle. Hegel's account of theoretical reason accordingly seeks to bring out the telos of this intellectual Erinnerung or cognition, the dialectic connection between mental activities whereby subjective or psychological freedom establishes itself and is sustained and whose principal moments are given as 'intuition', 'representation' and 'thinking'.

"Intuition"

The primary division of his analysis of theoretical reason is between thinking as intuitive, as reflective ('representational') and as conceptual. The chief point to be made about intuition as Anschauen is that it does not at all imply, as it tends to with Kant, the imprinting of a spatio-temporal manifold on a mental tabula rasa. Not only is intuition active but, Hegel insists, intellectual, that is, a thinking which seeks active 'insight' into a content which it takes immediately to be its own.35 Hegel concurs absolutely, if in a different vein, with the Kantian principle that "concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts blind". But since in the self-enclosed free reciprocity of mental life there is no inside or outside, no 'in-itself' standing over against a 'for us', the description of intuition as 'sensible' can only be metaphorical. 'Sensibility' ordinarily implies physical affectation but that intuition be sensible in this sense is, of course, a category mistake. Kant did not intend the term in this sense but had rather in mind the model of perceptual consciousness whose object is assumed independent of it. But again, by intuition is not meant the simple apprehension of some outwardly given content, but active insight into its inner significance, the sense or reason intrinsic in the fact itself. "Intuition" Hegel says, is not merely the consciousness of objects in general, but "consciousness filled with the certainty of reason, whose object is rationally determined... a totality, a unified fullness of determinations" (EN 449 Add.).

In short, intuition is intellectual observation, an entirely non-conceptual and prereflexive thinking such as does not relate passively to some empirically given manifold but looks past this phenomenality, sinks itself wholly into its content and seeks out what it is that holds it all together: in short, intuition is the grasping of things in their inner meaning. This is, of course, the sense 'intuition' has in ordinary usage, a standard which Hegel in all cases respects. Nor is intuitive, insightful thinking the privilege of the philosopher, the artist or mystic; it is second nature to the human being as such, a fact of mental existence, manifest in the universal demand that life 'make sense', the speculative impulse to look beyond experience to the inner meaning of the world. The religious analogue is the general belief that in all things a god or spirit is indwelling, a conviction echoed aesthetically in Hopkins' sentiment of a "beauty deep down things". It is also what is really behind the demand in science that one begin with nothing less than what is unqualifiedly self-evident.

35 Even the being one calls 'nature' is an immediate being-for-thinking. Hegel concludes the EN logic: "Considered on the side of its being for self, according to its immediate unity with self, freedom [the idea] is intuition; and the intuitive idea is 'nature' (244)".
Though certainly analogous to sensation as also to the 'sense-consciousness' of phenomenology, intuition is neither. What is common to them is their aspect of immediacy. But intuitive thinking is of quite another order than the immediacy of psycho-physical conjunction or the unmitigated otherness of the world-for-consciousness. For, as a mental act, intuition has reason implied in it, that is, it already knows that in seeking the meaning of some content it seeks only what is already its own. Immersing itself freely in the objective, giving itself over wholly to it, what intuition reveals is the immediate unity of itself with objectivity and objectivity with itself: this is what 'insight' is. In intuition, therefore, cognition comes into possession of a world that belongs directly to its own freedom, a world that is not only given, but intuitively given, not only a natural or objective world, but a meaningful world. And it is with this its own immediately self-constituted meaning-world, and no other, that thinking in its further reflective and conceptual modes is occupied.

That intuition is already wise before all reflection or intellection and even wiser than they; that truth is given whole and brought complete in the witness of immediate feeling needing only to be expressed and brought out: this is the peculiar bias, not only of perennial mysticism, aestheticism and romanticism, but also of much of contemporary popular philosophy. It is a claim, Hegel says, that goes too far. Although it is of supreme importance to recognize thinking as itself intuitive and that 'nothing is ever in thought that is not first in intuition', that intuition be thought to stand on its own as cognition independent of, and even superior to, reflective thought, is a wrong view of the matter. While intuition is fundamental to cognition and the guarantee of its concrete substantiality, as wholly unreflective it also loses itself in, and remains undistinguished, from whatever its content happens to be. Its cognition is thus itself supremely prone to contingency, a contingency it directly construes as absolute truth. Accordingly, the claim that intuitive feeling directly discloses the hidden truth of things without further ado is as capable of breeding the most absurd superstitions as it is generative of true insight. The reason is that:

in intuition we are outside ourselves in the element of spatio-temporal asunderness ... Intelligence directly immerses itself in with this external material, identifies with it and will have no other content than its object so intuited. Accordingly in intuition we can become unfree in the highest degree (EN 450 Add.).

As for the idea of romanticism that art, as exclusively intuitive, affords a preferred access to truth:

People often imagine that the ... artist must go to work purely intuitively. This is absolutely not the case. On the contrary a genuine poet, before and during the execution of his work, must meditate and reflect, for only in this way can he hope to bring out the heart or the soul of the subject-matter and free it from all the externalities in which it is shrouded. (EN 449 Add.)
It is thus all-important in Hegel's analysis, as in ordinary practice, that the immediacy belonging to intuitive thinking not be confused with its exclusivity as an access to truth. Indeed, it is in this same immediacy that the limit of intuition also lies, namely in the contradiction entailed in a free cognition which, as the immediate immersion in, and identification with, an essentially contingent content, renders itself also thereby contingent. This limit points to what thinking further entails beyond its intuitive form.

"Representation"

Mental activity on its intellectual side is the infinite process of 'interiorization' wherein the world as objectively experienced is progressively assimilated to unity with subjectivity, a unity already assumed in the certainty which is reason. In intuitive insight this unity appears as something given immediately, and thus also contingently: the 'inner meaning' of the objective world. What ranks as the real world for the free thinking spirit is thus neither nature as such nor even the world of experience, but the meaning-world, the world as given in and for human insight. In the free act of intuition, accordingly, thinking is directly being and being directly thinking; reality simply the undivided identity of self and world. Intuition is this self-identity, however, only so far as it also conceals in it or negates the moment of self-differentiation that also belongs to what thinking is. This is why the romanticist desire to celebrate as absolute the pure life of intuitive feeling notoriously bears within it a foreboding of a harmony that threatens ever to pass away due to the alienating encroachments of a meddling intellect that 'murders to dissect'.

'Representational' thinking is thinking so far as this equally essential moment of self-differentiation is brought to the fore as against the immediacy of intuitive thinking. In it are comprised a variety of familiar mental activities of which 'imagination' is perhaps the most vivid paradigm, all manifesting the characteristic of self-reciprocation or 'reflection' wherein some intuitively given content is stripped of its immediacy and contingency and referred back to the subjective activity which both posits it and appropriates it as its own. In recollecting a familiar face it is not that face itself which forms the content but the actively posited image of it.

Representation is recollected or inwardized intuition, thus a mean between intelligence which finds itself as immediately determined [i.e., intuition as such] and intelligence in its freedom as thought ... The course of intelligence as representation is to render immediacy inward, to set itself forth as intuitive in itself, thus to overcome the subjectivity of its inwardness, to render itself outward in itself, and thereby, even in its own outwardness, to remain enclosed in itself (EN 451).

In this Hegel expresses clearly how recollection, imagination or memory are actually witnessed; as freely self-reciprocal activities in which some immediately given content is transformed into an object posited as the subject's own product. Imagination, for instance, is no Humean sanitarium to which worn-out intuitions passively retire, to associate and reminisce about a former active life. Nor are its images a conjuring of mere fancies and dressing them up in borrowed empirical costumes. Nor is representation for Hegel a
second-order picturing or fictionalizing of an unmoved sensible reality which remains the
standard of authentication. Rather it is a wholly creative productivity in which thinking as
infinite self-activity liberates itself from the immediacy and contingency of its own
intuitions, purges them of their residual extraneousness and appropriates them as its own
freely re-produced content.

The German, Vorstellen, expresses the matter more clearly again than the English
'representation'. The latter, as evidenced at length by Rorty,36 typically embodies a
distinctly empiricist bias: representation as reflection, the passive 'mirroring' of a reality
already assumed as given. But Vorstellen has the quite different sense of a positing or
setting-forth, implying the free re-constitution of what is merely given, giving it an
autonomous new life in an intellectual space and time -- which is, of course, the location-
less, timeless realm in which things of imagination or memory actually do live. The
power to generate perceptions, images or concepts thus belongs entirely to freedom and
can, neither in principle nor in fact, have its explanation in terms of a physics of mere
picturing or mirroring or a phenomenology of fantasies or simulacra.

Hegel groups acts of representation under 'recollection' (again more aptly denoted in
the German, Erinnerung), imagination proper (Einbildungskraft) and memory
(Gedächtnis). 'Recollection' describes the primitive psychological acts whereby intuited
things and events are appropriated as freely re-presented data, stored in the mine of the
mind, as it were, and available to be re-recognized' or 'called to mind' at will. All
knowledge, said Plato, is in a sense recollection. Beyond this first-order creation of
images, imagination proper is the associative power which moves freely among its
images, endowing them with connection and generality; and it is further the power which
enlists these, its own figurative constructs, in the interest of giving concrete expression of
its own infinite freedom. For Hegel, imagination must be seen as a double-sided activity,
no less creative than reflective, no less expressive than impressive. That is, the generation
of images is at once the positing inward of an outward, pre-reflexive or intuited world
and equally the outward expression through which an inwardly abstract thinking gives
itself outward, concrete embodiment. Like art, imagination does not simply
imitate life but imposes its own truth upon it; not only forces a mindless world to yield up its hidden
truth but also creates a brave new world of its own.

Association introduces order among images according to inclusion and exclusion,
similarity and difference and so forth, and arising therefrom is the further possibility of
the spontaneous generation of images that comprehend or stand in for other images: the
'creative' imagination. The most refined and sophisticated of the product of creative
imagination is, of course, language, the system of symbols and signs. It is one of Hegel's
unique contributions to have developed an account of language consistent with a
psychology of freedom, in contrast with the more usual deterministic psychological or
anthropological approaches. It is chiefly in and through language, Hegel avers, that
thinking accomplishes its dual end of, on the one hand, purging the contingency of its
intuited world and repossessing it in and for freedom, while on the other, rendering this
freedom itself incarnate. In the symbol an empirical image is employed to stand in for,

literally represent, what is more than an image, some deeper, more universal reference, meaning or principle. With Hegel, however, a great deal hangs on distinguishing between language properly speaking and symbolic representation; between the image as symbol and as sign. Symbols are often considered the more effective in expressing meaning because of the more distinct reference they bear to 'ordinary reality'; representing some abstract idea in terms of a familiar image keeps thinking's feet on the ground, as it were. But Hegel argues to the contrary: symbols, just because they embody a reference to a more directly empirical image, are thereby rendered inherently ambiguous. The eagle rampant may represent state authority, but a bird is not a state nor a state a bird; nor is death a crucifix or even a house a home.

The freedom which thinking demands is not adequately grasped or expressed in symbol or hieroglyph due to the residue of empirical meaning infecting it. What is rather required for thinking are images which, while serving to embody and represent a universal meaning, have themselves no empirical reference at all, or only a meaningless one, and this is how it stands with the image as 'sign'. Linguistic signs are mere arbitrary sounds, marks, gestures etc. whose whole virtue and utility lies in their intrinsic meaninglessness. Whatever meaning they do have is one conferred upon them in an entirely arbitrary way. Hegel makes the point that the thinking life had its true advent (Socrates comes to mind) with liberation from the ambiguity of the symbolic-hieroglyphic imagination, an event coincident with Greek linguistic innovations. Where picturesque grammar and onomatopoeia give way to the embodiment of meaning in meaningless squiggles and sounds, only then does a comprehensive thinking first become possible. Contrary to the reigning linguistic neo-primitivism, the more senseless and indeterminate language is semiotically, the more adequate it is as an expressive vehicle of thought.

From Hegel's perspective it follows that, as itself the free product of thinking, it is absurd to construe language itself as imposing an absolute limit on thought, or to construe thought as reducible to language. Were this indeed the case the descent into mere verbiage, bombast and gossip, where the letter killeth and dead utterance usurps the authority of thought, is inevitable and irresistible. There is liberation from the entrapments of language only where thinking has command of it, where the ambiguity which fails to separate signs from their meaning is surmounted. In Hegel's scheme, accordingly, the imagination that produces language has its further sophistication in the reduction of language itself to a mere mechanism of which thinking has the absolutely free and fluid use. Language is robbed of its power to dominate and delude only where its mere grammatical and lexical machinery has been so committed to memory as to become automatic. What is then brought forth and encountered in speaking-hearing or reading-writing is not 'language' at all, but a world of meaning in which language plays an essential but silent role as mere tool and messenger.

This is not to point beyond language to a universe of pure verbless significations, nor to a pseudo-platonic perspective requiring a meta-language available only to the professoriate -- what more formidable linguistic prison-house could there be?37 Hegel is

clear enough on the point: "we think only in words". In speaking of language as ultimately in the service of thought, the suggestion is not that it is only the philosopher who grasps or speaks the truth. Rather, for Hegel, since every human being thinks and to that extent is already implicitly a philosopher, he refuses to stray from the ordinary reality of language as the everyday means whereby free individuals sustain and articulate a meaningful life. The relation of language to meaning is for Hegel again analogous to the Aristotelian body become the transparent instrument of the soul, or the knife in the hand of the surgeon which itself has no idea of the life that it saves, or the audio device going about its electronic business in the corner oblivious to the spiritual longing for music which invented it.

"Thinking"

It is in and as thinking proper, Denken, that the mere welter of words as such is broken through and the self-determinate character of the meaning which language only embodies and expresses comes into view for itself. In language generally, the power of representation renders the whole of the intuited world its own, brings it under the sway of inner freedom. But in thinking comprehension, language is itself liberated from the formalism of its grammatical and lexical mechanisms, as well as from its hermeneutical relativity. Thinking brings before it the concrete meaning to which words refer and is the grasping (Begreifung) of this meaning according to a principle of self-determination, that is, on its own terms as what is meaningful in itself. It is as the comprehension (Begreifen) of meaning for its own sake that thinking is properly thinking, and it is the free, inner logical structure of meaning so comprehended that Hegel calls the 'concept' (Begriff). In it, such subjective-objective distinctions of language as that between signifier and signified, word and meaning etc. are superceded; the word is nothing apart from the more-than-verbal meaning it expresses. What the 'concept' in its fuller development is, Hegel chooses not to discuss at length in his psychology; no doubt partly because it has already been fully explicated in the earlier, logical sections of the Encyclopaedia. Here Hegel is chiefly interested only in what the psychological origin of the concept is.

If in language subjectivity has a freedom that is only partial and one-sided, as was in another way the case in intuition, in a comprehending or speculative thinking there is a complete unity of cognitive form and content, thus the full certainty of the infinity of one's self-relation.

Intelligence knows something intuited but as already its very own; likewise it possesses the fact already in the word. But [as thinking,] what exists for it is its own universality, in the dual sense of its universality as such and the same as an immediately existent content: thus a true universal which, comprehending otherness or being as its own, remains in unity with itself. As thinking, intelligence is re-cognitive in and for itself ... its product, what is thought, is directly the fact, the simple identity of subjective and objective. It knows that 'what is thought' is 'what is', and that 'what is' only 'is' so far as it is thought. To think is thus simply to have thoughts; to have these alone as content and object. (EN 465)
In comprehension the world of intuition, imagination and language is resolved to a world of pure meaning, the subjective-objective reciprocity which is the principle of intellectual life fully realized, if realized only on its inward side. In the ordinary thinking life, the outward world is ideally reconciled to oneself, and freedom to this extent has the form of an inner or ideal certainty of a unity of self and world. But an intellectual freedom of this kind remains in one respect incomplete, not with regard to certainty -- 'thinking' is this certainty of freedom -- but incomplete in the sense there is still the want of a freedom which is more than just the subjective or psychological certainty of it, i.e., an actual freedom. For Hegel, this want, so far as it is expressed subjectively, that is, still has the form of a psychological modality in the individual, is what is called 'will'.

(d) The Practical Spirit

Mental life is an inwardly appropriated outer world, or an outwardly posited inward one: a unity of self and being whose formal process is the mutual mediation of one through the other, the principle of 'reason' in Hegel's sense. This reciprocity is of course a two-way street: reason is at once the subjective appropriation of the objective --intuition, representation, comprehension -- and equally objectification of the subjective -- will, deliberation, self-realization. In short, reason is both theoretical and practical, and subjective freedom in its fully developed sense (Hegel will call it 'free spirit') consists in these twin dynamics taken in their unity: a 'thinking-willing', a freedom at once intellectual and practical.

As already described, intellectual appropriation has two components: on the one hand it is immediate insight into the truth of the given world, on the other a dynamic of op-positioning within this unity its subjective and objective moments. In short, thinking is at once intuitive and reflective, no less an immediate insight into meaning than the dual recollection and objectification of this meaning. The activity which had intuition and reflection as its moments is thinking itself as addressing an objectivity now posited as intelligible. This thinking is comprehension (Begreifen), its self-intelligible content the concept (Begriff). In viewing the whole range of cognitive forms as grounded and consummated in thinking so considered as free, that is, as at once self-determinate and concrete, Hegel steps decisively beyond the standpoint of earlier metaphysical and empirical-phenomenological psychologies of knowledge (EN 26-60, espec. ss.77,78).

Intellectual life is thus free subjectivity reconciling a merely given world to itself, which latter is born again as an autonomous, self-enclosed and self-sustained life, the so-called 'inner' life of the individual. But this inner or mental life, even though in itself free, has implied in it the demand for an outward reconciliation, for the objectification of a freedom otherwise sustained only in thought. This is the basis of the practical human spirit which springs, in Hegel's account, from nothing else but the inner certainty of freedom. For practice -- as opposed to motion, process, behaviour or other activity -- explicitly presupposes deliberation and initiative, thus a preexistent speculative life wherein intentions are generated, ends are proposed and articulated, and discretion and options exercised. In short, the individual, to be a practical being or agent, must already be a thinking being. (EN 468)
'Will' or practical reason is for Hegel that dynamic, belonging to mental life as such, according to which one is impelled to enact or bring about circumstances or conditions consistent with the inner certainty of one's freedom. The concept of the free will forms for Hegel the culminating point in the psychology of freedom, yielding as it does the very presumption upon which any philosophy of human practice, of ethical and political life, must necessarily rest: namely that human beings really are free agents, beings capable of positive, creative action. Nevertheless, so far as freedom thus remains a psychological modality only, is but the 'will' to action, it is not freedom as an actually free life, not an 'objective' spirit. The psychology of the free will thus forms the transition-point where spirit considered in its subjective manifestation in and as mental life passes into a consideration of freedom in its objective embodiment in an actual human-practical order. (*EN 481*).

'Will' is a common enough word in ordinary discourse where it is normally understood not at all metaphysically, but as a familiar fact of psychological life. Of course historically the term has indeed been endowed with a metaphysical meaning, most vividly in the voluntarism of Schopenhauer whose account of will as the Absolute, a pre-rational and unconscious power, became through its refinements with Nietzsche, Spencer, Bradley, Heidegger and many others a principal strain in 19th and 20th century philosophical thought. The bias is found everywhere in popular expressionistic psychologies where behaviour is assumed to be driven by organic, erotic or aggressive urges welling up in an unconscious self to be inhibited, frustrated and perverted by contrary 'repressive' forces of parental, social or moral-cultural origin -- a theme also ubiquitous in Victorian and post-Victorian literature.

With Hegel, however, 'will' retains its more modest everyday psychological meaning as referring to the self-initiated character of human behaviour which alone makes it possible to speak of individuals as acting 'deliberately' or 'intentionally', being responsible for what they do, forming self-proposed ends and carrying them out by actually altering circumstances or shaping events. In short the concept of will is the simple presumption of agency, describing a human being's inherent or 'inner' capacity to act on self-generated motives. The certainty individuals have of this capacity is not an illusory psychological inference, nor, at the other extreme, a mysterious metaphysical endowment. For Hegel freedom is human nature, "not anything which [human beings] have but what they are" (*EN 483*); it is second nature to know oneself as an infinitely self-given, self-relative being. Accordingly, the expression 'free will' is for Hegel a pleonasm; will is nothing else but freedom so far as it denotes the human capacity to act. If the free will does have a limit, it does not lie in any conjecture that it may not be free after all -- an 'unfree will' being a contradiction in terms -- but rather it lies in fact that, conceived merely as will, freedom is no more than a psychological capacity, not freedom itself as something actually and objectively realized.

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38. The psychological moments of the free will are summarized again in *The Philosophy of Right* (ss 1-33) by way of introducing the philosophy of ethical-institutional freedom, 'objective spirit'. But while generations of political philosophers have turned to these sections to discover the basis of Hegel's concept of the free will, the broader psychological considerations out of which it springs are typically missed or ignored with the result that Hegel's account there appears arbitrary or dogmatic.
Hegel's purpose in his psychology of the will is to reveal this limit and show how, within the more complete freedom of the actually free spirit, the merely subjective freedom of the will is reduced to a subordinate element, an ideal moment. The argument thus moves from the concept of the free will as immediately given in and as 'human nature', as it were, to the concept of a self-conscious or thinking will whose own form as will is potentially self-transcended as the will that wills an actual and objective freedom.

"Practical Impulse"

So far as motives, intentions and purposes are simply found in oneself in an immediate way, to this extent one's freedom is no more than the irrepressible propensity to act, to impose one's will on the world, to appropriate, change, order, command and create it -- in short, the practical spirit in general. For Hegel, freedom is implied even in the most capricious and seemingly involuntary human acts, though, as such, only as a freedom possessed and expressed contingently. Hegel calls this sheer impulsiveness the 'natural' will, meaning not at all to suggest that human actions spring, after all, from biological drives or something else of the kind -- they would then not be actions at all but something else -- but that freedom is already directly implied in the sheer proclivity to act from oneself; and that this proclivity is 'native' to human beings as such, their 'original sin', the source as much of everything wanton, cruel and decadent in human affairs as of everything liberating and ennobling.

This confusion of natural will with natural instinct is the source of the ancient prejudice which regards the latter as in itself evil. In a more sophisticated moral psychology, however, evil is seen rather to lie in the unredeemed impulsiveness of the human will, an impulsiveness that nonetheless belongs to it as free. Practical feelings and impulses, qua practical, are never in any case instinctive, given as natural; there is no 'organic will' in competition with a free one. Rather, in human beings, instinctive urges inevitably arise in the context of an already implicit consciousness of freedom, with which they are directly felt to be compatible or incompatible. What Hegel means by the 'natural' will is thus not natural urges as such, acting as if on their own, but the free practical will so far as may link itself with any determining fact it may find just 'there' in itself, whether this be some biological urge, a particular sentiment, a cultural prejudice, a habit and so on. The key difference lies rather in whether the will unthinkingly attaches itself to particularistic motives or whether it self-consciously brings these under the universal practical standard of freedom.

In this view of the freedom of the natural will Hegel advances a unique and important doctrine. The notorious wilfulness, egoism, selfishness, impetuosity and capacity for unlimited evil that is 'original' with human nature, has its source and meaning, not in the corruption of human actions by extraneous natural passions, nor as the secret work of sinister supernatural agencies; nor again as a consequence, as Nietzsche thought, of cultural decadence. Rather, Hegel thinks, it is nothing other than freedom which is the original 'will to power' behind the practical passions, no matter how trivial or profound, high-minded or debased they may in fact be. Even in his most repressive acts, it is his own freedom the tyrant perverts. Being simply what it is, an immediate wedding of the
infinity of freedom to some finite aim, the passionate or impulsive will is neither evil nor good in itself and contains indifferently the possibility of either outcome.

More precisely, will is 'natural' for Hegel only to the degree its aim or object is something immediately and subjectively given. It is to this extent blind and impulsive, a direct identification of freedom with purely egoistic self-activity, not a deliberative, thoughtful willing. Far from representing the natural and the rational wills as locked in eternal Manichaen conflict, Hegel rather affirms they are forms of the same; that the natural will is rational in principle, the former the latter's unreflective form. In this view, Hegel stands at complete odds with much of the modern tradition on this matter, and especially with Kant's rigid distinctions between inclination and will, heteronomy and autonomy, where freedom belongs only on the one side of the rational or holy will, standing in irreconcilable opposition to the human inclinations, passions and desires seen as originating in natural necessity and as reconciled to freedom only formally in the 'ought-to-be' of moral conscience. This same polarization was to evoke the extreme resolutions of 19th century absolutism based on a dogmatic identification of nature and volition on the one side or the other. Fichte's moralism would reduce nature to a moment of will -- the very trees in the garden are constituted in my moral self-consciousness -- while Schopenhauer's metaphysics asserted the converse: that the In-Itself, the Absolute, is an irrational, implacable, purposeless, all-generative Wille whose most notorious manifestation is the intractable egoism of humankind. In psychologizing this metaphysical will as Will-to-power, Nietzsche significantly described the latter as the "instinct to freedom".

As much as moral, naturalistic and aesthetic absolutism were to become permanent strains in later 19th and 20th thought, already in his time, Hegel had rejected them as failing to appreciate the dynamic or dialectical character of the unity of nature and man, of being and self-consciousness, resorting to dogmatic affirmations which betray the underlying assumption that what is being unified is still really something divided, a difficulty which infects most subsequent humanism and existentialism. For Hegel the difficulty lies in the Kantian insistence on treating inclinations, passions and desires as in essential conflict with the free will, having their origin in an alien nature defined as ruled by a necessity in principle unreconciled to freedom. But for Hegel this is too abstract a view; it fails to distinguish between physical and psychological contexts and to recognize that even the most ordinary feelings, so far as they are practical, fall entirely into the latter class:

delight, joy, grief, shame, repentance, contentment, etc., are partly just modifications of practical feeling generally [the natural will]; partly the practical 'ought' gains determinateness through their varying contents. (EN 472)

[The feeling of joy] consists in a sense of the accordance of my whole being with some event, thing or person [while] in terror I feel an instant discordance between something external and my own positive self-feeling. (Ibid. Add.)
In short, such human feelings are improperly defined as 'natural impulses'; they are entirely practical in character and content and are utterly unintelligible except on the presumption of a thinking, and feeling being freely addressed to the context of its very own life.

For Hegel, "nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion" and "it is only a dead and too often hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against passion as such (EN 474)". But if freedom is indeed the energy behind human practical passion, it is also the case there is no greater bondage than that incurred in giving oneself entirely over to them. The contradiction springs from a possibility lying in freedom itself, namely the possibility of absolute commitment to some determinate end for its own sake, in which commitment one renders oneself unfree. Hegel's position is the ancient and familiar one: the passions are destructive only so far as they become bonds freely forged for oneself. If the pursuit of particular aims and needs may well serve the interest of freedom, the equation of them with freedom itself renders the latter 'wilful' and capricious, a mere 'will to power'.

