The Dialectic Of Enlightenment: A Critique Of Recent Spinoza-Hume Scholarship

Vance Maxwell
Memorial University
vmaxwell@mun.ca

1. Introduction

Writing on the Enlightenment, Professor James Doull variously invokes its crux as the Cartesian cogito. Referring to the emergence of the "modern state" in the Enlightenment, he writes that: "In this society the Cartesian subjectivity has its practical fulfillment as universal self-consciousness, in which falls the manifold occupation of individuals with external ends (utility), where humanity should be one with sensibility" (italics added). Elsewhere, writing on faith and enlightenment, Professor Doull claims that: "If faith and pure insight—the Cartesian subjectivity which is certain of its being are the causes and moving principles of this great revolution [Enlightenment] which neither secular nor ecclesiastical powers could stay, then they were not separate from the general culture of peoples, or parts of their life, but each comprehensive of the whole culture" (italics added). Perhaps most philosophers, and certainly those historically minded, would agree that, out of the "pure insight" of Cartesian subjectivity, arise those forms of it known as 'rationalism' and 'empiricism', both opposed and mutually implicit as they are, Enlightenment moving through them to Kant. Indeed, these forms of Cartesian subjectivity arise together, but distinctly, in Meditation II. Rationalism' arises as Descartes arrives at the standpoint of pure thought taking the reflective structure of the absolute intuition "cogito ergo sum'. And, methodical doubt fully working, 'empiricism' arises as Descartes affirms from the cogito that only within the immediacy of pure thought, can sense experience be accepted as true: we cannot know that we see or hear x, only that we seem to see or hear x. Each is a sensory expression of the cogito itself. Thus arises classical empiricism in its positivist (immediate) and phenomenalist (skeptical) nature.

Given the movement of Enlightenment from Descartes through 'rationalism' and 'empiricism' to Kant, we can readily agree that, as Spinoza expresses the quintessence of

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3 We enclose 'rationalism' and 'empiricism' in single quotes to indicate that, as Professor Doull notes: "The division between empirical and rational, as between sophist and philosopher, is a subordinate distinction" ("The Argument to the hypotheses in Parmenides", Animus, Vol.4, 1999 [http://www.swgc.mun.ca/animus/1999vol4/Doull4.htm], para.39). Their distinction is subordinate to the movement of Enlightenment itself from Descartes to Kant.
'rationalism', so Hume expresses the quintessence of 'empiricism'. Now, while Professor Doull has not written at length on Spinoza or Hume, he has, in writings on Enlightenment and elsewhere, made highly implicative remarks on both. These impart a deep sense of the historical integrity and implicit historical relation of Spinoza and Hume; and, as such, they implicitly *preserve* that relation against a destruction of it such as we shall critique at length in this paper. For example, contrasting "the natural will which pursued its particular end against the good with diabolical resolution" with the evil will in Spinoza (and Hobbes), Professor Doull writes: "There was not present in the evil will itself the tendency to overcome its own evil", as was afterwards taught in a reformed [Enlightenment] culture by Hobbes and *Spinoza*" (italics added). Here, Professor Doull seizes on the *conative* nature of Spinoza's epistemology and ethics such that an essential continuity exists between passive (passional/evil) and active (good) states of the endeavouring individual. No such conation pertains to the 'empiricist' epistemology and ethics of Hume, as we argue below. Of Hume, Professor Doull remarks that "In a later age Hume for whom 'impressions' were the primary truth had in him a reason which knew the universal and divine, and that his empirical self could not attain to what he knew" (italics added). And elsewhere he remarks that: "When Hume in his theological writings looks back to the Calvinism in which he had been formed as a child he can find no sure evidence in experience of an absolute divine teleology". In these remarks, and while granting more to Hume than his essential empiricism, Professor Doull focuses on the impression-idea relation as decisive for Hume's philosophy.

Applied methodically as Hume's "one general proposition", that relation (wherein original impressions cause all meaningful ideas) decisively thwarts the efforts of recent scholars (Klever and Baier, documented below) to make Hume into a Spinozist literally and entire, and hence to destroy the historical integrity of the Spinoza-Hume relation. This extensive critique of their work, and of Leavitt's inadequate opposition to it, is intended to restore that relation. It is inspired by Professor Doull's profound and unfailing historical sense in all that pertains to philosophy. As Doull demonstrates the contemporary "unenlightened enlightenment" is distinguished from the original by the absence or incomprehensibility of the Cartesian cogito. Where commentators interpret the early modern from a contemporary standpoint distinctive, positions such as those of Spinoza and Hume can easily appear identical or when distinguished, distinguished in ways external to rather than integral to their difference. Doull's reminding us of the centrality of pure insight is the necessary beginning to a more objective reading of the logic that animates enlightenment. In this chapter we hope to demonstrate by a careful assessment of certain influential contemporary readings that there is need to be recalled to this standpoint of pure insight in the interpretation of the relationship of Spinoza's thought to that of Hume.

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4 Doull, "Faith and Enlightenment", 131
5 As Spinoza writes in *Ethics V*, Prop.4, Note.
7 Doull, "Faith and Enlightenment", 129.
With the appearance in 1977 of Jerome Neu's *Emotion, Thought and Therapy*, there emerged in recent scholarship an interest in the philosophical relation of Spinoza and Hume. In the context of psychoanalysis, which Neu would defend and ground in Spinozan terms, Neu compares Spinoza and Hume as "the most systematic representatives of two opposing traditions of argument about the relation of thought and feeling in the emotions". Accordingly, he claims that "the Humeans treat emotions as essentially feelings (impressions and effects) with thoughts incidentally attached". Contrariwise, "The Spinozists say roughly the reverse, treating emotions as essentially thoughts ('ideas' or 'beliefs') with feelings incidentally attached". Here, we are not concerned either to dispute the accuracy and rigour of Neu's particular claims, or to discuss his work generally. These matters would require extended treatment in their own right, such lying beyond our scope and spatial limits here. Rather, we note that Neu's presenting Hume and Spinoza as opposed both presupposes and expresses their difference and relation as implicitly historical: Hume, the empiricist-phenomenalist understands emotions as mainly feelings or non-intentional sense impressions; Spinoza, the rationalist-realist, understands emotions as essentially ideas intentionally related to bodily states. Neu's work is followed by a doctoral thesis by Gilbert Boss, again arguing comprehensively for a fundamental opposition of Spinoza to Hume. In this work also, Boss preserves the historical difference and relation of Spinoza and Hume.

Some years later, scholarly interest in Spinoza-Hume resumes with a debate hosted by the journal *Hume Studies*. That debate is the critical focus of this paper. Wim Klever begins it with an essay entitled "Hume Contra Spinoza?" In his essay, Klever would do more than to put their opposition into question, and perhaps to effect something of a rapprochement between Spinoza and Hume. Klever goes so far as to proclaim "their overall agreement", and indeed to insist that Spinoza's Ethics was "on the top of Hume's desk" when he wrote the *Treatise*. Klever's thesis and his method are alike simplistic: he would collapse each philosopher into the other, empiricism into rationalism and the reverse, but somehow with a Pyrrhic victory for Spinoza. Klever's method is a mix of text- and category-matching and eager pronouncement. All of this is too much for Frank Leavitt who replies the following year with an article opposing Hume to Spinoza and Aristotle. In it, Leavitt understandably objects to Klever's "blatant" misreading of Spinoza. In that issue of *Hume Studies*, Klever responds to Leavitt. Two years later,

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9 Neu, 152.
10 Neu, 152.
11 Gilbert Boss, *La différence des philosophies Hume et Spinoza* (University of Zurich, 1982).
13 Klever, ibid., 89.
14 Klever, ibid., 92.
16 Leavitt, ibid., 204.
Annette Baier continues in Klever's vein with a paper that directly identifies Hume as a "Spinozist". 18

The aims of this paper are two-fold. First, in Part II, we shall move critically through these four articles in Hume Studies, offering a thematic but not exhaustive treatment of their respective claims. Second, in Part III, we shall provide a reading of Hume's own remarks on Spinoza, putting them into the decisive context of his phenomenalism where they belong. We thus intend to restore, for emerging scholarship, the historical relation of Spinoza and Hume. Neither Klever, nor Leavitt, nor Baier at all considers Hume's utter and disdainful rejection of the Spinozan philosophy. This failure alone makes gratuitous their claims for or against the thesis that Hume is essentially a Spinozist. Moreover, Hume's full doctrine makes the gratuitous claims of Klever and Baier for the positive thesis rival Christ's feeding the multitude with few loaves and fishes. And, after all, Hume does reject miracles.

2. Contemporary Accounts

(i). Wim Klever's "Hume Contra Spinoza?":

We shall proceed selectively, taking as our themes several of Klever's most important claims. Early on, Klever, in discussing the origin of ideas in Hume, asserts a Spinozan influence: "It seems that Hume had learned the epistemological lesson [that ideas are caused only by other ideas, not by bodies or material things] from this reflection (Ethics II Prop.5) 19 or from elsewhere" (p.91). 20 Presumably, Klever means that Hume does not commit the 'category mistake' of holding that mind and body cause each other's affective states. Now, in 2P5, Spinoza assumes the entire metaphysics of Ethics I to prove that substance or "God himself " causes all ideas under the divine attribute Thought, and within the divine intellect, such that no mode expressing any other of God's infinite attributes (e.g., a body under Extension) can cause any idea or mode of Thought, but only modes under its own Attribute. As we shall argue in Part III of this paper, Hume shows no detailed knowledge of Spinoza's metaphysics whatever. He discusses Spinoza only briefly in the Treatise (Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sect.II: "Of Scepticism with regard to the senses") 21 Moreover, the "epistemological lesson" the Hume learns is really the "one

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19 Henceforth, we shall use the established method of referring to texts in Spinoza's Ethics such that 'Ethics II Prop.5' = 2P5; and 'Ethics II Prop.7, Proof, Corollary, Note' = '2P7DemCorSch', where Dem = Proof, Cor = Corollary, Sch = Scholium or Note. In other such citations, Lem = Lemma (ata), Ax = Axiom. Spinoza's 2P5.
20 Henceforth, we shall refer to texts in these four articles by page number in the issue of Hume Studies cited for each.
general proposition” which he states at the beginning of the Treatise. That proposition affirms: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T4). Moreover, Hume, the phenomenalist, declines to pursue the origin and nature of simple impressions, since "the examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon" (T8). Indeed, for Hume, impressions of sensation arise “in the soul originally, from unknown causes” (T7). We add to this that Hume, arguing strictly, rejects 'soul' or spiritual substance (T: Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sect.VI: "Of personal identity") and 'body' or material substance (T: Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sect.II: "Of skepticism with regard to the senses"). It follows that, since neither mind nor body exists for Hume, the strict phenomenologist, the "epistemological lesson" that Klever credits Hume with learning is both gratuitous and nonsensical. And, needless to say, Klever's words "….or from elsewhere" do not help his endeavour.

Klever mistakenly draws a simplistic parallel between Spinoza and Hume concerning personal identity. In this, he would make Spinoza a Humean: "For both [Spinoza and Hume] the human mind is nothing more than the set of its related ideas (p.91). Thus Klever identifies the constitution and composition of individual minds in Spinoza with the Humean "mass of perceptions which constitute a thinking being"(T207). He ignores Spinoza's doctrine that the essence of individuals, whether conceived as minds under the attribute Thought or as bodies under the attribute Extension, is their conative unity or endeavour to preserve their being (3P.s 6,7). But no such conative unity is to be found in Hume's view of mind:"….what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity" (T207). These perceptions are atomic, and their relations are external, inasmuch as "there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind [or "collection"] or in breaking off all its relations…." Klever maintains that, in Spinoza as in Hume, "the body and also correlatively the soul, is [sic] in a continual flux and permanently changed by other bodies" (p.91). Now, while Spinoza grants that a body and its mind can change dramatically (4P39Sch,cited by Klever), that body and that mind must persist conatively in order to undergo such change, whether from health to severe illness or from infancy to "ripe age". Moreover, Spinoza teaches also that the more complex the individual the more it retains its conative individuality in the face of external affects changing it, such that: "this union, although there is a continual change of bodies [or of minds], will (by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance in respect of mode" (Lem4Dem after 2P13). Indeed, all of nature under each of the divine

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22 3P6: Every thing [i.e., individual things], in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its being. 3P7: The endeavour, whereby everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.

23 In the axioms, lemmata and postulates following 2P13, Spinoza employs his theory of individuation with respect to extended bodies explicitly. But his theory applies implicitly and equally to the ideas--or minds--of such bodies, and to the equivalents of these bodies as modes under all attributes other than Thought and Extension.

24 Spinoza's hypothesis here is Lemma4 (after 2P13).
attributes is an absolute individual, so that we may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as one individual whose parts, that is all bodies [and their minds], vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole" (Lem2m7Dem after 2P13).

To continue, we note that Klever holds that (i) "Spinoza is not less convinced of the fictitious character of personal identity than Hume" (p.91). He claims also that (ii): "The idea of personal identity is a confused and false idea for Spinoza in every possible meaning and interpretation" (p.92). We shall deal with these two claims in sequence. Claim (i) is indeed false on several grounds. First, because personal identity is, for Spinoza, essentially conative endeavour in finite individuals (3P.s6, 7), it cannot by definition be fictional since it expresses the actual or real essence of the individual itself (3P7). Hence, while an individual person does possess false and fictitious (i.e., inadequate) ideas and equivalent images or bodily modifications (3P9 with 2P.s 7,12,35), that actual person also can possess ideas and bodily images that are adequate and true. The first, as inadequate, belong to imaginatio, and the second, as adequate, belong to ratio and scientia intuitiva (2P.s41, 42). Moreover, Spinoza states in his Tractatus de Intellectualis Emendatione (TdIE): "For, in our own case, knowing as I do that I exist, my existence or non-existence cannot be a matter of fiction for me…." (TdIE 54, italics added). That is, whatever we know to be either actual/necessary or impossible cannot be feigned. Hume, on the other hand, does indeed argue that "The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects" (T259, italics added).

Klever's claim (ii) is, again, both false and misleading. It restricts the idea of personal identity to the lowest level of knowledge, imaginatio, where all ideas are, as passive, inadequate, and hence false, fictitious or doubtful (2P41). Here, Klever ignores Spinoza's demonstrating that (i) knowledge of the second (ratio) and third (scientia intuitiva) kinds "is necessarily true" (2P41), and (ii) that ratio and scientia teach us "to distinguish the true from the false" (2P42). It follows that true knowledge (including true knowledge of personal identity) arises within ratio and is, indeed, completed within scientia from which arises "the highest possible mental acquiescence" (5P27). Now, in 5P27Dem Spinoza proves that one who knows things by scientia "passes to the summit of human perfection", being thereby affected by the highest pleasure as the amor dei intellectualis (5P.s32, 33). Note also that one's supreme pleasure "is accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue" (italics added). That is, one thereby attains the highest and truest idea of one's personal identity in God, this being as conatus" the highestendeavour of the mind"(5P25). Clearly, then, Klever's asserting that the idea of personal identity in Spinoza is confused and false "in every possible meaning and interpretation" is itself false and indeed misleading.