Hegel thus breaks radically with the Kantian scheme where the passions, as heteronymous, can at best only be regulated, brought conditionally under the imperative of freedom, which 'ought' to prevail over necessity. Strict morality is an inherently inadequate basis of a philosophy of practice since the unredeemed subjectivity of conscience only guarantees that the gulf between impulse and freedom is never bridged, and that the objective measure of good is no more than an ought-to-be which never is. It becomes impossible in the end to distinguish morality from caprice or moral virtue from moral hypocrisy (PR 140; PG vi.C). As against this, Hegel insists the conflict between inclination and freedom is not absolute. No matter how bodily or material their reference may be, human practical urges, desires and passions, qua human, are already modes of freedom; since they are those of a thinking being who feels, reflects, associates, imagines and thinks, even the crassest of human motives, the cruelest of passions, the most decadent of desires imply an 'instinct to freedom'. This alone can explain the common observation that it is impossible to account physiologically for the human propensity to corruption; human evil being inventively vicious and self-destructive far beyond anything of which other animals are capable.39 The real question is not how the practical passions may be repressed, overcome, regulated of whatever, but how a freedom already latent in them may be more fully realized and developed.

For Hegel, as determination is actual only as self-determination and necessity is actual only as freedom, so the impulsive will is implicitly but not actually free. The conflict between the free will and the passions is accordingly an entirely spiritual one played out in the court of free individuality, not a cosmic war between nature and spirit. It comes down to a question how, as a practical being, one reconciles the inner and to that extent abstract certainty of one's freedom with the host of the particular motives, enticements and ends presenting themselves in everyday life, competing as optional

39 "Nor does evil, the negative of self-existent, infinite spirit ... afflict spirit from outside; on the contrary, evil is nothing other than spirit putting its separate individuality before all else... Thus even in this its extreme disunity ... spirit remains identical with itself and therefore free." (EN 382) Add.
vehicles for bringing this freedom to bear. The question of the moralization of the natural will is thus for Hegel not a matter of how free will overcomes impulse in the abstract, but how freedom in its immediate psychological or impulsive form can develop into an actual, positive, living capacity for free action.

The conflation of impulse with instinct has led to the now common contemporary way of speaking of the individual as free aboriginally, 'by nature', prior to all rational, moral, cultural, historical, religious or political mediations or constraints. Such a notion not only gives priority to practical impulse but would render this impulsive aspect of freedom absolute, pushing the romanticist thesis to its extreme. But the description of one's freedom, and the rights flowing from it, as absolute in the sense of 'natural' or 'aboriginal' can again only be metaphorical, for what is really being referred to is not really some natural fact, but the psychological fact that human beings are first aware of their freedom unreflectively, in the irrepressible practical impulse to exploit whatever opportunity presents itself for its satisfaction. But since its principle is freedom, willing has already in it the necessity that it not remain impulsive but be subject to the measure of a reflective element that is as essential to its freedom as spontaneity is. This necessity, certainly well documented no less in experience than in philosophy, lies in the common observation that in seeking to satisfy this or that finite end, what notoriously is achieved is often the opposite, the dissatisfaction of knowing one's freedom unrequited or conflicted in the very pursuit or attainment of it. The impulsive will to act is thus forced inexorably to reflect on the limits and relativity of its own aims, to become thus divided against itself, and to seek to realize its freedom, no longer directly, but indirectly through appeal to some principle through which conflicting desires and inclinations might be reconciled or unified.

"Free Choice"

Freedom in its subjective form as 'will' is thus as much reflexive as it is impulsive; as much a moral as a natural will. For the will as reflexive, Hegel reserves the term Willkür (arbiterium) or in ordinary English parlance, the will as choosing: 'free choice'. It involves two factors:

(a) free reflection, abstracting from everything, and (b) dependence on a content and material given either from within or without...

The idea people most commonly have of freedom is that it is [free option or] 'arbitrariness' -- the mean, chosen by abstract reflection, between will as wholly determined by impulse and will as free absolutely ... Though the abstract certainty of freedom, is not its truth since it has not got itself as content and aim and consequently the subjective side is still other than the objective ... (PR 15)

That is, freedom would be self-determination; but choice is only the determining of a content not explicitly generated through freedom itself. In choosing, the will is thus in one sense free, in another not free, a second-order selecting and rejecting of inclinations and impulses taken as simply given and in conflict with the autonomy of the choosing...
will itself. In its simplest expression freedom as choice comes down either to the attempt, in hedonism, to satisfy all inclination in some measure or, as in asceticism, the denial of the inclinations as such. But such extreme measures do not really confront or resolve the real problem which lies in the concept of free choice itself:

The contradiction which the choosing will itself is, comes into view as a dialectic of impulses and inclinations, each in the way of every other, the satisfaction of one unavoidably subordinated or sacrificed to the satisfaction of another, and so on. Since an impulse is a uni-directional urge it has no measuring-rod in itself, and so the determination of its subordination or sacrifice is a contingent decision of the choosing will ... appealing to intelligence to calculate which impulse will afford the greater satisfaction or in accordance with some other ground of option. (PR 17)

Beyond the self-defeating solutions of hedonism or asceticism, freedom as Willkür asserts its abstract universality as against the multitude of given inclinations. It is then an explicitly 'moral' or reflexive will which appeals to its own principle of autonomy as the ground for choosing among various options (keeping or not keeping a promise or whatever). Hegel mounts an extensive criticism of the idea of moral free choice (e.g. EN 53, 473-478, PR 15-20) on the grounds that freedom still has the form of contingency. The abstract or morally free agent ought to act only from its own inner principle, never 'heteronomously' from particular motives. In actually choosing some course of action, however, the moral standpoint falls into contradiction, for then one does something definite, and having chosen to do this rather than that, cannot hide the fact one might just as well have chosen that rather than this, or perhaps some other option altogether. The question then is how and why the option chosen is the 'moral' one consistent with freedom. If one looks for a criterion in the pure form of free choice itself, this proves too abstract to apply to any particular case. If one looks to the intent, the circumstances or the consequences of the particular option chosen, then it becomes impossible to know whether it was made on moral grounds or from quite other, extraneous motives. The whole question of moral goodness or wickedness becomes undecideable.

Practical reflection may, in this dilemma, conjecturally propose to itself some ideal conjunction of morality and reality, a condition of human happiness wherein all impulses are satisfied consistent with a general moral ideal. But, Hegel observes, this "merely imagined universality of things desired" remains "a universality which only ought to be (EN 480)", that is, an ideal unattainable no less in concept than in fact. Free choice turns out to be, not an activity of harmonizing or reconciling conflicting impulses but a process of diversion or distraction, suspending one desire or enjoyment by another and one satisfaction (which is just as much no satisfaction) by another ad infinitum. (EN 478)

In other words, free choice, once enacted, produces a spurious infinity (schlechte Unendlichkeit) in which whatever option one chooses must appear at once moral and
immoral, in which case freedom itself becomes indistinguishable from a literal arbitrariness into which in fact it is bound to degenerate. The moral standpoint thus contains in it the seed of its own decadence, just as surely as the 20th century followed the 19th.  

“Thinking Will”

The impulsive will has the deficiency that though freedom is its real underlying source and aim its cannot find the fulfilment of its essential infinity in the satisfaction of finite, fleeting desires -- hence the romantic spirit's perennial complaint as to the fatally unrequited nature of all desire. The limit of the autonomous or reflective will on the other hand lies rather in that, while it has freedom explicitly in view, it has it in such an abstractly subjective form that committing to any actual course of action sullies it or makes a virtue of arbitrariness. For Hegel, what is negatively important in this mutual failure of a natural will which is never satisfied in its finite embodiments and a moral will which is impotent to act or else corrupts freedom whenever it does, is the insufficiency of either view by itself as an adequate account of the psychology of human freedom.

Hegel set himself resolutely beyond both the romanticist and the moralistic views of freedom emerging to predominance in his time, not by simply refuting them but by containing and reinstating them as elements within a larger view of the psychology of freedom. He accordingly describes the relation between the natural and the moral will as dialectical rather than, as in the traditional and still dominant view, oppositional. The relation is clearly analogous to that between intuition and representation in the analysis of theoretical reason, where these are seen, not as separate or alternative forms of intellectual cognition but as moments of the self-determinative activity which is 'thinking' itself, an act which demands both direct and immediate insight into meaning and also the reflection which articulates the subjective-objective unity-in-reciprocity which forms the inner essence of that same meaning. Similarly, the passionate and the moral view of willing are not to be taken as standing in irreconcilable conflict, but as moments within what Hegel calls the actually free will, a reciprocity indeed implied in all truly practical life where what is realized through a rational ordering of the practical passions is nothing less than the satisfaction, if not of them directly, then of the universal end latent in them and driving them, namely freedom itself.

The practical will in its fullest realized sense is thus simply the will to freedom. It remains a 'will' so far as still considered only the human propensity to free, deliberate action, which Hegel describes as springing directly out of the immediate certainty human beings have of their essential freedom. It is only as utterly divorced from thinking that will can appear as a principle of irrationality, as with Schopenhauer, or its freedom as sheer limitlessness, as in anarchic liberalism. For Hegel, the individual is only practical so far as also a thinking reason. In opposing 'wilfulness', moral self-consciousness brings the pure thought of freedom back into the picture, but at the price of a division within the will itself. What is lost in the idea of a moral will (Nietzsche's 'will not to will'), in turn, is

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40 Philosophy of Right, Pt. II, ss.3;  
41 Ibid. S. 27
the spontaneity characteristic of the natural or impulsive will. Still, with Hegel it is never a question of refuting the moral standpoint as such, as with Nietzsche and his legacy, but of taking its acknowledged impotence as symptomatic of the inadequacy of the whole division between thinking and willing, between theoretical and practical reason, which it proves unable to reconcile.

By an 'actually' free will Hegel means willing so far as it's own inner principle, the freedom established and made certain in thought, is no longer concealed in it. Such a will is 'actually' free in the sense that its essential unity with thinking life, the basis of its rationality, is brought explicitly to the fore in it: it is a self-conscious, deliberating will.

The actually free will is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit, a free will which realizes its own freedom of will now that the formalism, fortuitousness and contractedness of the practical content has been superceded and will is immediately self-instituted individuality, an individuality purified of all that interferes with its universality, that is, with freedom itself. This [individuality] can have this universality as its object and aim only so far as it thinks itself, knows this to be concept, and is thus will as free intelligence. (EN481)

Where freedom becomes the consciously explicit end, willing can no longer appear as simply impulsive, whether morally fettered or unfettered, but as a willing free in itself and knowing itself to be such. So considered, 'will' is more than a mere psychological practical proclivity and presents itself as 'ideal' in the larger life of the living agent who, more than merely free 'by nature' or even by moral cultivation, is an actually existing free individual through whose deliberate actions an objective, ethical and institutional order of freedom is sustained.

(e) The Free Spirit

So far as a division persists between its intellectual and its practical expressions, 'spirit' is a subjective freedom only, a psychological category, a purely mental, not an actual life. This limit lies in the division in reason whereby it is on the one side appropriation of otherness to self, cognition, and on the other impulse to self-realization, will. Both are incomplete expressions of freedom as self-determination, and if the Kantian legacy remains ambiguous on this point, Hegel is not:

For the theoretical mentality, though the object is subjective, a residual objective content remains outside this unity; ... as subjectivity does not wholly pervade the object, the latter is accordingly not posited wholly in and through spirit. In the practical sphere ... subjectivity still does not possess a true objectivity since in the immediate form [of 'will'] it is not a ... [freedom] existing in and for itself, but such as still belongs to the singularity of the individual. (EN 444 Add.)

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42 If one may judge Kant's third critique, as it was generally judged in its day, to have been unsuccessful in demonstrating an aesthetic or teleological reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason.
Or again,

The theoretical no less than the practical mentality still belongs to the sphere of *subjective spirit* ... The inward, theoretical spirit produces only its own ideal world and attains a degree of abstract self-determination therein. The practical spirit is concerned only with giving universal form to a content which is after all only its own, and thus again only nominally self-determined. Existing as the unity of soul and consciousness, of its anthropological and phenomenological aspects, the subjective spirit ... [has] for its theoretical product the *word* and for its practical, *enjoyment*, but not yet deeds and actions. (*EN* 444).

Where so divided, whether as an inner intellectuality culminating in language, or as an ever-unrequited will to personal reconciliation, freedom can have only a subjective or psychological meaning; the character, that is, of a universal self-determinateness which yet belongs only to 'this' individual -- a paradoxical and problematical 'fact' of the latter's finite existence. But for the self-conscious spirit which knows this universality to be its own very being and essence, freedom is no merely inward human condition but an actual ethical order of life, realized and sustained by thinking individuals mutually recognizing and enacting a freedom understood to be objectively fulfilled only in a common commitment to familial, social and political institutions.

True freedom, freedom as actual ethical-institutional life, is this: that willing have for its content a universal end and not some subjective or self-serving one. But such a content can exist only in and through thinking, so that it is nothing short of absurd to exclude the fact of thinking from the consideration of ethical, religious or juridical rights. (*EN* 469)

Hegel's psychology thus reaches its consummation in the concept of the individual as an actually free spirit in whom being, thinking and doing are one and the same. This concept of the free spirit (*EN* III.C.c) is the driving force throughout the whole argument of the Hegelian psychology: namely the demonstration that "freedom is not something human beings have, but what they are". This is a view contemporary psychology cannot bring itself to embrace, whether forced to deny it as inconsistent with the primarily technocratic aims of experimental science, or whether willing to acknowledge freedom but as compromised by any number of existential conditionalities: circumstantial, cultural-political, linguistic etc. The Hegelian psychology of the free spirit is unique in making the outright argument that freedom and nothing less constitutes human nature as such; that 'mind' or free personality is not some enigmatic, supernumerary entity or quality grafted upon a human existence to be conceived and explained otherwise, but is an actual, living-freedom *in which every other sense and significance of existence is implicitly contained*. The aesthetic and theological analogies to this speculative position are obvious.
From its very commencement, then, the metaphysical dichotomy between nature and freedom, body and spirit, is assumed as already superseded in the human self-consciousness of freedom considered as such. Human mentality is not in Hegel's psychology, as in most others, a lingering conundrum recurring again and again at each stage of inquiry, finally requiring to be abandoned altogether or only foisted capriciously in at some point in a quite contradictory way. In Hegel's account, the whole gamut of human psycho-physical and phenomenological structures and activities are not allowed to fall outside the principle of freedom but are drawn together under it. The 'ideality' of mental life is thus identified and confirmed at every level of psychological life from the most elemental to the most complex, from the direct impact of climate or gender on temperament, to the intricacies of mind-brain relations, to the more subtle phenomenological relations between a self and its world, to mental life as such where, in thinking, language and deliberate action, the individual's essential freedom is made most distinctly evident.

It is remarkable that, however obviously any account of legal, moral or institutional freedom must depend on the assumption, at least, of human freedom as a psychological fact, this question is for the most part ignored or summarily dismissed in contemporary psychology. And this, even where there is a coincident total contemporary commitment, no doubt even on the part of psychologists themselves, to ideas of individual and social liberty, with which commitment it is nonetheless supposed consistent to describe human beings as organisms in whom the category of freedom has no scientific relevance or else as existential beings in whom freedom has at best only a conflicted status. Accordingly, the relation of psychological to political theory almost always entails a leap of some kind from such a deterministic or existential account of human nature to the possibility of an ethically, socially or institutionally meaningful freedom, an ideal which therefore can only be, and typically is, dogmatically laid down.

A plausible explanation for this pervasive contemporary inconsistency might be that in post-Hegelian times the certainty of the individual's essential freedom, far from having gone by the board, has rather 'gone under', that is, become an absolute and unspoken assumption, so thoroughly and universally accepted as no longer to enter into the mix of ordinary inquiry or to be considered as standing in need of a speculative or any other form of justification. This newly blind conviction, implicit no less in contemporary science than in contemporary politics, can thus appear unconscious of or indifferent to the question whether such a psychologically unfounded appeal to freedom can be any more than ephemeral, can avoid foundering, as some might well argue contemporary freedom has, into a celebration of personal caprice and public anarchy for want of a definite and concrete knowledge, beyond dogma and conviction, of what freedom actually is. The aim of working out just such a psychological foundation of freedom as 'absolute idea' forms the central inspiration of Hegel's philosophy of the subjective spirit, which suggests it may well be the case that the post-Hegelian world is far more Hegelian than it knows.
Hegel's Political Ideal: Civil Society, History And Sittlichkeit

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I. Introduction

The door to Hegel's thought is guarded by the mutually opposed twin hydralis of Marx and Nietzsche and the post-modernities they have spawned. There is on both sides of this revolutionary division a conception of philosophy not as rational comprehension but as domination whether as Ideologie or as Wille zur Macht. Likewise Rawlsian liberalism, pragmatic and constructivist, is intent on consigning philosophical wisdom to the realm of private opinion and, from the standpoint of consensus or moral consumer democracy, on portraying as oppressive any attempt to found justice on a philosophical conception of the good. Liberalism, existentialism, communism and the various deconstructive syntheses which are their progeny all have as their stated goal the limitation if not the destruction of philosophical rationality. It is a matter of some interest, however, as to how, starting from an explicitly a-philosophical standpoint, it is possible to interpret the works of previous philosophers without caricature of their method, aim and spirit. This is not to say that post-Hegelian philosophy is without philosophical content and import or that it is not instructive as to certain limitations of the philosophical tradition. Still, and with all due respect, it would be surprising to find a philosophical comprehension of the tradition and its revolutionary moments from within the revolution itself.

Mainstream late-nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy both in its continental and analytic forms has its origin in large measure in opposition to the claims of the Hegelian system and inevitably falls into a severe hermeneutic raging against the outrageous fallacies of the past, on the one hand, or on the other, precociously to and froing, gleaning out of context various forms and arguments in the service of some

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1 Throughout this essay I use the English verb to comprehend and noun comprehension to convey the sense of Hegel's aufheben and Aufhebung respectively. This strikes me as preferable to Stirling's awkward suggestion of to sublate in The Secret of Hegel (1865) and Suchting's suggestion of to suspend in "Translating Hegel's Logic: Some Minority Comments on Terminology" in Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, (Tr. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, H.S. Harris) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991). Suchting's sense of aufheben as putting what is aufgehoben "out of action" cannot be reconciled with Hegel's thought. Comprehension implies the grasping of some object in its rationality which maintains the "action" of the object but as preserved and elevated in rational concretion.
contemporary dogmatism all the while holding in ironic or regulative suspension the substance of previous standpoints and comprehending neither the past nor the present. Such interpretations it might be said are hermeneutered. Adequately to conceive the accomplishments of the philosophical and post-philosophical traditions, then, requires clarification of their relation and central to this clarification is the rediscovery of traditional philosophical texts in light of their own logic. Such is the concern of the present argument which attempts to show in the Hegelian Sittlichkeit an institutional life not exhausted by Marxist and Rawlsian criticism. This essay indicates the limits of post-Hegelian interpretations of Hegel by attending to the argument of Hegel's Philosophy of Right to indicate how it imposes neither a spurious ideal of the state on the material reality of human society nor an abstract spiritual ideal on human history. Finally, in light of these reflections, the present argument considers John Rawls's "Reply to Hegel's Criticism" in Lecture VII, Section 10 of his Political Liberalism. Here it is argued that Hegel's conception of an historically determinate common good beyond the divisions of civil society (explicated in the first two parts of this essay) provides a more comprehensive account of political life than is available on the Rawlsian view.

II. Marx's Feuerbachian Critique Of Hegel

Marxists and liberals alike find in Hegel's political philosophy and philosophy of history a spurious ideal, whether state or cosmic spirit, which stands opposed to the freedom of individual labourers, consumers or culture-producers. Marx's criticism of Hegel is grounded in Feuerbach's view that Hegel has inverted the real subject of human existence, making what is merely ideal into an underlaying reality and making reality into mere appearance. According to Feuerbach: "The essence of Hegel's logic is transcendent thinking, the thinking of the human being supposed outside human beings" (Feuerbach:158). As a result: "Hegelian philosophy lacks immediate unity, immediate certainty, immediate truth." To correct Hegel, then: "We only need always to make the predicate into the subject and thus, as the subject, into the object and principle"(Feuerbach:157).

2 Rawls does not conceive the freedom of individuals as so radically destructive of institutional life as his deconstructionist contemporaries but maintains such ethical concretion only in virtue of a presupposed moral will present in what he calls the public culture of the United States but articulated only hypothetically in his thought.

3 In its atheistic form this argument collapses real and ideal into the freedom of the natural finite subject. In its theistic form this argument separates real and ideal in a division between a finite subject and an ideal realm radically beyond human reason. From a Hegelian perspective both sides of this division are equally theistic and atheistic, one rendering the finite subject absolute, the other unable to distinguish the finite and infinite except by means of enthusiasm or authority.


5 Likewise the liberal L.T. Hobhouse in The Metaphysical Theory of the State (Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1984) p. 18: "This then is the metaphysical theory of the state. It is the endeavour to exhibit the fabric of society in a light in which we shall see it, in or through its actual condition as the incarnation of something very great and glorious indeed, as one expression of that supreme being which some of these
It is instructive to consider the basic components of Marx's critique of Hegel as they succinctly appear in *Kritik des Staatsrechts* especially with reference to sections 261-69 of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*. Marx argues that on the Hegelian account the state appears as an external necessity which subordinates the realms of family and civil society which are thus rendered spheres of circumstance, caprice and individual choice. He states: "Accordingly, the rationality of the state [Staatsvernunft] has nothing to do with the division of the material of the state into family and civil society" (Marx:7).

For Marx this indicates that, on Hegel's view, the spheres of particularity and difference do not have their own rationality and moreover that the supposed rationality of the state, that is, its self-conscious order, does not permeate the lived content of family and civil society. The abstraction of the state lies precisely in its inability to comprehend the particular realms. Thus on Marx's view we have in Hegel's thought an essential tension between the abstract rationality of the state and the particular wills and lives of individuals, a tension which is overcome only through the conceptual subordination of the particular realms to the state.

Therefore, both from the standpoint of the private realms of family and civil society, which find in the state a merely external force, and from the side of the state, which finds in these realms contingency, caprice and circumstance, the emergence of the state appears unconscious and arbitrary. Marx links this unconscious process with nature. He states: "Family and civil society appear as the dark natural ground from which the light of the state emerges" (Marx:7).

Because actuality, on the Marxist view, lies on the side of particularity and difference, the concept of the state which Hegel develops over and against family and civil society will thus be a kind of unreal mysticism an immanent spirit which works through family and civil society but of which individual family members and labourers are unconscious. From the Hegelian standpoint, Marx argues, this mysticism in turn renders human freedom and nature inactual, that is, without a rational order of their own.  

Marx contends that this denigration of the content of the familial and civil realms has a formal or logical correlate, that is, that the transition from these spheres to the state is not derived from the specific essence of the family, etc., and the specific essence of the thinkers call the spirit and others the Absolute. There is no question here of realizing an ideal by human effort. We are already living in the ideal."


7 Marx expresses this Hegelian inactuality of family and civil society in a number of ways: (1) The purpose of their particular existence is not particular existence itself. (2) The conditioning factor (the reality of human discourse and activity) is presented as conditioned. (3) The determining factor (differences in the realms humans have created) is presented as determined. (4) The producing factor (human labour) is presented as the product of what is in fact its product. (5) Humans (*en masse*) are presented not as thinkers but as the result of thought/the Idea (262).
state, but rather from the universal relation of necessity and freedom" (Marx:10). Again particularity and difference have been given over to abstraction and the transition occurs merely by the imposition of vague categories on the specificity of natural life. According to Marx: "Exactly the same transition is effected in the Logic from the sphere of Essence to the sphere of Concept, and in the Philosophy of Nature from Inorganic Nature to Life" (Marx:10).

Further, on Marx's view, because mere abstractions do not have their own principle of movement, Hegel cannot indicate a movement or differentiation on the side of the ideal. Real movement, for Marx, occurs on the side of actually existing particulars which Hegel's idealistic account cannot possibly comprehend (Marx:10).\(^8\) Marx states: "He does not develop his thought out of what is objective \[aus dem Gegenstand\], but what is objective in accordance with a ready-made thought which has its origin in the abstract sphere of logic. It is not a question of developing the determinate idea of the political constitution, but of giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea, of classifying it as a member of its (the Idea's) life history. This is an obvious mystification" (Marx:14-15).

The basic thrust of Marx's criticism, then, is that Hegel's conception of the ideal State necessarily subverts the individual freedom and material reality of civil society, rendering them subject to an external necessity. There is also an historical correlate to this political criticism. Marx states: "Hegel's view of history presupposes an abstract or Absolute spirit which develops in such a way that mankind is only a Mass, a conscious or unconscious vehicle for spirit." And: "The history of mankind becomes the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, thus a spirit beyond actual man."\(^9\)

To respond to these caricatures, it is appropriate first to consider the unity of nature and will presupposed in the Philosophy of Right and the nexus of nature and freedom in family life which is a presupposition of Hegel's account of civil society. Both accounts indicate the limits of radically separating ethical and material life as on Marxist lines. Second, an explication of Hegel's account of civil society demonstrates that Marx's view of the contradiction between his conceptions of civil society and the state is not well founded.

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\(^8\) Cf. Also his remarks on Philosophy of Right section 269 where Marx criticizes Hegel's view of the organic nature of the state. While Marx finds laudable Hegel's sense that the diversity of powers in the state is a rational and living whole, he is critical of Hegel's deduction of this principle. According to Marx, Hegel's view is not content to express the empirical reality of the differing and related powers in the state but posits over and against this fact an idea which, on Marx's view, is attached to no particular substance. Because this ideal is mere mysticism, how the organism is specifically political is not defined. For Marx, Hegel does not develop a political ideal, i.e., one which emerges through reflection on actual differences but rather develops an abstract ideal which he attempts to coerce into political form and which, as we've said, relates to political differences as external necessity. As noted earlier, on Marx's view, this ideal can be related to difference only through its subordination. The subordinating activity of the Ideal is thus a leveling of differences and only a general concept of organism remains. Marx states: "The same thing can be said with equal truth about the animal organism as about the political organism" (Marx:12).

III. The Nature And Ethics Of Civil Society


It is essential to see the role nature plays in Hegel's political thought. Hegel not only presupposes a unity of nature and freedom but also attempts to recognize a natural substantiality which informs the free will of individuals. Hegel asserts in the introduction to The Philosophy of Right that the account of the free will presupposes his account of subjectivity in the Encyclopaedia. Turning to the Encyclopaedia we find that Hegel contends "mind has for its presupposition Nature of which it is the truth".  

It has been argued that Hegel has a merely mechanistic and mathematical view of nature and that he thus contrasts the freedom of spiritual life with the externality and necessity of nature. However, for Hegel this is nature as the understanding sees it, nature in its externality, that is, as the "merely external connection of mutually independent existences" (PM:381z). Hegel's view of the relation of will to nature conceived as mechanism follows this account. Hegel states: "here the activity of our willing, as of our thinking, is confronted by an external material which is indifferent to the alteration which we impose on it and suffers quite passively the idealization which falls to its lot" (PM:381z). However, for Hegel this is a limited account of nature and the intelligibility of nature in fact lies in that it is not thus opposed to the will. According to Hegel, nature itself overcomes its own externality (the division of independent existences) and "liberates the concept concealed in nature from the covering of externality and thereby overcomes external necessity." He argues further that this process is the "transition from necessity to freedom" (PM:381).