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25 Spinoza identifies the actual (and the possible) as necessary in as much as he denies any real contingency in nature (1P29), and holds that whatever we conceive to be in God's power, exists necessarily (1P35).
Klever is most blatant as he misrepresents Spinoza and Hume on the nature of substance. He writes that: "Spinoza….would certainly like to subscribe to Hume's modest position: We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it" (T16)" (p.93). This Klever simply asserts, without argument, as he simply denies that Spinoza is a target of Hume's rejecting substance in the sense of substratum or ground. And, of course, Klever ignores Spinoza's definition of substance, and the propositions of Ethics I concerning it. Before invoking these, however, let us note that Hume offers two closely related definitions of substance (T16), neither being at all applicable to Spinoza. Having defined the idea of substance (in Klever's citation) as the idea "of a collection of particular qualities……" in the first paragraph of T16, Hume begins the second paragraph of T16 by stating that "The idea of substance as well as that of mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall….that collection". We note that, whereas Hume first defines the idea of substance as the idea of a collection of particular qualities or ideas, he then defines the idea of substance as itself that collection "of simple ideas". Now, these definitions crucially share the notion of a collection of "particular qualities" or "simple ideas" named (e.g., 'orange', 'man', 'table') and hence recalled "to ourselves or others". Hence, what we mean here by 'substance' is 'collection' of atomic ideas or properties. But, for Spinoza, substance is not a collection of 'anythings'. He defines God or substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself "(1D3, italics added) and as "an absolutely infinite being….consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (1D6), italics added). We note also that by 'attribute' Spinoza means "that which the intellect perceives of substance constituting its essence" (1D4, italics added). Moreover, and against those (including Klever) who hold that substance is a 'collection' of attributes as 'its properties', we cite 1P12: No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided. Indeed and comprehensively, we cite 1P13: Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.26

The divine substance is not all that Klever would atomize. In recent years, he has even alleged that Spinoza's Ethics was not written by Spinoza himself but mainly by a group of his friends. Klever readily ceased from his allegation, perhaps from lack of any real evidence,27 perhaps because of a passage he surely met in Spinoza's Letter XXVIII to Blyenbergh (13 March, 1665). We shall quote that passage as italicized in Abraham Wolf's translation of Letter XXVIII:

If you then ask whether the thief and the righteous are equally perfect and blessed, I answer No. For by a righteous man I understand one who firmly desires that each shall possess his own. I show in my Ethics (which I have not yet published) that this desire arises necessarily in the pious from the clear knowledge which they have of themselves

26 The relation of substance to its attributes is a perennially difficult issue in Spinozan scholarship. As such, it lies beyond our scope here.

27 Klever's allegation, based only on annotations supposedly found on an early copy of the Ethics, was reported widely in the media. Officers of the North American Spinoza Society invited Klever to present his findings, but he readily declined.
and of God. And since the thief has no such desire, he necessarily lacks the knowledge of God and of himself, that is, the chief thing which makes us men.  

Other passages and their contexts in Spinoza's correspondence confirm Spinoza as author of the *Ethics*, however, the quoted passage and Spinoza's exalted character confirm that fact beyond doubt.

Limitations of space force us to conclude now our treatment of Klever's first article with a brief discussion of this claim: in urging that Spinoza's *Ethics* was "on the top of Hume's desk" when he wrote the *Treatise*, Klever insists that it is hard to maintain that Hume knew Spinoza only through Bayle's *Dictionary* article. Moreover, Klever insists, because Hume wanted to avoid the charge of atheism, be adopted the "strategy" of engaging in ulterior debate "using Spinoza's own texts" (p.92). These matters notwithstanding, we shall argue in Part III that, in Hume, we find no evidence that Hume knew Spinoza's thought and texts beyond Bayle's clearly limited and biased presentation of them. But here we adduce several points in support of that approaching argument. First and foremost, we shall cite what Klever ignores, namely Hume's own words concerning the spirit in which he wrote and published his philosophical and historical works. In his earlier autobiography (1770), Hume describes himself as publishing these with "Boldness" and an open resistance to "any Authority":

Everyone who is acquainted with the Philosophers or Critics knows that there is nothing yet establisht in either of these two Sciences, & that they contain little more than endless Disputes, even in the most fundamental Articles. Upon Examination of these, I found a certain Boldness of Temper, growing in me, which was not enclin'd to submit to any Authority in these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by which truth might be established

Again, summing up his life and work, and indeed his motives of "vanity" and fame for publishing (these in an otherwise blameless character), he concludes his second autobiography (1777) with these words:

In a word, though most men anywise eminent have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked by her baleful tooth: and though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate…my character and conduct: not but that the zealots…would have been glad to invent and

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29 For example, cf. Spinoza's Letter XXVIII to Bouwmester (June, 1665).
propagate any story to my disadvantage but they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of probability. (italics added)

Very clearly, these two excerpts from Hume's autobiographies show him to be a man of high intellectual courage and moral principle; a man not at all afraid of being thought an atheist. In concluding, we add the independent remarks of Paul Wood, writing also in *Hume Studies*:

Hutcheson's subsequent opposition to Hume's abortive bid to become the Edinburgh Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1745 underlined their differences, and Hume's defeat may well have prompted him to cast prudence aside and to launch his sustained public campaign against religion (rational or otherwise) in 1748, with Hutcheson undoubtedly as one of his targets. (italics added)

Accordingly, we conclude the obvious: Hume, as a man and as a thinker, stood above any fear of being thought an atheist; hence he had no motive whatever to adopt the "strategy" of engaging in ulterior use of "Spinoza's own texts".

(ii). Frank Leavitt's "Hume against Spinoza and Aristotle":

In arguing against Klever's "Hume Contra Spinoza?", Leavitt rightly claims that Klever "has gone too far in trying to bring together what should have been left asunder" (p.203). Here, and for the sake of thematic comprehensiveness, we shall briefly consider Leavitt-Klever on universals (or common notions), on imagination-intellect, and on intuition in Spinoza-Hume. To consider Aristotle in this context is beyond our scope and competence.

Leavitt criticizes Klever for asserting that Spinoza and Hume agree on the existence of universals or common notions. Leavitt holds that, whereas Spinoza affirms universals, Hume denies them. This question really concerns abstraction, which Hume does grant, though in a way different from Spinoza's. Hence, both scholars are here mistaken: Klever for holding that Spinoza and Hume agree simpliciter on universals, Leavitt for denying outright that Hume grants universals at all. Discussing abstractions in *Ethics II* P40Sch1, Spinoza classifies these conflated ideas as common notions, which he distinguishes as 'transcendentals' (Being, Thing, Something) and 'general notions' (man, horse, dog, etc.) such that when, through experience, the body's capacity to form distinct images of things is exceeded, the images become confused, and the mind's ideas of these become conflated:

that is to say, so many images are formed in the human body simultaneously (e.g. of man) that our capacity to imagine them is

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32 Hume, *ibid., "II. My Own Life",* 356.
surpassed, not indeed completely, but to the extent that the mind is unable to imagine the unimportant differences of individuals (such as the complexion and stature of each) and their exact number, and imagines distinctly only their common characteristic, insofar as the body is affected by them.

Hume, granting abstraction, proceeds to confirm with his own arguments Berkeley's view that abstract ideas are not general or 'common notions' in Spinoza's sense, but are particular ideas related by their names to hosts of other particulars. Here, we cannot pursue his confirming arguments, but for brevity's sake will quote him sufficiently:

A very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas, whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them. A great philosopher has disputed the received question in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them....this....I shall here endeavour to confirm.... By some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

This excerpt from the Treatise makes it clear that Hume grants and explains abstract or general ideas as, in fact, particulars, and able immediately to summon any of these to serve and to correct the intellect.

In summation, then, how do Spinoza and Hume relate on abstraction? The answer to our question is this: for Spinoza, to abstract is to conflate bodily images and the mind's ideas of them so as to elicit distinctly their common characteristics; for Hume, by contrast, to abstract is to relate particular ideas (or images) to hosts of other particulars. What they share on abstraction is the fact that both understand abstraction as a method having practical importance: for Spinoza it serves our conative convenience as finite modes affected by others to infinity; and for Hume abstraction applies Custom to the effective working of intellect in theoretical and practical life.

Against Klever, Leavitt argues, correctly, that, whereas Spinoza does not depart from the Aristotelian distinction between imagination and intellect, Hume does. Spinoza distinguishes the passive imagination (imaginatio), with its inadequate ideas and bodily modifications from ratio, the second level of knowledge and scientia intuitiva, the third, which both involve adequate ideas and bodily modifications (2P.s40Sch2, 41&passim). Now, as Klever makes clear in his response to Leavitt ("A Vindication", q.v. note 10), he holds to a "striking parallel" between the three levels of knowledge in Spinoza and what he claims to be an equivalent noetic division in Hume. Hence Klever holds that Hume as a Spinozist preserves the Aristotelian distinction between imagination and intellect. From Hume's Treatise and his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Klever extracts what he proposes as three levels of knowledge, which function "exactly the same"(p.210)

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34 2P40Sch1 in the Shirley translation of the Ethics, op.cit., 89.
35 Aristotle distinguishes imagination from both sense and intellect in De Anima, Bk. III, Ch. 3, 428a.
as *imaginatio, ratio* and *scientia intuitiva* do in Spinoza. Now, while Leavitt is right to deny this view of Klever's, more is to be said, but here briefly: what Hume does is to reduce all cognition to imagination and belief (the strong feeling which accompanies the idea hence believed). We shall present three doctrines of Hume's, which prove our claim.