Thus Hegel clearly recognizes that the concept of nature opposes the concept of free will when nature is conceived as mechanism. When he contrasts freedom to nature in this way it is the Enlightenment understanding of nature he has in mind. On his own view, however, this opposition is only one moment of the relation of nature to self-consciousness. It is crucial, therefore, to see that when Hegel speaks of nature in his political philosophy, he intends nature as thoroughly spiritualized in the human will. The whole standpoint of objective spirit is beyond the dualism of mind and nature; in the concept of the free will, which Hegel's political philosophy everywhere presupposes, this dualism is understood as implicitly overcome.

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12 This makes sense of the difference between his view of the state as organism and the Wolffian view of Fredrick the Great, for example, which sees the state as mechanism. For an account of the Prussian Enlightenment cf. C.B.A. Behren's, Society, Government and the Enlightenment: The Experience of Eighteenth Century France and Prussia (New York: Harper and Row, 1985).
In the 'Introduction' to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel recapitulates the argument of his 'Psychology' that the free will knows itself implicitly as the comprehension of nature. For Hegel the will is a thinking will and thus thought and will are not two separate faculties. Rather the will is a manner of thinking: thought determining itself to existence; "thinking as the urge to give itself existence". In any activity of the mind both moments are present (PR:4-A). Further, for Hegel the will is not limited by nature. Rather, the will's relation to nature is the will's relation to its own particularity and the distinction with which we are concerned is not between the will and nature but rather lies within the will itself; a disparity between what the will is in its principle and what it is in its deed. It is the unity of nature and freedom which permeates the relation of civil society to state in Hegel's political thought.

The basic or immediate institutional articulation of the unity of nature and will is the family. The family is both a natural institution and an appropriate ethical beginning in that it shares the immediate starting point of abstract right (in that the subject is confronted with a natural limit which must be transformed) while at the same time providing an objective ethical institution which can be recognized as grounding the subject's moral freedom and as presupposed by such freedom. It is presupposed by freedom, first, in an immediate or natural way. In infancy one is unable to look after oneself and therefore one's existence and welfare depends upon and is mediated by the concern of others. Most importantly the very identity of family members is mediated by relation to others, of child to parent, husband to wife, and sibling to sibling. Through their life together husband and wife become a unit, sharing experience. Also as a child one's own self image is determined by one's relation to one's parents. One's conscience is determined by the moral strictures of parents and one feels guilt when one contradicts parental rules.

This effects a severe criticism of the assumption that the free individuality upon which civil society rests is something given and unmediated as in state-of-nature accounts. In Hegel's account the individual freedom which is the foundation and justification of civil society and state is not merely given but rather has been mediated through the interiorization of the culture and discipline of family life. The individual is ethically educated prior to his capacity for full self-conscious moral action, his will is disciplined by a concrete ethical institution equipped with force, authority and legitimacy. Self-interest and nature, the corner-stones of state-of-nature accounts, are comprehended by the family unit which includes selfish individuals who are also devoted to one another. The family, therefore is a mediation of self and other implicitly accomplished in the feeling of love which family members have for each other.

The family is, however, a limited form of ethical life because individuals cannot develop to their full potential so long as they remain dependent on their parents; and the purpose of the family is to develop the individuality of children to the point where they can leave their merely natural relations behind. Children develop and leave their natural family in order to make lives for themselves, and ethical life in its immediate union of universal and particular ends is thus sundered into a situation where the individual defines himself in contra-distinction to the universal. According to Hegel, the further
development of individuality takes place in civil society which he calls "ethical life in its stage of division" because in it the individual subordinates the universal good to his own private interests (PR:184).

Thus the family unit dissolves through the working of the principle of individual personality and in civil society individuals are treated not as loved family members but as independent persons related to each other through self-interest and law. At all points however they are also united by the ethical education received in the home, through the experience of cooperation, and by common customs (PR:181). This very division is in the interest of ethical life and the individual's activity in this realm, though expressing his particular interests, are still ethical. From this perspective, the Idea of right which refers to ethical life in the state is in fact prior as final cause to its articulation in family and civil society. In principle, ethical life as the union of self-conscious freedom and political institution is the reality from which family and civil society are abstractions or one-sided accounts.

2. Civil Society

According to Hegel, an individual's particular acts are embodiments of his freedom, not simply of his particular (economic) freedom (freedom of choice or freedom from obstruction) but of a more universal freedom, mediated by consciousness of law and institutional life. In developing its potentialities, Hegel contends, "particularity passes over into universality and attains its right" (PR:186). The process of civil society is thus an education of the particular individual from his own self-interest to a more universal ethical life, the development of the implicit universality of the moral will (PR:187). Through the course of this education, the individual is socialized and his talents, personality, and habits take on a social character. It is not simply that social institutions arise from these inter-relations though no doubt some do. Rather, the argument of 'Civil Society' can be seen to articulate why it is that certain social institutions have legitimacy for the free will: in its most general sense institutions are legitimate so far as economic and moral freedom presuppose them.

Hegel's argument develops in two ways. On the one hand, through the actions and interactions of self-interested individuals and the interplay of individual and social interests a spontaneous structuring of this inter-relation occurs, and the structures of civil society emerge as embodiments of the subject's free will. On the other hand, the structures which develop serve to discipline the subject's interests so that these interests become universalized and enact rather than contradict the interests of the community. On the principle of modern political life, only when legitimated, that is, when willed by an ethical community, do institutions discipline the individual will and objectify the universal relations of this will.

The division present in civil society does not mean that the individual has no universal interests, indeed people work to provide for their families and as members of corporations. Also their labour supplies the needs of moral individuals who have an inner universality. Nevertheless for Hegel these universals are rendered relatively particular in relation to the state because it belongs to their principle to be in conflict with each other in the civil realm.
(i) The System of Needs

For Hegel the individual with which we are concerned in civil society is not simply an isolated natural subject, bound to impulse but is, rather, a self-conscious subject related to his own appetites as a free member of a society. In civil society humans give an explicitly rational institutional form to their needs and desires. For Hegel, the subject's relation to desire and appetite is therefore not opposed to reason but is, in fact, determined by reason and his needs are not satisfied through merely natural objects but through the artificial products of human action.

In the place of natural desires we create our own second nature; our appetites and consumption are not limited to the products of nature and, in fact, for the most part we consume the products of human work. Indeed our particular desires are often only means to more social desires such as the desire for status. Therefore it is wholly abstract to describe our appetites as given by nature. Human desires are for the most part produced through social interaction, likewise the objects of desire are produced by society and the value of these objects is determined by human labour (PR:196). In the system of needs both the objects desired and the means for achieving them are through and through the product of human activity. Thus our desires cannot be described as merely natural, they belong to a complex web of social and commercial interactions. When one's needs are multiplied one is more dependent on others for one's satisfaction and the civil individual cannot be adequately understood in terms of the natural particularity of his will. The fact that in one's own work and self-interested activity one produces satisfaction for others makes reference to the needs of others essential to one's private conduct. Even one's desires are determined by the latest fashion and in the interest of status.

According to Hegel, however, thought as well as desire is educated in the workplace which is an intellectual and practical education resulting in the: "habit ... of objective activity and universally recognized aptitudes" (PR:197). One learns to be busy, to work in accordance with social standards, to get along with co-workers, basically to get things done. In Hegel's concept of civil society we are not dealing with individuals isolated by the particularity of their needs and brought together as a mere external collection of particulars. Rather we are concerned with members of a society, with individuals whose actions serve universal civic interests.

It follows that in terms of this universal, moral subjectivity, it an abstraction to speak of a radical distinction between the differing interests of individuals. Individuals are freed from the conflict between a heterogeneity of needs and an homogeneous moral law into an inner universal will which finds its objective actuality in social institutions. The development of a system of need actualizes the moral subject's comprehension of his relation to nature; it is an objective expression of his liberation from the givenness of nature. Thus for Hegel, the significance of civil society is that in it individuals find satisfaction only in relation to other free individuals, that human action is essentially

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14 This liberation when conceived abstractly is a technological will whose freedom is expressed in the destruction of the environment.
moral and institutional, that is, *ethical*. He states: "This relation of will to will is the true and proper ground in which freedom is existent" (PR:71). But it is important to note that this is a will which, in a certain light, is the product of nature's own development and is thus not, in principle, opposed to nature.

In relation to the multiplication of needs and talents one comes to be recognized socially only in so far as one works in the satisfaction of one or another of these needs and insofar as one's special skill in this work meets social standards. This actuates a division of labour which is legitimated insofar as it enhances the objectivity of the system of need and deepens universal interdependence. Hegel states: "By a dialectical advance subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning and producing and enjoying on his own account is *eo ipso* producing for the enjoyment of everyone else (PR:199).

The resulting objective, social organization is composed of two elements: (i) a universal or common possession of general resources and skilled labour and (ii) a division of classes. The principle of common capital, general resources etc., is relatively clear.\(^{15}\) Hegel's concept of class division requires further elucidation.

Hegel argues that individuals partake in universal institutions and common capital by means of their own skills and resources. These are not simply personal attributes and acquisitions, however, because one attains one's own resources only in relation to others and further because what actually counts as skill is determined by what is valued in society. For Hegel, the basis of the class system is that the individual be related to society by virtue of the particular skills and intellectual and practical education attained by himself and his family. In this system the individual obtains his position in society in terms of the actual circumstances of his life and his ability to perform socially recognized work.

The conjunction of particular skill and the universal will (the social will of particular individuals) is determined as an objective ordering of individuals in terms of the work they do, that is, in the divisions of class. What Hegel has in mind here are the divisions among those occupations whose activity might be defined as (1) primary labour directed to the harvesting of nature (farmers and fishers, for example), (2) industrial and market labour directed to the transformation of nature, and (3) professional labour directed towards humans themselves (doctors, lawyers, teachers, civil servants) (PR: 202-205). The development of such objective classes is a necessity, according to Hegel, but he argues that "the ways and means of sharing capital are left to each man's particular choice" and that the classes are the root which "connects self-seeking to the universal" (PR:201-A). The important aspect of class division is that, in it, there is a unity of the interests of society with the interests of individuals. One satisfies one's particular desires by adapting oneself to the customs of one's class and to the skills required in civil society, and by cooperating with one's co-workers. The objective order upholds individual choice and conversely the universal is instantiated in the ethical intentions of individuals. On

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\(^{15}\) Cf. for example, Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book II.
Hegel's view, therefore, because the realm of civil society is not a realm of merely natural need, it is not ultimately opposed to ethical life.

In the satisfaction of self-interest, therefore, individuals also partake in an objective order which in turn educates them beyond their isolated self-interest and disciplines them in the needs of society. One is recognized not as a merely private person but as a member of a class and in order to actualize one's purposes (which means to have them recognized) one must limit oneself to a particular trade, profession, or vocation. It is important to note however, that individuals are not simply bound to a particular class. On Hegel's analysis, an individual may, in principle, choose the class to which class he will belong in accordance with the skills and manners he develops. Further, the forms of social life which develop in civil society are not meant completely to determine the individual's ethical life; for Hegel society is founded on far more than need and economic relations (PR:205). The class system is not to be valued in and of itself but rather as an appearance or prefiguration of the ethical life which is only fully developed in the state.

Hegel recognizes the limits of the class system and he argues that adjustment and correction are to be undertaken by the government. He states that classes are superceded by and undergo modification through the working of civil law, the administration of justice, the process of education, and religious instruction (PR:203). Therefore, one's relation to society is not wholly determined by one's relation to one's class. One must keep in mind, however, that one's class and occupation imply a specific discipline and experience of life, a particular kind of education. For example, what one ought to do is determined relative to one's class and one's interests are, in part, mediated by one's class. It follows that the individual can have ethical knowledge in civil society and (again) that the relation of civil society to the state is not that of a non-ethical to an ethical realm. In fact, the important point for Hegel is that civil society is a definite form of self-conscious ethical life. In the education (Bildung) which occurs in the system of needs, the activity of the subject is to develop the implicit customs of this realm in order that they may be known. This reflection upon custom is, in the first place, rectitude or knowing the attitudes and behaviour appropriate to one's class.

However, the identity of particular and universal interests is relative in the class divisions and individuals are more than merely class-beings, for example, they may move from one class to another. Further, individuals from different classes come into direct relation to each other, as the system of needs engenders an interdependence of class, and it becomes necessary to know the customs of many different classes if one is to work in civil society.

(ii) The Administration of Justice

In this interdependence of classes and in virtue of the freedom with which the individual may move among different classes, the person educated in the system of needs is conscious of participating in an order which goes beyond the particular class to which he belongs. According to Hegel this univerality is at the basis of the administration of justice: everyone is seen to be equal and one's rights are recognized, not in virtue of one's
class, but in virtue of universal personhood. Right therefore, has universal validity (it belongs to everyone) and in law it is given determinate existence for consciousness (PR:210). From a division into individual persons and distinct classes, civil society makes explicit its unity and universality through the system of law. Hegel states: "In the administration of justice ... civil society returns to its concept, to the unity of the implicit universal with the subjective particular" (PR:229).

This unity has primarily two manifestations. First, the particular conventions and interconnections brought about by the necessary dynamic of the system of need are raised to the level of self-consciousness in the system of law. Custom is made into a system in which the subject recognizes his own universal reason. Second, because the universal law is determinate and actual in this sphere, the right of intention is given objective standards by which it can judge action. The universal or social interest is made objective for consciousness in positive law and is further determined by its application to the details of civil and family life.

Hegel sees law as produced in the actual life of a people and sees the role of government to articulate these developments. In the system of law, the subject knows a reason that is actual and determinate in society. The social relations, which remain implicit qua custom, now assume an explicit and independent reality which stands over and against the individual's merely particular interests. In a society whose customs have been raised to the objectivity of positive law, the individual has the objective right to "insight into what is recognized as right" (PR:132). It is essential to Hegel's argument that civil law is willed and actualized by the self-conscious subject. In fact, for Hegel, the authority of the modern system of justice lies in the recognition by individuals that their personal interests can be realized only in a universal order. On Hegel's conception, then, civil law is not some abstract metaphysical end-in-itself which a philosopher king type ruler imposes upon his subjects, rather it arises from the particular customs and appetites of a people.  

There are, however, two significant limitations to the administration of justice. First it remains in a certain sense only a relative unification of universal and particular interests because, though it brings all individuals under the form of law, it tends somewhat to defend the individual's universal interests as against his merely personal interests. Second because the actuality of the union of universal and particular ends occurs only in single cases of infringement of the law, justice is not a thoroughgoing unity of universal and particular rights (cf. PR:229). Hegel explicitly demonstrates the limits of civil law and shows why civil society develops institutions of concrete universality, which educate the individual such that he recognizes in a more explicit form that the will of the courts

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16 This contradicts K.H. Ilting's point that "Hegel could no longer describe the state as that organization of a political community where the citizens examined and decided the general problems of the family and especially civil society." Cf. K.H. Ilting, "The Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" in Pelcynski 1971, p. 107.

17 Though, taken to extremes, the distributive justice of the present day defends the personal over and against the universal.
(the rule of law) is his own will. The most determinate form of the ethical life of civil society occurs through government agencies and private corporations.

(iii) Government Agencies and Private Corporations

It is the demand of the subject that his concrete freedom, the unity of his social and particular ends, be actualized in a stable and continuous manner (PR:230). This unity is extended throughout the realm of civil society through two institutions: government agencies (municipal, provincial and federal) and private corporations.

According to Hegel, the purpose of government agencies and regulative bodies is to be a middle term between the individual and the common goods and opportunities which society affords. One of the duties of government agencies is to maintain the common capital and general utilities (PR:235). Also government agencies are concerned with quality control and price fixing of essential services and goods. Hegel argues that "goods in absolutely daily demand are offered not so much to an individual as such but rather to a universal purchaser, the public" (PR:236). Government regulations insure that the public is not defrauded or taken advantage of by particular interests. However, even lawful actions may interfere with the freedom of others and Hegel contends that government agencies also attempt to remove accidental hindrances to the rights of the individual and the public (PR:230).

Further, government is responsible to ensure that the disparities of the system of needs do not infringe the universal right to partake in the common good. For Hegel, the extravagance of the free market causes an impoverishment of those who for reasons of luck or ability cannot partake fully in the market. As members of civil society they are encouraged to actualize themselves through work yet they are prevented from this by the very system which encourages the desire (PR:243). Because the dispossessed cannot fully partake in the benefits and opportunities of civil society, they feel this limitation as a resentment of those who have more and whose disproportionate wealth is one cause of their poverty (PR:244). Hegel argues that government attempts to prevent vice from breeding among this class and to secure the welfare of its members (PR:245). Nevertheless, in this contradiction the dispossessed are left out of society as a whole and do not find their freedom in its laws and customs, which appear merely to instantiate the aforementioned contradiction.

On Hegel's view, only if one's class is liberated from opposition to the whole can an individual be liberated to the universal standpoint of justice and to participation in the broader interests of the whole society. Likewise justice can attain true universality only when class prejudices can be overcome. Thus on Hegel's account the very justice of a society depends on the issue of re-integrating the dispossessed, which is demanded by the dignity of individuals. He states: "Against nature man can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class
by another. The important question of how poverty is to be abolished is one of the disturbing problems which agitate modern society” (PR:244-A).

In its relations to business, to the dispossessed class and to individuals, government agencies protect particular interests so far as they have a relation to the common good; so far as they are related to the institutions of civil society. Government agencies and regulatory bodies have as their purpose the actualization of the universal contained within the divided interests and classes of civil society. In this actualization however, the universal ends of society are determined in a merely external organization whose activity is mostly the prevention of hindrances to particular satisfaction. On the one hand, specific departments of government mediate between the various individual ends in order to maintain their harmony, though still only in the interest of individuals. On the other hand, individuals will their own personal ends and the common end primarily as a means to these ends.

In order to overcome the limits of government civil regulation, where the common good remains in a somewhat external relation to individual interest, the common good must be given a more objective form in corporate life. In the corporation, Hegel argues, the relation of the particular worker to the universal organization is mediated by his particular skill. The purpose of the individual's activity and of the activity of the corporation, however, is one and the same, that is, the satisfaction of the individual, though at this stage as a collective enterprise. In this way the purpose of the corporation is to establish reciprocity between the universal good and the particular interests of individuals; only so far the individual cooperates with others and adheres to the conventions of the workplace can he find his satisfaction, and only through the efforts of particular individuals, in the satisfaction of their needs, can such a system and education be developed (PR:251). In the corporation it is not simply the case that the particular subject must will a universal good which is still imposed in a somewhat external manner; rather the corporation is a universal institutional will which more directly engages the particular interests of its members. Though the corporation is exacting in its discipline, educating its members to requisite levels of skill and habit, it ought also to protect its members. Hegel argues that the corporation restricts unlimited earnings, rationalizes the form of charity and actualizes the right to welfare of its members (PR:253).

The corporation is the most concrete institution of civil society. In the system of needs for example, one accomplishes one's own welfare and only subsequently

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18 From a Marxist standpoint it appears that Hegel inadequately comprehends the principle of equality as witnessed in his acceptance of class alienation and primogeniture, for example. This criticism has some validity and marks in Hegel's thought a certain abstraction relative to the concrete freedom and equality presupposed in the centuries after Hegel. It is misleading, however, to conclude, as does Riedel, that Hegel was thus attached to pre-modern social structures. Rather, he found in the principles of the Prussian Enlightenment a less violent transformation of political institutions than present in the French Revolution which resolved into a reign of terror. It is only on the view that civil society is an end in itself and on the assumption that classes are static forms imposed on social life and not themselves expressions of modern freedom that Hegel's depiction is found radically flawed. It is closer to the Hegelian argument to see historical-political forms both as stable and as containing within the logic of freedom which is their very substance the seeds to their own rational revision.
contributes to the satisfaction of the welfare of others. In the corporation one wills the satisfaction of others as well as oneself, and recognizes that one's particular satisfaction is the product and end not only of one's own will, but also of the will of others. Under the system of justice the standards which must be respected in the relation to these others has been determined but in the corporation the moments of civil society, of right and welfare, are united (PR:255). Further, the union of particular interest and universal interest is more concrete in the corporation than in the system of justice. Here it is not simply a matter of an application of the universal to the particular. Rather, for Hegel, the true union of the subjective and the objective will is implicit in the corporation. Nevertheless, the ethical union present in corporate life is subject to competition among the various corporations comprising civil society, it is not therefore sufficient to ethical life.

It is plain, however, from the preceding account that it is quite problematic to argue that Hegel sees civil society, by contrast with the state, as a merely unconscious economic realm restricted exclusively to the satisfaction of material natural desires. Rather, for Hegel civil society is an education of individuals to a consciousness of the underlaying ethical institutions which ground their self-interest and morality. The universality of the moral will is shown to presuppose a concrete institutional system.

Contrary to appearances, the real end of civil society is not simply wealth but an education of individuals to a consciousness of true human enjoyment. Consequently, for Hegel, the economic relations of civil society are fundamentally ethical because they develop the subject's objective duties and overcome abstract moral reflection (PR:187). The movement of civil society is to develop universal and free relations among humans who recognize and respect each other, who share customs, laws and history. It is a dialectical development, where the individual develops his consciousness of his institutional nature.

IV. Against The Cosmic Spirit: The Logic Of Hegel's Philosophy Of History

The contention that Hegel's political thought involves an unresolved division between civil society and freedom which renders oppressive his concept of the state is mirrored in criticism of Hegel's concept of history. Even Charles Taylor the most influential North American interpreter of Hegel follows Marx in this regard: "[W]ith the development of a notion of Geist as a subject greater than man, Hegel developed a notion of historical process which could not be explained in terms of conscious human purposes, but rather by the greater purposes of Geist. The transformation in political, social, religious institutions which must come about if man is to fulfil his destiny are no longer seen as tasks which men must consciously accomplish." And further: "In other words, the notion that man is related to a larger cosmic subject went along with the displacement of the subject of history in Hegel's thought, who is no longer simply man -- if indeed, he ever conceived it as such -- but Geist."

But just as on Hegel's account, the state is not related as ideal spirit to civil society as material reality, neither is world history (whose subject is the state) a process which uses individuals as its tools and instruments. The present argument is concerned to clarify the logic of Hegel's philosophy of history through an examination of three of its basic components: (1) the conception of the state as eternal, (2) the distinction between the essence and existence of the state and, (3) the distinction between the real and the ideal state.

1. Freedom and the Eternity of the State

On Hegel's argument, the eternity of the state lies not in some timeless other-worldly realm, but in the fact that it is a product of the infinitely free will. The minimum presupposition of Hegel's political thought is the free will in its most abstract form, that is, in its relation to external natural objects and other individuals who are "conscious of their own particularity and diversity" (PM:483). From this starting point the action of the will is to overcome the difference between itself and the otherness of its own actions, to make these actions more fully embody its freedom. The free will determines itself in the actual world by transforming what is merely given in accordance with its concept.

For Hegel, the will's self-reflected and self-determined activity is in principle eternal, though not in separation from the finite world. Rather its activity is self-determination in the finite and real world. For Hegel, natural objects, as finite, are in a constant state of alteration because of the contradiction between self and other. By contrast, the free will as self-referential being, comprehends natural form, is a unity of self and other, and is not therefore subject to this alteration. The activity of the will is precisely to give itself embodiment, to transform the other into a determination of itself. Therefore the principle of the will is that of a true infinite which contains all finitude, difference, and limitation within itself (PM:386).

For Hegel, freedom, because infinite, implies the comprehension of time. He argues that man's ethical life, having its principle in freedom, is elevated above all necessity and chance, beyond all contingency and temporality. Therefore, for Hegel, human beings are both in time and in a sense beyond time. He argues that time is a limited form of history, the mere succession of epochs ad infinitum. He calls this the spurious or negative infinite, an interminable alteration between one epoch and the next; a time-1 which always becomes a time-2 (Logic:94).

Therefore, considered solely in terms of its merely temporal movement, spirit appears as incomplete and finite. However, according to Hegel the actual process of history is to comprehend this limit. He states that time is, in fact, the necessity which compels spirit to make manifest its inherent principle, that is, to give embodiment to the

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free will. For Hegel, therefore, history is the expression of spirit in time, the labour of transforming time in its apparent difference from spirit, into an expression of spirit or, in other words, the development of the ideality of the real.

The practical development of the free will is an historical process; the successive transformation and appropriation of the otherness of the objective realm by the subjective will. History, therefore, is nothing other than the self-development of the self-understanding of the free-will. Hegel's concept of the 'cunning of reason', however, seems to lend credence to the view of Marx and others that Hegel's political thought involves a state which is the result of no conscious purpose and a process of world history which uses individuals as its tools and instruments. Hegel states: "It is what we may call the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work in its service" (RH:89).

However, properly conceived the 'cunning of reason' does not imply a cosmic spirit which uses humans as instruments. Rather, Hegel uses the phrase the 'cunning of reason' as a metaphor for the implicit realization of spirit in the immediate or natural form of the human will, that is, its unconscious impulse towards freedom. Even in one's most particular desires one is free, according to Hegel. One's actions show a command of nature and overcome one's individuality by bringing one into a relation to others; that is, they have a universal significance. The universal significance of an action, Hegel argues, is its implicit principle. Initially the means of realizing this principle appear as something external to the universal, as mere particular acts, that is, the purely subjective interests of individuals. Hegel argues, however, that passions, in the process of their own self-fulfilment create a universal order of society and that this social order in turn, is given power over the passions. This is familiar as the basic argument of 'Civil Society'.

It becomes evident in history, Hegel contends, that the passions are thus not opposed to the universal ethical order but are the means by which it is achieved. The point made by Marx and others that individuals are merely instruments in so far as they are not conscious of the ends they serve, would seem correct. What such interpretations neglect however, is the dialectical element. In Hegel's argument, both passion and principle are mere abstractions from concrete human existence; humans are self-conscious intelligent beings and their actions and reactions are interwoven with universal elements, with the good and with welfare (PH:28). The content of passion by its very nature is of universal significance and is not external to spirit in Hegel's argument (PH: 73).

Further, the process of history, which originates in a subject unconscious of his freedom, is precisely a development of that freedom from its implicit expression in impulse and desire to its self-conscious actuality in the state. In terms of world history, Christianity represents, for Hegel, a liberation from the unconsciousness of this process in the human recognition that it is realized in the 'fullness of time' and that the end of its development is free, self-conscious spirituality. From the origin of Christianity onwards

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human beings are aware of the goal of spirit and the process of history becomes a self-conscious, self-development (cf. RH: 54). Once humans become in some measure conscious of their own freedom, they can no longer be described merely as unconscious tools. For Hegel, humans are ends in themselves, who consciously will and actualize their own freedom. He states: "Not only do they in the very act of realizing [freedom] make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires whose purport is diverse from that aim -- but they share in that ideal aim itself" (PH:33). This is the essence of modern democracy.

2. The State as Essence and Existence

The core of Hegel's argument is that the ideal state is not the simple essence of the state. In fact to speak of the ideal state as the essence of the real state is a category mistake. It is only when we focus on the particularity of an historically existing state that we can distinguish between its essence and its appearance.

Further, he argues that within the category of reality the distinction between essence and appearance is actually a distinction between the underlying consciousness of freedom and the actually existing state the object and embodiment of this spirit. It is therefore apparent that the essence of the state is not some eternal other-worldly essence which the real state but feebly imitates. He argues, the "universal spirit is essentially present in human consciousness" (RH:95). Moreover, he contends that this universal has its phenomenal reality in the state and, in contrast to the caricature of his view, he states: "In the case of the spirit or concrete concept, however, the phenomenon itself is the essential ....The phenomenal aspect of spirit is its self-determination, which is the element of its concrete nature: the spirit which does not determine itself is an abstraction of the understanding" (RH:96).