First, introducing impressions and ideas, these elements of his "one general proposition" that all simple ideas arise from simple impressions, Hume writes:

> These perceptions, which enter [the "mind"] with most force and violence, we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.\(^{37}\)

In this passage, Hume at once identifies ideas with images in the "soul", and presents these as the objects of all "thinking and reasoning". That is to say, all acts of mind are implicitly forms of imagining.

Second, in his crucial note 1(T96-97) Hume explicitly reduces all "acts of the understanding" to what he calls "conception". In so doing, he rejects the schoolmen's division of the understanding's acts into "conception, judgment and reasoning". He writes that "What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects." He continues with this:

> Whether we consider a single object or several; whether we dwell on these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive. (italics added)

Now since by 'conception' Hume means "the simple survey of one or more ideas", and by ideas he means images, it follows that when the mind conceives its objects, it variously imagines them.

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36 Klever's schema is as follows: Spinoza \((Ethics)\) (Treatise) (Enquiry)  
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37 (T1). Hume italicizes "impressions" and "ideas"; we italicize the remainder.

38 We remark here that, while images are identified with ideas in the 'mind' or 'soul', for Hume, images are located in the *body*, as its modifications, in Spinoza: "the modifications of the human body….we will call the images of things…."(2P17Sch, &passim). This fact Klever either misses or ignores.
Third, and finally here, in his famous Section VI ("Of personal identity") of Bk.I of the Treatise, Hume, having reduced all acts of mind to imaginings, reduces the mind itself, in its supposed self-identity, to imagination. We supply, with appropriate emphasis, a text cited earlier from T259:

The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (italics added)

Clearly, Hume's doctrines and cited texts speak with one voice: collectively they reduce all cognition, and indeed the mind itself, to the imagination. It follows that Klever is indeed mistaken to propose that the epistemologies of Spinoza and Hume are "parallel", to say nothing of their being, in function, "exactly the same".

We shall conclude this section of Part II with a short discussion of Leavitt-Klever on intuition in Spinoza-Hume. Leavitt is entirely correct in judging Klever to be "gratuitous" as he identifies intuition in Hume with scientia intuitiva in Spinoza. Quoting Hume, Klever writes that "In the case of propositions that are prov'd by intuition or demonstration...the person who assents...is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas" (T95)(p.97). He then simply claims that this would be scientia intuitive in Spinoza. His claim is false for several reasons: (i) In Spinoza, scientia's structure is not propositional but rather "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things"(2P40Sch1). In Hume, there is no trace of the metaphysical structure of substance-attribute-mode grounding scientia in Spinoza. (ii) As shown above, Hume reduces intuition and demonstration to imaginational "act[s]" of belief, whereas Spinoza preserves these and relates them as scientia and ratio respectively (from which scientia arises: 5P28). (iii) In Spinoza, scientia culminates analogically in human salvation through the amor dei intellectualis; but in Hume, 'intuition' as imaginational belief bears no such character.

Later, replying to Leavitt, Klever asserts that "Both philosophers locate the highest kind of knowledge in the evidence of mathematics and the common properties of nature explained in physics".39 But, for Spinoza, mathematics lies at the level of demonstrative reason or ratio; and the 'common properties of nature' exist within the common order of nature (2P29Cor&Sch), the common notions of which, being inadequate or confused (2P39Dem), belong to imaginatio, the lowest level of knowledge (2P41). And, for Spinoza, the highest level of knowledge is not ratio as mathematics, but scientia itself (5P25,27). Moreover, Hume, reducing inference to belief, such that we "are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive" (T96-97, n.1), exalts belief as "not only a true specie of reasoning, but the strongest of all others...." Hence immediate belief exceeds demonstrative mathematics, being "more convincing than when we interpose another idea.

to connect the two extremes." In other words, mathematics in Hume proceeds as a kind of mediated, and thus mitigated, belief, the ultimate genus of which is Custom itself.\(^{40}\)

Part of the reason Leavitt rejects Klever's view that intuition in Spinoza and Hume is the same, is that "... the divine origin of [scientia] makes it clear that Spinoza intends [scientia] to be identical to prophecy, as...understood in the [Tractatus Theologico-Politicus]" (p.205). Hume, of course, rejects prophecy with miracles and all other elements of Christianity as "superstitions", and "inconceivable mysteries" (T515), such "monstrous doctrines" being "merely priestly inventions" (T524). Now, here, Klever is quite right that Leavitt is mistaken to identify scientia with prophecy in Spinoza; as he correctly states, Spinoza locates prophecy at the level of imagination. In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza states that "the prophets were endowed with unusually vivid imaginations, and not with unusually perfect minds;"\(^{41}\) he argues this point at length there.

3. Klever's "A Vindication":

Since we have already considered material from this short paper in connection with our discussion of imagination - intellect in Spinoza-Hume, we shall restrict ourselves here to examining Klever on causation in Spinoza and Hume. Specifically involved is Spinoza's 'causal axiom', 1Ax4, which states that "The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause."\(^{42}\) Klever insists that Hume, with Spinoza, holds to causal and logical necessity, and Leavitt denies this of Hume, affirming it of Spinoza. In his critique of Klever (n.8), Leavitt claims that Spinoza accepts, but Hume rejects the Aristotelian doctrines of cause-effect in both efficient causality and logical demonstration, these involving a kind of "violence" in Aristotle. He writes that, while Hume's "denial of 'efficiency, agency, power, force, energy,...productive quality' (T157), has been frequently discussed, less attention has been paid to his denial of the second [logical] kind of Aristotelian causal necessity. If there is a difference between an empiricist and a rationalist, then it is this denial which makes the difference" (p. 205). Leavitt reasonably cites Hume here: "...there are no objects, which by the mere survey, without consulting experience we can determine [a priori] to be the causes of any other;". He continues: " But for Hume the correspondence between the order of ideas and the order of things cannot be ascribed to any stronger principle than the Association of Ideas, which is certainly not an Aristotelian necessary connection of the sort which Spinoza adopted, but merely 'a gentle force, which commonly prevails' (T10)" (p.206-7).

\(^{40}\) Spinoza and Hume do agree that metaphysics, as the enquiry into ultimate causes, stands above all other disciplines and grounds them.

\(^{41}\) Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, transl. R.H.M. Elwes (Dover; New York, 1951), Ch.II, 27. In his erroneous claim here, Leavitt is as "gratuitous" as he rightly charges Klever with being

\(^{42}\) In strictness, however, we note that Spinoza provides two causal axioms, and 1Ax4 should be taken with 1Ax3 asserting the necessity of the causal relation: " From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause is granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow" Elwes, op.cit., 46.
Before turning to Klever's response to Leavitt we remark that, as desideratum, much more is involved in Hume's doctrines of logical and causal necessity than Leavitt indicates here. In a recently published paper, we argue three levels of causality such that: (1) [Custom] - (2) [original causality: impression - idea] - (3) [Belief-constructed causation]. For the interested reader, we there argue that original causality is the source of belief applied to the atomistic or synthetic orders of inner and outer sense. In this sense, original causality (impression - idea) mediates the relation between Custom and the domains of common belief. But we present original causality within Hume's phenomenalism such that, apart from Custom, we begin noetically with the sheer and mysteriously arising impression (T7). We argue that the relation of impression - idea, being reflective, is logically and causally necessary a priori, and that it both grounds and expresses, as Belief, Hume's invoking a 'pre-established harmony'. But, in original causality, contrary to Leavitt's citing Hume's 'gentle force, which commonly prevails', original impressions express strong force: "These perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions...." And, while Hume presents resulting ideas here as "the faint images" (T1) of impressions, he is at least inconsistent about them; for they do generate strong emotions as impressions of reflection (e.g., "desire and aversion, hope and fear": T38). In this sense, we can say that impressions of reflection, or emotions, express and confirm the original reflective relation between original impression and idea.

We turn now to Klever's response, in his "A Vindication", to Leavitt's critique. Again, he insists that " on the contrary, Hume was fully convinced of the truth of Spinoza's [causal] axiom." For Klever, Hume's "adherence" to Spinoza's causal axiom takes the form of "reasoning from general properties etc." (p.211). Now, apart from Hume's showing no knowledge whatever of Spinoza's causal axioms, we note this: we have already explained that, for Spinoza, general properties as common notions in thought, are passive, conflated and hence inadequate ideas. They belong to imaginatio (2P's38, 39,40Sch); and as common or universal, they are pre-rational harbingers of adequate ideas in ratio or reason. Moreover, in Spinoza, who always holds that only particulars (modes, as well as substance and attributes) exist, the causal axioms formalize and express this very point. 1Ax4 follows 1Ax3, which derives a necessary effect from "a given definite cause" (italics added). Hence that is the crucial sense of 1Ax4: The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause." (italics added). Spinoza deploys his causal logic such that we define the essence of particular things by conceiving them through their given, definite proximate or efficient causes.

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44 By the notation '->' we mean to designate power, production or generation as causal necessity in each case here. In our cited paper (n.44), this causal dynamic is represented by the hyphenated word 'to-' as in 'Custom -to-(Impression-to-idea) etc.'
45 The latter quotation from Leavitt makes it clear that Leavitt gets no further than the sheer, external application of belief (as the "Association of Ideas") to "the order of ideas and the order of things." But, for Hume, the association of ideas arising from constant conjunction is necessary but not sufficient for Belief. What adds sufficiency is the arising, from that constant conjunction, of an original impression - idea relation, such that we cannot not-believe the idea hence believed. Cf. Vance Maxwell, op.cit., and especially IV. Original Causation (Impression-to-idea), paras. 44.-63.
Only thus can their properties be deduced, they being considered in themselves, and not as connected with other things. Thus, for example, when we define a given circle to arise through its proximate cause, a rotating line (or compass), we adequately deduce its property of equal radii.46

Our causal point here expands into this: Spinoza's analysis of causality in common life expresses a conative realism. For him, impressions arise conatively in that ordinary things or finite modes affect one another in their essential endeavours to preserve their own being (3P's 6,7). Impressions thus arise as bodily images and mental ideas in that essential, conative and mutual engagement (3P.s6, 7 with 2P17DemCorSch). Such external causality functions crucially in Spinoza's ethical doctrine of the salvific overcoming and re-ordering of the passions. In decisive contrast, original causality as the impression-> idea relation grounding Hume's 'one general proposition' is undeniably phenomenalist: impressions of sensation arise "in the soul [later reduced to an hypostatized 'imagination'] originally from unknown causes"(T7). This critical and decisive contrast between Spinoza and Hume is entirely lost to Klever; and it is not at all clear in Leavitt.

Klever opposes Leavitt's claim that Hume reduces causality to an external, constant conjunction alone. But he simply pronounces that "Hume never reduces causality to a constant conjunction, that is, to its absence from the physical and mental world. Neither may this fictitious denial be considered the 'modern view' of causality" (p.211). In truth, however, Klever is again mistaken in the sense that Hume misleads his reader at times about his full doctrine, as we elicit elsewhere.47 Proposing in Bk.I, Sect.XV his "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects", Hume first writes: "…the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation." He then claims that "where objects are not contrary, nothing hinders them from having that constant conjunction, on which the relation of cause and effect totally depends" (T173). Once again: constant conjunction is necessary but not sufficient for believed causation to arise. Belief generated by original causality as impression-> idea (believed) must be added to constant conjunction. We turn now to our final scholarly paper on Spinoza-Hume.

4. Annette Baier's "David Hume, Spinozist":

Despite her proposing analogies and parallels between Spinoza and Hume, Baier is no more successful at rendering Hume a Spinozist than is Klever. Of course there are bound to be analogies and parallels between philosophers of profound and historical difference: they share and submit to a common discipline with common concerns, themes and objectives. But neither these nor such analogies and parallels imply identity of philosophical standpoints. Here, we find Baier often proceeding in terms of suggestions rather than careful, scholarly argument, and speculation thus governed.

47 Vance Maxwell, op.cit., para. 68.
We shall begin our brief and selective review by juxtaposing two claims that Baier makes on behalf of "David Hume, Spinozist". (i) Early on, and invoking Spinoza's three levels of knowledge, Baier writes that Hume "makes his epistemological home" at the level of *imaginatio*, whereas Spinoza contrasts *imaginatio* with *ratio* and *scientia*. Thus, Hume's concept of cause belongs only to *imaginatio*, supplemented by "a projected 'determination of the mind' that yields the idea of necessity in the causal relation." Yet this 'necessity' allows Hume "to give his own sense to Spinoza's axiom 'From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily' (E1, A2 [sic] 48 ...." (p.240). (ii) Late in her paper, Baier, claiming that "the true religion" might be the same in both, asserts: "Hume's agreements with Spinoza are deeper than his more obvious and more superficial disagreements" (p.250).

Now, these juxtaposed claims, coming early and late in Baier's paper, oppose each other to the point of contradiction. For, in claiming that Hume "makes his epistemological home" within *imaginatio*, and yet contrasting *imaginatio* with *ratio* and *scientia*, Baier points to very significant differences, noetically and causally, between *imaginatio* (Hume's level) and the emendation of *imaginatio* in *ratio* and *scientia* (Spinoza's positive doctrine and levels). Noetically, the difference is between the inadequate ideas of imaginatio and the adequate ideas of ratio and scientia, as already noted. Causally, the difference lies in the fact that we are only the partial causes of our ideas in *imaginatio*, and the full causes of our ideas in *ratio* and *scientia* (2P41Dem with 3Defs.I,II). That is to say, the mind is mostly passive in *imaginatio*, and active in *ratio* and *scientia*. Hence, the exercise of the mind's power in *ratio* and *scientia* is much greater than in *imaginatio*. To this we add that, for Spinoza, though *ratio* or reason is, as adequate, superior to *imaginatio*, *scientia* itself greatly exceeds *ratio* in power, since, when the mind understands things directly within God as their attribute, the mind is *supremely* affected by its own power within the divine intellect (2P40Sch1 with 5P36DemCor Sch). How much more superior than *imaginatio*, then, is *scientia*. Since Baier locates Hume within *imaginatio*, the reader can now see readily that Baier implicitly proceeds *against* her thesis in claim (ii). But this critical fact emerges only when we attend to the differences and relations among Spinoza's three levels of knowledge: Baier ignores them as they function in detail, presumably in order to reduce *ratio* and *scientia* implicitly to *imaginatio*, where she would place Hume.

Baier also argues at cross purposes in claiming, as noted, that the 'necessity' which the Humean 'mind' applies to experience in *imaginatio* allows Hume "to give his own sense to Spinoza's axiom [1Ax3]...." (italics added). Our points here are these: (i) There is *no* evidence in Hume's texts that he knew, or in any sense applied, Spinoza's 'causal axiom' (1Ax3--or 1Ax4). (ii) Even if Hume had somehow noted and been influenced by 1Ax3, Baier's claiming that he therefore could have given his own sense to it works against her thesis that Hume *agreed* with Spinoza on causality as formalized in 1Ax3 (and 4). (iii) Baier begs the question of whether Hume *could* have given 1Ax3 his own sense such that Spinoza's 1Ax3 would *remain* 1Ax3 as functioning in his thought. (iv) Spinoza's axioms, including the causal axioms, are reflectively self-evident in character according to his

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48 Baier means, of course, 1Ax3, which she partly quotes here.
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doctrine of reflective knowledge as method itself (TdIE 38.). That is, their necessity is causally/reflectively self-evident. Baier, however, does not present the 'necessity' of causality in Hume as self-evident in a reflection; rather, as noted, she proposes "a projected [i.e., laid on] 'determination of the mind'...." yielding causal necessity. Hence, for her and for Hume scholars generally, causality in Hume is not reflectively self-evident and thus not axiomatic. 49

We return to reflectivity soon.