Essence therefore is not beyond appearance, rather it is essential to existence to be appearance, essence must appear. Whereas Kant, for example, interprets appearance in a subjective sense which fixes the thing-in-itself outside or behind appearance, for Hegel the significance of the category of appearance is that we are no longer faced with independent existences in the world.

Again it is important to note that for Hegel the existence of the state is not simply held in distinction from its essence. Rather, appearance is manifested essence. For Hegel, it is merely an abstraction to think essence and appearance (inner and outer) as radically opposed. He states: "The usual error of reflection is to take essence as what is merely inner. If it is taken only in this way, then this view of it is also a quite external one and that essence is the empty external abstraction" (Logic: 140-Rmk).

On Hegel's view, in the case of spirit, essence is existence and existence is essence. Spiritual activity is self-determining and its freedom consists precisely in transforming what confronts it as mere externality into its own embodiment. From the standpoint of the understanding, however, we can distinguish two senses in which the state may be analyzed in terms of a division between essence and appearance: (i) the essence of the state as the underlying consciousness of freedom and the appearance of the state in its
existence as a temporally and geographically bound set of political institutions and (ii) the rational institutions of the state and their appearance in the patriotism and ethical freedom of its many citizens.

But, for Hegel, to describe the state from this standpoint is inadequate. He argues that the state is nothing other than the institutional expression of the objective logic of self-conscious freedom. There is thus an essential unity of the state and the individual's consciousness of his freedom. The objectivity of the state is the individual's objectivity and conversely the individual's consciousness of his freedom is the state's own subjective life. The objective realm of spiritual existence or freedom is thus the state and its motivating principle is the subjective will. Subjectivity stands outside the state only in the mind of the commentator or so far as the subject consciously abstracts himself from its laws and customs and it is thus only in abstraction from the totality of institutional life that a distinction of subjective essence and objective appearance can be maintained.

3. The State as Real and Ideal

On Hegel's view, the ideal state is not to be radically separated from either the real state or the free will. According to Hegel, the ideal state develops out of the activity of the real state and is not some eternal idea or essence in which the real state participates. Hegel contends that the development of the ideal state is the development of the nation's own thought, that is, its movement from a primitive or merely natural awareness to a thinking culture. Correlative to this development is the emergence of a free self-conscious life among its citizens; and it is in the self-consciousness of its citizens that the nation's spirit or ideal side is actualized.

On this view, the very essence of a nation's spirit is the activity whereby it realizes its potentiality and makes itself its own deed, its own work. In more concrete terms, a nation's spiritual act is the process whereby it develops itself from its largely restricted and merely national reality to its free ideality, to an actual idea of itself, articulated in its art, religion and philosophy. The ideal state is the result of an actual historical development through which a definite cultural and intellectual idea of the state has been accomplished. Through this process the universal interests of the citizens of a state become objective for them (PH:73).

For Hegel, a nation's greatest achievement is self-understanding; the full self-comprehension of its own customs, laws, institutions, of the whole sphere of its ethical life. And this self-understanding is its ideal life, its comprehension of its history. This ideal life, therefore, is not some perfect abstract attainment, according to Hegel, but is the end of the real work of the nation, the dusk of its ethical activity. He argues that thinking culture, a society's rational self-consciousness and self-expression in art, science, religion, and philosophy, is both the completion and the corruption of the state. Thinking culture, the highest development of the state, sets itself over and against the state and is its dissolution (PH:71).
Hegel identifies the *real* state with the particular, finite, and transitory interests of a nation. From one standpoint, then, history thus appears as the story of the glorious rise and inglorious fall of nations. Hegel's observation that "history is the slaughter-bench of nations" is well known. A question arises as to how the transitory and finite state can be related to the supposedly eternal ideal state. A brief consideration of the accounts of *reality* and *ideality* in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* sheds light on this relation in Hegel's philosophy of history.

Hegel argues that all determinate reality is permeated by its limit and he contends that limit is also the negation of determinate realities. Furthermore he states: "As the negation of the something, limit is not an abstract nothing in general, but a nothing that is, or what we call an other. In something we at once hit upon an other, and we know that there is not only something, but also something else" (Logic, 92). And: "Something is in itself the other of itself, and the limit of a something becomes objective to it in the other" (Logic: 92).

In terms of the real state this dialectic is apparent in the relation of a given state to other states. Hegel argues that the states negative relation to itself, that is, its finitude is embodied in the world in its relation to another state as if the negative were something external. However, because this negativity and distinction in fact give shape to the individuality of the state, it is just as much an internal moment (PR:323). These external states determine the identity of the given state in terms of its geographical boundaries in so far as they may compete for resources and also in terms of war where the limit of a given nation becomes apparent if it is defeated. However as soon as one nation is defeated another nation arises as the enemy. Further and in a deeper sense once a given nation has been world historical in the Hegelian sense (that is, has played the greatest role among its peers in the development of freedom in its age) and has passed through its cycle of advance and decline, another nation takes its place. From this point of view, history appears to be an infinite process of the rise and fall of finite nations as one nation gives way to an other, a process to which nations are subject but which they do not comprehend.

According to Hegel, however, this infinite progression is a spurious or negative infinity (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*) since it is nothing but the negation of the finite (Logic: 94). It is not a true comprehension of the finite as after the negation of one nation another arises only to suffer the same fate. The infinite expressed in this way expresses the requirement that the finite and the infinite ought to be united, that the finite merely ought to be *aufgehoben* (Logic:94). It is an infinite which has only a negative relation to the reality of the state. From this standpoint history appears to be incomplete, the mere succession of states.

However the dialectic of negative infinity elucidates the true relation of the finitude and infinity of the state. For Hegel, it is mistaken to conceive the relation between the

\[\text{An internal reflection of this negativity and division is present in the competition characteristic of civil society}\]
finite and the infinite as one of rigid antithesis. He states: "If we say that the infinite is the 'nonfinite', then by saying that we have already expressed what is true: since the finite itself is the first negative, the nonfinite is the negation of the negation, the negation that is identical with itself, so that it is at the same time true affirmation" (Logic:94). What this suggests is an infinite process of the finite wherein something passes into another, this into another and so on in infinitum. But as the other into which something finite passes is an otherness that is its very own, so in passing into this otherness it remains in relation to itself: as such a negation of the negation it is a "being for itself" and "this relation in the passing and in the other is genuine infinity". Hegel continues: "In being-for-itself the determination of ideality has entered. Being-there [Dasein], taken at first only according to its being or affirmation, has reality, and hence finitude too is under the determination of reality at first. But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality." (Logic:95)

For Hegel, this movement from the finite to infinite being-for-itself, from reality to ideality also occurs in the internal life of individual states and is the process whereby a state moves from being a merely particular nation to being a world historical nation. According to Hegel, thought has as one of its moments the negation of the finite and determinate. By comprehending itself in thought, by raising its implicit principle to self-consciousness, he argues, a nation overcomes its geographical and temporal limitations and can be said to be truly historical. The thought of Plato, for example, lives on though Athens has fallen. The principle developed in a particular state becomes the starting point of the next phase of world history, whose real activity is the objective determination of this principle.

Thus, at the historical point when a particular state has reached its completion, a contradiction between its ideal and its real moments presents itself. Thinking reflection upon the state isolates its rational spirit and thus stands in opposition to all that is merely particular, determinate, and limited. Social bonds are thus broken, Hegel contends, and subjectivity takes refuge in individuality (RH:146.).

Hegel argues that although this division of ideal and real dissolves the bonds of the state, it also gives rise to a new principle. Whereas the principle which motivated the nation was at first merely implicit in its concrete relations, its laws, and external affairs, in thinking culture this principle is made explicit, and given the form of universality. Hegel argues that, "this change also brings with it new and additional determinations of content", developments in art, religion and philosophy (RH:147).

For Hegel, therefore, the state obtains to ideality only once its practical and particular activity is accomplished. The idealization of the state transforms its merely linear history and gives it the form of universality in religious and aesthetic representation and in philosophical conceptualization. According to Hegel the concept of the state contains a whole history of spirit in its universal principle; for example abstract right is the principle of the Roman world and morality is the principle of the Reformation and Enlightenment (PH:281). By contrast with Marx's portrayal, a careful analysis shows that on Hegel's view the concept of the state is thus not a timeless other-worldly structure. Rather the concept contains the whole history of the state, but, having comprehended its historical
contingency, the concept expresses this history in the form of philosophical necessity, as a necessary determination of the free will (RH:146).²⁵

V. Rawls's Reply To Hegel: A Response

Hegel's political thought is thus not an abstraction as suggested by Marx and his contemporary followers. Over and against Marxist readings, Hegel's political and historical conception of Sittlichkeit does not subvert the real relations and divisions among citizens in favour of an ideal speculative resolution. Rather it articulates a concrete ethical order which mediates the individuality of citizens through an objective good present in the historical life of institutions. Moreover, its conception of the institutional difference between civil society and state seems more fully than the Marxist view to express the principle of modernity, that is, the free individual.

By contrast, Marxism, in virtue of conceiving the divisions in civil society as destructive of free individuality can thus be seen as a kind of political moralism; a longing for a utopian freedom which ought to be, finding in the heteronomy of civil society an affront to the universality of the citizen-labourer.²⁶

What primarily distinguishes Rawls from Marx (and Nietzsche), however, is the Enlightenment constitution of the United States and the Kantian moral philosophy which he presupposes at every point. As a result, he is able to give expression both to the moral equality of individuals, in his conception of the 'original position', and to a hierarchy of talent and exertion, in his 'difference principle' which states: "[T]he social and economic inequalities attached to offices and positions are to be adjusted so that, whatever the level of those inequalities, whether great or small, they are to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society"(1,1).

Rawls thus presents his liberalism, a modified Kantianism, as that political construction most inclusive of the private and public dimensions of the freedom and equality of individuals. His view, 'political liberalism', more fully than Hegelianism recognizes the pluralism characteristic of contemporary liberal democracies while, at the same time, attempting to answer Hegel's criticisms of contract doctrine. His theory presents liberal contract doctrine in its most universal form able to express not only individual conscience and welfare but also the social and political good which the state secures.

²⁵ It should be noted that for Hegel the mere succession of states is not just set aside. Rather he argues that this succession (the spurious infinity) is the external aspect of the unity of the infinite and the finite and that the truth of the finite and the infinite is implicit in this process.
But Rawls's appropriation of Hegel's theory in his own *politicized* contract doctrine is less than complete. While attempting to develop a universal political realm beyond the particular divisions of civil society and private association, Rawls nevertheless falls short, unable to conceive the state in terms of its full ethical concretion. Rawls can make explicit the whole of the constitution only as it is reflected in the Supreme Court. Further, on his view the unity of equality and difference which liberalism seeks can be secured only in a temporary manner and requires the intrusions of an activist Court to rectify the unjust distribution of social goods which necessarily arises from the free pursuits of even good-intentioned individuals. Thus his conception of the judiciary renders it more akin to Hegel's account of the administration of justice, properly within the realm of civil society, than to a properly constitutional institution.

Rawls conception of the American state is thus rendered problematic as he cannot articulate the historical unity of politics, morality and religion through which the state comprehends the divisions present in civil society. While he brings a Kantian philosophical conception of the state in by the backdoor, so to speak, he gives its ethical substance only hypothetical determination.

1. *Reply to Hegel's Criticism*

Lecture Seven of *Political Liberalism*, 'The Basic Structure as Subject', contains Rawls's reply to Hegel. Over and against Hegel's criticism of contract doctrine Rawls believes that a pragmatic Kantianism can comprehend both the social nature of individuals and the distinction of constitutional from other social agreements. Rawls portrays Hegels view as arguing that contract doctrine:

1. Confuses society and state with the association of private individuals;
2. Determines law by the contingent and private interests of individuals;
3. Extends illegitimately to the state ideas properly applicable to civil society;
4. Cannot adequately express the embedded nature of the human subject;
5. Fails to recognize the social nature of humans (PL:VII,10).

In sections 1-9 of "The Basic Structure as Subject" Rawls derives the significance of the basic structure of the state from his conception of individuals as free, equal, rational and moral (PL:VII, 4-5). Further he indicates that the agreement about which principles are to govern the basic structure are to be distinguished from the other agreements characteristic of the private associations of civil society (PL:VII, 6-7) and argues that the Kantian view can be shown to accommodate the social nature of individuals (PL:VII,8).

(I) Political Liberalism: Not Value-Comprehensive, Not Individualist

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27 The translation of Hegel's *aufheben* as *to comprehend* has the unfortunate result, in this essay, that it leads to confusion with Rawls's notion of *comprehensive doctrine*. Rawls defines comprehensive doctrines as those moral, religious and philosophical views which are concerned with what is of value in human life. Such conceptions are general when they are applied to a wide range of subjects. He distinguished as a
Rawls begins by contrasting political liberalism with utilitarianism and libertarianism (PL: VII, 2-3). By contrast with utilitarianism, political liberalism is not a general theory, it does not determine the principles appropriate for all social realms. Rather it applies only to the basic structure. He states: "It seems natural to suppose that the distinctive character and autonomy of the various elements of society requires that within some sphere they act from their own principles designed to fit their peculiar nature" (PL: 262). Thus unlike utilitarianism, political liberalism maintains distinct principles for the basic structure.

In opposition to utilitarianism, libertarians do not view the state as based on a common end. They contend that the unity of the state emerges not from the pursuit and achievement of a common good but on the basis of the private contracts of individuals. The state, therefore, is conceived as a unity only in a minimal sense. Like utilitarianism, then, libertarianism denies that there are principles which are specific to the basic structure of the state.

Rawls wishes to distinguish his view from utilitarianism and libertarianism both of which wish to collapse the state into civil society. On the one hand, utilitarianism improperly applies to the whole state a general principle, for example the principle of utility or the greatest happiness principle, which is appropriate only to the various spheres of the civil realm. Similarly it applies to the state as a whole a common good appropriate only at the level of private association. Conversely, libertarianism does not make principles appropriate to the private sphere universal or public, rather it renders private principles and institutions which are properly public or universal. Utilitarianism, then, might be said to conceive the state from the standpoint of the equality of individuals, while libertarianism treats of the state from the standpoint of the freedom of individuals. Rawls intends to conceive the basic structure in distinction from the agreements and principles appropriate to the civil realm. He develops its distinctive quality in his account of why the basic structure is the first subject of justice.

(Ii) Justice And Hypothetical Agreement

matter of degree between generally and partially comprehensive doctrines. To avoid confusion I will use the phrase value-comprehensive doctrine when referring to Rawls's usage (PL:13,175).

28 Those references to Political Liberalism which include Roman Numerals refer to Chapter and Section.
29 Here Rawls's argument responds to the concerns of Michael Walzer's interesting Spheres of Justice.
30 Relying on Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia Rawls defines the libertarian state as "a network of private agreements". Further: "this network represents the procedures the dominant protection agency (the state) has agreed to use with its clients, as it were, and these procedures may differ from client to client depending on the bargain each was in a position to make with the dominant agency" (PL: 264). Nozick argues that to deal with the troubles present in the state of nature: "Groups of individuals may form mutual-protection associations: all will answer the call of any member for defense or for the enforcement of his rights" (Nozick: 12). Further he states: Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual protection associations, division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and rational self-interest there arises something very much resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states." The dominant protection agency emerges typically as the victor (within relevant geographical boundaries) in conflict with other protective agencies (Nozick: 16-17).
31 Though, as is commonly argued, utilitarianism only partially comprehends the equality of individuals, while libertarianism has a less than complete conception of freedom.
Rawls contends that only a hypothetical agreement can avoid the contingencies of historical life and thus secure a universality capable of determining what is fair, of recognizing unfairness in particular historical situations and of providing guidance for adjustment of institutional practices. He states: "We cannot by actual agreement get beyond happenstance or specify a suitably independent standard"(PL:272). Hence Rawls's original position which he defines as: "a point of view, removed from and not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of the all-encompassing background framework, from which a fair agreement between persons regarded as free and equal can be reached"(PL:23). In A Theory of Justice he states: "One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be governed by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. And again in Political Liberalism: "Thus the original position is simply a device of representation: it describes the parties each of whom is responsible for the essential interests of a free and equal citizen, as fairly situated and as reaching an agreement subject to conditions that appropriately limit what they can put forward as good reasons"(PL:25).

While Rawls considers political liberalism constructivist, this representation is not itself constructed, rather it is a reflection of Rawls presupposition of the moral person, that is, a person who is both reasonable, having the capacity for just cooperation and rational, having the capacity to pursue his own good (PL:103-4). Further he states: "Citizens capacity for a conception of their good in a manner suited for political justice is modeled within the procedure by the rationality of the parties. By contrast, citizens' capacity for a sense of justice is modeled within the procedure itself by which such features as the reasonable condition of symmetry (or equality) in which their representatives are situated as well as by limits on information expressed by the veil of ignorance"(PL:104).

It is important to consider the ethical substance of Rawls's position even though he now avoids a philosophical exposition of this, relying rather on a merely constructivist-political account. Fundamental to Rawls's Political Liberalism is that it moves beyond the value-comprehensive Kantianism emphasized in A Theory of Justice. Rather than explicitly grounding his account in a Kantian concept of the person he wishes his theory to be a module which can be grounded variously from differing value-comprehensive views. The doctrine as he now espouses it is itself political and, on his view, its distinguishing virtue is that because it is not value-comprehensive it is beyond the conflicts which exist among religious, philosophical and moral views. Thus political liberalism more fully represents the pluralism and toleration characteristic of modern liberal democracies. But were political liberalism merely to be hypothetical and pluralistic it would not be able objectively to specify which goods are primary, it would

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32 John Rawls, The Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) p.19. Hereafter in text notes TJ and page #. Here the veil of ignorance is a representation of the restrictions placed on the knowledge of individuals in order to insure that they chose principles of justice from an equal standpoint.

33 In Rawls's political constructivism, what is constructed is "the content of a political conception of justice. In justice as fairness this content is the principles of justice selected by the parties in the original position as they try to advance the interests of those they represent"(PL:103).
not be able to advance determinate ethical principles on the basis of which to choose among the diversity of goods present in consumer democracies. It is in the principles of justice that Rawls moves beyond pragmatic consensus and, as James Doull argues, returns pragmatism to its Kantian source.  

While Rawls wishes to provide merely political justification of his position, the good which underlies his position remains Kantian. To quote William Galston, the right is really the liberal conception of the good "that dare not speak its name". In this light then it remains appropriate to treat Rawls's argument in light of the substantive commitments expressed in *Theory of Justice*. First, it is important to note that the Rawlsian good obtains its universality via the negation of the particular characteristics of citizens. He states: "No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor does any one know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life" (TJ:137). The good for Rawls is freedom and equality conceived as the universality of individuality. Secondly, he clearly recognizes that this universal good is not subject to the temporal limits of history. He states: "[T]o see our place in society from the perspective of this [original] position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view" (TJ: 587). Nevertheless, thirdly, Rawls considers the universality, the eternity thus obtained to be concrete in that it does not reside in an otherworldly realm. He states: "The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world" (TJ:587). Finally, this Rawlsian view expresses a confidence that union with such eternity, an inwardness characteristic of faith, frees one in relation to the world. He states: "Purity of heart if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command from this point of view" (TJ:587). Thus Rawls, like Hume and Kant, uncovers the moral universality which underlies the economic and cultural activities of individuals in civil society; the enlightenment form of a Reformation ethic.

2. The Limit of Rawls's Reply: A-historical Liberalism and the Supreme Court

Rawls obtains to this union of morality and self-interest, however, only in abstraction, that is, only as a representation. His attempt to show how this abstract universal might stabilize the concrete political life of Americans does not and cannot express the full dynamic of the U.S. Constitution which informs the political culture from which he draws his fundamental concepts. Rather Rawls's view can express the totality of the Constitution only through one of its moments, the Supreme Court.

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36 Here Rawls expresses, in part, the tendency within the U.S. constitution to a separation of parts which replicates the divisions of civil society.
For Rawls, the Supreme Court has a special role as the institutional exemplar of public reason (PL:235-240). According to Rawls, public reason is the reason which citizens use when considering themselves from the standpoint of the 'original position'. As argued above, for Rawls, the various conflicts among moral, religious and philosophical views in liberal society are legitimate because grounded in the free use of reason. (PL:xiv,1,36f.,55,129,135,144). He argues that conflicts among reasonable persons inevitably arise because of "the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life" (PL:56). From this legitimate pluralism of value-comprehensive doctrines, Rawls draws the conclusion that such views are too diverse to serve as the basis of "lasting and reasoned political agreement" (PL:58). Likewise the type of reasoning which ought to be employed in public debate concerning issues of basic justice must seek to avoid controversial value-comprehensive principles.37 The degree to which public reason is exemplified by the debates held and decisions made by other institutions is judged by Rawls in terms of their likeness to those of the Court. He states: "To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion"(PL:254)?

Rawls' account, then, of the adjustments which will renew justice in liberal democracies is particularly apposite to Supreme Court decisions. He sees the tendency of individual actions, even when just, to be opposed to fairness. He states: "The overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from and not toward background justice .... the invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration"(PL:267). However, while society tends to fall away from a unified social good, individuals are freed in this decline, they can pursue their private goods without fear that this entails the total destruction of justice they know that adjustments are made elsewhere in the system especially in the just decisions of the judiciary (PL:269).

Whereas on the Rawlsian view the judiciary exemplifies an ideal of public reason that other branches of government vaguely approximate, the history and logic of the U.S. constitution indicates a more concrete spirit. A more comprehensive view sees all branches of government as fundamentally shaped by their relation to each other in the context of the whole Constitution. The U.S. Constitution gives institutional form to the political will of the American people and constitutional history is in large part the history of America itself. The fundamental political ideals of the United States have been shaped by the creation, crises, and corrections of the constitution. In the broadest sense, then, the Constitution itself is the best exemplar of public reason. The separation of powers limits each branch by its own function and that of the other branches. The abstract universality of law is tempered by the particular interests expressed by the representatives of the people. The executive branch gives energy and focus to the government, especially in times of great struggle. In principle all branches of government are committed to

37 For Rawls the values of public reason are as follows: (1) Appropriate use of fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence; (2) Reasonableness and fair-mindedness; (3) Adherence to the criteria, procedures and generally accepted beliefs of commonsense knowledge; (4) Acceptance of non-controversial methods and conclusions of science. Rawls 1993: 66-67, 139, 162, 224.
defending the constitution. Thus, in principle, each branch through its relation to the others gains an appreciation of the whole constitution and thus of a crucial element of the public good. Each branch in its own way thus expresses the public reason which is primarily embedded in the Constitution as a whole.

Michael Sandel's recent *Democracy's Discontent* goes a considerable distance in correcting Rawls's account of American public reason. Sandel in a selective but telling history argues that a more institutionally concrete reason found in the republican tradition answers to a greater degree the aspirations of American citizens, conceived as embedded in time and place. Sandel it might be said presents the limits of the Supreme Court from the side of the embedded needs and rationality of the individual and association. His public reason is best exemplified in the legislature. But his account like that of Rawls falls short of a comprehensive view of American history. Primarily what is lacking in both accounts is a sense that implicit in the constitution is a determinate good, as the totality of finite interest, of the freedom and equality of individuals. Because the constitution fundamentally informs American history, indeed is its subject, the histories which Rawls and Sandel would tell of the American public culture are rendered one-sided by their partial accounts of the Constitution.

Consider Rawls's discussion of the emergence in the United States of a general agreement on the principles of justice. Central to John Rawls's account of how a stable liberal regime is possible is his conception of the *historical* transformation of individuals' value-comprehensive doctrines by liberal institutions. It is an under-appreciated fact that Rawls's political conception of justice, thoroughly analytic in its methodology, is nevertheless grounded in certain presuppositions about the history of the United States and highly questionable presuppositions at that.

Rawls makes reference to history primarily for two purposes. First to indicate why an overlapping consensus is a necessary condition of justice and secondly to indicate that it is a reasonable possibility that an overlapping consensus be achieved, that it is not a utopian idea. He contends that the liberal values of individual freedom and toleration arose historically only when it was realized that peace could not be achieved on value-comprehensive grounds during the Wars of Religion (PL:xxiv). Thus on Rawls's view, toleration is linked with the denial that a political order can be grounded in a single value-comprehensive doctrine. Likewise, conceptions of a political order based on a value-comprehensive common good are linked with oppression. He states: "a continued shared understanding on one [value-]comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can only be maintained by the oppressive use of state power". Rawls calls this the 'fact of oppression' (PL:37). The necessity of a political conception of justice follows from the inability of religious and political views to provide a stable basis for society without oppression.

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This assumption is closely related to his second use of history, that is, to show that the idea of an overlapping consensus is not utopian (PL:158). Because liberal constitutions emerge in the wake of the impotence of value-comprehensive doctrines, they are at first established, from the standpoints of those who believe various moral, religious and philosophical views, as a modus vivendi: "as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife" (PL:159). Rawls contends that from this modus vivendi, it is reasonable to conceive citizens moving through a constitutional consensus to an overlapping consensus.

He states: "the liberal principles of justice, initially accepted reluctantly as a modus vivendi and adopted into a constitution, tend to shift citizens' value-comprehensive doctrines so they at least accept the principles of a liberal constitution"(PL:163). For Rawls, it is the transformative power of liberal institutions which makes possible an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice. In discussing the transition from a modus vivendi to a principled 'constitutional consensus', Rawls argues that political liberalism can take advantage of "a certain looseness" in the value-comprehensive standpoints of most citizens. He states: "Most people's religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and [value-] comprehensive, and these aspects admit of variations of degree." Further: "many if not most citizens come to affirm the principles of justice incorporated into their constitution and political practice without seeing any particular connection, one way or the other, between those principles and other views." And: "Should an incompatibility later be recognized between the principles of justice and their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise these doctrines rather than reject those principles" PL:160). Finally he argues that "the political conception shapes [value-] comprehensive doctrines to cohere with it" and liberal principles of justice "tend to shift citizens' [value-] comprehensive doctrines so that they at least accept the principles of a liberal constitution" (PL:160n.25,163). On the Rawlsian account one moves from a constitutional consensus to an overlapping consensus when political principles and ideals are founded on a specific political conception of justice that uses fundamental ideas of society and person or a range of such ideas as illustrated by justice as fairness (PL:158,164). But these brief historical forays, although they have some plausibility, at best capture only one side of the historical development.

First, Rawls underestimates the value-comprehensive underpinning of toleration and overestimates the link between a politics of the common good and oppression. Rawls's sense that there is a looseness of fit in the way citizens hold their value-comprehensive doctrines makes no sense of the religious spirit which, in part, animated the American Revolution. Moreover, it fails to recognize the ways in which Reformation subjectivity undergoes its own internal transformation which prepares the way for the acceptance of liberal principles. There is not, contrary to Rawl's account, the reluctant acceptance of a modus vivendi and then the external cultural transformation of religious views. The transformation which occurs, albeit through the influence of political forms, has as its

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41 Cf. PL: 164-167 for an account of the "forces which push a constitutional consensus toward an overlapping consensus."
prior basis a union of value-comprehensive doctrines and constitutional principle. There is an identical spirit which animates Reformation religion and Enlightenment philosophy. From the sides of faith and pure insight respectively each upholds only those forms of political life which can be grounded in the rights of free subjectivity. The spirit common to these standpoints finds its practical fulfilment in the American revolution and the U.S. Constitution. The constitution stabilizes the Revolution in relation to its substantial basis a common good beyond the division of states and individuals.