Baier analogizes between Spinoza's "multiple definitions of God" under different attributes and Hume's "multiple" definitions of cause (p.242). Here she assumes a logical atomism in Spinoza such that God or substance, as divisible, has as many essences as attributes, each essence grounding a definition, there being hence "multiple" definitions of God. Her assumption is demonstratively false: Spinoza enunciates one definition of God and one definition of attribute, God being absolutely infinite and attributes being infinite in their kind. 50 Moreover, Spinoza is careful to prove in1P12 that: No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided, and in 1P13 that: Substance, absolutely infinite is indivisible. By contrast, Hume, who rejects substance (and hence attributes in Spinoza [1D4]), gives, not "multiple", but two definitions of 'cause' (T170), the first involving a relation of "objects", and the second a relation of 'objects' with their ideas and impressions. In further contrast, we add that Spinoza's definitions of substance as in itself indeterminate essence (1D6) and as attribute or determinate essence (1D4), involve God as causa sui (1D.s1, 3,6), whereas we have no causa sui in Hume: the 'other' through belief is necessarily thought to cause the 'other', and hence the synthetic character of causal propositions concerning experience. Clearly, then, Baier's causal analogy cannot support her thesis that Hume is a Spinozist.

We return to reflectivity. Baier again analogizes reflection in Hume with the reflexivity of ideas in Spinoza: Hume "examine[s] our causal inferences before offering any definition of cause....his reasoning in Part III is almost always able to be converted into an instance of its own subject matter (see T169)" (p.244). At T169, and explaining power or necessary connexion, Hume writes that"....I am ready to convert my present reasoning into an instance of it, by a subtility which it will not be difficult to comprehend." He then moves from external sense to internal sense, from an "object" causing a lively (hence believed) idea of an other object associated with the first, to an "impression" causing the lively idea believed:

But when we change the point of view, from the objects to the perceptions; in that case the impression is to be considered as the cause, and the lively idea as the effect; and their necessary connexion is that new determination, which we feel to pass from the idea of the one to that of the other.

That is, while " the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning" (T176), they do pass into the understanding as a relation between impression and idea

50 Spinoza's one definition of God (1D6). Spinoza's one definition of attribute: "IV.
constituting the very ground of philosophical method for Hume, the empiricist. Indeed, Hume, noting "the great resemblance" between impressions and ideas (except for "their degree of force and vivacity"), writes that "The one [ideas] seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other [impression]; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas" (T23, italics added).51

Here, we do have parallels with Spinoza, who holds that philosophical method is reflexive knowledge or the idea ideae, such that in knowing, one knows that one knows (TdIE 38.). Moreover, as in Hume, reflection in thought follows the causal order of nature, for Spinoza. To pursue a complex matter is out of the question here; but we note that, beyond these points, Spinoza and Hume part company. In Spinoza, we find an ethical teleology of method wholly lacking in the positivistic "reflexion" of impression-idea proposed in Hume's doctrine. Spinoza writes:

So a good method will be one that shows how the mind is to be directed according to the standard of a given true idea. Again, since the relation between two [reflexive] ideas is the same as the relation between the formal essences [i.e., objects] of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive knowledge of the idea of the most perfect being [substance or God] will be more excellent than the reflexive knowledge of other ideas. That is, the most perfect method will be one which shows how the mind should be directed according to the standard of a given idea of the most perfect Being. (TdIE 38., italics added)

Here, Spinoza distinguishes and relates good method (as reflexive means) and perfect method (as reflexive end, allowing the deduction of the Ethics).52 Earlier in the TdIE, Spinoza presents the relation of good to perfect method, or reflexive knowledge, as that between a true good and the supreme good:

Thus [man] is urged to seek the means that will bring him to. …perfection, and all that can be the means of his attaining this objective is called a true good, while the supreme good is to arrive at the enjoyment of….the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature (TdIE 13.)

Hence, by 'true goods' Spinoza means true and reflexive ideas; and by 'the supreme good' he means the absolute reflexive idea, or knowledge, of the mind's union with God, or substance, as realized in the definition of God in 1D6, true goods or reflexive ideas leading to the supreme good. No such doctrine appears in Hume.

It is now evident that the parallels, which we here identify between Spinoza and Hume on method, do not in the least amount to identity in method. Baier's analogy of reflection

51 Cf. Vance Maxwell, op. cit., Pt.IV for an argument concerning the reflective relation of impression->idea in Hume.
is weak and ineffective because: (i) She does not arrive at the *focus* of reflection in Hume, i.e., at the relation of impression->idea, which generating belief, generates causality itself as imposed on inner and outer experience; (ii) She does not arrive at the ethical teleology of philosophical method in Spinoza; (iii) hence Baier cannot *compare* Hume with Spinoza, thus to reveal their methodological *differences* as elicited here. On method, then, Hume is no Spinozist.

Perhaps because she analogizes reflectivity in Spinoza and Hume, Baier alleges that Hume had read Spinoza's *TDE*. Even Klever did not allege this; and no textual evidence exists for the claim. Indeed, Baier seems to read into Hume an instrumentalist claim that Spinoza, after Bacon, explicitly makes. She writes that "one great advantage of Hume's empiricist and pragmatist version of the human understanding over Spinoza's deductivist version is that Hume would be able not merely to analogize understanding's progress to tool making, but to include the latter as an instrument of the former" (p. 245).

Now, while Baier asserts that Hume "associates the mechanical arts closely with all the other arts, civic and intellectual", she quite forgets that, as a philosopher, Hume *denies* both mind and body as other than fictions of imagination. But Spinoza, as a philosopher, *grants*, as conative modes, *both* mind and body such that:

…at first, with the tools they were born with, men succeeded…in making some very simple things….thus advancing gradually from the simplest works to the making of tools….they have reached a point where they can make very many complex things with little labour. In just the same way the intellect by its inborn power makes intellectual tools for itself by which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works….and thus makes steady progress until it reaches the summit of wisdom (*TDE* 31.)

It follows that Spinoza, not Hume, is the instrumentalist or pragmatist philosopher. And while Spinoza denies that tool making is instrumental to, or cause of, the intellect's progress, he does mean by "the same way (sic etiam)" a dynamic parallelism (2P7) such that 5P39: *He who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a soul whereof the greatest part is eternal.* In this sense, Spinoza is indeed a pragmatist as he presents the mind's - and the body's - rise from *imaginatio* through *ratio* to *scientia intuitiva*. Baier is, then, mistaken in holding that Hume's "pragmatist version" of the human understanding constitutes "one great advantage" over Spinoza's "deductivist version" of the intellect. Moreover, she again argues at cross purposes: to claim here "a great advantage" is to claim a great and crucial *difference* between Hume and Spinoza, a difference that directly opposes her thesis that Hume is a Spinozist.

In conclusion, we note that Baier draws a parallel between Spinoza's breaking off the *TDE* at 108. (which text lists the understanding's properties) and Hume's virtual despair

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54 For Spinoza, deduction in the mind is production in the body, mind and body (identical in substance) thus acting under their respective attributes, Thought and Extension (2P7 with 3D.s 1,2). Hence, when the mind adequately conceives or *deduces* a circle arising from the rotation of a compass, the body *produces* that very circle in that way (*TDE* 96.). Spinoza's "deductivism" is thus indeed pragmatic.
at the end of Bk. I of the Treatise. She writes: "I suggest, then, that we can helpfully see Treatise Book I as re-enacting Spinoza's early failed attempt to get the human understanding to understand its own essence in order to mend its own insufficiencies...." (p.246). Here, we cannot pursue the reasons for Spinoza's breaking off the TdIE at 108., except to make two points: (i) Hume virtually despairs at T264 (later recovering), but Spinoza at TdIE 108. does not despair;\(^{55}\) (ii) his not finishing the TdIE has everything to do with the elemental nature of the TdIE, and with his not then having thought through the mind-body relation as bearing in the nature of reflectivity, or the idea ideae, in the ethical overcoming of the passions and the re-ordering of them into actions. All of this lies before Spinoza as he discontinues that earliest work. Space restrictions here allow us only to juxtapose texts showing clearly the profound differences in outlook manifested by Hume and Spinoza. At T264, Hume anguishes that:

The wretched condition, weakness and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into Immensity. (italics added)

Now the very title of Spinoza's TdIE (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) itself contrasts resolutely with Hume's claim that the correcting of the intellect is an "impossibility". To that title we add Spinoza's words at TdIE 16.:

But, before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in the best possible way. Thus it is apparent to everyone that I wish to direct all sciences to one end and aim, so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as useless. (italics added)

These juxtaposed texts show that Baier's parallel as noted above is spurious, though stimulating. And the reader should now be convinced that the efforts of Klever and Baier to render Hume a Spinozist, while also stimulating, are as specious as they are a-historical. Leavitt's response, directly to Klever and implicitly to Baier, takes the right approach, but is also insufficient to a large task. We conclude now with Part III, where we shall discuss Hume on Spinoza, as mediated by Bayle.