Further, the structure of the U.S. constitution indicates that a politics of the common good need not lead to oppression. As conceived by the framers, all government, federal and state, is grounded in the universal will of the people. However, differences which emerged from allegiance to particular states and self-interest led to considerable worries concerning faction. Without eliminating local interest, national government was achieved in the direct relation of the federal state to individuals and the maintenance of substantial local jurisdiction. Further, the separation of powers ensured that, in principle, no branch of government (legislative, judicial, executive) could gain dominion over others; all branches conceived as equally grounded in will of the people (Hamilton, Federalist: 22).

Madisonian pluralism, then, is founded on the clash of particular interests, the tension which can be resolved only around principles of justice and the common good. (Madison, Federalist: 51). On this view, particular self-interest and the universal laws of the state are conceived not as simple opposites but as necessary to each other and to the common good of which each are but moments. The will of the people is given rational form in the Constitution which in turn rests on the people's sovereign will. But as Madison is clear, neither element exists in separation from the other: in abstraction from each other, both the raw will of the majority and the rule of law are equally destructive of freedom. The constitution achieves, in principle, the political enactment of a good whose objectivity consists in the comprehension of the individual will in its universal and particular expressions. For the founders, the goods of government and religion are in principle one and the same. Here there is a common good whose inner differentiation protects citizens from oppression and is the source of their public philosophy.

There is reason then to question Rawls's conception of the necessity of an overlapping consensus. The constitution of the American Republic expresses a convergence of religion and principles of justice at a far deeper level than Rawls


44 It is unsatisfactory, then, to conceive the difference between ancient and modern constitutions simply as a difference between good and right.


49. Hereafter in in-text notes: Contributor, Federalist, and section #.
suggests, American freedom is accomplished in part through the strength of its religious life not through its impotence.

Nevertheless while Rawls's position cannot give true political form to the public culture of the United States and is unable to comprehend the ethical concretion of the framers, it is beyond the standpoint of the framers in its content. The division with which Rawls is concerned is not simply between a universal good and the particular goods of individuals, be they persons or states. Rather he starts from the presupposition of a well-ordered society in which individuals have a sense of the public good and are driven by both public and private motives reasonably stabilized. The division for Rawls is between the public goods of political life and the value-comprehensive goods of moral, religious, and philosophical life. Individuals thus stabilized in a well ordered society are divided, not between the public good and particular interest, but between the value-comprehensive union of reason and nature and the political union of the same. For Rawls the individual obtains to ethical concretion, a union of universal and particular interests, on both sides but so far as he attends to one side or the other finds himself in conflict. By contrast with Madison's standpoint where faction emerges only through the aggressive tendencies of self-interest, for Rawls, faction and instability emerge from the rationality and autonomy of individuals engaged even in just pursuits.

Rawls has thus deepened the divisions between the private realm and the public realm. But his concept of an overlapping consensus is no more than a contingent unification, inadequate to the universality and rationality of both realms. While the Supreme Court may uphold justice, individuals and states nevertheless find ways around the law because it does not permeate and express the totality of ethical life. The legalistic state appears a hollow coercive shell in conflict with the lived content of the aspirations and practices of members of society.

Rawls captures crucial aspects of the finitude of the state in his primarily juridical conception; he indicates, for example, how the state can be conceived as an external means to individual's conceptions of the good life. Further the deepened divisions to which Rawls gives voice reflect in a profound manner the pluralism of American civic life. But what Rawls cannot articulate is the actuality of the good as ethical totality, as a concrete unity of the universal will of individuals and not simply as an external comprehension in a social union of social unions (cf. TJ 527ff). He conceives the institutional life of the United States from the standpoint of a pragmatic sociology which lacks the logical form which animates the U.S. Constitution.

To reflect on the content of contemporary ethical life in terms of the philosophical form implicit in the arguments of the framers would be to see, beyond the irresolvable private moral conflict of individuals, an ethical whole comprehensive of such division. The ideal implicit in the U.S. state might thus be shown to underlie and complete the social divisions characteristic of civil society. As such the differences of private and public universalized in Rawls's political liberalism would be shown to have their place within the logic of the state. This division then would no longer stand in the way, morally or politically, of the correction of the infinitely destructive will of the American
economy. Such a view would indicate in terms more pluralistic than Hegel's, the 
historical objectivity of the good in the United States and the freedom which might be 
obtained in relation to it. While such a position advances beyond Hegel in the 
determination of democracy and equality, it cannot ignore the ethical institutions called 
forth by the limitations of civil society and the ethical ideal which permeates the history 
of the public realm.
Hegel, Lutheranism And Contemporary Theology

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I

Hegel's status as a theological thinker has long been a disputed question amongst the theologians, and a variety of views have long been taken. What was unquestionably the most common theological assessment of Hegel during much of the twentieth century derived from the prominence of the philosophy of Kierkegaard, according to whom the crooked paths of the Hegelian conceptual wilderness must yield to the straight and narrow way of subjective authenticity in religious faith. Kierkegaard, however, has gone somewhat out of fashion recently in theological circles, so that although a broadly Kierkegaardian hostility to "the system" is still discernible amongst a great many who still follow at a respectable distance, his negative assessment of Hegel is today very probably at its lowest ebb since about 1920.

The second of the major alternative theological assessments of Hegel will be no less familiar. According to this view, Hegel is a champion of the decline and fall of the traditional Christian doctrine of divine transcendence, and a prophet of pure historical process as the locus of the divine. This thesis is hardly new; it could fairly be said to represent, for example, the kernel of D.F. Strauss' early reading of Hegel's theological legacy but it has continued to be highly influential in some theological circles. In the 1960s, for example, it constituted a major theoretical strand underlying the American theology of the "death of God," especially through the influence of Thomas J.J. Altizer.¹ The same tendency appeared independently in German theology at the same time, particularly in the work of Dorothee Sölle, who also, interestingly, advocated a sympathetic reassessment of the wider Idealist tradition in this connection.² Today, the "Christian atheism" of the death of God movement is upheld in America by only a remnant of the original school, but Sölle's call for an "atheistic doctrine of God" still echoes remarkably deeply in the souls of students of German Protestant theology. (Unfortunately, her call for a revision of their relationship with Idealism is less often heard.)

² Dorothee Sölle, Atheistisch an Gott glauben (Olten: Walter, 1968).
The third major theological approach to Hegel that I wish to mention is of a very different sort, though again, we have long since become accustomed to the point made. Beginning with the advent of liberation theology in Latin America in the 1960s, a range of neo-Marxist assessments of Hegel found their way into theology. These have generally been of the history-walks-on-its-feet variety, though sharpened somewhat by way of critical theory and the philosophy of Ernst Bloch in particular. This theological view of Hegel, however, is predominantly derivative and indirect, for the liberation theologians cannot in all honesty be said to have tackled Hegel directly. For this reason, their views are of less importance than that of either the existentialist theologians, or the death of God movement.

There has, however, long been a fourth approach to Hegel to be found amongst the theologians, an approach which admittedly has been critical of major aspects of the overall Hegelian vision, but which nevertheless has attempted to engage with Hegel's philosophy as a key source both for the rehabilitation of the discipline of theology in modern intellectual culture, and for the constructive development or redevelopment of Christian doctrine itself. In this tradition, unlike any of those cited above, Hegel has been understood along broadly classical theological lines. The most obvious representatives of this view are the now almost forgotten "old Hegelians" of the nineteenth century, whose concerns are to some extent also reflected in the writings of the "British Hegelians" of the early twentieth century. Both groups are now surely extinct, at least as classes of thinkers, but interestingly, something of their theological project can be seen perpetuated in a range of much more recent theological sources. Indeed, of the differing responses to Hegel available on the theological scene at present, I would suggest, this is clearly the most important and even the most influential. The movement looks to Hegel's philosophy to provide conceptual tools for the development of what is claimed to be a fully and integrally Christian conception of God.3

That such an approach to Hegel should have developed is not especially surprising, since the possibility of a theological reading of Hegel is well established. Admittedly, the thesis is controversial, and the bitter religious controversies which raged for twenty years among Hegel's followers after his death do muddy the waters very considerably. Nevertheless, Hegel did begin his scholarly career as a seminarian at the Protestant Stift in Tübingen, and it is at the very least plausible to say that he ended his system by defending the truth and legitimacy of the Christian religion as religion, even taking up its most fundamental theological claims into his philosophy.

Much is made, of course, of Hegel's hostility in his early years to the theology of the Lutheran theologians under whom he studied. The Tübingen curriculum, it is true, seemed to the young Hegel to be oppressively traditional. Though honest efforts of a sort were made to be open to the new learning, this was mainly done in a defensive way, so as

to provide an opening through which to reintroduce the old scholasticism.\textsuperscript{4} The theory
(developed along broadly Kantian lines) was that what reason could not criticise could
thereby be left intact! One senses that Hegel's teachers saw the brewing intellectual storm
as one that ultimately would blow over the ship of faith, so long as here and there the
sails were furled and the holds barred. This was obviously less than satisfactory as a
response to the Enlightenment challenge. It is not surprising that in 1794, the year after
his graduation, Hegel would write to his fellow seminarian Schelling, complaining of the
stifling intellectual atmosphere of Tübingen theology: "Nowhere is the old system
transmitted so rigidly as it is there...."\textsuperscript{5}

Yet, however disillusioned Hegel became with Lutheran orthodoxy as a young man,
and however much he could be said to have turned instead to Kant, the Revolution and
Romanticism, the extent of his rebellion against religion even in this youthful period is
often overstated. Hegel did not become a pastor, it is true, but he did complete his
seminary studies, which evidently served him reasonably well in life (more of this
shortly). Furthermore, one has to reckon with the fact that many of the works produced
by the "disillusioned" young theologian are overtly theological in character, conforming
broadly to what other theological progressives at the time thought. Such thinkers would
go on doing so, in fact, often without in any way attempting to extricate themselves from
the institutional structures of Protestant Christianity, for the best part of the next two
centuries.

Hegel certainly moved on in his thinking, but he also, I would like to suggest, carried
key aspects of his youthful theology with him in his work to the end. First of all, elements
of the theology of moral beauty worked out in Hegel's early theological essays survive in
the mature position, in fact as late as the Berlin \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion}.
For example, in commenting on the human view of Jesus (as opposed to the standpoint of
faith which represents what is "new" in the mature, speculative standpoint), Hegel speaks
glowingly of the "colossal boldness" of the moral teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the
Mount.\textsuperscript{6} I wish to go further than this, however, and raise the suggestion that it is
precisely the scholastic Lutheranism of the \textit{Stift} that makes sense of the "religious"
content of the speculative position that Hegel reached in his maturity, and that makes
sense of things in the mature position that cannot otherwise be easily explained. Though
he was not unaware of the limitations of the theology in which he was educated,
therefore, or uncritical of it, one can rightly speak of the young Hegel's theological
education being "taken up" into his final standpoint. Hans Küng's largely biographical
study of Hegel, \textit{The Incarnation of God}, goes to far as to make the case that it was
precisely the tension between the Enlightened convictions of the young Hegel and his
native Lutheranism that set up the basic problem of Hegel's philosophy in his maturity,
namely, how to reconcile Christian faith (especially in its Lutheran form) and
Enlightened philosophy. This is also the thrust of a critical but perceptive essay by Karl

\textsuperscript{4} See the account of the theology of Hegel's dogmatics teacher C.G. Storr in Küng, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 34ff.
\textsuperscript{5} G.W.F. Hegel, \textit{Briefe von und an Hegel}, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 4 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
Barth, which ought perhaps to be better known among theologians and philosophers alike.\(^7\)

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Unfortunately, Hegel's direct references to Luther and Lutheranism are infrequent, and surprisingly so, given the views just presented. Without some independent access to the theological issues at stake, therefore, even philosophically educated readers are likely to overlook the depth of the religious ideas in question in Hegel's philosophy. The situation of the philosopher in approaching Hegel, we might say, is similar to that of the theologian who approaches Hegel: much that he says in relation to Kant, for example, will frequently pass the theologian by, simply because Kant is not explicitly mentioned in the text, but is instead alluded to in the distinctive, difficult idiom of Hegel's philosophical prose. The problem with reading Hegel is often that he assumes that the reader knows as much as he does, or readily grasps the issues in the logical form in which he presents them, whereas this is obviously not always the case.

There is, however, one main exception to this general rule, and it is one that is of great importance for our own discussion, for it is just this exception that sparks the interest of those contemporary theologians who have attempted to draw on Hegelian philosophy in their development of the Christian doctrine of God. I refer, of course, to the theme of the death of God, which has earlier been mentioned in connection with its peculiar treatment in the theologies of Altizer and Sölle, but which is addressed by Hegel in a rather different way in a variety of works spanning the whole of his philosophical career. The death of God, it should be remembered, is susceptible to a basically classical theological exposition by way of direct christological reference: on the cross, the Son of God in some manner "dies." Although such exposition is a matter of considerable controversy in the tradition, it is nevertheless a matter of christological orthodoxy to say that death has been experienced by the Son of God as man, i.e., in the human nature assumed. This entirely orthodox christological reference is the key to understanding its particular importance in the contemporary theological context, where it is employed in more constructive, but also more radical fashion in the field of the doctrine of God.

Hegel himself writes of the death of God a number of times. The theme appears, for example, in an early essay from the Jena period, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, which announced the theme of the speculative Good Friday in its closing, summative sentence.\(^8\) This language would be mirrored in the better-known "Calvary of absolute Spirit" which appears in the conclusion of the \textit{Phenomenology}.\(^9\) The latter is obviously of great importance in the present context. In an earlier section of the \textit{Phenomenology}, Hegel had


written of the process by which Substance becomes Subject as "the painful feeling of the Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is dead" (777). The unhappy consciousness is best understood as a feature of every logical form taken by thought in its development, rather than just one stage along the way. At this juncture, however, consciousness has met with the full implications of the "death of the Mediator," through which, Hegel argues, the idea of the unity of God with radical otherness is realised. This idea involves far more than simply faith's affirmation of the saving act of God in Jesus Christ. Rather, Hegel speaks of the systematic implications of the thought of the death of the Mediator, and in particular of the painful theological discovery that this death, consistently thought through, requires the development of nothing less than a concept of God which can accommodate death. This can only be done through a painful sacrifice in the world of theological thought itself, a process by which the cherished idea of the radical transcendence of God is in a sense preserved only by way of its relinquishment, that is to say, only by surrendering it to a conception which can withstand the utter alienation of death.

Hegel's description of the pain involved in this realisation is interesting, and connects what he says to a range of themes in Christian spirituality. The unhappy consciousness is, in a manner of speaking, a kind of dark night of the soul. All religious ideas, it has to be recognised, are hard won, and their relinquishment is therefore always a costly business. The new light breaking through will seem like darkness, for example, so long as it is measured by the old standards. Nevertheless, the negativity in question is fundamentally a product of the inbreaking of the truth of God upon the heart and mind, and so a mode of the presence of God rather than a mark of his absence. Such development is integral and organic to the Christian theological tradition, most obviously on its mystical side, which Hegel apparently grasps in some depth. However this may be, the result is that the abstraction of the metaphysical concept of divine being is thus overcome, and the concrete unity of God as Spirit for Hegel, the trinitarian conception is ultimately embraced. What is thus advocated, and what emerges ultimately from this Calvary of absolute Spirit, is meant to be a deeper and purified conception of God. The result is that spiritual transcendence is no longer distinct from immanence, but is to be thought together with it. What emerges is a thoroughly modern view of God, a view clearly intended to be post-enlightened, but also, equally, one which has emerged naturally from the inner logic of the religious picture of God inherited from a previous age.10

There is no doubt that what is thus attained represents a remarkable conception of God, one, for example, in which the divine is not only transcendent, but is also the ultimate reality in the depth of things, whether history, or consciousness, or Jesus Christ (a name that is strangely never mentioned in the Phenomenology!). Only in this way could God be placed again at the centre of philosophy or for that matter, it would appear, at the centre of theology too. On the other hand, it is extraordinarily difficult for the theologian, in approaching the bewildering argument of the Phenomenology, to make an informed response to the question that we face: Is this really Christian orthodoxy, as Hegel appears to claim? Or does it instead represent a reductionist call for the grandest of all the modernist programmes of religious demythologisation, on the grounds that what is

10 Cf. Küng, op. cit., p. 228.
uncovered is a quasi-naturalistic "christ-principle" which operates independently of religious revelation and theology, but which nicely explains the emergence and the power of both? D.F. Strauss, who valued the Phenomenology highly, provides a clear indication of one of the possible directions in which one could move theologically at this point. It is clear that this is a possibility that is still available to us.

At this point, therefore, it is wisest to take refuge in the wider Hegel corpus. Two further references to the theme in question can be cited, the first from the Encyclopaedia and the second from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The importance of the former work in general for our purposes is that it shows that Hegel intends a genuine development of the Christian concept of God in his philosophy, a development involving no move towards religious reductionism, but rather, the development of an advance on the standpoint of natural religion in Enlightened philosophical theism. As to the question of the christological reference we are pursuing, the relevant passage in the Encyclopaedia is again extremely dense, but the point made is nevertheless of interest: the divine, Hegel argues, is "actualised out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness. This individual, who as such is identified with the essence (in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) is transplanted into the world of time, and in him wickedness is implicitly overcome." The last phrase is less than transparent, but it is most likely a reference to the classical christological theme sometimes called the "wonderful exchange," according to which what was achieved by Christ was the overcoming of death by Life, the overcoming of evil by Righteousness, and so on. Such a "Christus victor" soteriology has frequently been identified in modern times as a distinctive feature of the theology of Luther. It is in fact, however, a much more general soteriological theme which, where it appears, is always strongly incarnational, in that it regards the event of salvation as located decisively at Bethlehem, and in that it interprets the content of soteriology in relation to the coming of the Son of God in the flesh. This represents a rather different approach to salvation than is characteristic of some Christian thought, which prefers to focus on the event of the cross, and which tends to view the rest in its light (a good example being Anselm's famous Cur Deus-homo?). To say that wickedness is implicitly overcome is to say that human nature has been raised above wickedness by God's action in the whole complex of the birth, growth, life, obedience, death, resurrection and ascension of the God-man. The theological question is then how we come to have a share in what has been accomplished in him, how it is that what is done "in principle" in the sphere of human nature can come to have a life-giving impact on humanity. On some views, we come to be so affected purely by being human, since human nature as such has been raised to a new dignity in Christ; on other, somewhat less generous but certainly more common views, it comes about by the awakening of faith, or by participation in the sacraments. These are the major alternatives offered in the Christian theological tradition. Such an approach to the basic mystery of salvation is not, therefore, unique to Hegel, but is integral to important sources in patristic and mediaeval theology, to the theology of Luther, and indeed, to the theology of all the magisterial Reformers.

In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, our theme receives a series of successive and much fuller formulations. For the sake of economy, I shall take one of these as representative of the rest. In the *Lectures* of 1827, which have already been cited in connection with the "human" view of Jesus in the rational theology of the Enlightenment, Hegel treats the death of Christ as the point of transition in religious consciousness to the genuinely religious sphere.\(^3\) This transition, he goes on to argue, is to be understood as a function of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit: "The relationship [of believers] to a mere human being is changed into a relationship that is completely altered and transfigured by the Spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself therein, and so that this truth obtains immediate certainty in its manner of appearance" (pp.324-5). This is a statement both of Lutheran orthodoxy as it appears, for example, in the comments on the third article of the Creed in Luther's *Kleiner Catechismus* and of Hegel's own speculative grasp of the content of the Christian religion. Faith itself is presented in religious terms as the act of grasping the truth subjectively through the gift of God in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the community.\(^4\) It is only thus that the church believes or can believe, or as Hegel puts it, only thus that the history of Jesus "receives a spiritual interpretation" (p.326). It might well be added that it is only thus that God is truly known, as the trinitarian or "speculative" conception of God is embraced, and the abstract and therefore inadequate idea of God in Enlightenment theology transcended.

It is only now that the well-known reference to the "Lutheran hymn" is introduced:

But this humanity in God and indeed the most abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility is natural death. "God himself is dead," it says in a Lutheran hymn, expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself, that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as otherness, hinder unity with God. Otherness, the negative, is known to be a moment of the divine nature itself.... This is the explication of reconciliation: that God is reconciled with the world, or rather that God has shown himself to be reconciled with the world, that even the human is not something alien to him.... (pp.326-7)

Hegel's reference to a Lutheran hymn is not accidental. The reason for this lies in a basic feature of classical Lutheran orthodoxy, which places a strong emphasis on what is called the *communicatio idiomatum*. The *communicatio* doctrine has a long history, emerging both in Alexandrian and Western theological sources amid the christological debates of the patristic period, but it has a particular status in Lutheran theology that we need to note. The doctrine refers to the sharing of qualities between the two natures of Christ, so that it becomes possible to say, for example, that the *Son of God* wept at the tomb of Lazarus (John 11.35), or that *Jesus of Nazareth* is rightly worshipped as Lord and God

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(John 20.28). On some versions of the doctrine, the *communicatio* is interpreted as purely a manner of speaking, since on metaphysical grounds it is assumed that there is no real participation by the divine nature in the human, or by the human in the divine; on other versions, the transfer of qualities from the one nature to the other is understood in a more realist sense as a literal participation of the human nature in the glories of the divine, and of the divine in the humiliation of the human nature. Lutheranism is characteristically "robust" in this latter sense in its treatment of the *communicatio* doctrine, and it has been so deliberately and consistently over a long period of time, particularly through its polemical relationship with the Reformed tradition. It is precisely this doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* which enables Lutheran sources to speak of the "death of God," for though in the strict sense God cannot die, the attributes of the human nature assumed by the Son of God in the incarnation can rightly be predicated of the Son of God himself, and hence of the divine nature.

An important debate concerning the extent of the *communicatio* took place in the aftermath of the Reformation between the Lutherans Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586) and Johann Brentz (1499-1570). Both admitted that each of the two natures of Christ must share in the attributes of the other. Chemnitz, however, took a more reserved line, maintaining that the participation was mainly potential and only actual insofar as the will of God allowed it to be so, for the sake of some particular purpose or use. For Brentz, on the other hand, the participation of the human nature in the divine and *vice versa* is far more extensive, being taken as a fundamental ontological feature of the "hypostatic union," the union of divine and human natures in the *persona* or *hypostasis* of the Son. Thus, for example, the *exaltatio* of the human nature is co-extensive with the *exinanitio* of the divine in the incarnation. In other words, the human nature of Christ enjoys constant omnipotence and omnipresence by virtue of its union with the divine in the *hypostasis* of the Son of God, while the divine nature of Christ can legitimately be said to have experienced grief at the tomb of Lazarus. It was the theology of Brentz, significantly, which was followed subsequently in the school of Tübingen, which became the champion of his views in scholastic Lutheranism.

In general, therefore, Lutheranism affirms the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* as consistently and as persistently as it is possible to do, and nowhere more strongly than in Tübingen. Indeed, the same tendency can even be said to continue today in the work of a man such as Eberhard Jüngel (who is also, interestingly enough, the current *Rektor* of the Tübingen *Stift*). The theme, therefore, runs very deep in Lutheran thought. Luther himself famously spoke in the *Heidelberg Disputation* (1518) of the futility of recognising the invisible majesty and glory of God (the *theologia gloriae*), without comprehending the visible and manifest God found in the humility and shame of the cross (the *theologia crucis*) (thesis 20). The same basic insight underlies the so-called "*totus intra*" interpretation of the relationship of the divine to the human nature of the concrete man, Jesus Christ, which has an important place in Luther's christology: the divine Son of God lies in the manger, for example, *totus intra*. It was from this same insight that the Lutheran theology of the *kenosis* of the Son of God developed, first in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and then again, but this time following Hegel almost as much as Luther, in nineteenth century Lutheran sources. The mirror image of this
doctrine is found in the distinctive Lutheran view of the relation of the human nature of Christ to the divine, which in some of its formulations has been judged to verge on the Eutychian heresy, according to which the flesh of Christ is swallowed up in the divinity. This issues in the controversial Lutheran theory of the eucharistic presence, according to which the words, "This is my body" are to be taken with complete seriousness on the grounds that the body of Christ is made ubiquitous by virtue of the *assumptio carnis*. The Lutherans may have sought to appeal to no miracle other than the incarnation in order to explain the eucharistic presence, but this does not mean that their position was metaphysically neutral!

Thus a certain recognition of the depth of the involvement of God in the human predicament, and a corresponding stress on the *communicatio idiomatum*, is a distinctive feature of Lutheran orthodoxy. This definitely sets it apart, for example, from the principled Calvinist resistance to any "confusion" of the divine and the human, especially in Christ (*totus intra et extra* was the paradoxical Calvinist riposte to the Lutherans). Calvin himself, exasperated after years of unsuccessful attempts to engage in constructive dialogue with Lutherans on this question, finally went so far as to state flatly that because this principle of the distinction of the natures had been so compromised in Lutheranism (particularly as represented by the followers of Brentz) that it was in greater error in its conception of the eucharist than were the "sounder" mediaeval schoolmen, since at least the latter did not make Christ's flesh out to be physically omnipresent, thus compromising the authenticity of his humanity.\(^\text{15}\)

The Lutheran strategy is, then, fraught with very definite theological risk. For our purposes, however, the important point is that the *communicatio* doctrine as interpreted in Lutheranism represents a distinctive and important feature of the Lutheran theological tradition, particularly in the period of Lutheran scholasticism. It would seem to be no accident, therefore, that it is upon this tradition that Hegel draws in his discussion of the death of God; in fact, there was no other available tradition on which he could have drawn in the development of this theme, since the assertion of the *communicatio* is a distinctive theme in Lutheranism, and since Lutheranism is the most consistent of all (non-Lutherans would tend to say the most extreme) in its affirmation of the principle.

III

For such reasons, the philosophy of Hegel has long simmered away somewhere in the minds of many a Lutheran theologian. Today, however, it is important to recognise that it is not only Lutherans who make reference to Hegel. The work of Hans Küng, for example, has already been mentioned, but Küng, of course, was at the time of writing *Menschwerdung Gottes* a Roman Catholic theologian in good standing in the Catholic Faculty at the University of Tübingen. An equally interesting case is that of his then-colleague Walter Kasper, now a Bishop in the German Catholic hierarchy, who likewise

takes up Hegelian themes in his theology. According to Kasper, the great advantage of employing Hegelian philosophy in Christian theology is that it enables us to conceive of God more Biblically! This the older theological tradition was unable to do because of the limits of the philosophical tools at its disposal. The great problem it faced was to understand how it is conceivable that the eternal Son of God should have assumed flesh and died a human death. How, Kasper asks, can faith seek understanding at this point? In a variety of ways, classical theology attempted to acknowledge this mystery, but it was never able to shake off the crippling effects of one of the central ideas that it borrowed very early on in its development from Middle Platonism: the idea that such involvement with the creation is something that is in the strictest sense alien to God. Kasper cites a variety of attempts to understand God in what he sees as a more satisfactory, and more explicitly christological sense. The primitive christologies of Ignatius of Antioch and Tertullian, for example, attempted simply to acknowledge the paradoxical force of the idea that the eternal Son of God for our sake subjected himself to suffering and death. Kasper also has particular praise for Luther's theologia crucis, which, he says, was an attempt to break through the mediaeval system of theological metaphysics, on the basis of which God could not be found on the cross. But according to Kasper, the greatest single attempt to understand God in this christological sense to be found in the whole of the Western intellectual tradition is none other than that of Hegel. In Hegel, it belongs to the concept of the Absolute that it empty itself into its opposite. Only in this way is the Absolute in fact absolute, that is to say, only thus is it wholly free or self-determined. The important point here for Kasper is that in Hegel, God's very being is conceived in terms of the idea of a freedom which is mediated through self-surrender and self-emptying (181-185). The concept of God as "subject," or, as Kasper prefers, "person," is thus affirmed over against what is seen as a self-enclosed, abstract concept of divine substance. Thus, for Kasper, Hegel provides the necessary conceptual tools by which theology can relate God to history and specifically to the suffering of Jesus. Crucially, however, Kasper argues that Hegel's insistence that the logic of the Absolute is accessible to speculative reason is entirely misplaced; according to Kasper, it is love rather than logic which leads to the movement from eternity into time, a love which is known exclusively from and in the temporal events of revelation.