\(^{55}\) While Spinoza does not despair at 108., he has, through increasing reflection, overcome the "great peril" of pursuing riches, fame and pleasure noted early in the TdIE (9.-11.). As method or reflexive knowledge develops conatively, he sees more and more clearly that "love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength" (TdIE 10.), Elwes, 5.
5. Hume on Bayle's Spinoza:

Hume discusses Spinoza, in very brief summation, at Treatise, Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sect.II: "Of the Immateriality of the soul", (pp.232-251). He mentions Bayle as his source at T243; we shall relate Bayle to Hume on Spinoza in due course. Klever and Baier ignore Hume's dealings with Spinoza, presumably because, as we shall make clear, nothing in what Hume says about Spinoza can be used to render Hume a Spinozist in the least. Nor, for that matter, does Leavitt discuss Hume's critical text on Spinoza, when he rejects Klever's work. As well, consider this: we have already seen that Hume is careful to acknowledge Berkeley, a "great philosopher", as the source of his theory of abstraction, one important aspect of his entire philosophy (T17). Is it not then absurd to hold that the scrupulous Hume would not have acknowledged Spinoza as the inspiring source of his philosophy as a whole, were it so? For, as argued above, Hume had no motive to hide that hypothetical prospect. Indeed, as he actually did with Berkeley's theory of abstraction, Hume would have proceeded to acknowledge, "to confirm" and to amplify the philosophy of Spinoza, his alleged progenitor. Instead, Hume dismisses Spinoza's philosophy outright, with virtual contempt, and as involving "absurdities" (T243).

Context is always crucial; and in this case, Hume's critical context is decisive. Here, as throughout the Treatise, Hume applies his phenomenalism relentlessly, to the question of substance generally, and to the question of the theologians' 'spiritual' substance (as 'immaterial') specifically. Also, he equates substantialists, and by implication theologians too, with atheists as those who "affirm that plants, animals, men etc. are nothing but particular actions of one simple universal substance, which exerts itself from a blind and absolute necessity" such that:

This you'll say is utterly absurd. I own 'tis unintelligible; but at the same time assert, according to the principles above explain'd, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in the supposition, that all the various objects in nature are actions of one simple substance [Spinoza] which absurdity will not be applicable to a like supposition [theologians' 'immaterial substance'] concerning impressions and ideas (T246)

The crux of Hume's phenomenalism is, of course, his "one general proposition" that all simple ideas derive originally from simple impressions of sense. These arise "in the soul originally from unknown causes" (T17). Hence, and the point is crucial, they do not in themselves reveal any ground, material or spiritual, in which they inhere, or from which they arise. Hume argues at length against material substances or 'objects' in Treatise Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sect.II. And he argues likewise against spiritual substance, souls or 'subjects' in the Section we now consider and elsewhere (Sect. VI, Pt.IV). In this Section, Hume uses the word 'subject' also to mean 'substrate' or 'substratum', material or mental. Again and again, in rejecting substance altogether as "an absurdity", Hume invokes and applies his proposition that all ideas derive from sense impressions, which alone render those ideas true or "intelligible". Since no impression of sense, or of reflection, yields an idea of substance, that idea is "unintelligible" (T246 &passim) as proposed by substantialist philosophers, e.g., Spinoza, Locke and Berkeley.
In a now lengthy paper, we cannot present all of Hume's argumentation in detail. Nor is there any need to do so. None of our three scholars, especially Klever and Baier, considers this Section concerning Hume on Spinoza. Moreover, in it, Hume essentially elaborates his earliest argument against substance (T15-17) as he variously applies that argument. Here, then, we have no scholarly arguments from Klever and Baier to counter. We shall proceed, therefore, by briefly citing texts and arguments in a sequence which will show beyond doubt that, by the time Hume raises Spinoza, his phenomenalist rejection of substance firmly prevails. His treatment of Spinoza thus comes, not from a debtor, but from a remorseless critic.

Hume's earliest rejection, or refutation, of substance (T16) finds him methodically and exhaustively asking "whether the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions of sensation or reflection?" He rejects the possibility that this idea comes from either such as a colour (impression of sense) or a passion/emotion (impression of reflection). And he concludes: "We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities [not applicable to Spinoza, as we saw above], nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it." These "particular qualities" Hume says "are commonly refer'd to an unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere;....." That "unknown something" Hume dismisses as a "fiction" of the (reified) imagination. Anticipating what follows, we note here that the focus of Hume's rejection of substance is the problem of the 'inherence' or 'inhesion' of 'accidents', impressions or ideas (or Spinozan modes) in a substratum. That focus predominates throughout his discussion of Spinozan and immaterial substance (which he problematically equates). Furthermore, as we shall see, inherence or inhesion of modes in substance constitutes the exact and limited focus of Bayle's critique of the "absurdities" of Spinoza's system.

We now go directly to Hume's "Of the immateriality of the soul" wherein he eventually raises Spinoza's system. Right at the start, Hume refers to substantialists as "philosophers [who] are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere" (T232). Once again he applies the method of his earliest refutation: "I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, What they mean by substance and inhesion?" He then proceeds to answer his own now critically rhetorical question:

This question we have found impossible to be answer'd....As every idea is deriv'd from a precedent impression, had we any idea....of....substance....we must also have an impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an impression resemble substance, since, according to this philosophy, it is not a substance, and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance? (T232-33)

And immediately after rejecting a definition of substance as self-existent (we return soon to this), Hume distills his phenomenalist rejection of substance in a definitive statement which we hence quote in full:
Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and makes me condemn even the question itself. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance. Inhesion in something is suppos'd to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of inhesion. What possibility then of answering that question, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question? (T234)

Hume asserts, "We have, therefore, no idea of inhesion." Let us go now to Spinoza on this very matter, namely to his definition of mode, 1D5: "By mode I mean the affections of substance; that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else" (italics added). Clearly, Spinoza holds to the inhesion or inherence of modes in substance, their necessary cause (1D5 with 1P16), whereas Hume utterly rejects this doctrine, in any form, as unintelligible. To this we add that Hume rejects the possibility that the immaterial and the material can inhere in one subject: "For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth and an inch in thickness? Thought, therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and never can incorporate together into one subject [or substance]" (T234-35, italics added). In Spinozan terms, and for the sake of comparison, however, the attributes Thought and Extension do inhere in the divine substance (1D4 with 2P.s 1,2); and "Consequently, thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that" (2P7Cor), but within the indivisible substance (1P.s 12,13). They inhere in substance as expressive determinations of the one divine essence, which grounds an infinitude of such attributes (1D6).

We return briefly to Hume's rejection of the definition of substance as "something which may exist by itself" (T233), this definition being intended, he says, to "evade the difficulty" of inhesion. But this definition "agrees to everything [impressions], that can possibly be conceiv'd, and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from perceptions." All of our perceptions, being different from one another, are "distinct and separable….They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance." Clearly, Hume rejects substance, not just as substratum, but also as self-existent. Turning now to Spinoza, we find that he defines substance as (1D3): "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed" (italics added). In this sense, God or substance is causa sui (1D), that conception being wholly absent from Hume's thought.56 Spinoza affirms, then, what Hume denies: substance as self-existent, as causa sui, and as the ground or 'substratum' of modes.