It is difficult to underestimate the importance of this last point for a proper understanding both of what is made of Hegel in recent theology, and of what is wrong with it. Hegel himself, of course, is as capable as anyone of affirming the love of God in the God-man. In Hegel's hands, however, the theme of the love of God is not something incompatible with philosophical thought, for God is supremely rational, and has given himself to be known. Hegel himself writes in this connection that "without knowing that love is both a distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it." Recent theology takes a different path, even where relatively sympathetic assessments of Hegel are a given. I have written about this extensively elsewhere, and

do not wish to repeat myself unnecessarily in the present context, but briefly, the standard reading of Hegel which is current in theology derives from the massive influence of Karl Barth, combined, perhaps, with the general "anti-metaphysical" character of much contemporary theology, which makes it extraordinarily resistant to philosophical thought of the full-blooded Hegelian variety. For our purposes in the present context, a brief reference to the Barthian position will have to suffice.

One of Barth's key ideas, and one that has direct relevance to his rejection of Hegel's speculative logic, is that of God as "event," a concept developed in the most fascinating manner in what is without question the logical centre of Barth's theology, the Doctrine of God of the Church Dogmatics volume II. Barth's theology has been nowhere more influential than at this point. For Barth, the living God of the Bible must be understood in dynamic terms as having movement, life, and even decision in himself. There is nothing static, nothing metaphysically unchanging in God beyond God's own freedom, on the basis of which Barth can claim: "To its very deepest depths God's Godhood consists in the fact that it is an event...."19 Barth's doctrine of God, however, rests upon a further qualification of this event, for the event in question has a very specific character, and indeed, it could be said that it even has a specific name: Jesus Christ. For Barth, God is in himself the event in which he chooses to be open to fellowship with humanity in Christ. Or, to put the same thing another way, God is the event of election in which he chooses from all eternity not to be who he is without humankind.

It is significant that in his essay on Hegel in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, Barth also characterises Hegel's philosophy as centred in the idea of God as event.20 According to Barth, in Hegel's philosophy:

... the key to everything ... [is] that reason, truth, concept, mind, God himself are understood as an event, and, moreover, only as an event. They cease to be what they are as soon as the event, in which they are what they are, is thought of as interrupted, as soon as a state is thought of in its place. Essentially reason and all its synonyms are life, movement, process. God is God only in his divine action, revelation, creation, reconciliation, redemption; as an absolute act, as actus purus. (398-399)

Barth argues here that theology needs to learn from Hegel that God can only be known in truth as the living God, going so far as to argue on this basis that a Hegel renaissance might even be a good thing for theology (416-417). However, the pivotal Barthian criticism of Hegel that we have already encountered in Kasper appears in the essay, according to which Hegel made his concept of God a function of speculative logic rather than of free grace: the "weightiest" problem in Hegel's philosophy, according to Barth, is his "failure to recognise that God is free" (420).

19 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. T.F. Torrance et al.; trans. T.H.L. Parker et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), II/1, p. 263.
In fact, of course, Hegel's argument is precisely that God is free. The real point can only be, therefore, that instead of failing to recognise the freedom of God, Hegel understands this freedom differently. For Hegel, freedom is negatively the absence of dependence on an other, and more importantly, it is positively a relating of self to self, or a self-determination. According to Hegel, the very substance of Spirit is freedom, understood in this precise sense. Freedom, therefore, is a living process which proceeds necessarily from the very logic of Spirit. Hegel's entire position rests on the confidence that this logic not only determines the divine life, but that it is also accessible to us insofar as the human and the divine Spirit are not qualitatively different. Barth, on the other hand, understands the freedom of God as an existential freedom, which, in the end, ultimately has priority even over his essence. In Barth, God's essence is a function of God's free choice, God's election.

It is interesting that Hegel too adopts the idea of God as actus purus, but again reinterprets it completely, moving beyond the Aristotelian metaphysics of potentiality and actuality in which it was originally located, and understanding it instead in terms of his wider philosophy of subjectivity. Barth, clearly, follows Hegel in understanding God as actus purus in terms of the concrete actuality of his outreach. Where Barth differs from Hegel most clearly is in his claim that this outreach is not the outworking of what Hegel calls the "inward force" of Spirit, but rather of the freedom of God in the event of election. This view, however, leads to a fundamental problem in Barthian and post-Barthian theology, a problem acutely found in the development of post-Barthian trinitarian theologies, which is that the denial of any identifiable rational imperative lying behind this choice means that the being of God himself appears to be made arbitrary. It is not simply that it seems that God "woke up one morning and decided to incarnate," as I recall one of my teachers, A.M. Stafford, once putting it in a memorable joke, but that God could have, in principle, freely elected to define his being in the invention of the steam locomotive rather than in Jesus Christ. Even the choice of the incarnation seems adventitious. What emerges is a new twist on the old nominalist doctrine of potentia absoluta, which now assumes the distinctive shape of an absolute existential freedom.

The problem with this theology is easily identified: it is unphilosophical, or at least insufficiently aware of its philosophically questionable character. Hegel's philosophy has indeed been used, but only as a conceptual toolbag from which, from time to time, an idea may be drawn and put to use. Unfortunately, there the usage ends. A more sober appraisal of the matter is provided by Hegel, who tells us that while religion can survive within its own sphere without philosophy, it can as such only satisfy the human spirit within certain narrow limits. The problem is that without philosophy, religion inevitably retreats into an intellectual ghetto, while those are excluded who, by disposition, are only capable of "thinking belief." Halfway houses of a sort have been provided by existentialism or the later Wittgenstein, for example, but these are philosophical positions...
which are ultimately unreconcilable in their foundations with the content of Christian belief. In the end, faith requires philosophical elaboration which is consistent with its own content, and since the act of thinking theologically cannot be satisfied with religion alone, a peace between faith and thought has to be attained.

It is at this point that the great weakness of contemporary theological appropriations of Hegel appears, and nowhere more clearly than in connection with the theme of the death of Christ. In Hegel, this death stands at the centre of the philosophical system, and is the key to a fully trinitarian concept of God. It can, however, only be grasped at all because it has been grasped speculatively, that is to say, from the standpoint of the total synthesis of the system. Without the system, in other words, the death of Christ is not the key to a renewed doctrine of God. In contemporary appropriations of Hegel in theology, by contrast, it is precisely the speculative standpoint that is rejected. However much the theology offered may speak to religious faith or open up new approach roads to the mystery of God for the heart, therefore, it lacks the power to convince the mind. It is as if we had been presented with the conclusion of a syllogism without any knowledge of its premises, and were asked to accept it as "gospel" truth.

IV

It would in principle be possible to address a number of issues at this point by way of a conclusion of my own, but in keeping with the theological content and tone of the discussion, I wish only to sketch out an alternative theological vision to pursue, one that arises from a recognition of the major weakness of the theology I have referred to above, but which also specifies what we might be able to draw from Hegel in order to correct it.

Among the many problems faced in contemporary Christian theology, it seems to me, none is more pressing than the relative absence from it of the doctrine of God the Father. The problematic character of the Father is not at all due to feminist criticism of the language involved; in fact, to give feminist theologians their due, they are virtually the only contemporary theologians who take the doctrine of the Father seriously enough to warrant a discussion. My reference is to something else, namely, the tendency to take the idea of the self-definition of God in the choice made in the divine eternity to be God in Jesus Christ and in no other way with such seriousness as to make any talk of the first person of the Trinity redundant. If one conceives of the Father in classical terms as the fons trinitatis, then the ultimate implication of such an approach is that however full the pool into which it flows may be, the "source" itself is empty. In other words, God has come to be so identified with Jesus that there is little or nothing left of God to discuss once the point of absolute intensity, the christological centre, has been explored.

Let me be more radical again. To say this, I wish to suggest, is merely to put into theological form the ultimate philosophical emptiness of much contemporary theology.

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25 I might add at this point that the use of the term "Father" is by way of denotation rather than connotation. That is to say, "Father" is primarily a name rather than an image though it may be, of course, that as well.
The solution can be stated at this point with precision: the name of "God" has a content which cannot be reduced to the name, "Jesus Christ." I am not the first to recognise this fact, or the problems that accompany those theologies that tend to ignore it. As long ago as 1966, the Edinburgh theologian John McIntyre weighed in against the dominant Barthianism of the time (and this from within the Barthian heartlands!) with a careful analysis of the neo-orthodox slogan, "God is revealed in Jesus Christ," which had come to be accepted by virtually all theologians, everywhere, as a normative formulation. The problem with it, and with the entire logic upon which it rests, McIntyre observed, is that it makes sense only if the word "God" already has some content which is precisely the point that the Barthian tradition seeks to deny. According to McIntyre, however:

... where there is no prior knowledge or acknowledgement of God, revelation propositions have no weight. If I say to an unbeliever 'God is revealed in Jesus Christ', this proposition means no more or no less than the term 'God' means. If God has no existence, the proposition cannot assist his revelation. Propositions asserting the revelation of God presuppose some prior knowledge of God if they are to have any significance.... When we pursue this course, we begin to develop a sympathy which Protestant theology has not had for many decades now, for the proofs for divine existence. For among the many other things they may be trying to do, there is this: they are endeavouring to establish a value for the term 'God' which might make a revelation proposition not just meaningful but actually possible.26

McIntyre's criticism seems to have evoked absolutely no positive response at the time, which does not surprise me personally since I have met with a similar incomprehension from the Barthian camp on several very public occasions. Certainly no stampede back to the proofs resulted from McIntyre's intervention, but it seems to me to have been one of the more intelligent theological points made in the 1960s, and one of the points that needs to be made afresh and repeatedly today in face of the continuing dominance of what is basically a Barthian approach in so much contemporary theology. Where I would differ from McIntyre is in an insistence on an adequate account of the doctrine of God the Father rather than on the proofs as such since the proofs, properly understood, only serve the wider interests of a doctrine of God the Father, and since it is the latter that is the more firmly anchored in the theological tradition as a whole.

There is insufficient scope to develop this idea in detail at this point, though this is something that I hope to do in a future monograph. For the present, I wish only to make the unconventional suggestion that the philosophy of Hegel might well prove an important resource in enabling us to move beyond the confines of the contemporary approach. It is an unconventional suggestion mainly because Hegel is frequently thought and nowhere more frequently than in theological circles to collapse the distinction between divine transcendence (the realm of the Father) and immanence (the realm of the Son) in his philosophy of Absolute Spirit. It would, of course, be truer to say that the philosophy of Absolute Spirit preserves both elements in their distinction, while the very

concept of "otherness," which is integral to Hegel's approach, logically presupposes such distinction from beginning to end.

What is of greatest theological importance in Hegel is precisely what is neglected, therefore, in contemporary attempts to appropriate his philosophy, for it has an even more direct bearing on the Christian doctrine of God today than does the theology of the cross. It is, in short, what allows Hegel to grasp the cross as something of philosophical interest and importance in the first place. Thus, I wish to suggest, what Hegel has to offer us is chiefly a contribution to the doctrine of God the Father (who is always, I might add, the Father of the Son and of the Spirit). This contribution looks rather different than what is made of him in the context of the fragmentary "Hegelian" tendencies of contemporary theology. Over against Küng, for example, who tells us that theological study of Hegel is to be seen as prolegomena to a new christology, I wish to suggest that it is precisely Hegel's insistence on the notion of the Absolute as rational through and through that needs to be rediscovered, or at the very least taken seriously, since it is this rationality in God that preserves Hegel's overall theological vision from collapsing into the pure finitude of its christological moment. The whole point, in fact, is to see that finitude as embraced by God from the standpoint of speculative philosophy, a philosophy, we might say, which gives both philosophical and theological content to the doctrine of God the Father, much as the traditional proofs do for McIntyre. In other words, it is only the recovery of a philosophy of the Absolute which will rescue the doctrine of the first person of the Trinity, and with it the Christian doctrine of the triune God, from intellectual oblivion.
Taylor On Phenomenological Method: 
An Hegelian Refutation

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I

In his article "The Opening Arguments of The Phenomenology"\(^1\) Charles Taylor contends that the first three chapters of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an essay in transcendental argument; specifically, that it can be read as a transcendental argument of the Kantian variety. But given Hegel's frequent criticisms of Kant's philosophical method, is this an appropriate formulation of Hegel's work? In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, for example, Hegel criticizes Kant's philosophy as carried out from a merely subjective standpoint. Kantian philosophy he states:

.. .leads knowledge into consciousness and self-consciousness, but from this standpoint maintains it to be subjective and finite knowledge. Thus although it deals with the infinite Idea, expressing its formal categories and arriving at its concrete claims, it yet again denies this to be the truth, making it a simple subjective, because it has once for all accepted finite knowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint.\(^2\)

Again, in the Logic of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel is critical of the dualism in Kant's Philosophy.

Thoughts according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only our thoughts - separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things and of whatever is an object to us.\(^3\)

It is clear from much of Hegel's commentary of Kant's work that he has fundamental objections to transcendental method. It is also clear from the "Introduction" and "Preface" to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that Hegel has serious objections to traditional epistemology generally.

In the "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel straight away poses the question which epistemology sets for itself. Can our knowing afford us genuine access to the world or is it in some way defective? The agenda for any epistemological inquiry involves determining the limits of our knowledge in order to establish the validity of our knowing. Hegel frames the matter in the following way:

> It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to deal with its proper subject matter ... one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition ... because cognition is a faculty of a definite kind and scope, and thus, without a more precise definition of its nature and limits, we might grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth.\(^4\)

In other words, if it is assumed that our knowing is some kind of instrument for getting hold of the truth, then there is the added implication that we need to insure that the instrument is not defective. The need to avoid error, therefore, impels the epistemologist to try to determine exactly what the subject contributes to the act of knowing. In this manner, it is thought, any prejudice that might be inherent in our faculty of knowing can be eliminated, thus leaving us with the object as it really is.

Hegel has serious misgivings with this approach because it assumes that we can set down, in advance, the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Additionally, it assumes that knowing is some kind of instrument by means of which we get hold of the truth, or a passive medium through which the truth reaches us. In both, instances cognition can only grasp its object as in some way modified, either by the refraction of the medium or by the reshaping power of the instrument. Of the latter process Hegel asserts:

> ... if cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and alter it.\(^5\)

Thus, if cognition is viewed as some kind of instrument which alters and reshapes its object, then it must be different from that which it know. We have cognition, in whatever form it may take, on the one side, and the object as it is in itself on the other.

In both instances, though, a critical inquiry into the nature and limits of knowledge will not resolve the problem. If, for instance, the inquiry attempts to acquaint itself with

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the workings of the instrument of cognition, in order that it might eliminate the shaping functions of the instrument, it merely leaves its object exactly what it was before this inquiry. If, on the other hand, the investigation attempts to remove the refracting capacity of the instrument, this will not solve the problem either, because the elimination of the ray will also involve the elimination of the means whereby the truth reaches us. If the ray were eliminated, explains Hegel, "all that would be indicated would be a pure direction or a blank space." That is to say, if cognition is viewed as a medium through which we get hold of an object, then its removal also entails the removal of the object -- i.e. there would be no object of thought for us.

But what is also of concern to Hegel here is the question of whether it is ever possible to set down, in advance, what knowledge itself is. In the *History of Philosophy* Hegel states of critical philosophy and its aims:

> A further claim is made when is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know. For to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them; but how we are to know without knowing, how we are to apprehend the truth before the truth, it is impossible to say.\(^7\)

For instance, how is possible, if at all, to get outside of our cognitive life in order to make a critical examination of it? If we are able to do this, then what is the status of this knowledge of knowledge? Moreover, if it is also some kind of knowledge, is it not, then, itself subject to the same conditions which it establishes in its preliminary inquiry? All of this would seem to suggest that epistemological inquiries by their very nature are caught in a circle or dilemma. In other words, every epistemological inquiry, if it is making a claim about the nature and validity of knowledge in general, either has to appeal to its own criterion, which would make it's argument circular, or it has to make some preliminary presuppositions about knowledge, which prejudices the entire procedure.

It is not possible, in my judgment, to reconcile this view of Hegel's with Taylor's contention that the opening arguments in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will only hold if certain presuppositions -- undeniable facets of experience -- about knowledge are made. For the remainder of this paper I will examine Taylor's specific claim that the opening section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "Sense-Certainty", is transcendental in form. I will indicate why this interpretation is inappropriate, given Hegel's criticisms of transcendental method and his stated goal of disclosing how the various finite forms of consciousness represent the self-education of absolute spirit to its own spiritual principles. Additionally, I will offer an alternative reading of this opening movement, one that is guided by Hegel's own conception of phenomenology.

Transcendental arguments, as Taylor defines them, are ones that start from some putatively undeniable facet of experience and by regressive argument articulate the

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necessary conditions of this experience. In other words, transcendental argument reasons back from what experience is like to what the form of the subject must be if this experience is to be possible. Now in each case transcendental argument presupposes that we can identify certain basic and pervasive features of experience which are beyond cavil. With respect to the opening movements in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Taylor holds that, like transcendental argument, they presuppose certain undeniable features of experiences. In Taylor's judgment, the dialectic of consciousness narrated in the opening sections

.. presupposes that we can characterize effective experience in terms independent of the model of experience we are working with. Moreover, if we are to show that the model is not just unrealized in a given case, but cannot be realized, we have to be able to identify some basic and pervasive facets of experience independently of our model (they must be independent, i.e. not derivable from the model itself, if they are to contradict it and show it to be impossible).

In other words, the impossibility or inadequacy of a particular model of experience can be shown only if it is in contradiction with certain presupposed and undeniable characteristics of experience.

For Taylor, the whole dialectical movement of consciousness narrated in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* depends on such undeniable starting points, or what in an earlier work he calls "criterial properties". Criterial properties are basic notions of what a standard or purpose must be and which are already met or established. Taylor uses an example from Plato's *Republic* to indicate what he means here. He argues that the various conceptions of justice put forward in the *Republic*, can only be shown to be inadequate because certain criterial properties of justice are already known. Cephalos' definition of justice as telling the truth and paying one's debts is shown to be inadequate because certain criterial properties of justice are already known, specifically, that a just act is a good act. In the case of transcendental argument, which attempts to define the structure of the subject granted certain types of experiences, criterial properties are those undeniable features of experience which are essential and pervasive to our lives as knowing subjects. In 'sense-certainty', for example, the criterial property is 'to know is to be able to say'. Hence, if we have knowledge of the type, then we should be able 'to say' what it is we know. He writes:

For us, knowing is inseparably bound up with being able to say, even if we can only say rather badly and inadequately ... An experience about which nothing at all could be said ... would be below the threshold of the level of awareness which we consider essential for knowledge.

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8 Taylor, "The Opening Arguments", pp. 159-160.
10 Ibid., p. 133.
11 Taylor, "The Opening Arguments", p. 154
The principle that conscious experience must be sayable or that knowing is bound up with being able to say is, then, a criterial property which is brought to bear on 'sense-certainty'. For Taylor, the whole dialectic of 'sense-certainty' presupposes this basic and pervasive feature of experience. Without it, the inadequacy of 'sense-certainty' cannot be demonstrated and another notion of experience cannot be introduced.

For Taylor, to be more specific, this dialectical movement can be best understood as "a relation involving not just two terms but three: the basic purpose or standard, the inadequate reality, and an inadequate conception of the purpose which is bound up with that reality."

He goes on to explain more fully:

We start off with an inadequate notion of the standard involved. But we also have from the beginning some very basic, correct notions of what the standard or purpose is, some criterial properties which it must meet. It is these criterial properties which in fact enable us to show that a given conception of the standard is inadequate. For we show that this conception cannot be realized in such a way as to meet the criterial properties, and hence that this definition is unacceptable as a definition of the standard or purpose concerned. But we show the inadequacy of the faulty formula by trying to 'realize' it, that is, construct a reality according to it. This is what brings out the conflict with the standard.\(^\text{12}\)

If the standard we are aiming at is knowing or science, then the given conception of the standard would be a certain concept of knowing considered as a realized standard. Now in the opening section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* this given conception of the standard would be the affirmation on the part of 'sense-certainty' to be a knowledge of the immediate or what simply is. We can, Taylor thinks, show that 'sense-certainty' is an inadequate conception of knowing or science because we are from the beginning in possession of a certain criterial property of knowing, namely 'to know is to be able to say'; and 'sense-certainty' can only be shown to be a faulty conception of knowing in our very attempt to realize it, that is, to experience in this way, to have this type of knowledge. 'Sense-certainty', then, and consciousness generally can be judged self-contradictory where certain already existing standards or criterial properties of knowing are not met. Taylor indicates that while this may seem to be to import ideas and theories from outside ordinary consciousness that it is not the case. Criterial properties, he contends, do not violate Hegel's method because they are implicit in us as knowing subjects. In requiring the subject of 'sense-certainty' to say what he knows, argues Taylor, we are not violating Hegel's method because "... implicit in knowing in the sense relevant here is a certain awareness of what is known".\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 133.

\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*, p. 141
Robert C. Solomon, in his book *In the Spirit of Hegel*, argues that Taylor does indeed employ an external criterion when he insists that 'sense-certainty' *say* what it knows. Solomon states:

> It is argued that Hegel's attack on sense-certainty is essentially based on the fact that sense-certainty cannot or will not *say* anything, and knowledge requires something to be *said*. But if this were Hegel's argument ... it would be clearly ineffectual, and it would do what Hegel always insists that we must *not* do, namely, apply a criterion to a form of consciousness which is not already 'internal' to it, which it does not itself accept.\(^\text{14}\)

In any case, the requirement that we *say* what it is we know would be ineffectual, in Solomon's view, because 'sense-certainty' could make its case by just "shutting up".\(^\text{15}\) Solomon's contention that Taylor is importing an external criterion into 'sense-certainty', however, stems from his characterization of 'sense-certainty' as a theory of knowledge and not, as it is for Taylor, an actual attempt to experience in a certain manner. Of 'sense-certainty' he states:

> It is important to stress that this is a *view* of knowledge rather than an actual form of consciousness in the sense that we will encounter later, that is, a realizable mode of living, a set of concepts that structure our daily experience.\(^\text{16}\)

Solomon, nonetheless, does allow that in some instances a form of consciousness, as a theory of knowledge, can include an attempt to 'live' that theory.\(^\text{17}\) In spite of this caveat, however, Solomon insists that 'sense-certainty' is not, and can never be, an actual endeavor to experience in a certain way.\(^\text{18}\) 'Sense-certainty', in other words, is a view of knowledge and not the content of everyday cognition. Now Solomon's reason for holding this view is his belief that for Hegel there cannot be any immediate knowledge of particulars, that is to say, there cannot be any knowledge unmediated by concepts. 'Sense-certainty', therefore, as a form of consciousness which is supposed to be in immediate contact with objects, is ruled out from the outset. Though, for Solomon, this is a claim which must be demonstrated, not just affirmed.\(^\text{19}\) Nevertheless, Solomon's central point is that we are applying an external criterion to 'sense-certainty' when we insist that it 'say' what it knows, especially given that it is a theory of knowledge which holds that knowledge does not require general descriptions.

This argument against the possibility of identifying particulars has nothing to do with the demand that one must be able to *say* what it is one knows ...

It has to do with the use of universals at the very basis of experience, as a necessary condition for our being able to pick out particular objects. It has nothing to do as Taylor says, with "having to say something just to get started" ...  

The breakdown of 'sense-certainty' for Solomon, then, has more do with its inadequacy as a theory of knowledge rather than a failure of an actual model of experience which results from an attempt to say what one knows.

While I agree with Solomon that 'sense-certainty' resembles certain complex theories of knowledge, there is no doubt that for Hegel 'sense-certainty', as Taylor also suggests, is a form of phenomenal or ordinary consciousness. At the end of his "Introduction", to give one example, Hegel states:

The experience of itself which consciousness goes through can, in accordance with its concept, comprehend nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, or the entire realm of the truth of spirit. For this reason, the moments of this truth are exhibited in their own proper determinateness, viz. as being not abstract moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself stands forth in its relation to them. Thus the moments of the whole are patterns of consciousness.  

The patterns of consciousness, to use Hegel's wording, are those extant forms of finite cognition or points of view of human subjective consciousness exhibited in the Phenomenology. If, as Hegel observes in his "Introduction", consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something and at the same moment relates itself to it, then ordinary finite consciousness represents the cognitive relationship of a subject to an object. If this is indeed the case, then 'sense-certainty' is a form of finite or ordinary consciousness, not simply a theory of knowledge. However, while I agree with Taylor that 'sense-certainty' is not simply a theory of knowledge, his use of criterial properties can still be considered as violating Hegel's method, although for a different reason than that specified by Solomon.

'Sense-certainty', then, is the reflection of the everyday, naive affirmation of the immediately given world, and not strictly a theory of knowledge, as Solomon suggests. In this regard, Hegel's basic contention is that the development of consciousness from one stage to the next must be one dictated by the subject matter itself, by the particular concept of knowing being embodied in 'sense-certainty' itself. The transition from 'sense-certainty' to 'perception', for example, must result from an immanent necessity and not from the prior demands of our subjectivity itself. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Hegel's Dialectic, make the same observation concerning the development played out in the Phenomenology of Spirit:

20 Ibid., p. 334.
21 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 56.
22 Ibid., p. 52.
... the advance from one thought to the next, from one form of knowing to the next, must derive from an immanent necessity.\textsuperscript{23}

Richard Norman, in his work \textit{Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction}, makes a more general, but similar observation.

Science must vindicate itself not by being measured against some preconceived criterion, but through a descriptive examination of its character as a specific phenomenon, from which its validity will emerge. This is what Hegel understands by a 'phenomenology'.\textsuperscript{24}

In both quotes the sentiment is the same, the phenomenological development from ordinary to absolute consciousness cannot be such that its movement and outcome is determined by some preconceived criterion. Accordingly, to use Gadamer's example,

... in thinking the sense certainty which fills it, consciousness can no longer believe itself to be thinking anything other than a "universal 'this,'" and thus it must grant that what it meant is a "universal," and that it perceives it as a "thing."\textsuperscript{25}

But Taylor's criterial properties are preconceived criteria in that they impose, prior to our knowledge of anything, certain restrictions on what can or cannot count as knowledge for us. In the case of 'sense-certainty' it is the requirement that we 'say' what it is we know. However it is just this use of a preconceived criterion at the beginning of an examination into the nature of knowledge which, in Hegel's view, is not justified. It is Hegel's conviction that such epistemological presuppositions are not warranted, even though it would seem that if we do not have recourse to some underlying criterion at the beginning of the examination, the examination cannot take place. In his "Introduction" to the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} he writes:

If this exposition is viewed as a way of relating science to phenomenal knowledge ... it would seem that it cannot take place without some presupposition which can serve as its underlying criterion. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard and in determining whether something is right or wrong on the basis of the resulting agreement of disagreement ...; thus the standard is accepted as the essence or as the in-itself ... But here, where science has just begun to come on the scene, neither science nor anything else has yet justified itself as the essence or the in-itself ... .\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Gadamer, \textit{Hegel's Dialectic}, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{26} Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, p. 52
Thus, a presupposition such as the criterial property 'to know is to be able to say' has not justified itself for use at the beginning of an inquiry into the nature of knowledge, and cannot, therefore, serve as an underlying criterion or standard. Now Taylor might argue that a criterial property is not an actual definition of knowledge, but as a preconceived standard for knowing which must be satisfied, it is, nevertheless, a presupposition about what can or cannot count as knowledge 'for us'. Not only does such a prior requirement on what can count as knowing prejudice the entire investigation but, concomitantly, it also implies that knowing is strictly what it is 'for us', which then creates a distinction between our thinking, as something ours and entirely ours, and an objective reality as something other, about which we think.

There seems to be a kind of epistemological bias or predisposition in Taylor's reading of Hegel's work to regard knowledge as strictly a dimension of the human subject. In this regard, it is not at all clear that Hegel would accept the use of criterial properties of knowing, given that they are determinations which apply to us strictly as subjects. The use of criterial properties presupposes that our cognition is a kind of medium through which what we know is refracted. In the case of 'sense-certainty', for instance, what is to be known is refracted or shaped by the necessity that knowledge for us be 'sayable'. Moreover, the use of criterial properties would imply an original distinction, and concomitantly a division, between what is 'for us' and what is 'in itself'. But this is just the view of knowledge which Hegel disavows from the outset. The whole impulse or inclination to view knowledge strictly in terms of the demands of the knowing subject is one Hegel sees as untenable, in that it assumes a distinction between knowing and what is known, which, once accepted, can never be overcome.

Hegel's phenomenological exposition of 'sense-certainty' makes no such presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. That is to say, it does not suppose, as Taylor does, that conscious experience is "... that of a knowing subject who has a certain vision of things". Nor does it make any presuppositions about the structure of that experience, qua subject, that it is "inseparably bound up with being able to say...". Rather, for Hegel, the dialectical movement that consciousness undergoes is not about the contradiction between a particular model of experience, construed as a knowing subject who has a certain vision of things, and a particular standard, understood as a certain criterial property or undeniable facet of experience. Consciousness is transformed from within, not because certain models of experience are in conflict with presupposed standards of knowing, but because each form of finite consciousness is characterized by a disparity between its concept and its reality, that is to say, between what 'it is' and what is 'for it'. The dialectical movement of consciousness, in other words, is a result of this immanent self-conflict.

Taylor's approach to Chapter One of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to frame the argument in terms of the demand that 'sense-certainty' say what it knows. 'sense-certainty' claims to be the "richest" kind of knowledge, because it is in immediate contact with its

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27 Taylor, "The Opening Arguments", p. 158.
28 Ibid., p. 154.
object, prior to any conceptual activity. Hegel's strategy in the face of this claim, argues Taylor, is to take up the position of 'sense-certainty' and "try to say what we know in this way".\textsuperscript{29} The attempt "to say", contends Taylor, "will contradict the basic requirements of sensible certainty .. " and ".. will take us beyond its defining limits".\textsuperscript{30} Only in this way, maintains Taylor, can 'sense-certainty' stand self-refuted in the way Hegel outlines in the "Introduction" to the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}.

Taylor indicates two main ways in which the attempt 'to say' will take 'sense-certainty' beyond its limits. The minor way is its lack of selectivity in its attempt to grasp things, and the major way is its inability to pick out particulars without the mediating instruments of universal concepts. The first attempt, according to Taylor, centers on the claim 'sense-certainty' makes to be the richest and the most inexhaustible kind of knowledge. But when 'sense-certainty' is challenged to say what it really is aware of, then the inexhaustible richness of detail that it professes to possess is shown to be illusory. In its attempt to grasp things, argues Taylor, 'sense-certainty' discovers that it lacks selectivity. The requirement that we say what we know reveals that 'sense-certainty' is not really in contact with an inexhaustible richness of detail, but rather only a certain selection. He explains:

Looking at the objects in my study under their ordinary descriptions as use objects ( typewriter, desk, chairs, etc.), I cannot see them as pure shapes; or looking at them as pure shapes, I cannot see them as the juxtaposition of different materials, and so on.\textsuperscript{31}

But because 'sense-certainty' attempts to take in everything it lacks the selectivity required to grasp particular things and is thus condemned to emptiness, to fall over into a "trancelike stare".\textsuperscript{32}

Now, earlier in his article, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology", Taylor states:

An experience about which nothing at all could be said, not even that it was very difficult if not impossible to describe, would be below the threshold of the level of awareness which we consider essential for knowledge.\textsuperscript{33}

Because 'sense-certainty' is deficient in this respect, the obvious implication is that it lacks the minimum level of awareness necessary for knowledge. Thus Taylor takes this minor argument to be a transcendental one. We start with the putatively undeniable facet of experience, that to know, we must be able to say, and this allows us to demonstrate the illusory nature of the claim to be able to take in everything in an inexhaustible richness of

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.162-163.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 154.
detail. But because language by its very nature is selective, it also demonstrates that our experience is necessarily mediated by the use of concepts.

The second way in which the attempt to say will take 'sense-certainty' beyond its limits, argues Taylor, involves a refutation of its claim to be in immediate contact with sensible particulars. For Taylor this refutation will involve two stages. In both stages the challenge will be for 'sense-certainty' to say what it knows. In the first instance, this will involve 'sense-certainty' answering the challenge by use of "pure demonstratives". In the second instance, the challenge will be answered with the use of "ostensive definition". Each attempt, however, fails to answer the challenge because the attempt at effective awareness of the sensible particular can only be realized by employing universal terms or concepts, rather than through the object's own particularity. In the first instance, for example, the use of demonstratives such as 'this' or 'here' or 'now', because they can apply indifferently to a variety of contexts, operate like universals. Similarly, the use of ostensive definitions is only available in context, and this requires the use of descriptive terms such as 'day', 'night', 'hour' and so on. But these are general terms which can never capture the particularity of the object. And so, Taylor states:

... Hegel concludes, there is no unmediated knowledge of the particular. Sensible certainty ends up saying the opposite of what it means, and this is the proof of its contradictory nature.

Thus, by demonstrating the unsayability of the particular, argues Taylor, we also show that it can only be grasped by the use of universal concepts, that is, by subsuming the particular under universal concepts.

Now the contradictory nature of 'sense-certainty' can be demonstrated only if we first start from some undeniable characteristic of experience, that is to say, if we first have certain preestablished criterial properties of knowing. In the case of 'sense-certainty', then, the undeniable characteristic of experience is that our knowing is inseparably bound up with being able to say. The implication of this, however, is that our experience or cognition must be of a certain type, i.e., it necessarily involves the mediating instrument of universal concepts. Now, Hegel would not disagree with the view that immediate knowledge of sensible particulars is impossible. But what he would object to is Taylor's presentation of this idea as if it were simply about our cognition, namely, that it is a faculty of a certain kind and scope, whose nature and limits we need to define by means of transcendental argument. To treat conscious experience or cognition as a faculty of a definite kind and scope is to treat it as an instrument or medium through which we get at the truth. But as already suggested, this characterization of cognition also introduces an original distinction between ourselves and the real world, which for Hegel, once established, can never be surmounted.

34 Ibid., p. 163.
36 Ibid., p. 165.
37 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 46-47.
Transcendental argument can only work if subjective consciousness is understood as a pure, autonomous self to which certain transcendental criteria apply, a priori. Transcendental argument, accordingly, is directed to the conditions of the possibility of cognition or knowledge on the part of this subjectivity. But a phenomenological exposition of the experience of consciousness considers the actual dialectical movement in consciousness itself. That is to say, it is entirely taken up with how each of the various phenomenal forms of human subjective consciousness actually give way to more comprehensive ones, and how in this dialectical movement of the concept, qua subjective, the system of science is constituted. In this sense, there is never any "undeniable" or "permanent" feature of experience from which we can determine, a priori, the principles of knowledge. Hegelian phenomenology, briefly put, is an exposition of the various forms of finite consciousness in terms of the concepts which animate them and not in terms of preestablished criterial properties or transcendental requirements of knowing. The whole point of a phenomenological exposition is to demonstrate how the various forms of finite consciousness, which take themselves to be permanent and original, are really moments or elements in knowledge as such.

A phenomenological exposition of 'sense-certainty', therefore, will have to take up the argument from within 'sense-certainty' itself, exhibiting the logic of this form, and demonstrating the necessity of its advance to 'perception'. In other words, the dialectical progress of finite consciousness is not something externally imposed by the phenomenologist, but derives from consciousness itself. But we do not have to presuppose, as Taylor claims, some already accepted criterion by which to judge 'sense-certainty', we need only attend to the logic of the inherent conflict within 'sense-certainty' itself. It is this inherent self-conflict which is the means whereby consciousness as 'sense-certainty' recasts itself in a more complete form. But it is phenomenology which, in reflecting on this process, demonstrates the necessity of the advance, and which in turn ensures its completion as an actual knowing.

II

I now propose to take up Hegel's exposition of 'sense-certainty' and attempt to follow the structure of the argument, according to the method outlined in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit. My primary focus will be to show how the transition from 'sense-certainty' to 'perception' is the outcome of consciousness' own self-experience. This will involve, as I have already indicated, showing how the transition to 'perception' is a result of an inherent self-conflict between what 'sense-certainty' is and what is for it. In other words, it will entail showing how the contradiction within 'sense-certainty' is the result of the disparity between its concept and its reality, and not between a model of experience, characterized by a knowing subject who has a certain vision of the world, and a presupposed standard, 'to know is to be able to say'. All this is already implied in Hegel's understanding of what consciousness is, namely, the relating to and distinguishing from an 'other', in which the determinate aspect of this relating is 'knowing'. It thus belongs to consciousness that it is always testing whether its concept
corresponds to its object, and conversely whether its object corresponds to its concept. But what is crucial for the present examination is that in this testing both the measure of the truth and the knowing of it belong to consciousness. In this dialectical movement, where both knowledge and object undergo change, what Hegel calls *experience*, no presuppositions about the nature of experience, independent of any particular model or form of experience, need be made.

At the commencement of his exposition Hegel states that our approach to the object must be *immediate* or *receptive*, exactly as it is for 'sense-certainty'. "In apprehending it", he goes on to explain, "we must refrain from trying to comprehend it".38 Thus Hegel lets us know, from the outset, that he proposes to take up the argument from within 'sense-certainty' itself. This is as it should be given his claim that phenomenology is the dialectical exposition of the various forms of finite consciousness in terms of the concept of knowing which animates each of them. Concomitantly this suggests that the movement of 'sense-certainty' must spring from the internal logical action of 'sense-certainty' itself i.e. it must derive from the disparity between its what-it-is (its concept) and what-is-for-it (its reality).

'Sense-certainty', or ordinary, naive consciousness, then, takes as the foundation of our knowledge of the world that which is 'given' to us immediately through the senses. In other words, 'sense-certainty' is the view or notion that we immediately apprehend the 'given' in its entirety without comprehending it. Or, otherwise put, it is the view the there exists within consciousness as 'sense-certainty' an identity between consciousness itself and its given object. Accordingly, the 'given' of 'sense-certainty' has being only in our consciousness of it, and conversely there is only a registering consciousness where there is a 'given' to register. This is the essential point in 'sense-certainty'. Sensuous consciousness, as Hegel explains in the *Philosophy of Mind*,

.. is distinguished from the other modes of consciousness, not by the fact that in it alone the object is given to us by the senses, but rather by the fact that on this stage the object, whether an inner or an outer object, has no other thought-determination than first, that of simply being, and secondly, of being an independent Other over against me, something reflected into itself, an individual confronting me as an individual, an immediate.39

Thus, 'sense-certainty' is, firstly, immediate consciousness, and all that it can say of its object is that it simply *is*. The object, for its part, is represented as something which is immediate and individual or singular. Neither consciousness nor the object is anything other than a pure 'This'. In 'sense-certainty', as Hegel explains,

.. neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation; the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining

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38 Ibid., p. 58.
or thinking; nor does the 'thing' signify something that has a host of qualities.\(^{40}\)

But whether this is the truth of 'sense-certainty' is something which will come to light only in its development.

While, as Taylor acknowledges, there are recognizable empiricist themes in this section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, such a theory is considerably more complex than what is being exhibited in 'sense-certainty', namely, the naive affirmation of the immediately 'given' world. The nature of this 'given' is never explicated as it is in empiricism, but merely affirmed. There is, as previously indicated, no "complex process of mediation" in such a standpoint, but merely the apprehension of what simply is. To say more than this is to go beyond the immediacy of 'sense-certainty' to something else, namely some kind of mediation. In 'sense-certainty', consciousness or the 'I', is not characterized by any imagining or thinking, it is simply a pure 'This', just as the object is a pure 'This'. Hegel makes the following observation about how consciousness and its object must be construed for 'sense-certainty':

.. .the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the 'thing' signify something that has a host of qualities. On the contrary, the thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It is; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. Similarly, certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection; consciousness is 'I', nothing more, a pure 'This' ... \(^{41}\)

What a phenomenological exposition of 'sense-certainty' must consider is how this particular consciousness, in relating to and distinguishing itself from an other, is, through its own inherent self-conflict, forced out of its position as the knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is.

Now Taylor claims that phenomenology can only do this if we first identify certain pervasive and undeniable facets of experience which are outside any particular model of experience under examination. For Taylor, dialectical movement, as explained earlier, is a relationship involving three terms. First, a certain model or notion of experience; second, specific criterial properties of knowing that furnish the standard that effective experience must satisfy; and third, effective experience which is guided by this model of experience. It is the second term which, for Taylor, accounts for the contradiction in ordinary consciousness. But this would suggest that a phenomenological account of 'sense-certainty' would not be an exposition in terms of the concept of knowing which animates 'sense-certainty' as such i.e. its claim to be immediate knowledge. Furthermore, the contradiction within 'sense-certainty' would not be between its concept and its reality, i.e., what it is and what is for it, but between effective experience guided by 'sense-

\(^{40}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 58.

certainty' and certain presupposed undeniable facets of experience which condition the knowing subject, the 'I'. This characterization of knowing, however, is just what Hegel opposes in the "Preface" and "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit, although it is not limited to that work. In the Philosophy of Mind, for example, Hegel writes:

The 'I' is ... being or has being as a moment within it. When I set this being as an Other over against me and at the same time as identical with me, I am Knowing (Wissen) and have the absolute certainty (Gewissheit) of my being. This certainty must not be regarded ... as a kind of property of the 'I' as a determination \textit{in} its nature; on the contrary, it is to be grasped as the very nature of the 'I', for this cannot exist without distinguishing itself from itself ... \textsuperscript{42}

Knowing, then, is not simply some property of the ego, the 'I'. But this is precisely what transcendental arguments purport knowing to be. Thus, if 'sense-certainty' is simply a model of experience, characterized by a knowing subject who has a certain vision of the world, as Taylor contends, it simply establishes that we cannot effectively exercise our subjectivity except through the mediating instruments of universal concepts. It simply says something about our lives as subjects, whereas phenomenology is an exposition or articulation of the essential dynamic of 'sense-certainty' itself, its concept; specifically, its necessary connection to 'perception', and by extension its essential role in the entire series of concepts that constitute the becoming of knowledge or science.

To challenge 'sense-certainty', therefore, to say what it means, would be to deal with knowing as simply a property or determination of the 'I'. What phenomenology does, however, is pay attention to how in this relating to and distinguishing from something, consciousness tests itself and discloses what in truth it is. In the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel observes:

The immediate existence of spirit, \textit{consciousness}, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is this element [of consciousness] that spirit develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain that antithesis, and they all appear as shapes of consciousness.\textsuperscript{43}

It is only in this movement of becoming other to itself that spirit reveals its actuality and truth,\textsuperscript{44} and educates itself to its own genuine foundations as an actual knowing spirit. 'Sense-certainty' is a moment in this process and is not merely some property of or determination in the 'I', as Taylor suggests.

What, then, is the logic of 'sense-certainty'? It claims to be immediate knowledge of what simply \textit{is}, a simple registering of an immediate content. In other words, it holds that

\textsuperscript{42} Hegel, \textit{Philosophy of Mind}, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{43} Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.
there is an immediate identity between a registering consciousness, the 'I', and a given
datum, the 'This'. 'Sense-certainty' signifies the immediate identity of two particulars, the
'I', and the 'This'. In the dialectic of 'sense-certainty', however, the 'I' and the 'This' reveal
themselves to be something other than this, namely, mediated and universal. Hegel
remarks at the beginning of the argument:

... pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 'Thises',
one 'This' as 'I', and the other 'This' as object. When we reflect on this
difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only immediately
present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated. I have
this certainty through something else, viz. through the thing; and it,
similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the
'I'.

'Sense-certainty', then, shows itself to be much more than the immediate identity between
itself and its object, that is to say, it is not simply the immediate apprehension of a pure
'This'. Both the subject, as 'I', and the object, as 'This', are mediated; each is what it is
through the mediation of the other. Hegel quickly adds, however, that it is not just we, the
phenomenologists, who make this distinction, but it is present within 'sense-certainty'
itself, "and it is to be taken up in the form in which it is present there...."

'Sense-certainty', then, finds itself falling into contradiction between what it judges its
object to be in itself and how it is present to it. In the ensuing attempt to sustain the
oppositions that such a contradiction gives rise to, it will reinstate itself in a more
comprehensive form. In 'sense-certainty' this dialectical development has three phases. In
the first phase 'sense-certainty' takes the object as that which is essential and unmediated,
and the 'I' as that which is unessential and mediated. Now in this first phase, the question
to be answered is whether the object, as that which is essential and unmediated, is what
'sense-certainty' proclaims it to be. Hegel states:

The question must therefore be considered whether in sense-certainty
itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sense-certainty proclaims
it to be; whether this concept of it as the essence corresponds to the way it
is present in sense-certainty.

His ensuing statement indicates how this question is to be answered.

To this end, we have not to reflect on it and ponder what it might be in
truth, but only to consider the way in which it is present in sense-
certainty.
We do not, in other words, have to draw upon some underlying principle, 'to know is to be able to say', in order to reveal what in truth 'sense-certainty' is. Because, for Hegel, consciousness, thought, is inherently systematic, and so necessarily gives birth to an articulated series of concepts, we do not need to invoke some 'underlying', 'original' or 'transcendental' criterion in order to determine what 'sense-certainty' is.

Now, if we take the object as it presents itself in the first phase of 'sense-certainty', it does not correspond to what the object is proclaimed to be, that is, something particular and unmediated. The 'This' of the object, if taken in its twofold shape as 'now' and 'here', cannot be given a singular or particular designation. If we say the 'now' is night, for example, later 'now' is not night, but noon; 'now' is noon is immediately supplanted by 'now' is not-noon, and so forth. 'Now' is indifferently any state day, night, noon, etc. while preserving itself throughout. Indeed, what emerges at this point is the realization that 'now' is only permanent and self-preserving "...through the fact that something else, viz. Day and Night, is not". That is to say, 'now' is not something immediate but mediated. But additionally, 'now', because it can be indifferently night, day, noon, etc., is in reality, for Hegel, a universal. In the 'now' of 'sense-certainty', as well as the 'here', the pure being of the object remains i.e. it simply is, but no longer with the immediacy which it was taken to have initially. In the 'now' and the 'here' of 'sense-certainty', thus, the object has emerged as a pure universal. But it is just this new opposition which 'sense-certainty' must attempt to sustain which will insure the necessity of the advance.

Accordingly, the undoing of the object as immediate and particular signifies the beginning of a new dialectical phase of 'sense-certainty'. Because phenomenological exposition cannot be imposed externally by us, where every determinate form of consciousness must be forced out of itself by its own internal logic, 'sense-certainty' must be given full reign and allowed to maintain its position. Hence, the immediacy of knowing is now taken to lie in the 'I', in its 'seeing', 'hearing' and so on. As Hegel explains, "'Now' is day because I see it; 'Here' is a tree for the same reason". But 'sense-certainty' now experiences the same dialectic as it previously did when the essential element in its knowing was the object. The 'I', like the 'Now' and 'Here', is a universal, indifferent to what happens to it. Hegel observes:

I, this 'I', see the tree and assert that 'Here' is a tree, but another 'I' sees the house and maintains that 'Here' is not a tree but a house instead.

Both are equally legitimate, but the one vanishes in the other. But in this movement of experience what does not vanish is the 'I'. Hegel explains:

What does not disappear in all this is the 'I' as universal, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is a simple seeing which,
though mediated by the negation of this, etc., is all the same simple and indifferent to whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc.).

Again, what 'sense-certainty' takes to be immediate knowledge turns out to be mediated. The simple seeing of the 'I' is mediated by the negation of the house, etc., and what remains through all its negations, is the pure universal 'I'.

'Sense-certainty', however, makes a final attempt to preserve its position and declares that it is the whole of 'sense-certainty' itself which comprises immediate knowledge. In other words, it is the immediacy of the whole subject/object framework itself which constitutes the essence of 'sense-certainty', and not the immediacy of one or the other or these elements. But this pure immediacy of the whole will prove unsatisfactory too.

In confining itself entirely to one immediate relation, for example, the 'Now' is day, 'sense-certainty' seeks to preserve knowledge of what simply is. But the same dialectic operating on its previous incarnations again asserts itself. The 'Now' that is pointed to is never something that merely is, because in the very act of pointing it out it ceases to be, that is to say, it is a 'Now' that has been. The 'Now' that is meant, when pointed out, shows itself to be not an immediate knowing, but a knowing of what has been, i.e., something which is superceded. The 'Now' that is meant, just as the 'Here' which is pointed to, shows itself not to be an immediate knowing, but a movement through a plurality of 'Nows' and 'Heres'. What endures is a plurality of 'Nows' and 'Heres', which arises and passes away. Hegel observes:

The pointing-out of the Now is thus itself the movement which expresses what the Now is in truth, viz. a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together, and the pointing-out is the experience of learning that Now is universal.

Similarly:

The Here that is meant would be the point; but it is not: on the contrary, when it is pointed out as something that is, the pointing-out shows itself to be not an immediate knowing [of the point], but a movement from the Here that is meant through many Heres into the universal Here which is a simple plurality of Heres, just as the day is a simple plurality of Nows.

'Sense-certainty', then, can no longer maintain itself to be thinking anything other than a universal. Instead of immediate knowledge of what simply is, what emerges is sensible universality in the form of 'perception'.

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52 Ibid., p. 62.
53 Ibid., p. 64.
54 Ibid., p. 64.
In the dialectic of 'sense-certainty', then, the contradiction between what it takes to be true, and that which actually is for it, is overcome in 'perception'. Thus the singularity of the object is negated in the dialectic of 'sense-certainty' and what emerges is sensible universality. 'Perception' comprehends the object as it takes it to be in itself, a universal in general. Hegel's formulation is as follows:

perception, on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal.
just as universality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating moments within perception are universal: 'i' is a universal and the object is a universal.55

but the new object which emerges for 'perception', the thing with properties, will again involve consciousness in contradiction. this time the contradiction is between the object as an unconditioned universal and the object as a determinate singular. the entire argument of 'perception' is subsequently taken up with the attempt on the part of 'perception' to preserve the truth of the object from this contradiction.

now, for taylor, the movement of 'sense-certainty' reflects our experience itself; that is, in our attempt to grasp particular objects we discover that we can only get hold of them through the mediating instruments of concepts. we cannot have knowledge of particulars except as subsumed under universal concepts or descriptive terms. but even though the particular can be given an infinite number of descriptions, its full meaning can never be apprehended. hence there is always a duality between the particular thing and descriptions found true of it. this, for taylor, is the start of the next transcendental argument. this argument attempts to show that as subjects we cannot operate with property concepts without attributing them to particulars and reciprocally that we cannot identify particulars without the use of property concepts. but in each case the transcendental argument is directed towards defining the nature and limits of our experience or knowledge, and in this sense it is grounded in the subject, the 'i', and thus construes both 'sense-certainty' and 'perception' as simply subjective forms of experience.

in other words, knowledge, for taylor, is determined throughout, in its form, by the a priori conditions imposed by the nature of human cognition. the fact that knowing, for us, is inseparably bound up with being able to say, for example, precludes immediate knowledge of particulars. we can only get hold of the particular through the mediating instruments of universal concepts. that is to say, it is only through the mediating influence of concepts that the 'given' of 'sense-certainty' can be an object for us. it is impossible then, a priori, to grasp sensible particulars except as mediated through universal concepts. but it is also the case that the universal concepts or descriptive terms in our experience have meaning only through their union with sensible particulars. in either case, within 'sense-certainty' objectivity i.e. what can be an object for us is constituted by the prior rules laid down by our own subjectivity. we could not have knowledge of sensible particulars without the mediating influence of universal concepts,

55 ibid., p. 67.
and we know this to be so because for us knowledge is inseparably bound up with being able to say.

Hegel, on the other hand, grounds knowing, not in the I, in some subject or thinker behind thought, as in transcendental argument, but in the series of phenomenal forms of itself. But it is also necessary that science or knowing come to know how the various phenomenal forms of ordinary of finite consciousness are constitutive of its standpoint, and, concomitantly, how it is their culmination. Phenomenology, then, is just this exposition of its own development on the part of science, and in completing the logic of the various forms of phenomenal knowing educates itself as to its own genuine principles and sheds its abstract character as a simply subjective standpoint, with what is only 'for it'. Hegel writes:

In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it, and some sort of 'other', at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the authentic science of spirit. And finally, when consciousness itself grasps this its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself.56

But transcendental arguments by their very character are grounded in the nature of experience and only say something about the nature of our lives as subjects. They can say, to borrow one of Taylor's examples, that our experience is constituted by our sense of ourselves as embodied subjects.57 Yet they can never foreclose ultimate, ontological questions. Thus no transition is ever effected from the realm of experience to what Hegel refers to above as actual or absolute knowledge. Once one set of problems concerning the nature of our experience and thought is resolved, transcendental argument is always enmeshed in another set of problems. Why? Because transcendental argument is a method of procedure which by its very nature rests on a subject/object distinction i.e. it rests everything on consciousness and its world. So Taylor concludes his article, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology", with the following comment:

... once out of the bottle, the fly is not free; he is enmeshed in another set of problems, harder if more rewarding to explore.58

Transcendental arguments thus may establish something about our lives as subjects, but this is all that it does; it never gets around to what Hegel calls actual knowledge or speculative philosophy. Transcendental arguments, accordingly, are the endless reflections upon one context of objectivity after another, without ever getting around to actual knowledge.