56 Hume never argues that original impressions of sense cause themselves. As noted, they arise "originally, from unknown causes" (T7). Cf. Vance Maxwell, op.cit., Pt.IV, paras. 64. -72., where we argue that original causality (impression-> idea) mediates the causality of Custom-> Belief.
It is now manifest from the succession of texts and arguments cited here that Hume's phenomenalism stands forth as the critical context for his very brief presentation of Spinoza at T240-41 and T243-44. A comparison with Bayle, as well, will show Hume's clear dependence on Bayle for his version of Spinoza, and for several main arguments against Spinoza's system. Now, just as Klever, Leavitt and Baier have paid no attention to Hume on Spinoza, so they also ignore Bayle, and Hume's citing of and relation to that Calvinist critic of Spinoza's monism. Once again, then, we have no arguments from them to consider. Accordingly, a brief and comparative treatment of the Hume-Bayle texts here will make our case.

His phenomenalism firmly and critically in place, Hume arrives at Spinoza and provides the briefest statement of Spinoza's monism at T240-41:

The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere. There is only one substance, says he, in the world; and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible, and exists everywhere, without any local presence. Whatever we discover externally by sensation, whatever we feel internally by reflection; all these are nothing but modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possesst of any separate or distinct existence….The same substratum, if I may so speak, supports the most different modifications, without any difference in itself; and varies them, without any variation. Neither time, nor place, nor all the diversity of nature are able to produce any composition or change in its perfect simplicity and identity.

Hume then dismisses Spinoza's "hideous hypotheses" outright:

I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present purpose, and that without entering further into these gloomy and obscure regions, I shall be able to show that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul, which has become so popular…. (italics added)

Hume continues:

I turn my attention to these hypotheses….and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible, and that as far as we can understand them, they are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in one, which is not common to both of them. (T243)

As we turn now to a brief presentation of Bayle's texts on Spinoza, we make this cardinal point regarding Hume's dependence on Bayle: Bayle restricts himself, precisely as does Hume after him, to criticism of the inherence of varied modes in the unitary and simple divine substance of Spinoza's system:
....I have only endeavoured to refute the proposition which is the foundation of his system and which he expresses with the greatest clarity. I have confined myself to opposing what he clearly and precisely sets forth as his first principle, namely that God is the only substance that there is in the universe and that all other beings are only modifications of that substance.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, compare Bayle's text above and his text below with the Hume texts cited first above from T240-41:

\textit{N. The most monstrous hypothesis}....he [Spinoza] supposes that there is only one substance in nature, and that this unique substance is endowed with an infinity of attributes--thought and extension among others. In consequence of this, he asserts that all the bodies that exist in the universe are modifications of this substance in so far as it is extended, and that the souls of men are modifications of this same substance in so far as it thinks; so that God, the necessary and infinitely perfect being, is indeed the cause of all things that exist, but he does not differ from them.\textsuperscript{58}

In comparing these texts, note the following similarities and convergences: (i) First Bayle and then Hume, refers to Spinoza's doctrine of the one substance, within which all (different) modes inhere, as an 'hypothesis', "monstrous" for Bayle and "hideous" for Hume. (ii) Neither Bayle, nor Hume following him, refers specifically to Spinoza's definitions of substance (1D3) or mode (1D5) or God (1D6), or to 1P16 proving the immanently necessary following of all modes from substance. Rather, Bayle and Hume converge on this doctrine generally, and as Spinoza's "first principle" for Bayle (first excerpt) and "fundamental principle" for Hume (T240). (iii) Bayle and Hume converge strikingly on the problem of inhesion of different modes in the self-same substance. Bayle writes: "God....is indeed the [same] cause of all [different] things that exist, but he does not differ from them." And then Hume writes: "The same substratum....supports the most different modifications, without any difference in itself...." First for Bayle and then for Hume, the self-sameness or identity of substance and the difference of its modes are irreconcilable in Spinoza.

We shall conclude by citing two specific examples of Hume's use of Bayle, and comparing their texts accordingly. We note first Hume's dependent way of invoking Bayle. He writes: "....let us....see whether all the absurdities, which have been found in the system of Spinoza, may not likewise be discover'd in that of theologians" (italics added, except for Hume's "Spinoza"). And in his note 1 he writes, "see Bayle's dictionary, article of Spinoza" (T243):

\textsuperscript{57} Bayle, op.cit., 303-04. Indeed, Bayle's confidence in his critique rests on this restriction: "I would speak with less confidence had I written a book against Spinoza's entire system, following it page by page" (329-30). We may assume that Hume's confidence as he dismisses Spinoza (at T241, quoted above) is also partly based on Bayle's restriction, though mainly on his phenomenalism applied to Bayle's thus restricted Spinoza.

\textsuperscript{58} Bayle, 300-01.
I. Hume writes:

….It has been said [by Bayle], that we have no idea of substance, which is not applicable to matter; nor any idea of a distinct substance, which is not applicable to every distinct portion of matter. Matter, therefore, is not a distinct mode, but a distinct substance. I have already prov'd that we have no perfect idea of substance; but that taking it for *something, that can exist by itself*, 'tis evident every *perception* is a substance, and every distinct part of a *perception* a distinct substance….(T244, we italicize "perception")

Note crucially here that, as Hume uses Bayle against Spinoza and the theologians, he translates his realist term "matter" (in Boyle, "extension") into his own phenomenalist term "perception". While Hume does not cite any of Bayle's texts directly, the following is surely the source of Hume's text above:

*That according to Spinoza God and extension are the same thing.* I. It is impossible that the universe be one simple substance; for everything that is extended necessarily has parts, and everything that has parts is composite, and since the parts of extension do not subsist in one another, it must be the case either that extension in general is not one substance, or that each part of extension is a particular substance distinct from all the others. Now, according to Spinoza extension in general is the attribute of one substance. He admits, along with all other philosophers, that the attribute of a substance does not differ actually from that substance. Therefore he must acknowledge that extension in general is a substance. From which it necessarily follows that each part of extension is a particular substance, which destroys the foundations of the entire system of this author.59

Here, we need not comment further, and will leave the clear details of this telling comparison to the reader.

II. Hume next writes:

….It has been objected [by Bayle] to the system of one simple substance in the universe, that this substance being the support or *substratum* of every thing, must at the very same instant be modify'd into forms which are contrary and incompatible. The round and square figures are incompatible in the same substance at the same time. How, then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modify'd into that square table, and onto this round one? *I ask the same question concerning the impressions of these tables.* And find that the answer is no more

59 Bayle, 302-03.
satisfactory in one case than in the other. (T244, italics added except for Hume's "substratum")

Once again, we note crucially that Hume again translates the realist round and square" tables" of Bayle into his own phenomenalist "impressions of these tables." And here, certainly, is Hume's source -text in Bayle:

_Incompatible modalities require distinct subjects._…It is evident, and no Spinozist can deny it, that a square shape and a round one are incompatible in the same piece of wax. It must necessarily then be the case that the substance modified by a square shape is not the same substance as that modified by a round one. Thus when I see a round table and a square one in a room, I can assert that the extension that is the subject of the round table is a substance distinct from the extension that is the subject of the other table; for otherwise it would be certain that a square shape and a round one would be at the same time in one and the same subject…. All this shows that extension is composed of as many distinct substances as there are modifications.60

It should now be amply evident that Hume's only source for his critical version of Spinoza is Bayle's _Dictionary_ article, and that Klever's ignoring of Bayle's decisive shaping of Hume's Spinoza is either self-serving or uninformed. It should also be clear that Hume's summary use of Bayle to repudiate Spinoza he indeed subordinates and adapts to his own prevailing phenomenalism.

Despite the sustained efforts of Klever and Baier to make him one, Hume is, then, no Spinozist. Or, as Professor Doull has aptly remarked in conversation: "One can't imagine Hume able to bear reading Spinoza at all."

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60 Bayle, 306-07.