56 Ibid., pp 56-57.
III

The "Preface" and "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit make it clear that Hegel's goal is that point where the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is actually no distinction. In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness realizes that its distinction from a world, existing independent and opposed to it, is in fact no distinction. At this point the elements of subjectivity and objectivity still exist, however they are not polarities (isolated terms) but rather necessary moments within all knowledge. But this absolute standpoint can never emerge if we presuppose an original subject/object division between what things are and what they are 'for us'. Unlike Taylor, then, I do not see Hegel as trying to overcome dualism in that his position does not rest upon an original distinction between our knowing and the world. The central distinction in the Phenomenology is between finite consciousness, where the opposition between what is 'for us' and what is 'in itself' remains, and absolute consciousness in which such an opposition is set aside.

Another way to understand the difference between Hegelian phenomenology and transcendental argument is in terms of what each seeks to accomplish. What is sought in transcendental argument is a principle of objectivity for self-conscious human reason itself. In Kant's work, to give an obvious example, transcendental argument is employed to determine how objectivity is constituted for the understanding within the context of the given phenomena of immediate experience. What the world is actually like, however, remains always problematical. Taylor, in construing the argument of 'sense-certainty' a transcendental one, is carrying forth the same procedure: in 'sense-certainty', universal concepts are the mediating instruments by means of which objectification is determined; that is to say, objects can be present to us only through the mediating influence of universal concepts. For both Kant and Taylor, though, knowledge is strictly a matter of human consciousness imposing its own form on what it comes to know. Correspondingly, things are only what they are in the light of reflected reason, or as they are subjectively constituted. But as such, objects, and the world generally, are without significance and independent meaning. Subjectivity or reason is not manifested in the actual world, and the world, accordingly, is very much something which is 'alien' and 'other'.

Hegel by contrast rejects any notion of an 'other' which stands opposed to consciousness. The stated goal of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that point where it gets rid of its appearance of being burdened with something which is 'alien' and 'other' to it. In other words, its ultimate goal is that point where the relation of consciousness and its world is overcome, that is, where reason is an active principle in the world, and not simply subjective. And insofar as this is the ultimate goal of the Phenomenology, 'science' or philosophy depends upon this possibility as well. Hegel is quite clear on this point:

59 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 56-57.
Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this aether *as such*, is the ground and soil of Science or *knowledge in general*. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell in this its *element*.60

Thus, while Hegel recognizes, like all modern philosophers from Descartes on, that things must be understood in the light of the principles of subjective reason, i.e. what they are for thought, the above quotation suggests that he also insists that this reason must discover itself in 'absolute otherness', in the world. Philosophical knowledge or science, in other words, is not merely knowledge of reason as such, but of reason actually manifested in the world. To the extent it is this idea that Hegel espouses the opening passages of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* do not constitute an essay in transcendental argument.

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The Discursivity Of The Negative: Kojève On Language In Hegel

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The fame and influence of Alexandre Kojève's six year course on Hegel under the auspices of l'École pratique des Hautes Études is beyond question. In attendance were André Breton, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski, Eric Weil, Henry Corbin, Raymond Queneau, as well as perhaps Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Blanchot. The extent of Kojève's significance, however, is generally framed as taking one of three forms: (1) his reading is marked as historically important for its role in reintroducing Hegel to French intellectual life and turning a generation of thinkers toward the *Phenomenology of Spirit*; (2) his strong interpretations of Hegel's historical claims are taken to strike the first sparks of existential marxism, culminating as they do in the 'end of history' thesis that has undergone a recent, if somewhat specious, revival; or (3) his insistence on the overwhelming centrality of desire to the Hegelian project is seen as providing the philosophical ground for the explosion of Hegelian discourse into psychoanalysis, literature, and art. Indeed, it may today be somewhat difficult to imagine a presentation claiming to focus on Kojève's reading of Hegel that does not concern itself primarily with the role of desire in the dialectic of mastery and servitude. This essay, however, investigates a somewhat different aspect of Kojève's interpretation, one whose effects were no less decisive -- both for his own position and for its influence on later twentieth century French philosophy -- for their being unremarked. Namely, Kojève insists that it is not merely the case that language turns out to entail negation, but also that the negative itself is infected and structured by discourse.

The first year of the course, 1933-1934, ended with a tour de force of textual interpretation focusing on a number of key passages from the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* -- a text remaining untranslated into French until Jean Hyppolite's 1939/1941 publication. Reworked by Kojève into essay form and published in full under the title "L'idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel" in Raymond Queneau's still somewhat fragmentary edition of the proceedings of the course, the text of the final two lectures are the only fully remaining account of that explosive year. More conscious than

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the later lectures of the tensions between Hegel's project and the force of his own interpretation, this essay clearly marks Kojève's truly original contributions to a philosophical inquiry into the relationship between language and negativity.

But first a few words on the relation between the uses to which Kojève puts Hegel and Hegel's own philosophical position. On the one hand, the interpretive tradition initiated by Kojève is anything but orthodox. While relying on a close engagement with the text, he often freely disregards those aspects of Hegel's work that conflict with his own philosophical and polemical stance, and exaggerates the centrality of those that accord with it. Most crucially in this context, Kojève's claims with regard to the status of language focus almost exclusively on the role it plays in the preface and dialect of sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology*, generally ignoring Hegel's claims in later sections of that work (such as in the figure of "the beautiful soul" and the "Religion in the Form of Art" section). Neither does Kojève discuss the explicit theorization of the status of language and signs in the third section of the *Encyclopedia*. And even in the sections of the *Phenomenology* that he addresses, he is much more concerned with the identification of naming and negativity than with the structural role that such activities play in the dialectical unfolding of absolute knowledge. Indeed, Kojève's emphasis on the separating work of the understanding (discussed in detail below) clearly appropriates elements of Hegel's interpretation and criticism of the Kantian position, hypostatizing their contents into something like an independent ontological position. Furthermore, Kojève attributes a somewhat wider signification to the status of negation and negativity than Hegel. Where the latter largely accepts Spinoza's identification of negation and determination, adding that the negation of a stance or proposition remains precisely as determinate as that which is negated, Kojève conflates the role of Hegelian *Negation* with Heidegger's reflections on the ontological role of "the nothing" (*das Nichts*) which generates the ontological angst by which the world as such is disclosed to a being. This is not to claim that Kojève imports the entire range and power of Heidegger's "nothing" into his reading of Hegel. Rather, he overlays its basic ontological status onto Hegelian logical negation.

While today we are prone to reject what might be charitably describe a the "looseness" of Kojève's reading -- and this stance dominates most contemporary reactions to his work -- the influence of his lectures on 20th century French Hegelianism ought not be underestimated. While it gained a much more textually rigorous style via Hyppolite's translation and commentaries, it is Kojève's thematic obsessions with language and negativity that dominated Hegel reception among the existentialist and structuralist traditions. That said, I would now like to turn to Kojève's essay, beginning with a few words about its intellectual context.

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2 See *Encyclopedia* §451-464.
3. For Hegel on Spinoza's "omnia determinatio est negativo", see §91 of the *Encyclopedia* and its Zusatz. For Heidegger, see *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 184-191. Heidegger's claims regarding the status and role of *das Nichts* have a much wider role to play than this, and in fact dominate the whole of *Being and Time* for many interpreters. It is nevertheless the claims made in ¶40 of that text that dominate the reception of Heideggerian negativity in French existentialism and structuralism.
Roughly divided into two sections, "L'idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel" concentrates both on readings of a section of the preface to the *Phenomenology* and a number of relatively fragmentary parts of Hegel's earlier writings (generally taken from the 1803-1806 Jena lectures). While most explicitly dealing with links between the social nature of reason, freedom, and death in the latter section, much of Kojève's interpretation there can be directly traced to Alexandre Koyré's earlier attempt to introduce the young Hegel to France in his capacity as Kojève's predecessor and mentor at l'École pratique des Hautes Études. But the earlier section is the location of Kojève's most powerful interpretive work, and marks the commencement of a project linking negativity and language as the touchstones of Hegelian thought.

While this thrust of Kojève's reading is also undoubtedly inspired by his teacher's work, it also stands as the most radical break between them. From Koyré, Kojève inherits a linguistically reflexive interpretive apparatus that recognizes the powerful centrality of language in the Hegelian project. In the Jena writings Koyré had found an inseverable link between language and Hegelian *Geist*, taking language to be the spiritual motor that dialectically drove consciousness through its various incarnations and self-interpretations. "Language is thus the lower frontier of spirit," Koyré wrote, "the creation of a proper world, the only world that possesses being." All later 'spiritual' (*geistig*) evolution in Hegel would thus, as Koyré writes, "have language for its medium and vehicle," and would "incarnate itself in language." For Koyré, language — and here he means not only 'language in general' or 'the fact of language' but also the very material and specific terminological language of Hegel the philosopher — this language actually effects dialectical synthesis both within the text and in the 'journey' of consciousness of which it offers an account. Language, in other words, functions simultaneously as a trope of the dialectic and a dialectical trope.

Tempting though the interpretive possibilities that this performative reading of the role played by language (both 'language' and Hegelian language) may be, Kojève (under Heidegger's influence) rightly rejected Koyré's insistence on the instrumentality that the latter's reading required. Kojève also places language in its materiality at the heart of the negation and action that drive spirit. He stops short, however, of Koyré's assertion that this means that Hegel can have nothing to say about language, that the internality of language with regard to Geist and Sein means that Hegel must pass over it in silence. And this had been precisely the result of Koyré's investigation: Hegel cannot speak of language itself, merely of its bad use. Because, Koyré writes, "the history of language, the life of language, is at the same time the history and life of spirit," Hegelian philosophy in general, and the *Phenomenology* in particular, must remain mute with regard to language in that it uses it. For Kojève, such a position was tantamount to

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6 Koyré, "La terminologie hégélienne," ibid., 199.

7 Ibid., 200-201.
demanding a divorce between language and negativity and thus placing language (in Hegel) in a position exterior to death. But because Kojève was to insist on an identification (different than Koyré's because dialectical and shot through with the negative) between and among language, negativity, death, human existence, and spirit, he was unable to countenance Koyré's reading. Without rejecting the rhetorical movement and textual reflexivity of Hegel's language (even strengthening it via his emphasis on the historicity of the Phenomenology itself), Kojève attempts to explore language in Hegel.

It is precisely this dialectical movement and rhetorical doubling that are at issue for Kojève in his reading of Hegel's preface; at stake in the relationship between the being of discourse and the discourse that 'describes' being is (or better, becomes in Hegel) that of a circular self-grounding which enacts itself: Kojève begins his reading with the well-known passage that announces Hegel's explicit break from his contemporaries (most specifically Schelling) and substance metaphysics in general: "everything turns on expressing and grasping the True [das Wahre], not only as Substance, but also Subject." Kojève interprets the Hegelian opposition between Wahrheit and das Wahre (la Vérité and la Vrai, for Kojève) in terms of the relation between language and the real. He defines la Vérité as "the complete and correct 'revelation' (= description) of Being and the Real by coherent Discourse (Logos)," while la Vrai is "Being-revealed-by-discourse-in-its-reality (l'Être-révélé-par-le-discours-dans-sa-réalité" (529)). Kojève claims that Hegel's demand is a simple one: language that claims some type of correspondence with the real is nevertheless itself something real. Any philosophical discourse, then, that claims to speak of being must speak of the being of language in the course of its own exposition; and more crucially, it must speak of the being of the language that it itself is. Describing the totality of what is and exists, in other words, must include a description of this description itself. "It therefore does not suffice for the philosopher to describe Being," Kojève writes,

He must still describe revealed-Being (l'Être-révélé) and give an account of the fact of the revelation of Being by Discourse.... it does not suffice for him to speak of the Being that is given to him; he must still speak of himself and explain himself to himself as that which speaks of Being and of self. (530)

For Kojève, this means philosophy is charged with becoming an anthropology, of accounting for being's realization as human being, language, and history.

Thus far Kojève might be accused of falling (or following Hegel) into the error of finding language to be an essentially reflexive thing, an entity (in Kojève's Heidegger-inflected terminology) present-at-hand whose reflexivity has simply hidden it from pre-Hegelian philosophy as a thing. Without doubt Kojève's insistence on reading the Phenomenology as a philosophical anthropology has immediately disqualified it for many interpreters. Indeed, there is a sense in which Kojève forgets or neglects his hermeneutic

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8 Hegel, 23/10.
starting point in his strong interpretation of historical closure, particularly in the later lectures on Hegel's sixth chapter. (98-107 and 145-154) And finally, Kojève remains faithful to Hegel's insistence on totality and the possibility of its disclosure: substance does become subject (and vice versa); absolute knowledge does realize itself.

But precisely because language (in relation to death and negativity) is the site and ground for this 'anthropology,' Kojève's interpretation is obliged to become far more nuanced than this simple dismissal allows. To say 'anthropology,' for Kojève, is not to refer to an ensemble of human customs or a historical narrative of cultural events. Rather, it is to speak of human existence and language as radically interpenetrating each other, each simultaneously the ground and the annihilation of the other. His point is not to speak of the logos of anthros, but of the identification of human existence and language with negativity and finitude. In these early lectures, the history that hegelianism posits and uses is not that of an entity located in a world of other entities, but rather (to use the Heideggerian terminology that Kojève adopts) of being-in-the-world, of the historicity of human existence and of language. In the course of "L'idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel," the condition for the possibility of this historicity becomes discursive consciousness of finitude and death.

Even in the midst of his affirmation of Hegel's claim for the possibility of an absolute philosophy, Kojève's insistence on the historicity of language and man (l'homme) moves to the foreground. The true, he says with Hegel, is not a simple identity, but a result. "True knowledge" (the reunification of subject and object by the negativity which occasioned their split) remains a coincidence of discourse (subject) and the being which it "reveals" (substance). This coincidence is born of what he calls "the adequate description of the totality of Being and the Real by 'absolute' philosophy." (530-531) But because what Kojève calls "the totality of the real" includes human reality and discursive action, absolute knowledge can be nothing other than circular description.

But what is it about discourse that can be accounted for only by a circular, self-grounding description? In terms of what might be called the ontic level, it is true that Kojève seems not to have much more in mind here than the brute materiality of discourse as a thing or series of things amidst a multitude of others (an element of the manifold). Kojève, however, is far more interested in the ontological level of language, writing that the fact that "[dialectic taken in its] totality also implies the discourse which reveals it" means that it implies the becoming of this discourse. (532) The being of the absolute (as absolute discourse) must thus be the very becoming of language and signification: a negativity that enthrones itself at the very height of self-identity. It is not the fact or given existence of language (what Kojève calls l'Être donné or l'Être-statique-donné, translating Sein) that calls forth the circularity of the absolute, but rather its negativity. The totality 'revealed' by language is thus reflexively grounded on the very being of discourse in its materiality, such that Kojève eventually defines this very totality simply

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9 These lectures are preserved only in fragmentary form.
as "the ensemble of creative or dialectical movement which produces Discourse in the midst of Being." (532)

Kojève's account of language in the *Phenomenology* becomes most explicit in his interpretation of Hegel's engagement with the question of the understanding (*l'Entendement* for *der Verstandes*) where, writes Hegel famously, "The activity of separation is the power and work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power." (540) Language, on Kojève's reading, is precisely this separation; it is abstraction -- the work of the understanding (which he not merely locates in, but identifies with human existence).

For Kojève, the understanding is precisely that which is specifically human in *l'homme*: "la faculté du discours." (541) Again, what is at stake for Kojève is language in its becoming. Words "reveal" the particular singularities or events that constitute the totality of being. Language effects (or rather, is) an act of negation that separates ontological events from the being in which they are embedded. But as particular and singular, these events remain fragmentary and resist totalization. Only the totality of discursive acts can bring the totality of the real to knowledge, which is to say, separate it from itself in order to constitute itself as other than itself. Kojève writes:

Man [*l'homme*] does not reveal instantaneously, as in a flash, the totality of the real: he does not know this totality in a sole word-concept [*mot-concept*]. He reveals the constituent elements of the totality one by one, through isolated words or partial discourses, separating them from this [totality] in order to make them. And it is only the ensemble of this discourse extended in time which is able to reveal the total reality, even if [it be] simultaneous. (542)

Here Kojève is careful to retain a rich notion of totality, insisting that neither the vertical plane of historical, temporal, and diachronic becoming nor the horizontal plane of structural, simultaneous, and synchronic being escape the fragmentation of language. Which is to say that not only will any single (non-absolute) discursive event quail before the negativity of time and history, but also before the negative which constitutes the historicity of a synchronic and relational moment of that history. At stake here, in other words, is more than the relatively simple problematic of the disappearance of the *nunc* as articulated in Hegel's critique of sense-certainty. *This* would be the case if Kojève's "ensemble of discourse" -- the totality of language in its materiality -- merely signified all words which have been spoken. The question and difficulty of totality, for Kojève, is rather that of the possibility of an absolute discourse that would encompass all that can be said, all that can be meant, and all that can be intended precisely in and by its own articulation of itself.

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10 This is to render Kojève's more literal *séparation* for *scheiden* rather than Miller's juridical "dissolution." This choice was generally upheld by Hyppolite even while in this particular sentence he uses *diviser*. See Hegel, 36/18, and G.W.F. Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, vol. I, trans. J. Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier, 1939), 29.
The activity of the understanding, again, is the discursive separation of singularity from its totality. The catch that makes this activity of separation into a "miraculous" or "absolute" power, Kojève continues, is that these singularities ("constituent elements") are inseparable from the totality which they constitute in that they are material; they are temporally and spatially related to every other element of the totality in which they occur. They exist, in other words, as relational entities, elements that are constituted in their very being precisely by their relation to everything other. Kojève's totalité or ensemble, then, is a question of more than simple mathematical quantification. Rather, it signifies a relational context of meaning and existence in and through which each singular entity is born as singular. Nevertheless, the discursive act of the understanding accomplishes this separation. Abstraction can and does occur.

Kojève accurately traces the origin of this conception of totality as relational existence to Leibniz. Hegel diverges from Leibniz, he claims, where the latter thinker fails to specify that the relationality proper to Being is subject to an act of violent separation by discourse (that is, by the understanding). Leibniz missed the essential difference between nature and history, Kojève claims, and was thus unable to formulate a monadic anthropology (which is to say, he could not account for the monad's language or death). (535-536n1) On the same page, Kojève claims that Hegel himself was never able to adequately articulate this difference, leading to his application of dialectical categories to the natural world. Thus Kojève either neglects or brackets Hegel's complex relationship to Romantic philosophy of nature (as well as an entire volume of Hegel's own Encyclopedia) in favor of identifying negativity and language. Kojève's caveat is important in that it is one of his few acknowledgments that his interpretive emphasis on the centrality of language to the Hegelian project moves beyond the scope of a rigorous reading of Hegel's text. While it was Hegel who so eloquently argued for the negativity of discourse, the radical thought of the discursivity of the negative belongs to Kojève.12

Again, despite his Leibnizian conception of totality as a seamless and relational network of singularities, Kojève holds that abstraction, and thus extraction from this totality, takes place. Kojève's description of the process of abstraction is dual. In its first form, abstraction is simply a movement of generalization that creates concepts. The understanding annihilates the particularity of a singular really existing thing in order to create a concept in general. I speak of 'book' or 'books' and not of this particular book. This form of abstraction is a general account of the origin of categorical thought, and remains quite close to Hegel. More powerful and interesting, however, is Kojève's second interpretation of the abstraction that results from the separation effected by the understanding: I speak of this book. I give it a name and a discursive existence. I signify it and thus separate it from its totality. It is not their referent, on this second interpretation, that words or signs make abstract, but rather the whole of the relational totality in which that referent exits. Language signifies its referents, Kojève writes, "as if

11 While Kojève's acknowledgment of Leibniz is accurate, the grounds for his ultimate denunciation of the latter is more dubious.
12 Kojève was not to renew this acknowledgment of his divergence from Hegel until 1939, the final year of his course. See the closing pages of "Note sur l'Éternité, le Temps et le Concept." (377-378)
they were alone in the world." (542) It is the very totality of being that is negated by the discursive gesture of the understanding. Language does not merely negate singularity, it is the negative in general. Thus the labor of the negative is a discursive work; it is language that separates and recombines entities in such a manner as to annihilate the given.

Kojève's subsequent insistence on the materiality of language -- on the very real and powerful existence of the "separated entities" that form fragmentary discourses -- pulls his reading into locating the "absolute power" of the understanding in discourse. The originality and force of Kojève's interpretation lies here, even if he refuses to acknowledge it. For under this second interpretation of abstraction, rendering something conceptual (and thus discursively negating the world) does not mean situating that singular thing outside of time and space in an idealized and ephemeral realm. It is the totality of the real that has been transformed into abstraction, this act nevertheless paradoxically performed by a very real discourse that cannot be severed from its material existence in the very world it annihilates. Detached (by the understanding) from its material support, essence becomes meaning. "But 'meaning' (sens) does not float in the void;" Kojève insists, "it is necessarily the meaning of a word or of a discourse: -- pronounced, written, or only thought, but still existing in the midst of the spatial and temporal world." (543) Under the rule of Kojève's second interpretation of abstraction, no distance can be posited between a real thing and its concept. Because it is precisely totality that is negated, and not the materiality of the singular thing, a concept or meaning remains real, Kojève writes, "a real thing detached from its hic et nunc, from its here and now." (542) Standing simultaneously as essence and existence both of itself and its referent, and collapsing the distance of referentiality into its own becoming, discourse remains ineluctably material even while resisting reduction to the status of mere entity. "Thus the absolute power of the Understanding," Kojève writes, "separates the idea-essence (idée-essence) from its natural support only in order to reattach it, as idea-meaning (idée-sens), to the specific support of a discourse, which is itself also here and now." (543)

On the one hand, Kojève immediately retreats from the radical implications of his identification of negation and language, reserving effective negation for 'physical' labor in the world and relegating discursive separation to the realm of project formation: "it is by separating and recombining things in and by discursive thought," he writes, "that man forms his technical projects which, once realized by work, really transform the face of the given natural world..." (542) This retreat is absolutely necessary for Kojève's later eschatological account of Hegel's 'end of history' in and through the simultaneous advent of Napoleon and the System in the world. Faced with the magnitude and repercussions of his identification of discourse and negativity, Kojève jettisons language into the future, leaving the present free for the 'real' action of 'actual' labor. In other words, Kojève's dual commitment to Marx and Heidegger brings a tension to his project with which he can never truly contend.

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13 Again, note the use of Leibnizian terminology.
But on the other hand, Kojève complicates his own position by articulating the very being of the present as one dominated by the future, and by the discursive projects that constitute it. His account of the temporality of being, in other words, undermines his attempt to free himself from his own Hegelian web. It is action itself (which is to say human existence) that results in the primacy of the future for time. Applying an interesting reading of early Heidegger to the Hegelian problematic, Kojève argues that action reverses the given or natural conception of time that subordinates the past and the future to the present (in that only the present is being; the past has been and the future will be, but neither are). Action, which is to say human existence, has, Kojève writes "a real presence in Being" as the realization of a project. This project, as a project, is necessarily futural; it is the nothingness of being in that it is necessarily a potential negation of the present and the given. And this nothingness of being, for Kojève, is nothing other than meaning (sens).

In terms of its relation to the present -- given being -- a project need not be moored to a particular given existence. It is necessarily discursive, which is to say, it has already been subject to the radical separation effected by the understanding. This separation, it must be remembered, is simultaneously a reattachment of meaning to language in its materiality. Thus the futural discursive project reanchors itself in the present. The negativity of the future -- as discourse -- really and materially is in the heart of the present. This, for Kojève, means that the future has come to dominate the present. That domination is one of negation and action, which now finally appear as what they are: discursive projects. Kojève writes, "the project realizes itself in the present, and it is in the past as already realized. But the present of the project, and therefore its past, are penetrated and determined by the future, which subsists in them in the form of discourse." (547n1) Kojève evidently recognized the dangerous implications that this analysis of temporality (and the identification of language and negativity that it defends) posed for other aspects of his project. His response was to relegate the entire argument with regard to temporality to a footnote. The distance between a discursive project and its realization has collapsed with the irruption of the future in the heart of the present. And insofar as Kojève insists on an identification of futural negativity with finitude and death, the death of the real that language incarnates installs itself in the heart of the present. The 'deferred' and futural death of the human being dominates present existence in the form of the materiality of discourse.

Kojève goes to great lengths to avoid the impression that either the referentiality or the materiality of language can be taken as properties possessed by an entity (that is, he refuses to take Logos as present-at-hand). The concept is not simply an idea or a meaning, "but a word-having-a-meaning (un mot-ayant-un-sens), or a coherent discourse." Here Kojève forces subject, predicate, and present participle to relinquish their grammatical specificity and collapse into a single term, all in the service of avoiding the reduction of meaning to a property of a word while at the same time preserving its material existence. For Kojève, the result of the abstraction of the world (the work of the understanding) is a thing in the world, its essence precisely its very being-in-the-world.
Kojève's argument might seem to be immediately undermined by the possibility of meaningless words, of discursive events unmoored from their sense. But because for Kojève the arche and telos of discourse are strictly identical -- the understanding, itself discursive, produces discourse in its materiality through its very act of the negation of the given world -- meaningless discourse is simply impossible, an a priori contradiction in terms. It is simply that the relationship between sign and referent is no longer natural or immediate. Kojève writes:

"Here there has been, therefore, a negation of the given as it was given (with its 'natural' relations between essence and existence); which is to say there has been creation (of concepts or words-having-meaning [de mots-ayant-un-sens], which, as words, have nothing to do with the meaning that they incarnate); which is to say there has been action or labor. (545)"

The "miraculous" power of the understanding, then, is this discursive act of separation that negates the natural relation of words and things in order to recombine and reconnect them in a new materiality. The labor of the negative, once again, is the work of language.

Kojève had already provided another formulation of his insistence on the general ontological implications of thinking the temporality of being in discursive terms, one that foreshadows a number of lectures from the 1938-1939 course. He was to identify the concept with time,... or what is the same thing, to affirm the temporality of Being itself [l'Être lui-même]. For the concept, or more exactly the meaning of Being [le sens de l'Être], barely differs from Being itself [l'Être lui-même], if only through the absence in the meaning of the being of this Being [sinon par l'absence dans le sens de l'être de cet Être]. (544)

Note that in this second formulation, as in the later lectures, Kojève is careful to avoid positing action as discursive negativity. Nevertheless, the "absence" he finds here is located precisely in the meaning of "the being of this Being -- l'être de cet Être," which is to say l'homme in his human existence as taking action and thereby negating a given and natural world. The meaning of action, indelibly marked as discursive, is the human as the negative and as death. Kojève writes, "It is only in understanding Man as Negativity that one understands him in his 'miraculous' human specificity, making of himself an 'I' who thinks and speaks...." (547)

Kojève has thus established a circularity for his long chain of equivalencies: existence = action = negativity = language = death = existence. And it was the possibility of discovering the grounds for this process of identification in Hegel, along with the radical thought of the discursivity of the negative, that provided the passionate interpretive ground for much later French philosophy and theory. By reversing and expanding Hegel's subordination of language to negativity and finitude, Kojève opened
the textual and interpretive field that was to obsess French thinkers for generations to come: thinking the material discursivity of death and the negative.